Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including labor traffickers and public officials complicit in trafficking. * Provide specialized services for all victims of labor and sex trafficking, including adults, boys, and girls younger than 12. * Increase efforts to proactively identify victims of forced criminality and ensure victims are not penalized solely for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. * Revise the NAP (known as PACTA) to include efforts to mitigate the recruitment of children into criminality by armed gangs and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), including by force. * Create a specialized prosecutorial unit to focus solely on trafficking crimes. * Fund and increase support for NGOs to provide victim services. * Fund and implement provisions established in the 2023 anti-trafficking law. * Amend the definition of trafficking in the penal code (COIP) to remove the requirement of force, fraud, or coercion in child sex trafficking offenses. * Hire specialized labor inspectors, and train them on indicators of forced labor, and to conduct proactive and unannounced labor inspections in sectors vulnerable to exploitation, such as banana plantations, floriculture, hemp (abaca), and mining. * Establish systems to protect workers from labor trafficking, including amending legal provisions to prohibit employers from withholding passports or travel documents from workers, collecting worker-paid recruitment fees, and allowing foreign workers to change employers without facing penalties or deportation. * Increase training and efforts to pursue financial crime investigations in tandem with human trafficking cases.

The government increased efforts to prosecute TCOs and armed gangs, including those involved in illegal recruitment of children into criminality. Articles 91 and 92 of the 2014 Criminal Code criminalized all forms of labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking and prescribed penalties ranging from 13 to 16 years’ imprisonment. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those for other grave crimes, such as kidnapping. Article 91 defined trafficking broadly to include all labor exploitation, child pornography, child labor, illegal adoption, and the sale of tissues, fluids, and genetic materials of living persons. The definition of trafficking in Article 91 correctly established the use of force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of an adult trafficking offense. However, the law did not include a necessary provision indicating that the elements of force, fraud, or coercion were unnecessary in the case of sex trafficking offenses involving child victims. Therefore, some forms of child sex trafficking offenses were not explicitly criminalized under Article 91.

In 2023, the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) rolled out several high-profile cases implicating politicians, judicial actors, gangs, and transnational criminal organizations, including some responsible for illegal recruitment of children into criminality. In response to a rising caseload, the AGO temporarily reassigned some prosecutors from the Specialized Prosecutor’s Office in Transnational and International Organized Crime (FEDOTI) to other units. The reassignment of these prosecutors directly contributed to the decline in prosecutions for trafficking cases. In 2023, authorities investigated 197 potential trafficking cases, compared with 101 investigations in 2022. These included 112 possible trafficking cases under Article 91 and 85 cases of unspecified exploitation that may include human trafficking cases as defined under international law. Authorities actively prosecuted 10 trafficking cases involving an undisclosed number of individuals, five for sex trafficking, three for forced labor, and two for forced begging, compared with 17 trafficking cases involving 38 individuals prosecuted in 2022. The government convicted five traffickers, compared with the conviction of 13 traffickers in 2022. Officials did not report sentences given to traffickers. However, in previous years, sentenced traffickers received between 13 and 25 years in prison. Because Article 91 defines trafficking broadly, some of the investigations, prosecutions, and convictions reported under this law may not have involved crimes that rose to the level of trafficking as defined under international law. FEDOTI continued prosecuting a current CEO and two of his predecessors for their role in the alleged labor trafficking of 338 individuals at an abaca fiber plantation; the prosecution remained ongoing.

The Anti-Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Unit (UNATT) under the National Police was responsible for investigating crimes against children and adolescents, and the judicial police unit was responsible for investigating trafficking crimes against adults. In 2023, the UNATT increased the number of law enforcement officers working on human trafficking and migrant smuggling crimes from 30 in 2022 to 62 in 2023. The UNATT expanded and created two new taskforces, in Tulcan and Huaquillas, to improve victim identification and investigative efforts and obtained new vehicles for operations, facilitating the transfer of victims to safe houses and specialized services. Despite these improvements, officials indicated the UNATT remained under-resourced and understaffed, which impacted the unit’s readiness. FEDOTI was responsible for the prosecution of trafficking cases at the national level; however, due to its expansive mandate and the launch of several high-profile prosecutions, scarce resources were increasingly tied up, leaving the unit to prioritize non-trafficking crimes. The judicial branch had a specialized court against corruption and organized crime, which covered human trafficking crimes under its mandate; however, authorities did not report if any of the 10 ongoing prosecutions were handled by this court.

