Provide equal protections to domestic workers as private sector workers receive under the labor law and recent labor reforms, to ensure domestic workers’ freedom to change jobs or obtain an exit visa without employer consent and not just in cases of abusive employers. * Ensure adequate implementation of the new Domestic Worker Regulation, including by raising awareness of new protections with both workers and employers. * Ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked and are not subjected to re-trafficking by proactively screening for trafficking among those arrested for immigration and “prostitution” violations, and among foreign workers who flee abusive employers and face countercharges and deportation or seek police assistance, particularly in rural areas. * Increase training for border guards and police to proactively identify potential victims, and continue to improve screening protocols, specifically at detention and deportation centers. * Refer all identified victims to care and ensure all victims have access to shelter, including male victims and female victims in employment sectors other than domestic work. * Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and seek adequate penalties for all convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms. * Regularly use and train officials on the revised NRM, to ensure victims among vulnerable populations, including domestic workers, undocumented foreign workers, deportees, persons in commercial sex and People’s Republic of China (PRC) and government-affiliated Cuban workers, such as medical professionals, receive proper care. * Amend the anti-trafficking law to remove sentencing provisions that allow fines in lieu of imprisonment for sex trafficking offenses. * Expand implementation of electronic contracts and the Wage Protection System (WPS) to domestic workers. * Continue to investigate as potential trafficking crimes (not solely administrative issues) indicators of trafficking such as passport retention, withholding of wages, labor violations, and complaints of abuse found via inspections and complaints from workers. * Institute regular trainings for government officials on identifying cases of both labor and sex trafficking and differentiating between forced labor and other labor-related abuses. * Enhance oversight of recruitment agencies to deter non-compliant and non-licensed agents from facilitating unconsented transfers of domestic workers to new employers and hold fraudulent labor recruiters criminally accountable.

The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. The 2009 anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed punishments of up to 15 years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to 1 million Saudi Arabian riyal (SAR) ($266,670) or both; penalties increased under aggravating circumstances, including trafficking crimes involving a female or child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent; however, by allowing for a fine in lieu of imprisonment, the penalties for sex trafficking were not commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes such as kidnapping, false imprisonment, or sexual abuse. In 2021, the government completed a review of seven suggested amendments to the 2009 law, which included penalties that combined imprisonment and fines for convicted traffickers, establishing a minimum sentence of three years and criminalization of personal document confiscation, such as passports. The Council of Ministers recommended finalizing the amendments, but the government did not pass the amendments for the second consecutive reporting period.

The government investigated 244 potential trafficking cases, involving 362 alleged traffickers. Of the 244 cases investigated, nine were for sex trafficking, 94 were for labor trafficking, and 141 were for forced begging and “slavery-like practices”; this was a significant decrease compared with the investigation of 470 cases in 2022 and 346 cases in 2021. The government prosecuted 89 individuals, compared with the prosecution of 100 individuals the previous reporting period. Of the 89 individuals prosecuted, 13 were for sex trafficking, 66 were for labor trafficking, and 10 were for forced begging and “slavery-like practices.” Courts convicted 141 traffickers under the 2009 anti-trafficking law, compared with 60 convictions in 2022. Courts acquitted 24 traffickers. Of the 141 convictions, 59 were for sex trafficking, 53 were for labor trafficking, and 29 were for forced begging and “slavery-like practices.” Judges sentenced convicted traffickers to terms of imprisonment ranging from two and a half months to 15 years. Unlike previous years, no traffickers received fines in lieu of imprisonment. Seventy-nine percent of convicted traffickers received imprisonment of one year or more (54 percent in 2022); however, courts frequently sentenced labor traffickers to less significant penalties. The majority of convicted traffickers who received less than one year imprisonment were convicted of labor trafficking crimes (79 percent). Such lenient sentences did not adequately reflect the nature of the crime, undercut efforts to hold labor traffickers accountable, weakened deterrence, and increased potential security and safety concerns for victims.

The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees, including members of the royal family, complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the year. In the previous reporting period, the United Kingdom (UK) Supreme Court handled a case involving a Saudi diplomat assigned to London who allegedly exploited his Filipina domestic worker by withholding her wages and forcing her to work longer hours than contractually agreed upon without a weekly day off, ruling in July 2022 that the Saudi official could not use diplomatic immunity for protection against prosecution in the case and granted permission for the diplomat to appeal the decision. Following the allegations, the government of Saudi Arabia classified the case as a labor dispute based on the existing employment contract and did not investigate it as a trafficking case. The case remained pending within the UK court system.

