Document #2111695
USDOS – US Department of State (Author)
The Government of Kazakhstan does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting period; therefore Kazakhstan remained on Tier 2. These efforts included convicting officials complicit in forced labor and creating Territorial Mobile Teams to respond to forced labor crimes more efficiently in rural areas. The government adopted the 2024-2026 NAP. However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. It identified fewer victims and investigated and prosecuted significantly fewer traffickers. A lack of expertise and understanding of existing anti-trafficking laws continued to hinder effective anti-trafficking law enforcement and victim identification efforts. Authorities continued to identify few foreign victims and efforts to address forced labor remained inadequate.
Amend Kazakhstan’s penal code to align the definition of trafficking with the international law definition. * Proactively identify trafficking victims by screening for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including foreign nationals, and refer victims for assistance. * Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, including complicit officials, which should involve significant prison terms. * Allocate sufficient funding for victim services, including for shelters, and increase availability of services for male and foreign victims. * Strengthen the capacity of the Labor Inspectorate to identify forced labor victims, including by allowing unfettered access to factories, construction sites, and farms for unannounced inspections and increasing training on victim identification and procedures to report potential trafficking cases to the police. * Develop formal procedures to refer all victims, including foreign victims, to appropriate care and train officials on its use. * Train law enforcement officers and labor inspectors to apply Kazakhstan’s trafficking laws, particularly in the detection of cases involving psychological coercion and other less overt trafficking indicators. * Ensure victims are not inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. * Ensure victims are aware of their right to seek compensation, and train attorneys and law enforcement officials on how to assist in that process. * Enhance oversight and regulation of labor recruitment agencies and hold fraudulent labor recruiters criminally accountable.
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. Articles 128 (“human trafficking”) and 135 (“trafficking in minors”) of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. However, inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under international law, Articles 128 and 135 of the penal code did not include force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of the crime but rather considered them an aggravating circumstance. The law prescribed penalties of four to seven years’ imprisonment for adult trafficking and five to nine years’ imprisonment for child trafficking; the penalties could be increased under aggravated circumstances to up to 15 years for adult trafficking and up to 18 years for child trafficking. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as kidnapping. Sex trafficking crimes could also be prosecuted under Articles 134 (“involvement of a minor in prostitution”) and 308 (“involvement in prostitution”). Article 134 prescribed penalties of three to six years’ imprisonment. However, Article 308 prescribed penalties of only up to three years’ restriction of liberty, up to three years’ imprisonment, or a fine; these penalties were substantially lower than those available for sex trafficking offenses under the human trafficking provision. The government drafted a stand-alone anti-trafficking law in the previous reporting period to clarify government agency responsibilities and expand victim services, which was pending approval. Civil society reported concerns with the proposed trafficking definition in the draft law because it was not aligned with the definition under the UN TIP Protocol.
Police initiated investigations in 15 trafficking cases (10 for sex trafficking and five for forced labor) compared with 26 in 2022. The government prosecuted five human trafficking cases (four for sex trafficking and one for forced labor), compared with 18 prosecutions in 2022; and it convicted five traffickers, including two officials for forced labor, (one for sex trafficking and four for forced labor) under article 128 of the Criminal Code, compared with six traffickers in 2022. Of the five convictions, courts sentenced two labor traffickers to three years’ imprisonment, which is lower than the minimum penalty prescribed under Article 128, one sex trafficker to six years’ imprisonment, and two complicit officials with sentences ranging from six years and seven months to eight years’ imprisonment. Many of the trafficking cases were the result of four multi-day anti-trafficking police operations, called “Stop Trafficking,” in which anti-trafficking police units conducted enforcement operations with local police in brothels, massage parlors, construction sites, and farms and collaborated with NGOs to interview potential victims. The government created new Territorial Mobile Teams, which included police, prosecutors, labor inspectors, and NGOs, that travel to rural areas and respond to reports of forced labor, including in farms and other locations. The government made limited efforts to investigate forced labor involving foreign nationals and ensure the continued inclusion of victim testimony after foreign national victims and witnesses returned to their countries of origin due to prolonged legal processes. Observers reported law enforcement challenges in evidence gathering, a lack of understanding of trafficking and coercive methods utilized by employers, limited knowledge of the criminal code, and staffing rotations as impediments to police effectiveness, resulting in low identification of cases. Some law enforcement officials reportedly closed or decided not to pursue cases, especially among forced labor cases in rural areas, due to a perceived lack of evidence. Civil society noted the current definition of trafficking in the criminal code prevented some authorities from properly investigating or prosecuting cases involving more complex trafficking indicators, including labor trafficking cases. Criminal statutes carrying lesser penalties were widely used, and the significant leeway in how to categorize trafficking crimes given to investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial authorities made the statutes vulnerable to corruption. Kazakh law enforcement cooperated with the Governments of Uzbekistan, Russia, and Bahrain in trafficking cases, resulting in seven arrests in Kazakhstan, including one sex trafficker repatriated from Bahrain during the previous reporting period and sentenced to eight years in prison under Articles 128 and 135 of the criminal code.
