Increase efforts to vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, and convict traffickers, including complicit officials. * Amend the 2007 law to remove the required demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute child sex trafficking. * Allow shelter residents freedom of movement, possession of their travel documents, and the ability to work. * Develop – and disseminate widely – SOPs for proactive victim identification and train law enforcement, foreign affairs, marine, and labor officials on their use. * Proactively screen for trafficking indicators among vulnerable groups, including among workers in the fishing, palm oil, and extractive industries. * Increase resources for and proactively offer all victims, including men and boys, comprehensive services. * Increase efforts to effectively monitor labor recruitment agencies, including in the fishing sector; implement all labor laws and regulations and improve oversight of sectors at-risk for labor trafficking, including the fishing, palm oil, and extractive industries; and, through the 2022 regulation of the 2017 migrant worker law, develop and implement employer-paid orientations for Indonesian and migrant fishermen. * Provide regular anti-trafficking training for judges, prosecutors, police, and social workers. * Increase resources for the anti-trafficking task force and improve its coordination across ministries. * Ensure ministries and agencies fulfill their obligations to fund and implement anti-trafficking activities under the 2020-2024 NAP. * Develop and maintain a comprehensive and centralized database to accurately track and report the government’s anti-trafficking statistics, including victim identification and protection efforts; improve information sharing and targeted anti-trafficking approaches among relevant government agencies, including at all levels of law enforcement. * Increase awareness of trafficking trends and vulnerabilities among religious and local village leaders. * Create a national protocol clarifying roles for prosecuting trafficking cases outside victims’ home provinces. * Screen any North Korean workers for signs of trafficking and refer them to appropriate services, in a manner consistent with obligations under United Nations Security Council resolution 2397.

The government increased law enforcement efforts; however, the government has not taken significant steps to address corruption and official complicity concerns in trafficking crimes. The 2007 law criminalized all forms of labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking and prescribed penalties of three to 15 years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with international law, the 2007 law required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking crime and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. Judicial officials at the national and provincial level asserted the law implicitly established that force, fraud, or coercion were not required to constitute child sex trafficking, and that this therefore was not a barrier in successfully prosecuting and obtaining convictions in child sex trafficking cases. Nevertheless, observers noted low awareness among local law enforcement and judicial officials of trafficking and relevant legislation impeded case detection and prosecutions. The government also prosecuted trafficking crimes under other laws, including the 2014 Child Protection Law and the 2017 Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers Law.

Ineffective coordination among agencies and the lack of a centralized database hindered law enforcement anti-trafficking efforts and comprehensive data collection; therefore, data reported was incomplete and likely duplicative. The government reported investigating 1,061 trafficking cases – 370 for sex trafficking, 603 for labor trafficking, and 88 involving unspecified forms of trafficking – in 2023, compared with investigating 133 trafficking cases in 2022. Authorities prosecuted an unknown number of alleged traffickers in 706 cases under the 2007 law in 2023, compared with prosecuting an unknown number of traffickers in 223 cases in 2022. Courts convicted an unknown number of traffickers in 435 cases in 2023, compared with convicting 217 traffickers in 2022. The government’s reported law enforcement data – investigations, prosecutions, and convictions – were potentially duplicative and may have included cases from prior years. Prosecutors were reportedly more likely to charge trafficking crimes under the 2017 migrant worker law because it had a lower evidentiary threshold. The government reported investigating at least one alleged trafficker for their exploitation of 17 Indonesian fishermen in labor trafficking.