The government continued to utilize the specialized anti-trafficking unit within the Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO), while local police stations within the Ministry of Interior (MOI) handled alleged trafficking and related cases through relevant human rights departments that employed specialized anti-trafficking officers. All stakeholders referred alleged trafficking cases to the MOI’s human rights departments for initial investigation; the MOI then referred cases to the PPO to ensure the case received an official case tracking number. The PPO required police to collect evidence within a 24-hour period before referring the case to the PPO’s specialized investigators to review such evidence and build the case; finally, the PPO’s specialized investigators referred cases to a three-member committee of specialized prosecutors to determine whether an alleged case met the definition of trafficking. If confirmed as a trafficking case, officials referred the case to court and referred all victims involved in the case to care. The PPO maintained 17 trafficking-specific, operational investigative sub-units within branch offices (two in Riyadh and the remainder in the capital of each province) that also worked to identify potential trafficking cases among existing criminal cases. Specialized judges presided over cases in all levels of courts across the country. Some government officials continued to misclassify trafficking cases as administrative, immigration, or labor violations without routinely undertaking criminal investigations, which resulted in more lenient penalties and weakened deterrence. The PPO collaborated on seven alleged trafficking cases with the governments of France, Oman, Tajikistan, Morocco, Egypt, and Bangladesh. In one case, the PPO extradited an Egyptian national accused of trafficking to stand trial in Egypt.

The government conducted 60 anti-trafficking trainings, both independently and in partnership with international organizations, for hotline staff, Saudi Bar Association lawyers, labor-source embassy representatives, members of the National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking (NCCHT) and Human Rights Commission (HRC), judges, prosecutors, labor inspectors, immigration officials, border guards, police, shelter staff and Saudi labor attaches abroad; these programs covered victim identification and referral, ethical recruitment best practices, preventing forced labor in supply chains, distinguishing labor violations from labor trafficking, trauma-informed and victim-centered assistance, providing legal assistance to victims, interviewing techniques, inspection procedures, evidence collection, and criminal investigative procedures during trafficking trials, among others. In addition, MOI included information on human trafficking and the NRM in training courses held at Border Guard educational facilities. Despite having a limited role in evidence collection for alleged trafficking cases, experts noted law enforcement remained the most likely government entity to interact with potential victims, and encouraged an increased focus to train such officials on proactive victim identification.

The government increased victim protection efforts. The government identified 432 victims and referred 348 to care, including 230 adult males, 195 adult females, three boys and four girls, compared with 301 victims identified and referred in the previous reporting period. Of the 432 victims, 197 were for labor trafficking, 14 for sex trafficking, and 221 for forced begging and “slavery-like practices.” The victims were nationals of Bangladesh, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Madagascar, Morocco, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tunisia, Uganda, the United States, Vietnam, and Yemen. Of the 348 victims referred to care, the government reported most accepted services the government offered. The government reported some victims identified did not qualify for referral or chose not to accept referral to government shelters; instead, some sought to repatriate or stay at their embassy-provided shelter. An international organization identified and referred 10 female victims, including one victim of sex trafficking, one victim of labor trafficking and eight victims of forced begging and “slavery-like practices” to care, while an NGO identified and referred 36 male victims of forced begging or “slavery-like practices” three female victims, including two of sex trafficking and one of forced begging or “slavery-like practices” to care; all received services from the government.

The government, through the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development (MHRSD)’s budget, allocated 50 million SAR ($13,333,330) for victim protection, assistance, and shelter management, compared with 10.9 million SAR ($2.9 million) in 2022. The government continued to use MHRSD-operated shelters managed by a private entity. MHRSD shelters provided assistance for victims of forced begging in Mecca, Jeddah, Dammam, Medina, Qassim, and Abha, in addition to welfare centers for vulnerable populations, such as victims of domestic violence and trafficking, including female domestic workers in 13 locations throughout the Kingdom. Child victims received care at MHRSD social care centers. Each shelter provided accommodation, social services, health care, counseling, education, and legal assistance. The government offered these services to 348 victims during the reporting period. The government provided 11 victims with cash assistance from its victim assistance fund, compared with providing five victims cash assistance in the previous reporting period. Diplomats from labor-source countries had regular access to their nationals residing in government-run shelters and reported conditions and quality of services in the shelters varied slightly across the Kingdom but were overall satisfactory and safe; one international organization reported services available at the government shelters met basic needs but were not specialized to address different forms of exploitation, including trafficking. Some embassies and consulates – including Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Uganda – also operated shelters for their respective nationals. The government required all licensed and registered recruitment agencies to have shelters available for recruited workers. Foreign diplomats reported many exploited workers preferred to use their embassy shelters for assistance; an international organization reported in cases where such workers did not have embassy representation in the Kingdom, they were more willing to seek care at government shelters. The MHRSD welfare centers only provided care to female domestic workers, and the government remained without dedicated shelters for male victims or female victims exploited in other sectors. The government could provide shelter to male victims at the MHRSD shelter for forced begging victims and reported providing service to one adult male victim referred by an international organization. In July 2023, the government signed an MOU with a government-supported civil society organization to manage a trafficking-specific shelter in Riyadh; the establishment of the shelter remained pending at the close of the reporting period.

