Continue to train law enforcement officials, including investigators, prosecutors, and judges on human trafficking and the anti-trafficking law. * Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, including complicit officials, which should involve significant prison terms. * Using the established SOPs, systematically and proactively identify trafficking victims, including among vulnerable populations such as displaced persons, ethnic minority groups, and children allegedly associated with armed groups, and refer victims to care. * Cease the forcible recruitment or use of child soldiers, hold complicit officials accountable, and expand efforts to sensitize national security forces on CAR’s directives to prevent the recruitment or use of child soldiers. * Cease coordination with and support to non-state armed groups, including the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group, that recruit or use child soldiers, including in non-combatant or support roles. * Allocate funding and in-kind resources for anti-trafficking efforts, including victim services and, in collaboration with international organizations and NGOs, increase the quantity and quality of victim services, including in remote areas. * In partnership with international organizations and NGOs, develop and finalize an updated national action plan to combat trafficking and allocate resources to its implementation. * Work with civil society to develop a nationwide data collection system on anti-trafficking statistics and victim identification efforts. * Expand efforts to raise awareness on all forms of human trafficking, particularly among vulnerable populations, including displaced persons and minority groups.

The government decreased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. In August 2022, the government enacted a comprehensive anti-trafficking law, drafted with support from international organizations, Law 22015 “On Combating Trafficking in Persons in the Central African Republic,” which strengthened existing criminal provisions within the penal code, as well as included new provisions on victim protection and prevention efforts. Articles 5 and 6 of the anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving adult victims and five to 10 years’ imprisonment with hard labor for those involving child victims. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as kidnapping. Additionally, Article 7 of the law added increased penalties for trafficking crimes involving aggravated circumstances.

The government did not report investigating any trafficking cases, compared with investigating 42 cases during the previous reporting period. The government reported prosecuting two alleged traffickers, compared with no prosecutions during the previous reporting period. The government did not report any trafficking convictions for the second consecutive year. Severe resource constraints and a lack of trafficking expertise among law enforcement officials and judges continued to hinder law enforcement efforts. Data collection and information sharing remained challenging due to ongoing conflict and limited information technology access throughout the country.

The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the year. Some officials allegedly accepted bribes from traffickers to ignore trafficking crimes. FACA forcibly recruited and used child soldiers, including children younger than the age of 15, during the reporting period. The government also coordinated with and provided support to the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group, a non-state armed group that recruited and used child soldiers. The government did not report any updates on an investigation initiated previously involving a customs agent charged with trafficking-related crimes, nor did it provide any updates on individual FACA soldiers previously charged with violating command directives by forcibly recruiting at least one child and using seven children in support roles to serve at checkpoints and run errands.

The government continued to train police and gendarmerie officers on the anti-trafficking law and enforcement strategies. The government appointed two special prosecutors dedicated to cases involving trafficking in persons, conflict-related sexual violence, and protection of minors. Most government officials continued to lack an understanding of human trafficking, hindering the government’s ability to investigate trafficking crimes and identify victims. Years of destabilizing conflict exacerbated by continued violence severely limited formal judicial capacity outside the capital, leading to the frequent use of customary dispute resolution methods in which traditional chiefs or community leaders administered punishment for criminal acts.

The government maintained weak victim protection efforts. The government reported it identified nine trafficking victims, including four sex trafficking and five forced labor victims, compared with identifying two trafficking victims in the previous reporting period. An international organization reported identifying and providing care to 10 trafficking victims. The Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention and Repression of Sexual Violence (UMIRR) served as the lead government agency to provide services for trafficking victims. UMIRR, in partnership with NGOs and international organizations, offered shelter, basic necessities, and medical care to an unknown number of identified victims. In the previous reporting period, the government provided services to two victims. Observers noted most trafficking victims were individuals predominantly living in remote areas with limited to no government presence, including conflict or crisis zones, and overwhelmingly members of indigenous and ethnic minority groups, such as the Ba’Aka, Aka, and Bofi community. The government had SOPs on victim identification and referral to services. In partnership with an international organization, the government continued providing training to UMIRR officers and civil society organizations on the SOPs to improve victim identification and referral to services. The government, in partnership with NGOs, hosted a workshop for civil society service organizations to improve capacity and compliance with standards of care when assisting victims of sexual and gender-based violence, including trafficking.