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action. A court convicted an official with the Division for Coordination of Social Programs from the Kostanay oblast and the Director of Peshkovsky Center for the Provision of Special Social Services in the city of Kostanay for exploiting a disabled woman in forced labor; both officials received sentences ranging from six years and seven months to eight years’ imprisonment. Observers previously reported local official complicity in the unauthorized entry, transportation, and harboring of foreign nationals.
The government continued to provide anti-trafficking training to police, including in collaboration with civil society and other governments. The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) division for Combating Trafficking in Persons and Protection of the Participants of Criminal Proceedings is represented in all regions with officers specialized in human trafficking. Officials highlighted that gaps in existing laws and lack of expertise in investigating cybercrime obstructed law enforcement efforts to adequately respond to an increase in online sexual exploitation, including trafficking, unless minors were involved. In August 2023, the MIA disrupted the operations of a criminal organization operating a fraudulent modeling agency that exploited women and children in online sex acts that featured corollary sex trafficking indicators.
The government maintained protection efforts. The government identified 21 trafficking victims (15 females and six males), compared with 24 in 2022. Of the 21 victims identified (18 Kazakh citizens and three Uzbekistani citizens), 14 were sex trafficking victims (all female victims, including six children) and seven were forced labor victims (six males and one female). Experts reported that while the government continued to predominately identify sex trafficking victims, the majority of victims identified by civil society service providers were victims of forced labor. Law enforcement officials had standard guidelines for the identification of victims and their referral to protection services; however, the referral procedures did not establish clear roles and responsibilities among key stakeholders. Police also maintained a formal referral mechanism for victims initially arrested or detained during police operations. The government reported having standard guidelines on victim identification and referral to care for labor inspectors, diplomatic missions, healthcare providers, and education stakeholders. Prior to referring a victim for assistance, law enforcement, social services, or in some cases NGOs conducted a formal identification process, which included an interview and assessment. The government did not report how many victims it referred to care for the third consecutive year.
Enduring insufficiencies in victim identification procedures likely led to some unidentified victims, especially those exploited in forced labor in rural areas, being inappropriately penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Media reported law enforcement investigated forced labor allegations involving 64 Uzbekistani potential victims in a brick factory in Shymkent, prompted by a distress call. The government placed 40 of the potential victims who were undocumented in a detention center without adequately screening for trafficking and 24 potential victims were assisted by an NGO. According to observers only three of the potential victims were officially recognized as trafficking victims by authorities due to lack of knowledge of the crime, including on the element of coercion in trafficking crimes; the majority were returned to Uzbekistan after being partly compensated and some reportedly voluntarily returned to the brick factory.
Trafficking victims identified by government authorities could be referred to mostly government-funded, NGO-run shelters for victims of trafficking and domestic violence. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population (MoLSP) also operated some shelters. Victims could stay in a shelter for up to six months with the option of an additional three months if there was an ongoing criminal case against the trafficker or the victim was receiving medical treatment. Unaccompanied child victims were placed in separate shelters from adults and assisted by the Centers for the Adaptation of Minors. Trafficking victims were entitled to free medical, educational, employment, financial, psychological, and legal assistance. These and other protection services were not conditional upon victims’ cooperation with law enforcement. The government allocated 212 million tenge ($464,620) in 2023, compared with 101 million tenge ($221,350) in 2022, to fund 10 anti-trafficking NGOs. Observers reported a lack of protection services, including shelter, available for male victims. Observers reported shelters had insufficient government resources and funding to assist trafficking victims, including insufficient child-specific services, and limited capacity to assist the number of victims referred. It was previously reported that the government allocated funding for NGO-run shelters depending on the number of trafficking cases in a given region, which did not take into account the number of identified victims per case, often leading to funding shortages.
