In Haiti’s semipresidential system, the president is directly elected for a five-year term. The prime minister is appointed by the president and confirmed by Parliament. Jovenel Moïse of the Haitian Tèt Kale Party (PHTK), the handpicked successor of Michel Martelly, won the 2015 presidential election, but the results were nullified due to extensive fraud. Moïse won a repeat election in 2016, taking 55.6 percent of the vote. The events surrounding the repeat election later resulted in a political and legal dispute over whether Moïse’s term expired in February 2021, five years after the end of Martelly’s term, or February 2022, five years after Moïse’s inauguration.

Moïse frequently replaced the prime minister during his tenure, but after the terms of most lawmakers expired in early 2020, his appointees were unable to obtain parliamentary approval in keeping with the constitution. In 2021, after Claude Henry submitted his resignation, Moïse appointed Ariel Henry through a decree published in the official state newspaper, Le Moniteur.

Moïse was assassinated days after naming Henry, who had not been installed. The assassination set off a dispute among local political, civic, and economic actors as to who should head the executive branch, but key diplomatic representatives in the country—known as the Core Group—called on Henry to lead the government, and Claude Joseph stepped down. Henry dismissed the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and postponed already-overdue general elections in late 2021. Henry remained in his post at the end of 2023.

The directly elected, bicameral Parliament is composed of a Senate, with 30 members who serve six-year terms, and a Chamber of Deputies, with 119 members who serve four-year terms. The 2015 legislative elections were plagued by disorder, fraud, and violence; runoff polls held in 2016 were marred by fraud and low turnout.

The legislative branch in Haiti is effectively nonexistent. Parliament was dissolved in 2020, and the mandate of 10 senators expired in January 2023, leaving no elected legislators. Elections have not yet been organized.

The CEP was established in the late 1980s as a temporary body. Despite constitutional safeguards against executive dominance of the CEP, the executive asserted significant control in practice. In 2020, Moïse appointed a new CEP by decree which human rights observers called unconstitutional. Plans to hold a constitutional referendum and elections in 2021 were scuttled that September; Henry dismissed the CEP and pledged to assemble a new council with broader legitimacy.

In 2021, political and civil society leaders produced the Montana Accord, under which a transitional government would preside over new polls. In late 2022, Henry signed on to a different document that called for polls in 2023 and the 2024 installation of an elected government. Henry installed the HCT in February 2023 with the aim of preparing elections that were expected in 2024, later than envisioned in the late-2022 agreement. Civil society actors consider the HCT to be ineffective. In October, HCT secretary general Anthony Virginie Saint-Pierre was kidnapped in Port-au-Prince. The incident exacerbated tensions between the HCT and Henry, who was criticized by the other members of the council for the government’s response to the kidnapping.

Legal and administrative barriers that prevented some parties from registering or running in past elections have largely been eliminated. The number of members required to form a political party was reduced from 500 to 20 in 2014, leading to the creation of dozens of parties. However, pervasive insecurity, repressive authorities, and criminal violence impair political activity. Political actors have long employed criminal gangs to impede their opponents, further restricting competition.

Criminal violence is pervasive. The United Nations reported 2,490 kidnappings in a report covering events in 2023, 83 percent more than the 1,359 recorded in 2022. Gangs continue to control neighborhoods and strategic roads connecting Port-au-Prince to the rest of the country, with 200 and 300 armed groups controlling over 75 percent of territory in the capital. This remains a significant obstacle to political organization, as these groups are generally controlled by political actors.

Haiti has a poor record of peaceful democratic transfers of power. It remains difficult for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections, which are regularly disrupted by violence, marred by accusations of fraud, and postponed. The February 2023 creation of the HCT has not presaged an improvement.

Haitians’ political choices are marginalized by corrupt patronage networks, organized crime, and foreign actors. Many politicians have relied on money linked to drug trafficking, gang activity, and other illegal sources to finance their campaigns. The PHTK and opposition parties have enlisted armed criminal groups to either incite or halt residents’ involvement in protests and other political activities, according to local human rights activists.

Citizens’ democratic autonomy was further harmed by the assassination of President Moïse and its aftermath. In addition to the violence and criminality associated with the murder itself, many observers decried the role of the Core Group—comprising ambassadors or representatives from Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Spain, the United States, the European Union, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations—in accepting Henry as prime minister.

