2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: Djibouti

DJIBOUTI (Tier 3)

The Government of Djibouti does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore Djibouti remained on Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including identifying one potential trafficking victim for the first time in five years and investigating and prosecuting one suspect in a potential labor trafficking case. However, the government did not convict any traffickers for the seventh consecutive year or adequately screen vulnerable populations for trafficking indicators. The government did not appoint a chair or members to its anti-trafficking coordinating committee, allocate dedicated funds for its operations, or draft a new NAP after the previous NAP expired in 2022. Law enforcement officials sometimes lacked understanding of the 2016 anti-trafficking law. The government did not make efforts to operationalize its NRM. Officials continued to demonstrate a lack of political will to address trafficking crimes, but some working level officials showed willingness to implement reforms. Many officials claimed their lack of efforts were due to limited resources and that most trafficking in Djibouti is a migration issue that does not affect Djiboutians.

Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute traffickers and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms, in accordance with the trafficking provisions in the 2016 anti-trafficking law. * Systematically and proactively identify trafficking victims, including by screening vulnerable populations – such as refugees, asylum-seekers, individuals involved in commercial sex, transiting migrants, and Cuban government-affiliated workers, including medical professionals – and refer all identified trafficking victims to appropriate care. * Increase anti-trafficking training for police, prosecutors, and judges on strong evidence gathering, the use of non-testimonial evidence in the absence of witness testimony, the irrelevance of a victim’s initial consent when proving a trafficking crime, victim-centered investigations, and the distinctions between human trafficking and migrant smuggling. * Increase judicial officials’ awareness of the trafficking provisions in the 2016 anti-trafficking law, including by providing training for judges on trafficking crimes and ensuring the penal code on the judges’ bench includes the 2016 anti-trafficking law. * Operationalize the National Committee to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Similar Practices to effectively lead the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, including by appointing a chair, identifying members, and disbursing funding for its operations. * Develop and finalize an updated NAP to combat trafficking and allocate resources to its implementation. * Provide specific anti-trafficking training to law enforcement officials, labor inspectors, prosecutors, and magistrates to improve case investigation, victim identification, and referral of victims to appropriate care. * Strengthen protection services for trafficking victims, including by providing specialized services to trafficking victims and providing funding or in-kind assistance to NGOs and international organizations providing protection services. * Increase awareness of all forms of human trafficking, including domestic servitude and forced child begging, among the public through government-run campaigns or provide financial or in-kind support for NGO-run campaigns. * Improve nationwide data collection and coordination on anti-trafficking law enforcement and victim identification efforts, including a method to disaggregate data between human trafficking crimes and other crimes, such as migrant smuggling. * Expand law enforcement’s capacity to investigate trafficking crimes by reducing restrictions on the time for investigations and increasing resources, as feasible.

The government maintained minimal anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. The 2016 Law No. 133, On the Fight Against Trafficking in Persons and Illicit Smuggling of Migrants, criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking; it prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those for other grave crimes, such as rape. The law considered the involvement of a child or forcing a victim into “prostitution” as aggravating circumstances for which the penalties increased to 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment.

The government reported investigating and prosecuting one defendant in a potential labor trafficking case, compared with five reported labor trafficking investigations and five prosecutions in the previous year. For the seventh consecutive year, officials did not convict any traffickers. Most potential human trafficking crimes moved through the judicial system as sexual assault or migrant smuggling charges, resulting in more lenient sentences for perpetrators; this approach likely weakened deterrence and did not adequately address the nature of trafficking crimes. Observers reported law enforcement did not always pursue reported case leads with potential trafficking indicators. Observers also reported prosecutors routinely dropped trafficking charges, claiming trafficking convictions required a higher burden of evidence and a longer timeline, which impeded prosecutions. These cases were often reclassified as other crimes, including migrant smuggling, kidnapping, rape, and sexual assault. Law enforcement officials sometimes halted investigations of potential trafficking crimes after foreign national victims and witnesses left the country, rather than utilizing other means of gathering evidence to continue investigations. Similarly, prosecutors and judges did not ensure continued inclusion of foreign victims’ testimony who returned to their country of origin, often resulting in dropped cases or acquittals due to a lack of evidence. Victims often chose not to participate in court proceedings due to fear of arrest or reputational harm and the protracted nature of the criminal courts and administrative process. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes. However, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained concerns, potentially inhibiting law enforcement action; observers reported security forces, especially at lower levels, were susceptible to bribes and may have ignored trafficking crimes.