Endemic corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes, particularly in the palm oil, fishing, and extractive industries, remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action. NGOs and international organizations alleged both official complicity and corruption occurred on palm oil plantations, noting some regents run “prisons” with forced labor victims on the plantations; the government’s heightened requirements for organizations to visit palm oil plantations stymied NGO and international organization efforts to investigate labor conditions. Authorities prosecuted two government officials for alleged complicity in trafficking crimes, compared with prosecuting and convicting one complicit official in 2022. Among the two prosecutions, the government prosecuted an immigration official for facilitating the movement of trafficking victims; this case remained pending at the end of the reporting period. In July 2023, the government charged a regent previously convicted for corruption in relation to labor trafficking at a palm oil plantation, with trafficking crimes; the trial remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period. In 2023, authorities released the regent’s son after serving half of his 19-month sentence for torturing a trafficking victim to death in 2022. As part of the same 2022 palm oil plantation case, authorities only prosecuted 13 of 60 alleged traffickers implicated in the case; the other 47 alleged traffickers, including numerous police and military officials, remained free and in their positions at the end of the reporting period. Authorities prosecuted nine of the 13 alleged traffickers under non-trafficking statutes, resulting in significantly more lenient sentences as a result. Courts also convicted a former East Nusa Tenggara legislator, under the 2007 law for his involvement in facilitating child labor trafficking in Jakarta – after his time in office – and sentenced him to four years and eight months in prison. Civil society alleged some law enforcement officials and politicians organized law enforcement actions on entertainment venues to extort financial kickbacks from adults in commercial sex, which may have included sex trafficking victims. Corrupt officials reportedly continued to facilitate the issuance of false documents, accepted bribes to allow brokers to transport undocumented migrants across borders, protected venues where sex trafficking occurred, engaged in witness intimidation, and intentionally practiced weak oversight to insulate recruitment agencies from liability.

The Indonesian National Police’s (INP) Criminal Investigative Division was the lead agency for investigating trafficking crimes involving multiple jurisdictions; provincial and district-level police investigated all other trafficking cases. Ineffective coordination among agencies and the lack of a centralized database hindered law enforcement anti-trafficking efforts and comprehensive data collection. The Indonesian Attorney General’s Office was responsible for prosecuting trafficking crimes. The government provided anti-trafficking training to police at national training centers but did not report what specific topics were covered in such trainings. Officials reported police investigators lacked effective training and an understanding of how to build trafficking cases; therefore, prosecutors were frequently forced to charge traffickers with lesser crimes or not at all. Officials also reported some provincial police units, limited by budget constraints, investigated most trafficking cases as other crimes, which further hindered prosecutors from filing trafficking-related charges against alleged traffickers. Observers noted many investigators received limited or no guidance on the requirements to prosecute trafficking cases. The government, in partnership with an international organization, trained prosecutors and some judges on trafficking casework; in addition, authorities trained members of the national anti-trafficking task force on the services available to trafficking victims. The government did not report training police investigators on building trafficking cases; observers noted many investigators were reluctant to conduct cross-border trafficking investigations or investigate cases in which the victim was exploited abroad. The government’s lack of investigation and prosecution bilateral cooperation mechanisms hindered law enforcement efforts in transnational trafficking cases. In cases of labor violations, including suspected labor trafficking, police and the Indonesian Migrant Worker Protection Agency (BP2MI) often pursued mediation in lieu of criminal investigation. BP2MI reported it resolved approximately 32,000 migrant worker complaints through civil mediation between 2020 and 2022; during that same period, BP2MI reported identifying tens of thousands of suspected trafficking victims. BP2MI did not report how many complaints were resolved through civil mediation, if any. In August 2023, INP collaborated with a foreign government to conduct a law enforcement action against an online scam operation in Batam, Riau Islands Province; INP apprehended 88 PRC-nationals, including five adult female potential sex trafficking victims. INP did not report screening the PRC nationals, many of whom may have been victims of forced labor, for indicators of trafficking; observers reported these individuals may have been deported.

