Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, including complicit officials, which should involve significant prison terms. * Continue to increase efforts to proactively identify and provide protection services to men, boys, and LGBTQI+ victims of labor trafficking and sex trafficking. * Continue to increase transnational collaboration on trafficking investigations. * Continue to strengthen law enforcement, victim protection efforts, and government oversight of SEZs. * Continue to improve training for officials on indicators of labor trafficking, particularly among men, boys, and underserved communities. * Allow shelter residents freedom of movement. * Continue to disseminate, implement, and train police and border officials on the national victim protection and referral guidelines. * Proactively screen for trafficking indicators among vulnerable groups, including Lao and foreign nationals employed in SEZs; Lao and foreign workers working on large infrastructure, mining, and agricultural projects, and projects affiliated with the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as well as Lao communities displaced by these projects; Laos and foreign nationals exploited in labor trafficking in online scam operations; Lao labor migrants returning from work abroad through border crossings; and Lao and foreign women and girls discovered during law enforcement actions of nightclubs, karaoke bars, and other establishments that facilitate commercial sex. * Continue to train law enforcement officials at the national and local level to improve their ability to investigate and prosecute traffickers, including potentially complicit officials, those operating within SEZs, and perpetrators of extraterritorial commercial child sexual exploitation and abuse. * Continue to publicize and adequately staff all available government anti-trafficking hotlines, and train staff on victim identification and referral, including for labor trafficking victims. * Further reduce barriers to formal labor migration to reduce the vulnerability of migrant workers, including eliminating worker-paid recruitment fees. * Continue to strengthen efforts at diplomatic missions overseas to identify and assist Lao victims of sex and labor trafficking. * Screen any North Korean workers for signs of trafficking and refer them to appropriate services in a manner consistent with obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 2397.

The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Article 215 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10 million to 100 million Lao kip ($490 to $4,880); if the crime involved a child victim, the fine range increased to 100 million to 500 million Lao kip ($4,880 to $24,420). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape.

In 2023, the government investigated 45 potential trafficking cases, involving 98 suspected perpetrators, compared with investigating 39 cases involving 98 perpetrators in 2022. Authorities prosecuted 12 alleged traffickers in 13 cases, compared with prosecuting 27 alleged traffickers in 12 cases in 2022. Authorities also continued the prosecution of three traffickers in two cases initiated in previous years. Courts convicted 11 traffickers in 2023, compared with convicting no traffickers in 2022, and 10 in 2021. For the third consecutive year, the government did not disaggregate law enforcement data by type of trafficking or provide sentencing data. Authorities did not provide sufficient information to determine if the trafficking cases – investigated, prosecuted, or convicted – met the definition of trafficking according to international law; in previous years, authorities included non-trafficking crimes in reported prosecutions and convictions. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the year.

Despite widespread reporting of large-scale labor and sex trafficking in Laos’ SEZs, including in online scam operations, the government did not report any prosecutions related to trafficking that occurred within the SEZs. The Ministry of Public Security’s (MOPS) Anti-Trafficking Department (ATD) maintained an office inside the Golden Triangle SEZ and MOPS reported increasing police presence in the Golden Triangle SEZ to 170 personnel; however, observers reported no noticeable impact of this police presence. Despite government claims of complete sovereignty in SEZs, a lack of jurisdictional clarity between government officials and local SEZ-hired security forces hindered government attempts to investigate or prosecute traffickers; in practice, observers reported the Golden Triangle SEZ was controlled and administered, in part, by transnational criminal organizations. Officials reported they were frequently unable to investigate or prosecute foreign national traffickers, particularly those who exploited other foreign nationals, in SEZs. In March 2024, the Office of the Supreme People’s Prosecutor (OSPP) announced the planned opening of a new office in the Golden Triangle SEZ to address legal cases, including trafficking cases; the government did not report when this office would open. The government cooperated with the PRC in law enforcement actions which resulted in the arrest and deportation of at least 626 PRC nationals involved in online scam operations within the SEZs; however, while some of these likely included traffickers or other criminals complicit in the scam operations, the government did not screen any of these individuals for trafficking indicators and many likely experienced forced labor. Authorities did not report any other law enforcement actions against online scam operations exploiting non-PRC nationals in SEZs or other parts of the country. In February 2024, the government approved the opening of the Bokeo International Airport adjacent to the Golden Triangle SEZ; the airport was at least partially financed by transnational criminal entities. The airport opened despite international concern that the airport could serve to facilitate the exploitation of trafficking victims within the SEZ. The government did not report taking any steps to prevent the facilitation of human trafficking at this airport. The MOPS’s ATD was the lead agency for trafficking investigations. The ATD jointly investigated trafficking cases with anti-trafficking units located in provincial and district police departments. The government did not have prosecutors or courts specifically dedicated to trafficking cases, and whether courts tried a case at the central, district, or provincial level depended on the potential severity of the sentence. Officials reported they lacked the technical equipment and training to pursue senior members of trafficking syndicates, and security officials often only arrested low-level members of syndicates, as well as victims of forced criminality exploited by syndicates. Observers reported a fundamental lack of understanding about the pervasiveness of trafficking in Laos among government officials hindered anti-trafficking efforts. Many units tasked with anti-trafficking work, whether investigatory or prosecutorial, remained understaffed and under-resourced. The government, in partnership with NGOs and international organizations, trained law enforcement, military, prosecutors, media officials, social workers, and front-line responders on various trafficking topics. The government continued to cooperate with Cambodia, the PRC, Thailand, Vietnam, and international organizations pursuant to existing bilateral agreements on information sharing, case investigation and prosecution, and victim repatriation. The OSPP completed a draft manual to guide victim-centered prosecutions; authorities did not report releasing or implementing this manual.