The government continued to utilize its NRM to identify potential victims and refer them to care. The government reported the threshold for a case to be included in the mechanism was low, given the large foreign worker population in the Kingdom and the inherent vulnerability to trafficking. Officials entered data on the identification and referrals of potential trafficking victims in the NRM system through various hotlines, apps, social media, or through MHRSD when labor inspectors identified potential victims; NRM liaison officers stationed in each province were the first to receive a victim or case when it entered the NRM and were responsible for determining whether a case exhibited trafficking indicators, versus labor exploitation or other abuse, and referring potential trafficking cases to law enforcement for further investigation. The government finalized and began implementing a revised, second edition of the NRM in December 2023. The updates included procedural changes to ensure equitable, trauma-informed provision of services to all potential victims immediately following identification, with a particular focus on child trafficking victims. Along with the revised NRM, the government drafted a revised procedural manual to implement such changes, including establishing provisional timeframes for each entity within the NRM to expedite the response to cases and referral to protection actors. The government continued to implement an NRM policy requiring police to allow potential victims to spend at least three days at the shelter before a statement could be taken to begin a formal criminal investigation. The government coordinated closely with labor-source country embassies on victim identification and referral and reported receiving 21 referrals of potential trafficking cases from such embassies.

Migrant workers continued to document and assert being subjected to unpaid wages, passport retention, physical or sexual abuse, or substandard working conditions, many of which were trafficking indicators. Although the government had proactive victim identification procedures through the NRM and reported it screened all migrants in detention centers for trafficking indicators through forms developed by MOI and through NCCHT’s previously established screening committees to manage the identification of potential victims at detention centers, authorities continued to detain and frequently deport large numbers of migrants during the year. Observers reported authorities did not consistently and systematically screen all individuals for trafficking indicators and, therefore, likely arrested and deported some unidentified victims solely for immigration violations committed as a direct result of being trafficked. For example, media reported in one week between February and March 2024, the government arrested 23,040 migrants; according to MOI authorities, officials arrested 12,951 migrants for violating residency laws, 3,497 for violating labor regulations, and 6,592 for violating border regulations. The government continued circulating specific implementing guidelines for screening individuals in detention, including how to refer a potential trafficking victim after screening through the NRM. For the first time, the government reported identifying three potential victims via screening at detention centers. The PPO continued to direct all its branches and law enforcement agencies to cease deportation of any potential trafficking victims or anyone involved in an active trafficking case without the PPO’s prior approval, and the government continued to instruct each circuit court to screen defendants for potential trafficking indicators and to drop pending charges against identified trafficking victims. In December 2023, the government held a workshop in coordination with an international organization to discuss human rights at the border, including treatment of migrant detainees to ensure proactive screening and identification of victims of exploitation, including trafficking. Diplomats from several labor-source countries continued to report Saudi authorities regularly detained, fined, and/or jailed foreign migrant workers, which likely included unidentified trafficking victims, for immigration violations or “prostitution” offenses committed as a result of being trafficked. For example, labor-source embassy representatives reported instances of Saudi officials arresting potential sex trafficking victims alongside alleged traffickers during law enforcement action. However, the PPO reported instances where individuals arrested for “prostitution” were identified as victims of sex trafficking during law enforcement investigations during the year. Other representatives reported instances where potential victims, particularly in rural communities, sought police assistance to allege employer abuse but were instead returned to their employers without being screened for trafficking indicators, increasing their risk of retaliation and re-trafficking. Diplomats noted the likelihood of being identified as a potential trafficking victim without legal documentation was dependent on the law enforcement officer who came across the individual; in cases where police found a worker without their passport or residency visa, the individual could be referred to their embassy shelter, a government shelter, or could be immediately arrested and taken to a deportation center. The government did not consider certain populations’ vulnerability to forced labor prior to deportation; in 2022, NGOs reported four ethnic Uyghur Muslims, including a child, remained in detention without charge or trial in Saudi Arabia and were facing immediate deportation to the PRC where they would be at high risk of arbitrary detention, harassment, and forced labor. At the close of the reporting period, all four individuals remained in detention.