Observers reported government support for victim protection and services remained significantly limited, and NGOs funded and provided the majority of victim care without sufficient government support. While foreign national victims and CAR citizens were entitled to the same services, UMIRR officials reported long-term assistance was not available to foreign national victims. The government continued to provide reintegration support for former child soldiers. The government worked with an international organization to reintegrate some children associated with armed groups and placed children in community shelters, foster homes, or with relatives. The government did not report whether it released any children previously detained for alleged association with armed groups, compared with reporting 20 children were released and reunited with their families in the previous reporting period. Since April 2022, the government disseminated a command directive barring children from entry on military installations; the government reported it conducted training, in addition to inspections in four military installations, on this directive for community members and security forces.

Access to victim services was not conditioned on cooperation with law enforcement proceedings. The government reported it could provide shelter for victim-witnesses and police security if needed; courts held closed door trials for cases involving children. The government could provide legal aid services to victims, but observers noted resource constraints often limited the availability of legal aid. UMIRR worked with NGOs and international organizations to assist victims who participated in investigations and prosecutions. Authorities did not report providing legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where they may face hardship or retribution. The law allowed victims to file civil suits against traffickers, but none reportedly did so. While the government reported courts ordered restitution, it could not confirm specific cases, and according to sources, restitution was rarely awarded in practice.

The government maintained mixed efforts to prevent trafficking. The government’s inter-ministerial National Committee for Trafficking in Persons (National Committee), led by a presidentially appointed adviser, continued to coordinate the government’s anti-trafficking efforts and convened regularly. The government continued to implement parts of its 2022-2023 NAP but did not report efforts to update or create a new NAP. The government established a new committee to enhance anti-trafficking efforts in remote areas of the country. The government did not report dedicating a budget or resources for anti-trafficking efforts. However, the government, in coordination with local NGOs, conducted training for UMIRR’s staff, police and gendarmerie officers, social workers, labor inspectors, education personnel, and representatives from NGOs. The government continued to carry out awareness-raising campaigns in collaboration with local NGOs and funded a weekly anti-trafficking radio program. The government also used billboards and printed materials with picture illustrations for illiterate individuals. UMIRR, in partnership with an international organization, continued to operate its hotline dedicated to GBV, including trafficking, which staffed French- and local-language speakers; however, the government did not report any trafficking-related calls received by the hotline.

The government did not report any policies to regulate labor recruitment or prevent fraudulent recruitment and exploitation of CAR nationals abroad. The government, in partnership with an international organization, reported labor inspectors received anti-trafficking training. The government had a command directive restricting the government forces’ recruitment of children, but the government did not consistently enforce these measures. The government did not report efforts to prevent the recruitment or use of child soldiers by non-state armed groups including the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group. The government continued to collaborate with the United Nations Police (UNPOL) on its annual awareness campaigns against sexual exploitation and abuse. The government did not report efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government previously drafted a new mining code to align with international labor laws and improve standards for workers; it remained pending for the second consecutive year. The government did report providing trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in CAR, and traffickers exploit victims from CAR abroad. Observers report traffickers primarily exploit CAR nationals within the country and, in smaller numbers, in Cameroon, Mali, Chad, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and South Sudan. Poverty and conflict continue to increase the risk of all forms of exploitation in the country. Traffickers – including transient merchants, herders, and non-state armed groups – exploit children in sex trafficking and forced labor in domestic work, agriculture, artisanal gold and diamond mines, shops, restaurants and bars, and street vending. Some relatives exploit children in domestic servitude, and community members exploit Aka (pygmy) minorities, who have protected minority status, in domestic servitude, especially in the southwest of the country. Cameroonian trafficking networks in CAR exploit Malian, Cameroonian, and Congolese citizens in sex and labor trafficking. Authorities’ prejudice against individuals engaged in commercial sex hinders the willingness and ability of sex trafficking victims to access assistance. NGOs report members of the Muslim community, who lost vital identification documents while fleeing intra-communal violence or internal conflict, face discrimination in obtaining new identification documents, increasing vulnerabilities to trafficking. In previous years, some government workers reportedly coerced women into sex in exchange for government employment or documents and services to which they were entitled. Fraudulent labor recruiters attract foreigners from nearby countries, such as Chad and Libya, to enter the country undocumented to work in CAR’s mining sector; armed groups capture and exploit some of these economic migrants in forced labor.