The government increased efforts to identify and protect victims. The government lacked a comprehensive system to collect victim identification data; therefore, data reported was incomplete and likely duplicative. The Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK) received referrals for 508 trafficking victims and witnesses in 2023; it provided care, including shelter services, to these and other trafficking victims and witnesses identified during the previous reporting period – compared with assisting 262 victims and witnesses in 2022. Of the 508 trafficking victims and witnesses, the government reported identifying and supporting only two labor trafficking victims from the fishing industry, despite widespread reports of exploitation among fishermen. The government may have identified more labor trafficking victims from the fishing industry. Unlike the previous reporting period, the government reported the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) received 1,359 trafficking victim referrals from police, government ministries and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs in 2023 – compared with the government’s prior reporting in 2021 of MOSA receiving 1,082 trafficking victim referrals. An international organization identified 80 trafficking victims and assisted 101, including eight child victims (six sex trafficking and two forced labor) and 93 adult victims (89 labor trafficking and four sex trafficking). The National Commission for Indonesian Child Protection (KPAI) reported 922 instances of child exploitation, some of which were likely trafficking. KPAI did not report referring any victims to protection services or referring any cases to law enforcement for criminal investigation. The Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection (MOWECP) reported 172 child trafficking cases and 212 instances of child exploitation, some of which were likely trafficking.

Police, central and regional service centers, diplomatic missions, and key government ministries utilized separate SOPs for victim identification and referral to care. Observers expressed concern the lack of a national SOP and the placement of trafficking under the purview of local-level police and protection agencies, which generally focused on women and children, hindered the identification of rural and male trafficking victims, and victims from underserved communities. For example, government officials reported they lacked adequate SOPs to screen for trafficking among the newly vulnerable population of Indonesian migrant workers in Cambodia. Due to lack of formal identification procedures and training among front-line officials, authorities likely inappropriately arrested, penalized, and deported trafficking victims solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked.

The government operated several shelters and service centers for victims of crime, including trafficking, however the government did not report how many trafficking victims received assistance at these facilities in 2023. MOSA reported referring 1,359 trafficking victims to government social centers or NGOs in 2023, compared with no reported referrals in 2022 and 555 in 2021. However, inconsistencies in MOSA’s reporting made it difficult to confirm the true number of victims referred to services. MOSA reported providing all victims access to social assistance, medical and psychological support, and vocational training. The government coordinated assistance for victims of abuse, including trafficking victims, through Local Technical Implementation Units for Women and Child Protection, located in all 34 provinces and approximately 275 districts. The centers are equipped to provide short-term medical care, legal aid, and reintegration; however, funding and service delivery varied across locations. LPSK operated an undisclosed number of shelters and safe houses for victims and witnesses to crimes who faced threats or intimidation, including trafficking victims. LPSK did not permit shelter residents full freedom of movement, retained their passports, and did not permit residents to seek employment, reportedly for security reasons. MOSA operated 41 shelters which could assist victims of crimes, including trafficking. According to MOSA’s SOPs, shelters could only receive and release victims with approval of another government agency. MOWECP internal SOPs guaranteed services to trafficking victims, including medical care, legal assistance, and repatriation; however, international organizations reported these services were not available, or even known, in some parts of the country. A general lack of adequate protection and reintegrative care, coupled with low awareness among village and local leaders, increased the risk of re-victimization, particularly among fishermen exploited in labor trafficking. The government did not provide legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where they may face hardship or retribution.

According to a 2023 report by an international organization, 3,239 Indonesian nationals were identified in online scam operations in Southeast Asia and 1,132 were identified as trafficking victims; the report did not specify who identified these victims. In 2023, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) identified and provided protective services to 798 overseas Indonesian trafficking victims, including trafficking victims identified in online scam operations, compared with 1,018 victims in 2022. The MFA operated 75 temporary shelters in diplomatic missions for Indonesian nationals exploited abroad. As of 2020, the government operated three Seafarers Corners in Taiwan, South Africa, and Uruguay. The government last reported repatriating 589 Indonesian fishermen from abuse or exploitation on 98 PRC-flagged fishing vessels in 2020. An international organization reported identifying and assisting 25 Indonesian trafficking victims aboard foreign-flagged vessels in 2023.

LPSK reported 62 trafficking victims participated in investigations and prosecutions in 2023, compared with 208 in 2022. INP reported approximately 3,249 trafficking victims participated in investigations in 2023, compared with 668 in 2022. Although regulations permitted video testimony and pre-recorded testimony for some female and child trafficking victims, some judges continued to require victims to testify in person. LPSK was tasked with providing assistance to victim-witnesses in trafficking cases; observers reported LPSK is underfunded, and subsequently, their support to victims was inconsistent. Many trafficking victims chose to not participate in prosecutions because authorities required them to remain in government shelters – where they lacked freedom of movement, travel documents, the ability to work, and consistent funding for meals and incidentals. In some cases, authorities did not track victims released from MOSA shelters, including for purposes of keeping the victims informed of the cases against traffickers and to gather their testimony.