In some areas, armed criminal groups exert explicit control over people living in the territory they control. In a report covering the third quarter of 2023, the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) reported incidents where people were detained or executed for disobeying armed groups’ instructions.

Haitian women are underrepresented in political life, with only four parliamentary seats held by women from 2017 to 2019. The constitution mandates that 30 percent of public officials be women, but there are no penalties for noncompliance. Election-related violence and social and cultural norms discourage women from participating in politics. Due to societal discrimination, the interests of LGBT+ people are not represented in the political system, and there are no openly LGBT+ politicians.

The current head of government has not been freely elected, and there are no national legislative representatives to determine government policy. The prime minister and his self-appointed and approved cabinet make policy unilaterally, and Henry rules by decree. Ariel Henry’s 2021 appointment to the premiership was not approved by Parliament, which was dissolved in 2020 as most of its members lost their electoral mandates. Before his assassination, Moïse attempted to rule by decree; the legitimacy of his actions was questioned, since only members of Parliament have the constitutional authority to pass laws.

Corruption, instability, and security threats hinder the government’s ability to carry out its own policies and provide basic services. In late 2022, for example, the G9 an Fanmi e Alye (Family and Allies) alliance of gangs blockaded the country’s main fuel terminal after the Henry government announced a reduction in fuel subsidies. The government reclaimed control of the terminal after reportedly negotiating with the armed groups.

In October 2022, Henry called for other countries to send troops into the country. The UN Security Council showed its support for a multinational force in an October 2023 vote, after Kenya’s government said it would provide 1,000 police officers for that mission. The force, which was not deployed by year’s end, had some popular support within Haiti but also received criticism from residents, members of the diaspora, and civil society for want of a representative government to call on or manage such a force.

The country’s anticorruption framework is weak and corruption is widespread in Haiti, as are allegations of impunity for government officials. Anticorruption bodies remain targets for violence committed by armed groups.

A 2017 law reduced the independence and powers of the Central Financial Intelligence Unit (UCREF), which investigated money-laundering cases. Also in 2017, Moïse replaced the heads of the Anticorruption Unit (ULCC) and the UCREF with political allies and former members of the Michel Martelly administration. Under a 2020 decree, procurement-related opinions issued by the Superior Court of Audits and Administrative Disputes were made advisory and nonbinding. In a 2022 report, the ULCC warned that corruption remained widespread in national and local government bodies.

In June 2023, the US State Department prevented former prime minister Laurent Lamothe from entering the United States, saying he was involved in corruption. In its September update to the UN Security Council, a panel of experts noted that few cases sent to the judiciary from the UCREF and ULCC resulted in convictions. The panel also noted that official corruption remained pervasive, affecting the judiciary and the police.

Haitians’ general distrust of the government stems in large part from the absence of transparency and accountability measures that are needed to reduce corruption. There are no access-to-information laws, and it is reportedly very difficult to obtain government documents and data in practice. A 2020 presidential decree that created the National Intelligence Agency (ANI) granted it total secrecy and the ability to conduct surveillance on individuals and businesses at any time, even if there is no relevant ongoing investigation.

The constitution includes protections for press freedom and the media sector is pluralistic, but the work of journalists is constrained by threats and violence, government interference, and a lack of financial resources. Journalists have died at the hand of police forces and criminal groups while on assignment.

In October 2023, the special rapporteur for freedom of expression at the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) said that three journalists had been killed in circumstances related to insecurity over the year to date. The IACHR’s rapporteur additionally reported that at least 12 journalists had fled their homes in Carrefour-Feuilles over the preceding month. Also in October, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that at least six journalists had been kidnapped and released in the preceding eight months, with journalistic activity being a common motive for those crimes.

Freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed, and religious groups generally practice freely. However, the traditionally dominant Roman Catholic and Protestant churches and schools receive certain privileges from the state, while Vodou religious leaders have experienced social stigmatization and violence for their beliefs and practices. The government has denied registration to the country’s small Muslim communities.