Severe resource and capacity limitations continued to impede officials’ ability to comprehensively investigate trafficking crimes. Officials reported the requirement for law enforcement to present an investigative report and evidence to the court within three days of a suspect’s arrest (two days for crimes committed in Djibouti City) continued to inhibit law enforcement’s ability to fully investigate all crimes, including trafficking, and judges often dismissed cases on procedural grounds. As in prior years, criminal courts authorized to hear trafficking cases only convened twice during the year, hearing approximately 15-25 cases per year. Some judges did not use the 2016 anti-trafficking law to convict alleged traffickers and instead relied on older provisions from the 1995 penal code, such as kidnapping or abuse of power. Observers reported families or village elders often settled allegations of labor trafficking – including domestic servitude – informally through traditional arrangements between religious and community leaders, without referral to the formal court system.

The Djibouti National Police maintained a specialized unit to investigate crimes against children, including child trafficking, and an anti-vice unit to investigate commercial sex establishments, including sex trafficking. The government did not report providing any specialized anti-trafficking training to law enforcement or judicial officials. Some law enforcement officials demonstrated an incomplete understanding of human trafficking and the irrelevance of initial consent in a human trafficking crime. The government signed an MOU with the Ethiopian government to combat international trafficking and migrant smuggling with the assistance of an international organization.

The government maintained inadequate victim protection efforts. For the first time in five years, the government reported identifying one potential labor trafficking victim, and reported one potential victim of labor trafficking from the previous reporting period. The government did not report referring the victim to care. The government repatriated migrants – most of whom were Ethiopian – to their home countries without screening for trafficking indicators in most instances. During the previous reporting period, the government, in collaboration with an international organization, developed victim identification SOPs and an NRM to identify and refer potential victims to protection services. The government participated in the drafting of these documents and in related workshops but did not make an effort to validate and operationalize the NRM. The international organization operated the country’s only shelter dedicated for adult trafficking victims and vulnerable migrants. The government did not report referring any potential trafficking victims to the shelter or providing any financial or in-kind support to the shelter. The international organization intended to relinquish responsibility of the SOPs, NRM, and shelter to the government, but the government lacked the resources, training, and political will to implement or support these mechanisms. The government attended a training to commemorate World Day Against Trafficking in Persons held by an international organization, and the organization conducted a capacity building event for students at the national school of judicial studies related to trafficking and migrant vulnerabilities.

An international organization continued to operate a migrant shelter in Obock, which provided transiting migrants, including potential trafficking victims, with food and water; medical and psychosocial support; temporary shelter; and assisted voluntary return to their country of origin. The international organization also screened the migrants for trafficking indicators. Its staff continued to operate mobile clinics along dangerous migration routes to provide vulnerable migrants with medical assistance and raise awareness of the center’s resources, including voluntary repatriation and support for potential trafficking victims. Coast Guard officials continued to provide clothing and food to vulnerable migrants rescued from the sea and referred migrants to shelters, mainly the Obock shelter. In 2023, this international organization supported nearly 3,100 vulnerable people through its shelters. Observers reported the government did not provide financial support to the shelters. An NGO continued to operate a day center in Djibouti city for unaccompanied migrant children and vulnerable children who experienced homelessness, including potential trafficking victims; the government did not report referring any children to the NGO or supporting the NGO’s operations. The National Union of Djiboutian Women (UNFD) continued to operate a center in Djibouti city for vulnerable women and children, including gender-based violence victims and potential trafficking victims, to receive legal, medical, and psycho-social assistance. For the third consecutive year, the government did not report allocating funding for protection efforts that may have assisted potential trafficking victims.