Courts could order compensation and restitution in trafficking cases. Article 50 of the 2007 law permitted judges to substitute additional imprisonment for restitution if the trafficker did not have sufficient assets. Prosecutors reported foreign corporations and other traffickers could shield their assets, and many judges elected to order the additional imprisonment. Nevertheless, LPSK sought 11.4 billion rupiah ($741,580) in restitution for 389 trafficking victims, compared with 5.3 billion rupiah ($344,770) requested for 209 victims in 2022. However, courts only approved 1.8 billion rupiah ($117,090) for 56 victims and witnesses, and there were jurisdictional variations to how often courts awarded restitution. Labor courts could order defendants to pay compensation, and many labor trafficking victims, especially in fishing, pursued this option because of its speed and the greater likelihood of financial relief. Labor courts, however, did not always award adequate relief; for example, during the previous reporting period, one forced labor victim in the fishing sector secured a compensation award for less than the amount of his unpaid wages, on top of costs incurred during the eight months he had pursued the case without government assistance. The government did not report whether labor courts referred any potential trafficking cases to police.

Several ministries and agencies, including MOWECP, MOSA, and BP2MI, continued to operate hotlines which could receive trafficking-related calls. In 2023, BP2MI’s hotline and complaint system received 707 complaints from Indonesia workers overseas; it assessed 28 of the calls were suspected trafficking cases and 529 had trafficking indicators, such as illegal recruitment and false documentation. This is compared with receiving 1,987 complaints, 60 of which were suspected trafficking cases, in 2022. BP2MI did not report referring the cases to law enforcement. Separately, BP2MI also reported between 2020 and 2022, it came into contact with 80,000 Indonesian migrant workers in distress and assessed 90 percent of them were victims of exploitation, including trafficking. BP2MI did not report how many of these cases it reported to police for investigation or if and how it assisted the victims.

The government decreased efforts to prevent trafficking. The government had a national anti-trafficking task force. In 2023, the government designated the Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs and the Coordinating Ministry of Human Development and Culture as the task force’s co-Chairs, and INP as the Executive Chair. The government did not report how frequently the task force met, if at all. For the third consecutive year, the government did not report the task force’s budget. The task force continued implementation of the 2020-2024 anti-trafficking NAP, which required each ministry and agency to allocate resources for and conduct anti-trafficking activities. Authorities reported 283 municipalities and districts, and every province except Papua and West Papua, had established local anti-trafficking task forces; however, observers noted many of these task forces existed only on paper, or otherwise lacked funding, effective coordination, or an understanding of trafficking. Separate government ministries conducted awareness campaigns through print and electronic media targeting some vulnerable populations, including potential victims of online scam operations.

The 2017 migrant worker law mandated provincial governments – instead of private companies – oversee pre-departure vocational training and placement of migrant workers. The government did not report provincial governments’ efforts to implement this mandate. Although 2020 and 2022 implementing regulations of the 2017 migrant worker law defined and exempted Indonesian migrant workers, including migrant fishermen, from placement fees, including fees for flights, visas, passports, job training, and accommodation, many workers still reported paying these fees, including 89 percent of Indonesian migrant fishermen surveyed from 2021-2022. The government revoked four and suspended three licenses of recruitment agencies in 2023; this was compared with suspending 11 licenses in 2021, and suspending five and revoking 111 in 2020 for reasons such as unsafe accommodations, document forgery, coercive or deceptive recruitment practices, underage recruitment, illegal fees, and contravening the government’s moratorium on migrant work in several countries. The government maintained several policies and practices which increased migrant workers’ vulnerability to traffickers. A 2020 implementing regulation of the 2017 migrant worker law required married migrant workers to obtain permission from their spouse to work abroad. A separate policy banned the placement of Indonesian migrant workers in 21 Middle Eastern and North African nations. The government confiscated the passports of Indonesians repatriated from situations of trafficking abroad. Although the government assessed these policies protected vulnerable workers, the UN, international organizations, and NGOs continued to argue they instead increased the likelihood workers would move outside of regular migration channels, heightening their vulnerability to trafficking. The government had MOUs with 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions for the recruitment, placement, and protection of Indonesian migrant workers. The government renegotiated its group MOU with seven government ministries and agencies to add specific roles for the Ministry of Manpower (MOM) and LPSK.