Access to victim services was not dependent on cooperation with law enforcement proceedings. The Law on Migration and Law on Special Social Services entitled foreign trafficking victims to the same benefits as Kazakh citizens, including temporary residency with permission to work, access to government-funded shelters and services, and a reflection period of six months allowing victims time to decide whether to participate in law enforcement proceedings. However, observers noted systemic hurdles continued to limit victim protection and access to justice for foreign victims, especially male foreign victims. Due to lack of awareness and implementation by law enforcement of new provisions in the law allowing foreign victims to temporarily stay in Kazakhstan, officials reportedly deported some victims. The government began allocating funding for the repatriation of foreign victims; however, the government did not provide any information on the use of those funds. Experts previously reported insufficient funding to cover additional services available for foreign victims, including medical services, and officials’ efforts to identify and refer foreign victims and labor trafficking victims remained inadequate.
The government provided victim-witness assistance during court proceedings, including access to pre-trial shelter services, and basic provisions such as food, clothing, transportation, and medical and legal assistance. Trafficking victims were eligible to seek employment during their participation in criminal proceedings and cases could continue under counsel representation if a victim decided to leave Kazakhstan. In accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code, social workers could be present during victim interviews, which could take place in shelters instead of police stations or be recorded to prevent the need for multiple interviews, in order to avoid re-traumatization. All 21 identified victims participated in investigations; the government provided more than 1.437 million tenge ($3,185) for victim services for three Kazakh citizens and three Uzbekistani citizens who participated in criminal proceedings under the Protection of Persons Participating in Criminal Proceedings program – the remainder of the victims received assistance at shelters. Victims were able to receive compensation by filing civil suits in conjunction with criminal cases; however, no compensation was awarded during the reporting period. Many victims and their attorneys were unaware of the right to seek compensation, and high legal fees dissuaded some victims from doing so. The government maintained a compensation fund and four victims received a total of 452,040 tenge from it ($990). The government could provide pro bono attorneys to trafficking victims; however, NGOs reported a lack of legal assistance, particularly for foreign victims, and inexperienced attorneys that often refused to take trafficking cases. According to media reports, the Kazakh Embassy in Thailand assisted in the repatriation of Kazakh citizens exploited in cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia.
The government slightly increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The Interagency Trafficking in Persons Working Group, led by MoLSP, included participation from NGOs and international organizations. The Working Group met every six months to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts and developed and adopted its 2024-2026 NAP. The government continued conducting anti-trafficking awareness campaigns, including for Kazakh migrant workers, in collaboration with civil society. The government allocated 3.7 million tenge ($8,110) to fund the country’s NGO-operated trafficking hotline in 2023, compared with no funding reported in 2022 – the hotline identified one trafficking case.
In 2020, the government formally amended the position descriptions of labor inspectors to include responsibility for identification of trafficking victims and subsequent notification to law enforcement, which came into force in 2023. The government did not report providing labor inspectors with anti-trafficking training. Authorities previously acknowledged the labor inspectorate was underfunded, and civil society reported inspectors required more training to identify trafficking cases. Additionally, the frequent use of inspection moratoriums on certain types of businesses made it difficult to identify trafficking cases and ensure compliance with Kazakhstan’s labor laws. In previous years, migrant workers reported using unofficial third-party intermediaries to find employment and meet Kazakh migration registration requirements; these intermediaries often circumvented the law and could facilitate the trafficking of foreign national victims with relative impunity due to their unofficial status. International experts previously reported construction companies used sub-contractors as intermediaries to hire labor migrants without government oversight or the use of contracts, generating vulnerabilities to trafficking. Civil society reported a lack of knowledge on labor rights, including human trafficking, among migrant laborers. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government reported providing anti-trafficking training for its diplomatic personnel.