The government slightly increased victim protection efforts. Despite extensive reporting of widespread labor and sex trafficking in the Golden Triangle SEZ, authorities identified 25 trafficking victims among more than 2,500 vulnerable workers removed from the SEZ by authorities in 2023. The government identified 168 victims of trafficking in 2023; 149 sex trafficking victims – four women and 145 girls – and 19 labor trafficking victims – 10 women, five men, and four girls. This compared with identifying 75 trafficking victims in 2022; 67 sex trafficking victims – five men, seven women, four boys, and 51 girls – and eight labor trafficking victims – two men, two women, and four girls. The government’s reported data may have included some victims identified outside of the reporting period. The government also identified 54 additional individuals exploited through means which may not have met the international definitions of trafficking, but could have included corollary sex or labor trafficking indicators, as part of forced and fraudulent marriage cases. Of the trafficking victims identified, the government identified 36 foreign national trafficking victims, compared with six foreign nationals identified as trafficking victims in 2022. The central ATD was the sole authority able to formally identify and refer trafficking victims to short and long-term care; in practice, local authorities, the government-funded Lao Women’s Union (LWU), and NGOs could also screen and refer potential victims to the ATD for formal identification. Victim identification, referral, and care processes varied greatly dependent on how the victim was identified, the victim’s nationality, employment, and the location at time of identification. The government reported using victim identification and referral SOPs developed in a prior reporting period; however, inconsistent identification and referral practices throughout the country hindered the provision of sufficient protection services to all victims. The government reported working with international organizations to update identification SOPs; these updates remained pending at the end of the reporting period. NGOs reported independently identifying 108 victims of unspecified trafficking – 81 male and 27 female – who did not receive formal government identification.

Officials and observers noted authorities were less likely to identify men and LGBTQI+ individuals as trafficking victims. While some ATD officials had received victim sensitivity training and Lao-language victim sensitivity manuals, observers noted these officials may not have consistently practiced victim-sensitive techniques. Authorities inadequately implemented victim identification SOPs and demonstrated inconsistent victim identification in certain parts of the country and within specific sectors, particularly within SEZs and among individuals in commercial sex. As a result, the government handled some potential trafficking cases administratively, if at all, and due to a lack of effective identification procedures, authorities likely inappropriately detained, prosecuted, and deported potential unidentified sex and labor trafficking victims. Observers reported some authorities discriminated against LGBTQI+ victims, and LGBTQI+ victims were at a higher risk of being arrested for commercial sex crimes without being screened for trafficking indicators. Authorities did not proactively screen for or identify trafficking victims at foreign-owned rubber and banana plantations, in garment factories, or working on foreign-funded infrastructure projects, all of which presented some indicators of trafficking. Authorities reported conducting several law enforcement actions on establishments facilitating commercial sex, but did not always proactively screen individuals involved in commercial sex for indicators of trafficking. Border officials continued to demonstrate a low capacity to detect trafficking because of insufficient staffing at international checkpoints and border crossings and a lack of training on victim identification, including on identification of labor trafficking victims exploited in online scam operations. However, the LWU reported it, in coordination with NGOs and the ATD, screened some Lao nationals when returning through formal checkpoints.