The government extended to all identified trafficking victims the option of remaining in the country during judicial proceedings – either in a shelter or via transfer to a new employer, or alternatively an immediate exit visa; these benefits did not require a successful prosecution or cooperation with law enforcement personnel. The government reported it provided legal alternatives to the removal of foreign trafficking victims to countries where they might face retribution or hardship and could coordinate with international organizations to repatriate a victim to a third country if needed. The government repatriated 29 individuals to their countries of origin. The government continued to implement a policy allowing victims and potential victims to work while their labor dispute or criminal case was adjudicated, regardless of whether they resided in a shelter and if their work permits had expired; however, it did not report whether any victims received work permits or temporary residency status during the year. The government reported allowing victims to submit testimony in written form or remotely via recording, and it ensured victims’ identities remained confidential. The government reported law enforcement only took a potential victim’s testimony with informed consent, in adherence with the NRM. The government continued to allow all potential trafficking victims who desired to proceed with a legal case, but also wanted to voluntarily be repatriated to be assigned a pro bono attorney; the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) continued to extend notary services to facilitate the assignment of a lawyer as a proxy for potential victims. The law entitled trafficking victims to legal assistance, security protection, translation services, and the right to immediate repatriation or continued residence in Saudi Arabia until resolution of the case, in addition to medical and psychological care, shelter, and rehabilitation. In February 2024, the government enacted Ministerial Resolution No. 329 of 2024, which granted judicial officials the authority to ensure necessary protections for witnesses and victims against threats, assault, intimidation, or retaliation. The government reported all 432 victims participated in law enforcement proceedings at various stages, with 53 receiving legal services and six appointed a pro bono attorney. The government continued to use its Unified Translation Center Initiative to provide interpretation and translation services to courts and judicial facilities to protect the rights of non-Arabic speaking victims in court proceedings; the government reported an unknown number of trafficking cases used this service during the year. Officials permitted victims to obtain compensation directly from the government and/or by filing civil suits against traffickers; however, such settlements rarely took place and reportedly generally occurred outside of civil court proceedings through government-supported mediation efforts. These proceedings often did not entail criminal prosecution, and officials preferred to reimburse back-wages informally and/or assist in repatriating the victims. The government reported it could award restitution during criminal proceedings while victims could file civil suits to receive compensation; however, no victims received compensation or were awarded restitution.

The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The NCCHT – composed of members from MOI, PPO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOJ, MHRSD, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Media and HRC – led government anti-trafficking efforts; it met 13 times as a full committee, held five sub-committee meetings, and hosted two workshops focused on updating the committee’s mandate and responsibilities, among other topics. In November 2023, the government established three additional units within the NCCHT secretariat focused on raising awareness of the NRM, conducting studies based on NRM data, cooperating with relevant entities to address trafficking crimes, and ensuring the committee’s efforts, including the NAP, reflected assessments of NRM data on trafficking trends and ongoing gaps. The government drafted and finalized a 2024-2027 NAP. The NCCHT, through its members, allocated 15,542,182 SAR ($4,144,580) to support prevention efforts, including the committees’ activities, training programs, awareness campaigns, and implementing the new NAP. In December 2023, the government renewed agreements with two international organizations to continue cooperation and build capacity to combat human trafficking, including implementation of the NAP. The HRC organized a workshop with embassies of 14 countries to discuss combating trafficking in persons, including reporting mechanisms through the NCCHT and NRM and educating foreign workers on legal protections in the country. The government continued to raise awareness of trafficking, targeting employers, migrant workers, including domestic workers, labor-source country embassies, and the general public. The NCCHT and HRC provided awareness materials through their websites and socials in 15 languages; materials included the definition of trafficking and its manifestations as well as reporting mechanisms. Nonetheless, diplomats reported literacy and language barriers continued to prevent some workers from benefiting from awareness activities, particularly in rural areas of the country. The NCCHT, in coordination with an international organization, organized an exchange visit with the Government of Belgium to discuss best practices on interagency coordination, victim identification and care, and holding traffickers accountable. The NCCHT, in coordination with two international organizations, conducted separate studies on domestic workers and forced begging in the Kingdom; the domestic worker study aimed to inform the creation of post-arrival orientation programming for domestic workers, including educational materials and improve communication with employers. Following analysis of NRM case data, the government developed monitoring mechanisms for online platforms to prevent deceptive recruitment practices, resulting in more than 1,207 fake employment advertisements being blocked.