The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of any government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the year, and cases from previous years remained mostly unresolved. Officials did not investigate allegations that immigration officials at border crossings allowed alleged traffickers to transport potential sex trafficking victims to neighboring countries or provide updates in the case of the labor inspectors who may have accepted bribes to overlook violations. In 2023, an Ecuadorian diplomat settled an outstanding judgment from 2007 involving her former domestic worker. Some officials noted alleged corruption in the judiciary could inhibit justice in the abaca hemp plantation case. The company was well financed and extremely powerful, which increased the chance that members of the judiciary might accept a bribe to bring the case to an end or to determine violations did not rise to forced labor.

The Ministry of Interior (MOI) – in some cases in partnership with international organizations or foreign governments – trained officials, including police officers, prosecutors, and judges, on victim identification, victim-centered engagement, and investigating and prosecuting trafficking crimes. With support from an international organization, the MOI, the national police, and the AGO finalized a guide to help law enforcement officials identify, handle, and use evidence in trafficking cases, but authorities did not report relevant officials received any training on its use. The government cooperated with foreign governments on anti-trafficking operations. In 2023, authorities carried out nine anti-trafficking investigations with Peru, but authorities did not report how many individuals were apprehended or how many victims were identified as a result of those operations.

The government maintained protection efforts. In 2023, 190 victims were identified. Government authorities identified 67 victims (compared with 225 in 2022 and 51 in 2021), of which 30 were exploited in sex trafficking, three in labor trafficking, three in forced criminality, and 31 in unspecified forms of exploitation that may amount to trafficking; 27 were women, 22 were men, and 18 were girls. International organizations and government-supported NGOs identified 123 victims, of which 87 were women, 20 were girls, and 16 were LGBTQI+ individuals. Authorities identified three men in forced criminality as the country faced increased recruitment for forced criminality of men and boys by gangs supported by transnational criminal organizations. Three specialized shelters provided services to female adolescent sex trafficking victims, of which the government fully funded and operated two. The third shelter was operated by an NGO and mostly funded by the government. The government did not fund civil society organizations promptly and consistently, leaving victims vulnerable to re-trafficking and NGOs without secure funding for operations. MOI officials referred 14 sex trafficking victims to services, and, according to government reports, 222 human trafficking victims received assistance from the government and government-funded NGOs, including 162 women, 33 girls, and 27 men. Authorities reported housing 63 victims of trafficking in government-operated shelters. The NGO shelter reported housing 130 trafficking victims. According to NGOs, victims usually stayed from six months to a year. An international organization reported housing 89 trafficking victims in a non-specialized migrant shelter near the Huaquillas border crossing.

The government had a victim identification manual to aid with the proactive identification of victims, and authorities regularly referred victims to services. Stakeholders, including government officials, have reported concerns with the absence of specialized services and care outside major cities. Police noted challenges finding shelters for victims, particularly in provinces outside the capital; thus, police sometimes placed victims in non-specialized shelters until space in a specialized shelter became available. NGOs that relied on government funding for victim services expressed frustration with consistent and significant delays in the disbursement of funds needed to provide adequate care. In 2023, law enforcement officials collaborated with an international civil society organization that media, advocates, and anti-trafficking experts noted may not be using a victim-centered and trauma-informed approach.

The Ministry of Women and Human Rights (MWHR) was responsible for assisting adult victims of trafficking. In 2023, MWHR opened eight women-only shelters where adult female victims of violence could receive emergency care and shelter for a maximum of 24 hours. Authorities did not report providing shelter to adult victims of human trafficking; however, officials provided general services, including hygiene kits and psychological care to 90 trafficking victims (71 women, 11 men, and eight LGBTQI+ persons). In addition, there were five non-specialized shelters and 42 ambulatory care centers where adult female trafficking victims could receive general services from interdisciplinary teams that comprised psychologists, social workers, and attorneys. Authorities did not provide adequate services to men and boy victims. Officials remained confused and unaware of which agency was responsible for services for men or boy victims. Officials reported adult LGBTQI+ trafficking victims who did not want to receive shelter services could, with the support of a civil society organization, be provided hotel placement for up to 10 days. The Ministry of Social and Economic Inclusion (MIES) was responsible for assisting child trafficking victims; however, it did not have specialized services for child forced labor victims, boy sex trafficking victims, or girl sex trafficking victims younger than the age of 12. The government had two separate assistance protocols outlining minimum standards of care for female adult and adolescent trafficking victims in specialized and non-specialized shelters. Authorities did not report providing specialized care for victims in non-specialized shelters in 2023. The government did not report detaining or penalizing trafficking victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due to the deteriorating security situation and the lack sufficient proactive identification procedures for labor trafficking victims, particularly boys, authorities may have detained some unidentified trafficking victims forced into criminality by gangs and transnational groups.