The government, in collaboration with NGOs, provided services to 135 victims or potential victims of unspecified trafficking, including nine men, 14 women, four boys, and 108 girls, and of whom 22 were foreign nationals; this compared with assisting 95 victims in 2022. The ATD did not report if it counted or tracked victims who declined official assistance, and some victims declined assistance during the reporting period. The government provided victims with shelter, legal assistance, medical care, education, vocational training, basic mental healthcare counseling, and community integration services at either one of two government shelters. The LWU maintained two shelters for survivors of domestic violence and human trafficking; the shelters held separate spaces for men and women and could accommodate transgender survivors. The Vientiane shelter could accommodate approximately 30 women and 15 men; the shelter in Luang Namtha could accommodate approximately 30 women and 30 men. The LWU did not permit shelter residents freedom of movement, and observers reported LWU prevented at least one survivor and their child from returning home until authorities culminated their investigation. Observers reported the LWU lacked adequate counseling staff but provided basic counseling services. The government also referred victims to international organization- and NGO-funded shelters that provided care parallel to the LWU. Authorities and NGOs reported male trafficking victims sometimes declined stay at formal shelters and requested shelter at local guest houses instead; in such cases, authorities coordinated with NGOs to provide some male and foreign national victims temporary shelter in such local guest houses, sometimes with security provided by ATD. Authorities and NGOs reported many male trafficking victims requested shelter at local guest houses as opposed to formal shelters. The government did not require victims to participate in investigations to receive protection services. The law entitled all identified victims to the full range of victim support services, regardless of gender, nationality, or where the exploitation occurred. However, in prior years, officials acknowledged authorities prevented some male and LGBTQI+ trafficking victims from accessing protection services; additionally, the significant increase in male victims seeking services than in prior years overwhelmed the government’s capacity to respond, which required international organizations to assist with providing shelter for foreign male victims awaiting repatriation. NGOs assisted at least 126 victims and potential victims independent of government support in 2023.

Observers reported authorities did not proactively screen potential trafficking victims and vulnerable workers released from the Golden Triangle SEZ, despite extensive reporting of widespread labor and sex trafficking in entertainment venues, restaurants, karaoke bars, construction sites, factories, and online scam operations in the SEZ. Authorities reported most vulnerable workers in the Golden Triangle SEZ did not qualify as trafficking victims, despite the workers’ appeals for assistance; rather, authorities characterized these cases as “labor disputes,” which prevented potential victims from accessing trafficking-related protection services. Some of the cases ultimately categorized as “labor disputes” were likely cases of labor trafficking. Observers reported authorities may have discouraged many foreign nationals from seeking official inquiry into their trafficking cases, owing to the time and costs associated with investigation and service provision. Authorities removed 2,614 potential trafficking victims – 1,844 male and 770 female – from the Golden Triangle SEZ in 2023, including 1,756 foreign nationals; this is compared with authorities having removed 1,802 potential victims – 1,140 male and 662 female – in 2022, including 986 foreign nationals. Traffickers likely exploited the vast majority of these potential victims in forced labor in online scam operations. Of the 4,416 potential victims removed from the Golden Triangle SEZ between September 2022 and December 2023, the government identified 25 victims of unspecified trafficking – 17 male and eight female. Foreign governments and an international organization repatriated at least 56 victims, many of whom traffickers likely exploited in SEZs.