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Kazakhstan, and traffickers exploit victims from Kazakhstan abroad. Domestically, the relative economic prosperity in the capital Astana, the financial center Almaty, and the western oil cities of Aktau and Atyrau attracts large numbers of rural Kazakh citizens, some of whom traffickers lure through fraudulent offers of employment and then exploit in sex trafficking, including in massage parlors, and forced labor in agriculture, construction, domestic service, and other sectors. Traffickers force some children to beg and may also coerce adults and children into criminal behavior. The most vulnerable groups at risk of trafficking include individuals from rural areas, undocumented migrants, persons without identity documents, unemployed individuals, individuals experiencing homelessness, and disabled persons.
Members of Kazakhstan’s LGBTQI+ communities are at risk of police abuse, extortion, and coercion into informant roles; LGBTQI+ individuals, particularly transgender persons required to undergo invasive and bureaucratic processes for gender-affirming care, are vulnerable to trafficking amid widespread social stigma and discrimination that often jeopardizes their employment status or prospects in the formal sector and complicates their access to justice. Domestic violence victims may seek and accept unsafe employment opportunities in which traffickers may exploit them. Kazakh and foreign national forced labor victims may go unidentified in farms located in remote rural areas, such as in Karaganda. Turkmen citizens entering Kazakhstan without proper documentation are vulnerable to forced labor on farms.
Women and children from neighboring East Asian, Central Asian, and Eastern European countries, as well as from rural areas in Kazakhstan, are exploited in sex trafficking in Kazakhstan; in most cases, traffickers target young girls and women, luring them with promises of employment, including through social media, as waitresses, models, or nannies in large cities. Observers noted traffickers increasingly use online recruitment methods to lure victims for exploitation in sex trafficking. Experts noted individuals with substance use issues are at increased risk for trafficking. Children are increasingly targeted for forced criminality in drug trafficking. Traffickers exploit Central Asian citizens, in particular Uzbekistani men and women and lesser numbers from Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, in forced labor in domestic service, construction, bazaars, and agriculture in Kazakhstan. Many Central Asian migrant workers that were subjected to Russia’s 2014 re-entry ban have subsequently sought temporary work and residence in Kazakhstan. Thousands of undocumented Uzbekistani migrants transit into Kazakhstan each day via informal border crossings for seasonal labor in construction, agriculture, retail, hospitality, and commercial sex; these individuals are particularly vulnerable to trafficking by virtue of their irregular immigration status, as are their accompanying children, who often do not attend school despite their eligibility to do so. NGOs have reported the use of debt-based coercion by traffickers in the exploitation of migrants in recent years. Traffickers capitalize on tough law enforcement policies to coerce migrants to remain in exploitative situations and leverage these policies to threaten victims with punishment and deportation if they notify authorities, fostering distrust in law enforcement. Some Russian citizens fleeing Russia, some by irregular means, in order to avoid conscription into military service and military mobilization to fight in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, may be vulnerable to trafficking.
Traffickers exploit Kazakh men and women in forced labor, mostly in Russia, but also in Southeast Asia, Bahrain, the Republic of Korea, Türkiye, and the United Arab Emirates. Sex traffickers exploit Kazakh women and girls in Russia, Uzbekistan, the Middle East, Europe, East Asia, and the United States. Traffickers exploit Kazakh citizens in cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia. People’s Republic of China authorities arbitrarily detain some Kazakh citizens visiting family in Xinjiang and subject them to forced labor. Some Kazakh migrants in Russia, including those detained in Russian prisons, are vulnerable to forced recruitment to fight in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Kazakhs and citizens from other Central Asian countries in Kazakhstan are recruited to fight in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine with the promise of fast-track citizenship. Organized crime groups and small trafficking rings with recruiters operate in conjunction with brothel operators in Kazakhstan and abroad. Kazakh labor migrants in the UK that have faced labor violations by private employers may be at risk of exploitation. Kazakh men who traveled to Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan to fight alongside or seek employment within armed groups brought their families with them, at times under deception. Kazakh citizens remaining in these conflict zones, including children, may be at risk of trafficking, including in refugee camps in Syria.