MOM conducted 14,458 pre-announced labor inspections of formal sector workplaces in 2023, compared with 14,627 in 2022. MOM did not have sufficient staff or resources to fully inspect all formal sector workplaces, and it did not conduct any inspections of the informal sector. The National Commission on Human Rights did not report its findings after inspecting several palm oil plantations in 2023, despite continued reports of trafficking indicators among workers and the high-profile trafficking case involving a palm oil plantation in 2022. NGOs and labor unions alleged official complicity hampered authorities’ oversight of PRC-affiliated industrial plants. An NGO reported PRC-national owned industries perpetrated, and the government tacitly permitted, systematic labor abuses against PRC-national workers, including wage manipulations, passport confiscation, intimidation, physical abuse, and debt-based coercion. Observers noted widespread poor labor and safety conditions at industrial plants owned by PRC-affiliated companies directly contributed to a fatal 2023 explosion which killed 21 workers; labor leaders asserted authorities could have done more to regulate PRC-owned companies in the nickel smelting industry, including by ensuring accountability for accidents and implementation of safety improvements. The government reported limited efforts to prevent trafficking or investigate labor abuses among PRC-owned industrial plants and worksites, and observers reported government safety inspectors faced difficulties in accessing PRC-affiliated industrial plants; in one case, authorities were only able to inspect safety practices from a facility’s entrance while flanked by company-hired security.

The government did not effectively implement labor regulations for the fishing sector. An NGO reported indications of debt-based coercion, deception, intimidation, threats, document retention, withholding of wages, and physical abuse among fishers across numerous recruitment agencies in both the international and domestic fishing sectors. Civil society groups noted many Indonesian and migrant fishermen were unaware of their rights and responsibilities and unprepared for work in the absence of standardized, employer-paid pre-departure and post-arrival orientation and training. Regulation No. 22 of 2022, as required by the 2017 migrant worker law, required the provision of pre-departure orientation to Indonesian migrant workers in fishing, including information on labor rights and safety at sea; however, it did not apply to domestic fishermen, provide for post-return training on fishermen’s rights, or specify whether the government or employers should fund and provide the orientation. An international organization noted the government, in practice, continued to lack mechanisms to monitor recruitment agencies registered before 2022, and MOM and the Ministry of Transportation lacked an agreement clarifying inspection and enforcement mandates. An NGO noted ineffective labor inspections of fishing vessels, in part due to a lack of communication between inspection agencies under the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries; additionally, an NGO reported labor inspectors failed to interview or screen fishermen for indicators of abuse or trafficking. Due to overlapping government mandates, many fishermen were unaware of how to report labor abuses. The government continued to implement a 2020 ban on Indonesian fishermen working aboard PRC-flagged vessels, vessels operated by PRC-state owned companies, and Republic of Korea (ROK)- and Taiwan-flagged vessels operating outside of their Exclusive Economic Zones. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex. It made efforts to reduce the demand for extraterritorial commercial child sexual exploitation and abuse by coordinating with foreign governments to deny entry to known child sex offenders.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Indonesia and exploit Indonesians abroad. Each of Indonesia’s 38 provinces is a source and destination of trafficking. Traffickers use unscrupulous recruitment agents and sub-agents, retention of identity documents, and threats of violence to keep migrants in forced labor. Indonesian migrant workers often assume debts both Indonesian and overseas recruitment agents exploit to coerce and retain their labor. Labor traffickers exploit many Indonesians through force or debt-based coercion in Asia (particularly the PRC, ROK, and Singapore) and the Middle East (particularly Saudi Arabia) in domestic work, factories, construction, and manufacturing; on Malaysian oil palm plantations; and on fishing vessels. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Middle East host many Indonesian domestic workers who are not fully protected under local labor laws and experience trafficking indicators, including excessive working hours, lack of formal contracts, physical abuse, and unpaid wages; many of these workers come from the province of East Nusa Tenggara. The government estimates more than two million of the six to eight million Indonesians working abroad – many of whom are women in domestic work – are undocumented or have expired visas, increasing their vulnerability to exploitation. Indonesian nationals who participate in Japan’s “Technical Intern Training Program” are vulnerable to forced labor. In 2022, reports emerged of traffickers exploiting some Indonesian migrant workers to work in agriculture in the United Kingdom. Some workers had up to £5,000 GBP ($6,360) debts for one season of work, and some earned less than £300 GBP ($380) per week due to no minimum guaranteed hours and substantial deductions for transportation, visas, and language training.