While worshippers are not targeted by armed groups for their religious beliefs, criminal activity is impacting the freedom to practice religion peacefully. Armed groups have increasingly targeted churches and other gathering places for kidnappings, doing so openly and with little to no police response. In October 2023, for example, armed men wearing police uniforms kidnapped several worshippers at a church in Port-au-Prince, killing a police officer as they escaped; police later killed an individual who was allegedly involved in the kidnapping.

Educational institutions and academics choose their curriculum freely, but university associations and student groups that protest government actions are often met with police violence. Academic freedom is also negatively affected by the general climate of insecurity, and some scholars may self-censor to avoid conflicts with powerful groups or individuals.

There are some formal constraints on the expression of personal views, including criminal defamation laws. The risk of violent reprisal also serves as a deterrent to unfettered discussion of sensitive issues such as corruption, gangs, and organized crime. The government has been accused of using criminal gangs to help suppress dissent. Private discussion is also constrained by the risk of kidnapping, which is a common occurrence in Haiti.

Freedom of assembly is constitutionally enshrined but often violated in practice. Police have used excessive force including live rounds of ammunition to disperse protesters. Criminal violence has also affected the ability to demonstrate.

In August 2023, several thousand protesters demonstrated against gang-related violence in Port-au-Prince, with some protesters destroying official vehicles. Police used tear gas in response. Later that month, protesters in Port-au-Prince marched in an area controlled by an armed criminal group to demonstrate against gang-related violence; several protesters were shot and killed. Police later said that the protesters ignored security arrangements and confronted gang members.

Numerous domestic and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operate in Haiti, but human rights defenders and activists who address sensitive topics are subject to threats and violence, which creates a climate of fear. The National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH) claimed that a gang leader and a politician plotted to kill its director in a 2022 meeting.

Violence against activists is rarely investigated or prosecuted. Among other high-profile cases, the 2020 assassination of Port-au-Prince Bar Association head Monferrier Dorval remained unsolved in 2023.

Human rights and good governance groups continue to face threats due to the nature of their work. In August 2023, the RNDDH said that a police officer attacked its offices after the group accused the National Police and the government of complicity in rising violence to justify a call for foreign intervention.

The right to unionize is legally protected and strikes are not uncommon. However, the union movement in Haiti is weak and lacks collective bargaining power in practice. Most citizens are informally employed. Workers who engage in union activity frequently face harassment, suspension, termination, and other repercussions from employers, though union workers enjoy public support.

The Haitian judiciary faces a multitude of challenges including corruption, safety concerns, a lack of accountability, political interference, and arbitrariness in operations, rendering the justice system ineffective by any standard. The judiciary system struggles with internal corruption but also struggles to uphold accountability and carry out its functions as defined by the law. As president, Jovenel Moïse made judicial appointments beyond the authority of his office and interfered with judges who investigated politically sensitive matters.

After Moïse’s 2021 assassination, a number of judges assigned to the case resigned for security-related reasons. Other officials who were involved in the investigation received death threats. In December 2023, Judge Marthel Jean Claude, who was presiding over the Monferrier Dorval case, stepped aside for security-related reasons. Jean Claude was the third judge hearing that case to do so.

In an October 2023 report that covered a 2022–23 reporting period, the RNDDH noted the unconstitutional appointment of judges to the Supreme Court and the arbitrary firing and replacement of magistrates.

Constitutionally protected due process rights are regularly violated in practice. Arbitrary arrest is common, as are extortion attempts by police and at all levels of the legal system. Most suspects do not have legal representation. Those who do suffer from long delays and case mismanagement. In its third-quarter 2023 report, the BINUH said 84 percent of all detainees were held on a pretrial basis as of September 30. Many have never appeared before a judge despite the legal requirement of a court hearing within 48 hours of arrest, and some detainees have waited years for a trial.

Prison conditions are especially poor. Facilities are overcrowded and understaffed. The BINUH reported a cell-occupancy rate of 331 percent at the end of the third quarter of 2023. In a June article, the Associated Press reported that prisoners were facing malnourishment and illness. A 2022 UN report said that 185 inmates had died that year, many due to malnutrition.