The government continued to make efforts to prevent labor trafficking through its Single Electronic Contract and Wage Protection System (WPS), both implemented through the Mudad electronic platform. MHRSD continued to implement its Single Electronic Contract, which obligated companies and employers to include the type of work, salary, duration of contract, working hours, weekends, and annual leave for worker’s contracts in the private sector. The government required companies to sign such contracts in the system, enabling MHRSD to electronically account for, authenticate, and monitor all employment contracts in the private sector; employers and employees verified each contract filed through the Mudad electronic platform. The platform provided employees access to their contract and ensured MHRSD could impose sanctions on establishments that broke the contract terms; the contract on file could also serve as evidence in a potential labor dispute. If an employer did not have an e-contract on file, the employer could be fined up to 3,000 SAR ($800) for each employee. The government’s WPS continued to require employers to pay foreign workers by electronic transfer via a Saudi bank, thereby permitting the government to track disbursements and non- or delayed payment of wages. In cases of non-compliance, MHRSD investigated the employer and screened for potential trafficking indicators. For any employer or firm that failed to maintain at least 80 percent compliance on a monthly basis or failed to submit monthly WPS data, the government could impose penalties, including suspension of government services and recruitment privileges. MHRSD reported 87 percent of private sector businesses were fully compliant with WPS salary regulations; the other 13 percent related to instances where employers did not pay their employees within the five-day grace period (after the first of the month) or did not pay their employees their full salary. The government penalized an unknown number of employers for noncompliance but did not report if it referred any companies for criminal investigation for potential trafficking crimes. While use of the WPS was not required for employers of domestic workers, the government continued to mandate employers issue prepaid payroll or salary cards to domestic workers on arrival.

The government continued to operate and utilize its online domestic labor portal known as “Musaned”; the system included 891 private registered recruitment offices eligible to recruit domestic workers; agencies not registered in the system could not recruit such workers. This system consisted of a website and smartphone application that allowed potential employees in various sectors and individual employers to verify the license of a recruitment agency, review materials on employee and employer rights and responsibilities, complete and electronically sign contracts, and request a visa. The system intended to eliminate unregulated brokers, increase transparency and accountability of recruitment agencies and work contracts, and reduce the risk of labor trafficking; it also included a complaints resolution mechanism and served as a way to authenticate contracts for domestic workers in their home countries. Overall, diplomats from multiple labor-source countries reported Musaned enhanced the ability of embassies to monitor newly arrived nationals; however, other diplomats expressed the platform did not provide sufficient transparency on the recruitment process for foreign governments whose nationals used the system. The application was only available in English and Arabic; an international organization noted in cases where language barriers were present, a foreign domestic worker was unlikely to access the system and instead relied on recruitment agencies in their home country to provide and interpret the recruitment process.

The government continued to implement the Labor Reform Initiative (LRI) through Ministerial Resolution No. 51848/1442, which mandated private sector workers no longer needed their employer’s permission to travel abroad (obtain an exit and re-entry visa), obtain final exit visas, or change employers at the conclusion of their contract or after one year. This provided increased freedom of movement and therefore may have reduced the risk of labor trafficking for eight million private sector workers in the Kingdom. Workers could use the Qiwa electronic application to automate the process for transferring employment, notify an employer of their departure and re-entry, and receive a final exit visa. During the reporting period, the government reported 305,444 foreign workers changed employers without the consent of their current employer. The government did not report how many foreign workers obtained final exit visa without employer consent. However, NGOs reported concerns the employer-based visa system would persist as long as both the employee’s work and residence visas were tied to an employer. These organizations noted the reforms did not abolish the exit permit entirely – as a worker still submitted a request to MHRSD for an exit permit, and the ministry notified the employer electronically of the worker’s request. The employer then had 10 days to lodge an inquiry into the worker’s exit visa request, and an employer’s inquiry could potentially be used to deny the worker an exit visa.

In response to concerns that some employers filed “absconding” charges as a retaliatory measure against their employees to prevent them from changing employers, obtaining a final exit visa, or during labor disputes to avoid paying overdue salaries or end of service benefits, the government piloted a program in the previous reporting period removing the ability for employers to report a worker “absconded,” rendering the worker undocumented and vulnerable to deportation. Instead, an employer could submit a request to terminate an employee under the status “discontinued from work,” through the Qiwa app, which did not confer criminal liability; rather, workers had 60 days to change employers or depart the country before facing immigration violations. The government reported fully implementing this program during the reporting period; 22,663 workers were able to find new employment in the country following such reports without facing criminal penalties. The program continued to only cover private sector workers. Although the government reported efforts to expand the program to domestic workers through the Musaned application, it did not do so at the close of the reporting period.

