The president is elected by direct popular vote for up to two five-year terms. In the event of the president’s death, the vice president assumes the post and completes their predecessor’s term. Samia Suluhu Hassan, vice president since 2015, became chief executive in March 2021 after President John Magufuli died. In September 2021, she announced her plans to run in 2025.

The late president Magufuli won the 2020 presidential election with 84.5 percent of the vote in a contest that was markedly less free and fair than the 2015 election. The 2020 election was marred by widespread fraud and vote-rigging, threats of violence against opposition figures, and the use of police force against opposition demonstrators, among other irregularities. International and local observers were denied accreditation, as were many international media outlets. Turnout stood at 50 percent. Opposition parties rejected the results and called for protests but organizers were arrested and a widespread protest movement never emerged.

The semiautonomous region of Zanzibar elects its own president, who serves no more than two five-year terms. The 2020 Zanzibar presidential poll, held concurrently with the October general elections, was also marked by controversy. The Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) announced that CCM candidate Hussein Mwinyi defeated Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT–Wazalendo) candidate Seif Sharif Hamad, taking 76.3 percent to Hamad’s 19.9 percent. The ACT–Wazalendo rejected the results. Before the polls opened, the regime mobilized the army to Zanzibar; Hamad was detained by police and remained in custody during the election period. The army and police were accused of firing into a crowd days before the election, killing several people; members of the crowd were reportedly attempting to stop the delivery of ballots suspected to be fraudulent. Reports of further detentions, killings, and torture emerged after the election. The ACT–Wazalendo agreed to form a unity government in Zanzibar that November with Hamad as vice president, prompting co-optation accusations. In December 2023, the ACT–Wazalendo threatened to leave the unity government over what party representatives claim to be the government’s lack of progress in implementing democratic reforms and alleged disrespect from CCM officials.

Legislative authority lies with a unicameral, 393-seat National Assembly (the Bunge) whose members serve five-year terms. There are 264 seats filled through direct elections in single-member constituencies, while 113 are reserved for women elected by political parties, 10 are filled by presidential appointment, and 5 members are elected by the Zanzibar legislature. The attorney general holds an ex officio seat.

The 2020 legislative election was marred by extensive fraud and intimidation allegations. Widespread interference in nomination processes, both bureaucratic and physical, led to around 30 opposition candidates being kept off the ballot. Numerous legislative and local government candidates were detained during the campaign period, including high-profile opposition lawmakers. On election day, opposition politicians complained of election interference and fraud; 97 percent of the directly elected seats went to the CCM, substantially increasing its majority.

The opposition was granted a small number of women’s special seats in line with their share of the vote. The opposition Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema) refused to take those seats but a group of 19 female Chadema legislators defected, were seated in the legislature, and were then formally expelled from the party. Several women took their seats upon being released from police custody, prompting speculation of coercion.

Members of Zanzibar’s 85-seat House of Representatives serve five-year terms and are installed through a mix of direct elections and appointments. The 2020 legislative elections in Zanzibar were also marred by allegations of fraud.

The National Electoral Commission (NEC) is responsible for overseeing countrywide elections, while the ZEC conducts elections for Zanzibar’s governing institutions.

The structures of both bodies contribute to doubts about their independence. The Tanzanian president appoints NEC members. The NEC was criticized for poor administration of voter-registration processes ahead of the 2020 elections, and it oversaw the rejection of dozens of legislative and local candidates on technicalities. Opposition parties accused the NEC of complicity in widespread ballot stuffing and the use of “ghost voters” to benefit the CCM. The NEC did not release the full results of local or legislative elections in 2020.

Opposition parties and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have called for constitutional reform, saying the current constitution favors the ruling CCM. While the Hassan administration initially resisted those calls, in 2022 a CCM official said that the party “insists” on a new constitution. However, progress on constitutional reform has stalled; in September 2023, President Hassan stated that there was “insufficient time” to carry out the process before the 2024 elections.

In November 2023, the government introduced new draft legislation that CCM representatives claim would, if passed, increase the independence of the NEC. Among other reforms, provisions in the legislation would include the NEC president being appointed by a panel rather than the executive. Opposition leaders have raised concerns that even with these reforms, the president would still maintain a large degree of control over the NEC.

The Zanzibari president appoints most ZEC members, though the opposition nominates two of the seven members. Hamad of the ACT–Wazalendo accused the ZEC of failing to register over 100,000 young voters who reached voting age between 2015 and 2020.

Tanzanians have the right to organize into political parties, but the ruling CCM enjoys considerable incumbency advantages that stifle competition. The system of state funding for parties under the Political Parties Act (PPA) of 2015 disproportionately benefits the CCM. Political parties are regulated by a presidentially appointed registrar whom the opposition criticizes for partisan bias.

Authorities have constrained opposition parties in recent years. Opposition groups’ rights are further constrained by 2019 PPA amendments that empower a government minister to regulate party coalition formation, ban internationally sourced political fundraising, prohibit parties from “activism,” and introduce tools that the registrar can use to investigate and interfere with targeted parties’ internal operations. The amendments also gave the registrar legal immunity, further reducing that office’s accountability. However, in November 2023, the government introduced legislation that, if adopted, would lift some restrictions on coalition formation.