In 2022, reports increased of foreign traffickers, including PRC nationals, and Indonesian agents fraudulently recruiting Indonesian men and women for exploitation in labor trafficking in online scam operations in Burma, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Traffickers use social media to promise the individuals, many of whom are often moderate to highly educated, legitimate work in the information technology sector but, upon arrival, traffickers confiscate their passports and exploit them in labor trafficking in online scam operations using debt-based coercion, threats, physical force, and false imprisonment. In 2023, MFA repatriated more than 3,000 Indonesian nationals exploited in online scam operations; the true number of Indonesian nationals exploited in online scam operations is almost certainly significantly larger. In prior years, there were reports for-profit universities in Taiwan aggressively recruited Indonesians and placed them into exploitative labor under the guise of educational opportunities. Increasingly, unregistered Taiwan universities lured Indonesian students to Taiwan with fake internships and forced the students to work in the local economy; fake internship trafficking schemes targeting Indonesian students were also reported in Japan, Australia, Germany, and New Zealand. Sex traffickers recruit Indonesian women and girls for ostensibly legitimate employment abroad and exploit them in sex trafficking, primarily in Malaysia, Taiwan, the Middle East, and Timor-Leste.

Within Indonesia, traffickers exploit adults and children in fishing, fish processing, construction, mining, and manufacturing; and on palm oil and other plantations. Traffickers subject children to forced criminality in the illegal drug trade. Government regulations exempt employers in certain sectors – including small and medium enterprises and textile manufacturing – from minimum wage requirements, increasing the workers’ risk to debt-based coercion. More than 1.5 million Indonesian children between ages 10 and 17 work in agriculture, including on tobacco plantations, without protective gear, which can be an indicator of labor trafficking. NGOs report some professional horse racers in the city of Bima use child jockeys, some of whom may be forced. Early marriage practices push many rural and impoverished children into employment as new primary household earners, including pushing many into labor migration channels known for deceptive recruitment practices, debt bondage, and other forced labor indicators. Traffickers force women and girls in labor in domestic work.

In 2021, a PRC-owned nickel mining company allegedly recruited PRC national workers through unlicensed PRC-based contractors and forced them into labor through passport confiscation, wage garnishing and withholding, forced overtime, and physical beatings. In a 2022 survey of 333 PRC workers in Indonesia, 73 percent had invalid work permits, 23 percent reported they could not leave their workplaces, and seven workers had died at worksites without explanation. In 2023, Indonesian workers at a PRC national-owned nickel mining company protested poor working conditions and alleged they received lower pay than the PRC workers; two workers died at the protest. The Indonesian government criticized the PRC-owned companies’ working conditions and initiated an investigation into the company for labor law violations; however, the government has not reported any updates to the investigation, changes to working conditions, or providing assistance to the workers. North Korean nationals working in Indonesia may be operating under exploitative working conditions and display multiple indicators of forced labor. In 2023, observers reported traffickers increasingly exploit Rohingya refugees claiming asylum in Indonesia, especially women and girls, including by abducting refugees from refugee shelters.