The OSPP reported victims could testify behind a curtain to protect their privacy and ensure their safety; in practice, many court proceedings did not involve in-person testimony from either victims or defendants. Authorities reported one man, three women, and 92 girls participated in investigations; authorities did not report whether victims participated beyond an initial interview. The OSPP continued to collaborate with an international organization to provide judges and prosecutors with new victim-centered trial guidelines, which authorities finalized in late 2023 but did not yet widely disseminate. The government did not provide support to victims who assisted in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases but could work with village leaders or NGOs to provide financial assistance to victims. According to the NAP, the government would appoint legal representation from the Lao Bar Association for any trafficking victims whose cases went to trial; in practice, the government has never appointed a lawyer to represent trafficking victims. The government reported victims could request civil compensation, including in conjunction with a criminal trial. The government did not report if courts ordered restitution paid to victims in 2023 or 2022, compared with nine defendants ordered to pay 65.5 million Lao kip ($3,199) to 11 victims in 2021. Authorities did not report directly repatriating Lao women and girls who had been subjected to forced or fraudulent marriage in the PRC, which frequently included corollary sex trafficking and/or forced labor indicators; however, the government coordinated with NGOs to support repatriation costs and provided shelter and services upon the girls’ and women’s return to Laos. The LWU and the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MOLSW) were responsible for providing reintegration services for trafficking victims but relied heavily on NGOs to offer such assistance. The government did not report providing legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where they may have faced hardships or retribution. Authorities reported waiving immigration fines and cooperated with civil society organizations to shelter foreign nationals until their departure. The government maintained multiple hotlines to report incidents of trafficking, domestic abuse, GBV, child protection, and various forms of labor exploitation. Authorities did not provide disaggregated information on trafficking victims identified or referred through these hotlines; however, the LWU provided legal counseling to 17 victims in 2023. Insufficient staffing and low public awareness of the hotlines’ existence limited their accessibility and effectiveness. In response to these limitations, the LWU used social media and messaging applications (apps) to provide traditional hotline services like providing information and counseling resources. In March 2023, the LWU launched a Facebook page to provide victims access to information, staff, and support services.

The government slightly decreased prevention efforts. The ministerial-level National Steering Committee on Anti-Human Trafficking and the working-level National Secretariat on Anti-Human Trafficking met one time to coordinate Laos’s trafficking prevention activities. The government provided an unspecified amount of funding for anti-trafficking activities on a case-by-case basis, rather than allocating a set budget to each ministry, compared with 300 million Lao kip ($14,651) allocated to each ministry in 2020. The multisector Human Trafficking Working Group coordinated with civil society organizations and convened twice to share best practices and maintain partnerships at national and subnational levels, including in anti-trafficking enforcement in the SEZs. The government did not make its annual progress report on implementation of the NAP publicly available; authorities also did not provide an update on their reported evaluation of the 2021-2025 NAP. The government conducted awareness campaigns targeting government officials, factory workers, teachers, students, and some vulnerable communities.

The formal migration process remained insufficient to prevent exploitation in sex trafficking or forced labor for many Lao migrant workers. In 2023, the government negotiated with a foreign government to increase formal overseas work opportunities. Observers noted some migrant workers reported the government and its foreign missions supported them in negotiations with foreign employers while working abroad. The MOLSW ran one public Employment Service Center and oversaw 35 recruitment agencies, 33 of which could recruit for jobs abroad in Thailand, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK). These recruitment agencies acted as gatekeepers to the formal migration process in Laos, and the law allowed them to charge workers recruitment fees, some of which continued to contribute to indebtedness that placed Lao workers at risk of trafficking abroad. Legal overseas employment programs typically cost more than 41 million Lao kip ($2,000), which drove many migrant workers to use illegal recruitment companies where they faced greater trafficking risks. The government maintained bilateral labor agreements with several common destination countries, including Thailand, the PRC, Cambodia, Japan, the ROK, and Vietnam. The bilateral anti-trafficking agreement with the Government of Thailand outlined a formal labor migration process that was costly to workers, overly complex, and dissuasively time-consuming in a manner that reportedly caused many Lao migrants to opt for irregular and far more risky migratory channels. Once in Thailand, these workers were further vulnerable to passport retention, wage and contract irregularities, physical abuse, and many other forced labor indicators. The MOLSW continued to employ a labor attaché in Thailand who could register employment grievances of Lao workers in the country. The labor attaché received training from international organizations and the Government of Thailand before and during his assignment, but authorities did not report whether the attaché formally identified any trafficking victims there during the reporting period.