The 2016 anti-trafficking law included provisions allowing trafficking victims temporary residency during judicial proceedings and permanent residency, as necessary, as a legal alternative to removal to countries where victims might face hardship or retribution; however, the government did not report providing temporary residency to any trafficking victims during the year. Additionally, the law directed the government to provide victims legal assistance and an interpreter, as well as psychological, medical, and social assistance. Observers reported in practice, the government did not provide these provisions due to the lack of available resources. Due to inconsistent implementation of formal identification procedures, trafficking victims, particularly vulnerable migrants and individuals in commercial sex, may have been deported or remained unidentified within the law enforcement system.

The government decreased efforts to prevent trafficking. Overall anti-trafficking coordination efforts remained minimal, and the government did not report allocating funds for prevention efforts. For the second consecutive year, the government did not report appointing a chair or taking further action to operationalize its national coordinating committee. The coordinating committee was established in February 2023 via a presidential decree and was set to be chaired by a Ministry of Justice appointee to lead the government’s anti-trafficking efforts. The government’s 2015-2022 NAP expired, and it did not draft a new NAP for the second consecutive year. The UNFD operated a 24-hour hotline to report cases of gender-based violence and refer victims to services, which could be utilized by trafficking victims. Labor recruitment and placement companies were subject to random inspections by the inspector general; however, the government did not report conducting labor inspections to enforce laws against forced labor or identifying any potential trafficking cases during inspections. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Djibouti, and to a lesser extent, traffickers exploit victims from Djibouti abroad. Traffickers, including family members of the victims, exploit local and migrant children, primarily from Ethiopia and Somalia, in forced begging in Djibouti city. Traffickers exploit migrant and local children in sex trafficking, sometimes using substances as a means of coercion. Traffickers exploit Djiboutian and migrant women and children experiencing homelessness in sex trafficking or labor trafficking, particularly domestic servitude, in Djibouti city, Ali Sabieh, Dikhil, Tadjoura, and Obock. Traffickers may exploit migrant women in sex trafficking at truck stops and in restaurants, nightclubs, bars, and guest houses in Balbala, one of Djibouti’s poorest neighborhoods. Observers report, in past years, traffickers exploited foreign workers – including Ethiopians, Somalis Yemenis, Indians, Pakistanis, and Filipinos – in forced labor in domestic service, construction, and food service sectors.

Adults and children, primarily undocumented economic migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia, transit Djibouti voluntarily en route to Yemen and other locations in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia. An international organization estimates more than 200,000 migrants – predominantly Ethiopian – transited Djibouti in 2023, including both land and sea crossings, compared with more than 150,000 migrants in 2022. Traffickers often exploit migrants who are transiting Djibouti to return to their respective countries of origin in labor trafficking, primarily in the agricultural sector, and sex trafficking via debt bondage or indentured servitude to pay off smugglers. Reports indicate smugglers, often involved in organized, cross-border networks, hold large groups of migrants in isolated areas in Djibouti, particularly near Obock and Dikhil, where smugglers and traffickers may coerce migrants into labor or sex trafficking. Djibouti hosts approximately 32,000 refugees and asylum-seekers; some individuals in this population may have endured exploitation before their arrival in Djibouti and remain vulnerable to trafficking in Djibouti. As a result of continued instability in Ethiopia, many Ethiopians who came to Djibouti as migrants or asylum-seekers are often unable or unwilling to return to Ethiopia; many of these people reported abuses and may have been trafficking victims at various points on their journey, particularly migrants in Yemen and Saudi Arabia. This population remains vulnerable to trafficking due to lack of job opportunities in destination countries, including Djibouti. Cuban government-affiliated workers, including medical professionals, may have been forced to work in Djibouti by the Cuban government.