Saudi labor law protections did not include domestic work; instead, Decision No. 310/1434 of 2013 granted some protections for domestic workers through broad regulations on working hours, rest periods, annual leave, end of service benefits, written employment contracts, and payment of wages on a monthly basis. Under this decision, domestic workers included both male and female household workers, private drivers, gardeners, and security guards. In October 2023, the government published new domestic worker regulations through Ministerial Decision No. 40676; the government reported the regulations would come into effect in September 2024, and would supersede the 2013 decision. The new law included a prohibition on passport confiscation, establishment of maximum working hours, a mandatory day off, and minimum age of domestic workers to 21 years old, as well as new occupational safety and health requirements and increased penalties against employers who violate the law. The new law also required employers use the standard MHRSD contract, both in Arabic and translated into a language the domestic worker understood, include additional elements – particularly related to salary and method of payment, working hours, overtime working hours, weekly rest days – and have the contract on file with MHRSD to oversee compliance through the Musaned platform.

One rights group noted while the new law included critical provisions and greater clarity on existing ones, it did not address minimum wage nor include enforcement mechanisms, noting the government rarely enforced protections in the 2013 decision. NGOs and diplomats continued to report domestic workers experienced non-payment of salaries, forced confinement, food deprivation, excessive workloads, document confiscation, and severe psychological, physical, and sexual abuse. Authorities only sought authorization to enter a home if there was overwhelming evidence of a crime, which left some unidentified victims at risk of trafficking and without protection, especially if a domestic worker could not leave their employer’s home to report abuse. Domestic workers remained excluded from LRI reforms and lacked protections equal to those of private sector workers, increasing this population’s already high vulnerability to trafficking and other abuse. Domestic workers could transfer sponsorship in certain circumstances — mandated by MHRSD —without employer permission, including transferring the services of the worker to another employer without the worker’s consent, three months of non-payment of wages, and the employer’s failure to issue or renew residency permit for the worker, among others. The government reported the new domestic worker decision would include these provisions; as of the close of the reporting period, these circumstances were part of separate ministerial decisions from 2017 and 2022. Otherwise, domestic workers could change employers with their sponsor’s permission at any time and only without sponsor permission after two years of employment. In 2019, the government removed the requirement for employer approval to receive a final exit visa for domestic workers whose sponsors failed to pay required fees, renew a worker’s status, or were absent. In practice, however, international NGOs reported some domestic workers who experienced such circumstances were not able to change employers or obtain exit permits. In February 2024, the government launched a contract insurance program for domestic workers, mandating insurance be included in an employment contract to ensure compensation for an employer in the event the employee stopped working, leaves, or was unable to continue their contract; it also ensured compensation for domestic workers in the event of disability resulting from accidents or employers failing to pay salaries. The policy required recruitment agencies to cover any financial losses sustained in the event a worker desired to leave their employment. Officials reported the goal of this insurance program was to disincentivize employers from holding domestic workers past a contract’s expiration date or if the worker desired to stop working before the contract period had ended, which increased risk of labor trafficking.

MHRSD officials operated a 24-hour call center that could receive calls in nine major labor-source country languages: Amharic, Arabic, Bengali, English, Tagalog, Hindi, Indonesian, Malayalam, and Urdu. The MHRSD hotline was included in pamphlets given to all foreign workers who entered the Kingdom. The MOI’s crime reporting app, “Koolna”, allowed users to report trafficking crimes as a standalone option. The HRC continued to operate a separate center to receive calls, texts, and WhatsApp messages; it was staffed with operators trained on identifying potential trafficking cases and could receive calls in English and Arabic. The NCCHT continued to allow individuals to submit information on potential trafficking crimes through its website and reported receiving 25 trafficking-related reports. The government regularly shared all hotline numbers on social media platforms; furthermore, all hotline operators had standard checklists to screen for trafficking indicators and if operators identified a potential case, they referred the case to the applicable points of contact per the NRM. The government identified 68 potential trafficking victims via its hotlines (HRC, MHRSD, and MOI). Of these 68 potential victims, the government referred 47 to relevant entities in the NRM to handle their cases, and the government provided direct assistance to 21 potential victims. Some workers and labor-source country officials continued to report impracticalities and technical difficulties getting through to call center operators, citing poorly trained and under-resourced staff.

The government deployed 799 MHRSD labor inspectors – all whom receive training on identifying trafficking indicators — to conduct 965,238 labor inspections to monitor the application of employment and recruitment laws; of the inspections conducted, officials identified 211,339 violations (compared with 33,869 violations in the previous reporting period). Separately, MHRSD received 56,879 worker complaints; most grievances involved passport retention, non-payment of wages, and not having a contract on file, all common indicators of trafficking. The government continued to provide a questionnaire for labor inspectors to complete for situations where they suspected a trafficking crime; inspectors sent completed forms following an inspection to MHRSD’s anti-trafficking department to be referred for criminal investigation. During the year, MHRSD issued a circular requiring all inspectors to screen for trafficking indicators. Labor inspectors identified 1,353 instances where trafficking indicators existed; of the 1,353 instances, officials referred 54 as potential trafficking cases to MOI for further investigation. In October 2023, media and rights groups reported migrant workers working in warehouses in Saudi Arabia and employed by third-party labor supply contractors were exploited in conditions indicative of labor trafficking, including deceptive recruitment, worker-paid recruitment fees, non-payment of wages, lack of adequate rest time, unfit accommodations, and inability to change jobs within one year because the third-party contractor refused to approve the transfer. Upon being notified of the allegations, MHRSD labor inspectors interviewed the workers at the warehouses; from those interviews, MHRSD identified 40 potential trafficking victims. The government did not report whether such warehouses were included in regular scheduled inspections, despite allegations beginning in 2021.