The government’s labor laws required employers and employees to honor signed worker contracts; however, observers noted employers rarely faced legal repercussions for breaching contracts. Observers reported the government did not effectively enforce labor laws, and freedom to change employers largely depended on the situation between the employee and the employer. The quasi-governmental Lao Federation of Trade Unions (LFTU) maintained an MOU with the SEZ Promotion and Management Office to improve support of workers’ rights and ensure broad awareness of labor regulations among employers and employees, particularly inside SEZs. The MOU guaranteed LFTU officials access to SEZs, but some business owners refused to allow LFTU officials access to workplaces. Due to a lack of jurisdictional clarity in the Golden Triangle SEZ, the SEZ Management Committee and SEZ Administration Board effectively prevented MOLSW from exercising effective labor oversight or registering workers in the SEZ, compounding vulnerabilities workers faced in these zones. The government did not report conducting any labor inspections in 2023, compared with 306 unannounced inspections in 2022 which resulted in the identification of six trafficking victims. Officials and NGOs continued work to terminate work contracts for SEZ employees who filed formal and informal complaints of labor abuses throughout 2023, but NGOs report the ATD did not proactively investigate labor issues in the Golden Triangle SEZ or screen for potential trafficking indicators. Government capacity to register births and issue civil documentation remained limited and contributed to general trafficking vulnerability, particularly in remote areas of the country. The government began to modernize civil registration systems in 2021; in 2023, the government reported establishing new internal agreements for the modernization plan. The government trained diplomats on trafficking topics. The government made limited efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, including by creating three advertisements to discourage soliciting commercial sex.

As reported over the last five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims within Laos, and traffickers exploit victims from Laos abroad; traffickers also make use of Lao territory to transport foreign victims to other countries in the region. NGOs estimated in 2018 that 13,000 individuals in Laos are in commercial sex in established businesses and are potentially vulnerable to sex trafficking, with as many as three times that figure operating independently throughout the country. Lao farmers growing maize and cassava are reportedly more vulnerable to forced labor through indebtedness to local community leaders. With little oversight by local authorities, foreign and Lao workers at or near foreign-owned or foreign-operated agricultural operations, including banana and rubber plantations; transportation infrastructure construction sites, including those affiliated with the PRC’s BRI; and SEZs are extremely vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking. Reports indicate labor trafficking of Laos workers on agricultural plantations decreased after the pandemic, and workers have more freedom to avoid farms with undesirable working conditions. Lao communities displaced by frequent natural disasters; foreign-invested mining and construction operations, including those affiliated with the BRI; and foreign agricultural land concessions may be vulnerable to trafficking amid ensuing economic hardships. As regional authorities relaxed pandemic-related travel restrictions in 2022 and 2023, Laos began attracting more tourists, including large groups traveling for golf, gambling, and entertainment, especially within the Golden Triangle and other SEZs. The resulting spike in labor demanded for these industries has drawn many young Lao workers to entertainment venues in the Golden Triangle SEZ and in Vientiane. Traffickers exploit some of these individuals for work in restaurants, karaoke bars, agricultural plantations, and online scam operations. The pandemic-related closure of garment factories in 2021 and a significant downturn in the tourism industry led to widespread disproportionate unemployment among Lao women, who were increasingly vulnerable to predatory recruitment practices as a result. Against this backdrop, SEZ casinos have used social media to lure hundreds of Lao women to work as “chat girls” – online representatives selling casino stock to male customers – with false promises of high salaries and free meals and accommodations. Many of these women do not meet the unattainably high sales quotas set by the casino managers and are forced to incur debt to pay the difference, as well as to pay for meals and accommodations; casino managers leverage this debt to confine them and subject them to forced labor and sex trafficking.

In 2023, officials reported 28,300 foreign nationals officially worked in the Golden Triangle SEZ, while observers estimate the true number was much higher. In 2022, workers from more than 20 countries accused employers in the Golden Triangle SEZ of human trafficking and labor exploitation in online scam operations. Increasingly, traffickers use the internet and social media to fraudulently recruit men, women, and children from Laos and other countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, and South America for high-paying technical jobs abroad and force them to engage in online gambling, internet, cryptocurrency, and telephone scams, primarily in casinos and commercial compounds in Laos, including in SEZs. In Laos, traffickers often target young people from rural areas where there is a discrepancy between the high level of education available and the lack of commensurate job opportunities. Foreign victims are often lured to Thailand with false job offers, and traffickers transport them across the border into SEZs located in Laos, often by boat. Increasingly, traffickers lure foreign victims directly to airports in Laos. Traffickers in online scam operations subject workers to punishment for poor performance and disobedience, including but not limited to physical abuse, wage docking, and debt-bondage, and may “resell” those who cannot meet sales quotas or repay recruitment debts to other criminal networks for forced labor in similar fraud schemes, domestic servitude, or sex trafficking. Some of these online scam operations are likely run by PRC national-operated crime syndicates. Observers note that, in some cases, victims are forced to recruit their own replacement via social media to obtain their freedom. Foreign nationals operate pornography and child pornography rings in Laos that subject adult and child victims to sex and labor trafficking.