In 2021, Prime Minister Henry dismissed the justice minister and a chief prosecutor after investigators under their supervision uncovered evidence that appeared to link Henry to a top suspect in the Moïse assassination, prompting accusations that Henry was obstructing justice. Some progress on the case was reported in Haiti and elsewhere in 2023. Haitian police arrested Joseph Félix Badio, a former justice official, in connection with the case in October. In December, a US judge handed a life sentence to former Haitian senator John Joël Joseph for conspiring to kill Moïse. Haitian prosecutors were preparing to interview Henry over the case that same month.

A culture of impunity in law enforcement leaves civilians in Haiti with little protection from the illegitimate use of force, and police and civilians are subject to lethal attacks by heavily armed criminal groups.

A UN report counted 4,789 homicides in Haiti in 2023, a 119.4 percent increase over the number of homicides counted in 2022. The Cité Soleil and Carrefour-Feuilles sections of Port-au-Prince remain under the control of armed groups, which have expanded into other areas like the department of Artibonite.

Armed groups, faced by a weak and corrupt police force, now attack churches, schools, shops, and private homes. Homes are often set on fire, contributing to mass internal displacement. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), over 310,000 people were internally displaced as of December 2023, many of them due to violence.

In April 2023, the Bwa Kalé, a spontaneous vigilante movement, began lynching suspected gang members. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Bwa Kalé participants killed over 420 people in the first nine months of the year, sometimes with police support. Gangs went on to retaliate by engaging in revenge killings and forming the Zam Kalé to counter the vigilantes.

Armed groups subject women, girls, and LGBT+ people to sexual violence.

Police are regularly accused of abusing suspects and detainees. Police have also been known to use extreme force to repress protests. Police are rarely held accountable for their use of physical force.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 due to a continued rise in killings, kidnappings, and other criminal acts throughout the country.

Discrimination against women, the LGBT+ community, and people with disabilities is pervasive. Among other problems, women face bias in employment and disparities in access to financial services.

A reformed yet highly contested penal code was published in 2020 by executive decree and was set to take effect in 2022, but its implementation was delayed to 2024. It prohibits gender-based violence, sexual harassment, and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which occur regularly in practice. Conservative cultural and religious groups objected to the new code in part because it lowered the age of consent.

The government generally does not restrict travel or place limits on the ability to change one’s place of employment or education. However, insecurity has prevented free movement, particularly in Port-au-Prince, as most roads are controlled by criminal groups, and many residents avoid unnecessary travel due to widespread gang violence. Haitians’ ability to leave the country has also been impacted by an increase in passport processing prices.

The IOM counted over 310,000 internally displaced people as of December 2023, many of whom fled Port-au-Prince due to violence. Many displaced Haitians live in particularly poor conditions.

Although the legal framework protects property rights and private business activity, it is difficult in practice to register property, enforce contracts, and obtain credit. Poor record-keeping and corruption contribute to inconsistent enforcement of property rights.

Business owners regularly face intensive extortion efforts on the part of criminal gangs. Criminal gangs are also known to demand bribes or other support from officials. NGOs, meanwhile, have had to negotiate with criminal groups for access to territory and are pressured into providing financial assistance or hiring gang members. Businesses, particularly small businesses, frequently close due to insecurity.

Basic freedoms related to marriage, divorce, and custody are generally respected. However, there are no laws specifically addressing domestic violence, which is a widespread problem. Both domestic violence and rape are underreported and rarely result in successful prosecutions. Spousal rape is not recognized as a criminal offense. Sexual violence has also become more common due to insecurity.

The government postponed the implementation of a reformed penal code in 2022, largely due to negative public reaction but also due to a lack of follow-through on its own part. It included provisions that would lower the consent age to 15 and decriminalize abortion in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy in cases of rape, incest, or harm to the pregnant woman.

Socioeconomic mobility is obstructed by entrenched poverty and inequality. Legal protections against exploitative working conditions in formal employment are weakly enforced, and most workers are informally employed. After workers protested for better pay, the government introduced new minimum wages for three wage classes in early 2022.

As many as 300,000 children work as domestic servants, often without pay or access to education; they are especially vulnerable to physical or sexual abuse. Other forms of child labor are common.

To escape dire social and economic conditions at home, many Haitians have risked human trafficking and dangerous land and sea journeys to reach countries including The Bahamas, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and the United States.