The AGO’s formal witness protection program (SPAVT) could provide immediate support to victims, allowing them a 30-day reflection period before deciding whether to participate in the penal process against traffickers. If victims chose to assist in the prosecution of traffickers, the government continued to provide services through SPAVT; otherwise, officials referred female child victims to MIES and adult female victims to MWHR to help with their reintegration. During the reflection period, services offered by the SPAVT usually included shelter, medical assistance, legal support, psychological care, job placement, and assistance with school or university admissions. The SPAVT program assisted 25 victims during the year, compared with 38 in 2022 and 10 in 2021. In 2023, the anti-trafficking committee led the approval of a protocol for the protection of victims engaged in the SPAVT process. Foreign victims had access to the same services as Ecuadorian victims. The government had mechanisms to repatriate victims, and Ecuadorian diplomatic and consular missions abroad had funding to provide food, lodging, and airplane tickets to Ecuadorian victims seeking repatriation. Authorities coordinated with the Governments of Panama, Peru, and Colombia to repatriate six Ecuadorian victims identified in those countries. Officials also repatriated six foreign nationals identified in Ecuador. The Human Mobility Law guaranteed protection against refoulement to countries where the lives of victims or their relatives were at risk, including foreign victims of trafficking. Authorities reported they could grant temporary or permanent residency to foreign victims, and the government assisted in cases where the victims wished to repatriate. The government – in some cases with the support of international organizations – trained police and other public officials from MWHR, MIES, and the Ministry of Health on victim protection measures.

The government decreased prevention efforts. The Inter-Institutional Committee for the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons, which was chaired by the MOI and served as the national coordinating body, conducted 12 engagements. In 2023, the committee coordinated efforts to update several government guides and resources as required in the anti-trafficking law approved that year; these included the trafficking victim identification guide, guidelines for the repatriation of country nationals identified abroad and for foreign nationals identified in Ecuador. The Ministry of Labor (MOL), in coordination with an international organization, revised resources and tools for the implementation of the forced labor victim identification protocol and referral mechanism, likely improving government’s response.

The government continued implementing the 2019-2030 NAP for the elimination of trafficking, commonly known as PACTA, but did not report funding the interagency members of the anti-trafficking committee responsible for the implementation of PACTA-mandated activities. A civil society organization indicated the PACTA should be revised to reflect contemporary challenges the country faced in 2023, such as the increase in forced criminality of children related to a rise in gang violence. Authorities conducted some public awareness campaigns that reached students, members of the private sector, and businesses in artisanal markets where the presence of migrants in the informal sector was prevalent. Officials – in some cases with the support of international organizations – provided training for teachers, civil servants, and youth on the prevention of trafficking crimes. The criminal code prohibited extraterritorial sexual exploitation and abuse, known in the COIP as “sex tourism.” The government did not report investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of extraterritorial sexual exploitation and abuse crimes. Authorities made efforts to mitigate this form of exploitation by training officials and partnering with hotel establishments around the country to uphold regulations established to combat exploitation and trafficking in the tourism sector.

The MOL did not report conducting labor inspections despite concerns of forced labor in in sectors with vulnerable workers, such as banana plantations, abaca fiber, flower farms, mining, and palm plantations. NGOs and some government officials expressed concern the MOL did not make sufficient efforts to investigate forced labor. The MOL required employers to register the contracts of all foreign workers so authorities could verify they had adequate work conditions and salaries. Ecuadorian law did not prohibit labor recruitment practices traffickers commonly exploited, such as charging workers’ recruitment fees, confiscating workers’ passports, or allowing migrant workers to change employers without obtaining special permissions or losing their work permit. The absence of specific prohibitions against these practices increased the vulnerability of workers to exploitation. The government did not report efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government operated a hotline for the public to report crimes. Authorities did not report how many calls the hotline received or if calls led to investigations or victim identifications.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Ecuador, and traffickers exploit victims from Ecuador abroad. Traffickers exploit Ecuadorian adults and children in sex trafficking and forced labor in the country, including in domestic service; begging; banana, abaca fiber, and palm plantations; floriculture; shrimp farming; fishing; sweatshops; street vending; mining; and other areas of the informal economy. In 2019, the ombudsman’s office released a report on behalf of hundreds of agricultural workers and their families accusing a multinational corporation of child labor, forced labor, and practices analogous to slavery. According to sources, including the ombudsman’s office, abaca fiber workers, mostly Afro-Ecuadorians, lived on plantations under tin roofs in subhuman conditions without running water or electricity. Workers’ housing was in remote locations on the plantations, and access roads were often locked to prevent the workers’ freedom of movement. Most of the workers at the start of the supply chain did not have labor contracts in place and had to provide between three and five tons of abaca hemp to receive payment for their work. Women and girls worked as camp cooks and did not receive payments for their work. In 2021, a judge ruled in favor of the workers and ordered the company to pay compensation. In 2022, the company contested the ruling, and, in 2023, a court upheld the original decision. This is the largest criminal case in terms of victims of alleged human trafficking crimes in Ecuador’s history.