According to an international organization, up to 30 percent of individuals in commercial sex in Indonesia are child sex trafficking victims. Sex traffickers often use debt or offers of employment in restaurants, factories, or domestic service to coerce and deceive women and girls into commercial sex, notably in Batam, Jakarta, and North Sulawesi and in facilities such as spas, hotels, bars, and karaoke establishments. Family members or friends are often complicit in the exploitation of young women from North Sulawesi. Traffickers also exploit women and girls in sex trafficking near mining operations in Central Sulawesi, Maluku, Papua, and Jambi provinces. Traffickers increasingly use online platforms to recruit children for sex trafficking and men for labor trafficking. Extraterritorial child sexual exploitation and abuse is prevalent in the Riau Islands bordering Singapore. Bali is a destination for Indonesian and foreign perpetrators of extraterritorial child sexual exploitation and abuse. The government tacitly accepted a religious practice whereby Middle Eastern tourists come to Indonesia, particularly Puncak district in Bogor, and pay more than $700 for a “contract marriage,” usually lasting up to one week, that allows them to have extramarital sex with girls as young as nine without violating Islamic law. Religious extremist groups, in their fight against government forces, operating within and outside Indonesia recruit and use Indonesian children as child soldiers in combat and support roles as porters, cooks, informants, and propaganda distributers.

Indonesians whose homes or livelihoods were destroyed by natural disasters, the approximately four million children the government deems “neglected,” and approximately 16,000 children experiencing homelessness are vulnerable to trafficking. Government failure to prevent companies from encroaching on Indigenous communities’ land, sometimes in collusion with the military and local police, contributes to displacement that leaves some ethnic minorities vulnerable to trafficking. Observers note high level corruption facilitates illegal mining and logging; both sectors frequently include indicators of trafficking among workers and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities to trafficking faced by rural and indigenous communities harmed through ecosystem destruction and conflict with perpetrators. Endemic corruption among officials creates trafficking vulnerabilities in the travel, hospitality, and labor recruitment industries. Widespread social stigma and discrimination against LGBTQI+ individuals and persons living with HIV/AIDS complicates their access to formal sector employment, creating a risk of trafficking through unsafe informal sector employment.

Some traffickers target Indonesian fishermen from Java, including impoverished farm workers, fraudulently recruit them with promises of high salaries and good working conditions, provide illicit travel documents, and make them sign contracts so hard to break that experts call them “slavery contracts.” In Indonesian waters and elsewhere, some senior vessel crewmembers force fishermen to engage in illegal practices, making them vulnerable to penalization. Some senior vessel crewmembers on PRC, ROK, Vanuatua, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Italy, United Kingdom, and Philippines-flagged and/or owned fishing vessels operating in Indonesian, Thai, Sri Lankan, Mauritian, Namibian, and Indian waters subject Indonesian fishermen to forced labor. Most Indonesian fishermen work aboard vessels in Taiwan and ROK’s secluded distant water fleets, impeding their ability to report abuse and exploitation. Recruitment agencies in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand similarly lure fishermen with promises of high wages but then charge fees, curtail deposits, assign them fake identity documents and labor permits, and force them to fish for long hours on vessels that operate under complex multinational flagging and ownership arrangements and sometimes do not return to shore for months or years at a time, which permits abusive senior crewmembers to exploit workers with impunity. Fishermen on these vessels have reported low or unpaid salaries; coercive tactics such as contract discrepancies, document retention, restricted communication and movement, poor living and working conditions; physical violence; and severe physical and sexual abuse. In a survey of 35 fishermen on Indonesian-flagged vessels, 71 percent reported they did not have possession of their identity documents, and more than 88 percent reported substantial salary deductions and irregular wages – indicators of forced labor. Indonesian fishermen have reported persistent physical violence, 20-hour shifts, and lack of food on PRC-flagged fishing vessels – indicators of forced labor – and authorities have removed hundreds of exploited Indonesians from such vessels and recorded the deaths of 12 others between from 2019- 2020. Some PRC-, ROK-, and Taiwan-flagged vessels keep Indonesian workers after completion of their contracts until the company secures replacement workers.