In instances of passport confiscation, officials generally worked to give the employer notice before pursuing violations; however, MHRSD penalized 33 employers for confiscating their worker’s passports in 2023. Although the Council of Ministers’ Decision No. 166 prohibited withholding workers’ passports as a violation punishable by fines, the government did not report if it issued any such fines. Moreover, diplomats reported document confiscation – both of passports and residency visas – remained common place, particularly for domestic workers, ultimately preventing such workers from feeling safe to leave their employer’s home, even on their required day off. Saudi regulations did not explicitly prohibit employers from confiscating a domestic worker’s passport. MHRSD officials conducted 6,898 inspections of recruitment agencies, resulting in 141 warnings and 146 violation notices issued to agencies for confiscating worker’s passports, not providing employment contracts and not paying worker’s salaries; the government did not report holding any of the agencies accountable for violations or referring any potential trafficking cases to MOI. Diplomats reported increased use of General Services Offices – which provided a variety of administrative services to Saudi citizens and foreign nationals but did not have MHRSD licenses to act as recruitment agencies – by employers to facilitate illegal recruitment and transfer of workers to new employers without the worker’s consent. MHRSD reported it penalized such offices operating without a license to recruit or transfer foreign workers but did not report how many offices it found operating illegally or details of such penalties.

The government had several bilateral labor agreements with labor-source countries, including Ethiopia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which set minimum wage standards and regulated protections and benefits for migrant workers, such as hours, mandatory time off, and overarching conditions. In 2023, the government signed two new bilateral agreements on combating human trafficking and ethnical recruitment practices with Vietnam and Somalia; another 25 agreements remained active. MHRSD continued to send Saudi labor attachés to key labor-source countries abroad to enhance coordination on suspected trafficking cases and ensure workers from labor-source countries were adequately informed of their rights before arriving in Saudi Arabia; the government assigned labor attachés in India, Egypt, Pakistan, and the Philippines. The government made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, including by enforcing a law criminalizing commercial sex. The government provided anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel, particularly on identification and protection of victims and recognizing potential victims during visa interviews at Saudi Arabian missions abroad.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Saudi Arabia. Adults – primarily from South and Southeast Asia and East Africa – voluntarily migrate to Saudi Arabia to work in a variety of sectors, including construction, agriculture, and domestic service. Many of these low-skilled workers are employed in substandard conditions that heighten their risk of labor trafficking. Some traffickers or unscrupulous labor brokers illegally recruit migrants to work in Saudi Arabia and subsequently exploit them in domestic servitude. Undocumented entry across the Kingdom’s southwestern border via Yemen serves as a key gateway for vulnerable Yemeni, Ethiopian, and Somali workers, in particular. The Kingdom’s migrant worker population continued to be the largest group at risk of human trafficking, particularly female domestic workers due to their isolation inside private residences and vulnerability to employer abuse. Non-payment or late payment of wages, instances of employers withholding workers’ passports, and not having a contract on file remained the most prominent complaints from foreign workers in the Kingdom. Trafficking perpetrators include businesses of all sizes, private families, recruitment agencies in both Saudi Arabia and labor-source countries, gangs, and organized criminal elements, to include third-country nationals. Fraudulent recruiters increasingly use “General Services Offices” to facilitate illegal recruitment and transfer of workers to new employers without the worker’s consent; employers reportedly “sell” their domestic workers to another employer through these offices. Reports indicate traffickers in Saudi Arabia regularly sell and “trade” Ugandan domestic workers using an online marketplace. Trafficking increasingly use technology, including social media and other websites, to deceptively recruit victims through fraudulent employment opportunities that could lead to exploitative work conditions.