Traffickers exploit Vietnamese, PRC national, and Lao women and children in sex trafficking in larger Lao cities and near national borders, casinos, and other SEZs, reportedly to meet the demand of international tourists and migrant workers. UK, Australia, and U.S. residents travel to Laos to engage in extraterritorial child sexual exploitation and abuse. Burmese, PRC, Russian, Thai, and Vietnamese nationals are among those subjected to sex trafficking in the Golden Triangle SEZ where thousands of undocumented migrant workers are also vulnerable to forced labor in debt-based coercion. Other reports indicate Burmese nationals working as manual laborers or involved in commercial sex near the Laos portion of the Golden Triangle may be trafficking victims. Laos and foreign nationals, including migrant workers from the PRC, experience conditions indicative of forced labor at PRC-owned mining companies. North Koreans in Laos display multiple indicators of forced labor and may be operating under exploitative working conditions.

Pandemic-related travel restrictions and border closures starting in March 2020 led hundreds of thousands of Lao migrants formally and informally working in Thailand and other countries, including Malaysia and the PRC, to return to Laos, culminating in widespread unemployment within the country and increased economic hardship for families dependent on foreign remittances. These conditions placed many Lao workers into potentially exploitative situations as they traveled domestically in search of low-salary jobs, including at PRC-managed land concessions and SEZs, or illegally migrated for work abroad, particularly back to Thailand where wages are higher. Formal migration, which reopened after the pandemic, is slow, costly, and involves overly burdensome requirements that incentivize workers to rely on informal migration. Some workers from Laos migrate through Thailand to third countries such as Malaysia where they may face greater risk of trafficking. In 2023, observers reported the number of informal migrants to Thailand increased above pre-pandemic levels. Some victims migrate with the assistance of legal or illegal brokers charging fees; this is increasingly occurring under the direction of Lao intermediaries working with foreign traffickers. Others move independently through Laos’s 27 official border crossings using valid travel documents. Many of these border crossings are managed by provincial- or district-level immigration authorities with less formal training and limited hours of operation, making them easier transit points for traffickers to facilitate the movement of Lao victims into neighboring countries.

Traffickers in rural communities frequently and increasingly kidnap or recruit Lao women and girls with false promises of legitimate work opportunities or promises of marriage – typically through the use of marriage brokers – to nationals in neighboring countries, primarily the PRC, and then subject them to sex trafficking, forced labor, and forced surrogacy. This trend reportedly increased after completion of the Lao-China Railway but fluctuated during pandemic-related travel restrictions and border closures; traffickers also use other methods to transport Lao victims overland through Thailand en route to the PRC for these purposes. Brokered marriages between rural Lao women and PRC men employed at SEZs known for trafficking vulnerabilities had also increased during the pandemic. Traffickers increasingly exploit individuals from underserved communities in Luang Namtha and Oudomxay in forced and/or fraudulent marriage with corollary indicators of sex or labor trafficking. Children from economically disadvantaged rural areas were especially vulnerable to trafficking over the past few years, given the legal work age of 14, the widespread closure of schools during the pandemic, and the lure of higher wages abroad. Traffickers exploit a large number of Lao women and girls in Thailand in commercial sex and forced labor in domestic service, factories, or agriculture. According to Thailand-based public health organizations, traffickers take advantage of the undocumented immigration status of some Lao men and boys to exploit them in sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit Lao men and boys in forced labor in Thailand’s fishing, construction, and agricultural industries. Lao men are also subjected to forced labor on fishing vessels operating in Indonesian territorial waters. Companies operating under the auspices of the Japanese government’s “Technical Intern Training Program” have exploited Lao nationals in forced labor, in agriculture, and several other sectors. Lao women and girls are reportedly vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking at “girl bars” – entertainment sites advertising paid “accompaniment” services often involving sex acts with young women and girls – in urban areas in Japan.