The Hassan administration has targeted opposition activities, though it has more recently opened dialogue with prominent opposition figures. Specious terrorism charges against Chadema chairman Freeman Mbowe—who was arrested in 2021 as he was about to give a speech on constitutional reform—were dropped and he was released from custody in early 2022. Chadema then entered into formal reconciliation talks with the regime, but formally withdrew from these talks in October 2023, alleging that the government’s participation lacked commitment and sincerity.

In January 2023, Hassan repealed a Magufuli-era ban on political rallies and demonstrations outside election periods, which had sharply curtailed parties’ ability to mobilize public support. Although opposition parties have since resumed holding rallies, they are sometimes disrupted by police and security forces.

Arrests of prominent opposition figures and the repression of public opposition meetings increased beginning in June 2023 as authorities attempted to suppress widespread criticism of the government, including over its pursuit of a deal with Dubai-controlled ports operator DP World.

The CCM has governed without interruption for over 60 years. The opposition’s electoral prospects are limited due to interference, harassment, co-optation, deadly violence against activists, and criminal prosecutions. The political space for opposition parties narrowed due to repression in the 2020 election. While there have been efforts at reconciliation and reform since President Hassan took office, such efforts had largely stalled by 2023.

In January 2023, prominent opposition leader Tundu Lissu returned to Tanzania after spending several years in exile in Belgium. He had traveled abroad to recover after a 2017 attempted assassination and returned to Tanzania to stand as Chadema’s presidential candidate in 2020 before fleeing to Belgium after the polls with assistance from several European governments and the United States. In September 2023, Lissu was arrested and briefly detained hours before a scheduled political rally after police accused him of holding an illegal gathering.

The opposition in Tanzania is fragmented, which some analysts say may affect its ability to effectively build support and present a serious electoral challenge to the ruling CCM.

Tanzanian voters and politicians are subject to significant undue influence from unaccountable entities using antidemocratic tactics. During his tenure, Magufuli exerted pressure through local administrative authorities, particularly presidentially appointed regional and district commissioners. These officials are technically nonpartisan, but most are CCM loyalists or former security personnel. They have significant power within their jurisdictions and have been especially repressive when overseeing opposition-oriented areas. President Hassan appointed new regional and district commissioners in 2021; some came from opposition groups or were nonpartisan, though hardliners maintained some posts.

Civil servants in opposition-controlled councils are under significant pressure to follow directives from CCM officials, rather than elected opposition politicians. The government has sought to remove elected municipal leaders, and arbitrarily threatened and barred the movements and activities of critical NGOs and human rights advocates. During 2023, a number of officials and politicians from both the CCM and opposition parties, as well as the CCM parliamentarian for Ngorongoro, were reportedly arrested for criticizing the mass evictions of Maasai and public service closures in Ngorongoro.

Members of ethnic, religious, and other minority groups ostensibly have full political rights, but the participation of some groups is limited in practice.

Women hold 36.8 percent of legislative seats; the constitution requires that 30 percent of seats are held by women. However, women are underrepresented in directly elected seats, which are consistently won by male candidates. Women who run for office face mistreatment.

Hassan, Tanzania’s first female president, has promoted women’s representation in her own government and has significantly increased the number of women appointed to positions in local administration. However, misogynistic discourse and behavior have persisted in politics.

LGBT+ people, who face the risk of arrest and harsh discrimination, cannot openly advance their political interests.

Magufuli consolidated political power in the presidency, sidelining the legislature—in part by suppressing dissent within the CCM—and exerting greater control over cabinet ministers through dismissals and reshuffles. The CCM government actively manages the activities of legislators and has threatened those who are frequently absent. Bills are sometimes passed using “certificates of urgency,” which accelerates the legislative process.

Hassan has sought to consolidate her own hold on power after becoming president, and has moved Magufuli loyalists out of government and CCM posts via cabinet reshuffles and internal party elections. However, the October 2023 appointment of Magufuli ally Paul Makonda as ideology secretary of the CCM indicates the enduring strength of Magufuli supporters within the party.

Corruption remains a problem in Tanzania, and reform efforts have yielded mixed results. The Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau has been accused of focusing on low-level corruption and doing little to address graft committed by senior officials, who have been ensnared in corruption scandals in recent years. Recent audits have revealed that public funds were misappropriated or unaccounted for.

In June 2023, the National Assembly approved a controversial agreement that would give Dubai’s state-owned ports operator DP World partial control of Dar es Salaam port for a 30-year period. The opposition protested the agreement, which was the object of widespread corruption allegations, saying it gave too much control of Tanzania’s ports to a foreign power. Despite this pushback, the government ultimately signed the deal in October.

A weak access to information act was adopted in 2016. The law imposes prison terms on officials who improperly release information but assigns no clear penalties for those who improperly withhold information. The Statistics Act was amended in 2019 to remove criminal liability for publishing information that conflicts with the National Bureau of Statistics, but the government continued to resist transparency efforts and punish journalists and civil society groups that attempted to expose official wrongdoing. Journalists and civil society groups seeking transparency around the DP World deal in 2023 were met with obstruction and arrests.