Approximately 13 million foreign workers – primarily from Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Yemen—make up 75 percent of the total workforce in Saudi Arabia. Reports indicate 4.4 million foreign workers are domestic workers employed as maids, drivers, gardeners, and nannies. This number does not include undocumented workers and it is unclear if this number includes the family members of migrant workers residing with them in the Kingdom. NGOs and media sources report instances of racial and religious discrimination against African migrants – specifically domestic workers – and noted increasing concerns about harassment and discrimination among Christian African migrant workers in the Kingdom, rendering them vulnerable to abuse, exploitation, and trafficking. Thousands of Ethiopians – including domestic workers and migrant laborers who lost their employment due to the pandemic and migrants pushed out by violence in Yemen – face increasing vulnerabilities to trafficking after being placed in abusive detention centers in southern Saudi Arabia. As of December 2023, 30,000 Ethiopians remained in detention in Saudi Arabia for lack of legal residency. Media sources and rights groups previously reported that following harsh conditions in detention and subsequent deportation from Saudi Arabia, Ethiopian returnees faced increasing trafficking vulnerabilities once back in Ethiopia. Saudi Arabian employers continue to terminate or not renew contracts of Yemeni professionals in the country following a 2021 MHRSD policy change requiring businesses to limit the percentage employees from certain countries, including Yemen. Workers must find another employer to act as a sponsor to avoid leaving the country or risk detainment and deportation and increased vulnerability to trafficking if found to be residing illegally. In 2023, an international organization reported 60,815 Yemenis left Saudi Arabia, the majority of whom were deported without travel documents.

PRC nationals employed in Saudi Arabia at worksites affiliated with the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative remain vulnerable to conditions of labor trafficking, including debt bondage, restriction of movement, passport confiscation, excessive overtime, lack of adequate healthcare, and being sold to other employers for which they did not have signed contracts. Separately, NGOs reported the government deported at least five Uyghur Muslims, some while performing religious pilgrimage, back to PRC between 2017 and 2019, where they were vulnerable to arbitrary detention, harassment, and labor trafficking; in 2021, four Uyghur Muslims faced imminent deportation to the same conditions, and at the close of the reporting period, all four individuals remained in detention in Saudi Arabia. Government-affiliated Cuban workers in Saudi Arabia may have been forced to work by the Cuban government. There were 150 to 200 Cuban government-affiliated medical professionals in Saudi Arabia operating under contracts between the worker and the Saudi Ministry of Health (MOH). In 2021, one Cuban doctor working in Saudi Arabia alleged the Cuban government takes 70 percent of the salary Cubans employed on medical missions earn – or roughly $2,000 per month. Furthermore, an NGO reported that while the Kingdom paid Cuban government-affiliated workers a salary, workers are forced by the Cuban government to deliver between 75 and 90 percent of their salary to the Cuban government. Additionally, an NGO reported Cuban workers employed in Saudi Arabia were vulnerable to other abuses, including sexual harassment, forced enrollment into the medical mission program, surveillance, exploitation, restriction of movement, and passport confiscation. The government’s WPS did not monitor Cuban medical worker contracts as the system is only for private sector workers. The large Rohingya population in the country remains highly vulnerable to exploitation, including in forced labor, due to lack of legal residency and identity documentation. In previous years, Saudi authorities detained and deported Rohingya Muslims back to Bangladesh, where many live in refugee camps and are vulnerable to exploitation, due to lack of legal residency.

Some Saudi employers refuse to grant exit permission or pay the exit fee required by law to migrant workers, forcing them to work beyond their contract term and increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. Domestic workers, who make up 40 percent of migrant workers in the Kingdom, continue to lack protections under the labor law and other initiatives, increasing trafficking risks. Although most migrant workers sign contracts delineating their rights, some report work conditions substantially differ from those outlined in their contracts. Other workers never see their work contracts, heightening their risk of labor trafficking and debt-based coercion. Additionally, some migrant workers voluntarily enter into illegal arrangements where they seek freelance work while concurrently paying a Saudi national to sponsor their initial residency permit, thereby becoming vulnerable to extortion and trafficking through debt-based coercion by their sponsors using “free visas.” Some undocumented migrants from Yemen and the Horn of Africa who enter Saudi Arabia via the Yemeni border – involuntarily or through consented migrant smuggling – are likely trafficking victims. Migrants who enter Saudi Arabia continue to be exploited by traffickers/smugglers and Saudi employers; for example, one report noted traffickers/smugglers who transported undocumented migrants into the Kingdom made arrangements with Saudi employers to receive salaries of migrants directly – mostly in the domestic work sector. Reports indicate some migrant women exploited in Yemen consent to marriage with traffickers/smugglers to escape situations of forced labor or forced criminality and enter Saudi Arabia to find employment as domestic workers. In many of these arrangements, the women’s “husbands” mislead Saudi employers in order to receive the women’s salary directly, exploiting the worker in forced labor, with reported upticks during the holy month of Ramadan and the Muslim pilgrimages of Hajj and Umrah.