Sex trafficking is most prevalent in coastal provinces, including El Oro, Guayas, Manabí, Los Rios, and northern border provinces, including Carchi, Esmeraldas, Loja, and Sucumbíos. According to law enforcement and civil society experts, nearly 50 percent of the victims identified in 2023 came from Guayas, Los Rios, and Manabi province. Indigenous peoples and Afro-Ecuadorians, Colombian refugees, and Venezuelan migrants are particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers use Ecuador as a transit route for trafficking victims from Colombia, Venezuela, and the Caribbean to other South American countries and Europe. According to law enforcement officers, there were 42 informal border crossing points controlled by gangs and locals between Ecuador and Peru. Migrants unable to enter the country regularly opted for irregular border crossings, which significantly increased their vulnerability to GBV, exploitation, and human trafficking crimes. In 2022, an international organization reported that between eight and 10 single Venezuelan males crossed the border weekly with children with whom they did not have a familial relationship. Women, children, LGBTQI+ individuals, refugees, and migrants continue to be the most at risk for sex trafficking; Indigenous persons and nationals from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are vulnerable to forced labor. Traffickers promising a better life to migrants from South and Central America, the Caribbean, and, to a lesser extent, Africa and Asia confiscate documents, impose debts, and threaten or force migrants into commercial sex upon the victims’ arrival in Ecuador. Traffickers exploit Colombian, Peruvian, Venezuelan, and, to a lesser extent, Central American women and girls in sex trafficking, domestic servitude, and forced begging. Traffickers increasingly use social media networks to recruit and groom individuals to later exploit them in sex and labor trafficking. Traffickers recruit children from impoverished Indigenous families under false promises of employment and subject them to forced begging, domestic servitude, or forced labor in sweatshops and street and commercial vending in Ecuador and other South American countries. Traffickers exploit Ecuadorian children in forced criminality. In 2022, an NGO reported child recruitment by criminal gangs sometimes involved children as young as 10 years old. Traffickers recruited children to work as informants and lookouts (campanas), sell drugs in local communities, collect extortion payments, transport drugs, or work as hitmen. These traffickers recruited children from marginalized and vulnerable communities to strengthen their ranks by luring them with money or gifts and, in many cases, under threat of hurting their families. Schools remained recruitment grounds for traffickers and criminal actors, particularly in Guayaquil and Duran. Traffickers also recruited girls to exploit in sex trafficking or force into relationships with gang leaders, leaving them vulnerable to trafficking crimes. In 2023, the country faced a sharp increase in violence tied to TCOs and the rise of gang violence. This unrest led to an increase in forced child recruitment into criminality and armed conflict by gangs and TCOs. According to media reports, between January and June of 2023, an estimated 1,326 children between the ages of 12 and 17 had abandoned school to join criminal gangs. Traffickers exploit Ecuadorian in sex trafficking and forced labor abroad, including in the United States and other South American countries, particularly Chile and Colombia. Traffickers exploit Ecuadorian children in sex trafficking and forced labor in Chile, Colombia, Peru, and to a lesser degree, in Argentina, Spain, and Suriname. Some Ecuadorian trafficking victims are initially smuggled and later exploited in commercial sex or forced labor, including forced criminality in drug trafficking, in third countries. Allegedly, some corrupt Ecuadorian officials have alerted traffickers to law enforcement operations or labor inspections, and some local authorities assisted traffickers in procuring falsified identification documents, resulting in victims’ lack of confidence in the police and a reluctance to report potential crimes. Colombian illegal armed groups target and forcibly recruit Ecuadorian children living along the northern border. Traffickers lure vulnerable displaced Venezuelans with fraudulent employment opportunities, particularly those in irregular statuses, and later exploit them in sex trafficking and forced labor. Workers in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing – which is a maritime security threat and human rights concern for South American countries, including Ecuador – are vulnerable to forced labor. Foreign-flagged fishing vessels, including reefers that belong to PRC-based companies and often use Panamanian ‘flags of convenience,’ are found slightly outside Ecuador’s exclusive economic zone. These fleets deploy small vessels into Ecuador’s waters and turn off mandatory satellite radars, preventing authorities from tracking their location. Operators of foreign-flagged vessels often subject workers to forced labor and coerce them to illegally cross into sovereign territories, risking criminalization. IUU fishing practices could cause severe biodiversity loss because of overfishing and threaten the livelihood of Ecuadorian coastal communities who rely on artisanal fishing for survival; this results in forced displacement because of environmental degradation and risked additional trafficking in alternative sectors.