Traffickers reportedly take advantage of abject poverty across the country to recruit women and girls with the promise of money for their children or families. Some relatives or community members coerce girls into forced marriages and subsequently exploit the girls in domestic servitude or sex trafficking. Of note, 26 percent of girls in CAR are married before they reach the age of 15. Experts continue to raise concerns regarding child and forced marriage and its associated risks of trafficking, including sex trafficking and domestic servitude. Husbands may coerce their wives to engage in sex trafficking to cover household expenses with little recourse from authorities. Officials note some family members also exploit children in labor and sex trafficking to supplement family income due to acute poverty.

Observers reported Central African criminal elements engage in the sex trafficking of girls as young as age 12 in maisons de joie (houses of joy) throughout Bangui. Maisons de joie are private residences with little official oversight where Central Africans serve alcohol and food to middle- and upper-class customers as a cover to exploit girls and women in sex trafficking. Officials reported private residences operate as brothels for girls as young as 12. Violent conflict since 2012 has resulted in chronic instability with more than 1.1 million people forcibly displaced and stateless, increasing the vulnerability of adults and children to labor and sex trafficking. Observers noted individuals or communities living in conflict, crisis, or post-disaster settings; minorities; and undocumented migrants are at particular risk of sex trafficking and forced labor. Since 2013, more than two million internally displaced people have returned to their areas of origin. The UN reported 3.14 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in 2023, and more than 511,000 people had been internally displaced as of January 2024. A recent UN assessment reported that more than half a million children ages 3 to 17 are out of school, increasing vulnerability to trafficking.

Since the conflict began in 2012, armed groups have recruited or used more than 17,000 children, with nearly 3,000 recruited and used in combat since the country’s December 2020 elections. A coalition of six armed groups (Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique; Return, Reclamation, and Rehabilitation [3R]; Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique [UPC]; Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique [FPRC]; Anti-Balaka Mokom; and Anti-Balaka Ndomate), intent on overthrowing the democratically elected government – the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) – continues to recruit and use child soldiers. In addition, individual militias associated with Anti-Balaka; Ex-Seleka; the FPRC; the Lord’s Resistance Army; 3R; the UPC; and other armed groups continued to forcibly recruit and use child soldiers in CAR before and after the creation of the CPC. The government reports 15,000 children have escaped from rebel forces since conflict broke out in 2013.

Credible sources reported FACA forcibly recruited and used child soldiers, including children younger than the age of 15, in support roles during the reporting period. The government also continued coordinating with and providing support to the Kremlin-backed Wagner Group, a non-state armed group that recruited and used child soldiers. Additionally, reports indicate armed groups, including Wagner Group, exploit girls in sex slavery. Multiple sources alleged armed groups in southeastern CAR – areas outside governmental control – kidnap children and coerce them into serving as child soldiers, in addition to exploiting community members in forced labor as porters, cooks, and other support roles, or in illegal mining operations. International organizations reported armed groups recruited children to serve as combatants, servants, child brides, and sex slaves in 2020; armed groups also subjected children to forced labor in the mining sector, including in gold and diamond mines. During the reporting period, the government continued to provide mining companies linked to Wagner Group with permits to operate gold mines.

Militias primarily recruit and use child soldiers from the prefectures of Vakaga, Haute-Kotto, Haut-Mbomou, Nana-Grebizi, Nana-Mambere, and Basse-Kotto; these areas were under intermittent government control during the reporting period. An international organization reported armed groups, particularly UPC forces, began forcibly recruiting Peuhl and Arab children in Nzako. Although some children may initially join locally organized community defense groups to protect their families from opposing militias, many commanders maintain influence over these children even after they are demobilized, increasing their risk of re-recruitment. Inadequately funded reintegration programming, continuing instability, and a lack of economic opportunity throughout the country increase the likelihood that armed groups will exploit economic desperation to again recruit or use former child soldiers. Some demobilized child soldiers face violent, and at times deadly, reprisals from their communities after reintegration.