The government does not accurately report official data. In 2022, President Hassan warned ministers against sharing government information; she also contended that it was inappropriate to make government documents available online.

The government was opaque about Magufuli’s health and the circumstances surrounding his death. When Hassan announced Magufuli’s death, for example, she blamed heart disease; opposition politicians and Kenyan press reports contradicted that account, saying Magufuli was instead sent to Nairobi for COVID-19 treatment before dying in Tanzania.

Independent journalists and media outlets are subject to harsh repression in Tanzania. The 2016 Media Services Act grants the government broad authority over media content and the licensing of outlets and journalists. It also prescribes severe penalties, including prison terms, for publication of defamatory, seditious, or other illegal content. A 2018 law requires bloggers and owners of online discussion platforms and streaming services to pay annual registration fees.

Sustained legal and regulatory pressure on journalists and other public figures has contributed to self-censorship and other suppression of news coverage. The government also threatened to arrest journalists who reported on Magufuli’s health.

The Hassan administration’s record on media freedom is mixed. In 2021, Hassan lifted a ban on some online media outlets and in 2022, the government restored the licenses of several newspapers that had received bans or suspensions under Magufuli. There has also been an increase in qualified criticism of the government in both English- and Swahili-language newspapers. However, self-censorship and progovernment bias remain prevalent. However, authorities have also continued to target journalists under Hassan.

Musicians who criticized the government in their music, including dissident rapper Nay Wa Mitego, faced penalties and censorship during 2023. In September, singer Sifa Bujune was arrested for alleged incitement for a song in which she addresses police brutality; authorities later charged Bujune with spreading false information.

Freedom of religion is generally respected and interfaith relations are largely peaceful, though sectarian violence has periodically occurred. Muslims are believed to be a minority nationwide, but almost all Zanzibaris practice Islam. Political tensions between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar often play out along religious lines. The government occasionally raises the specter of interreligious conflict as an excuse to detain political rivals, contributing to a sense that Muslims are sometimes treated unfairly by authorities.

The 2015 Statistics Act requires data released publicly to be first approved by the National Bureau of Statistics and prescribes fines, imprisonment, or both for anyone who disputes official government figures, harming academic freedom. The law was amended in 2019 to remove criminal liability for publishing independent data. Tanzanian academics engage in self-censorship, though scholars sometimes release reports critical of the government

The government historically monitored the population through a neighborhood-level CCM cell structure and has policed personal expression on social media in recent years. Under laws including the 2015 Cybercrimes Act and the 2018 Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations, social media users have been prosecuted for offenses such as insulting the president. Vague prohibitions on communication that “causes annoyance” or “leads to public disorder” have confused users as to what constitutes a violation and empowered authorities to suppress unfavorable speech at their discretion. The Electronic and Postal Communications (Online Content) Regulations 2020 prohibits “spreading rumors” or insulting the nation online.

More than 20 people who criticized the government’s DP World ports agreement have been arrested since June 2023. The government also cracked down on social media users who publicly speculated about the health of the vice president in late 2023.

The constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, but the government limits this right through legal mechanisms, restrictions on social media platforms used to organize, and outright violence. Organizers must notify the police 48 hours in advance of any demonstration, and police have broad discretion to prohibit gatherings that could threaten public safety or public order.

In January 2023, the government repealed a 2016 ban on political rallies and public meetings. Though rallies were allowed to proceed without interference in early 2023, the government subsequently used heavy-handed tactics to disperse and prevent meetings or events that featured criticism of the government or its policies. Protests over the DP World deal led to arrests in several cities.

Tanzanian authorities have used force against Maasai protesters in the Loliondo division of Ngorongoro in recent years. In 2022, Maasai from four villages protested the demarcation of land for a planned game reserve, with police arresting at least 10 Maasai leaders in response. As many as 2,100 Maasai fled for Kenya after the clashes, with some injured people seeking medical treatment there. Protests against mass evictions of Maasai in Ngorongoro were again met with threats and violence from authorities during 2023, and numerous protesters were arbitrarily arrested. In August, security forces arrested 39 Maasai protesters and a member of Parliament for Ngorongoro after the Maasai protesters allegedly attacked journalists present at the demonstration.

Tanzania has a diverse and active civil society sector, but NGOs are subject to laws that give the government broad authority to deregister them. Human rights organizations and activists have been subject to restrictions, deregistration, legal harassment, and unlawful arrests. NGOs are prohibited from filing public-interest litigation and are subject to onerous financial reporting requirements.

The Hassan administration has worked to improve its relationship with civil society in recent years. Civil society leaders have also been more outspoken in their criticism of the government’s past mistreatment of activists and the political opposition, without facing reprisal. However, NGOs have not restarted election-related work, which was a particular target under Magufuli.

Trade unions are nominally independent of the government and are coordinated by the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania and the Zanzibar Trade Union Congress. The Tanzania Federation of Cooperatives represents most of Tanzania’s agricultural sector. The government has significant discretion to deny union registration, and many private employers engage in antiunion activities. Essential public-sector workers are barred from striking, and other workers are restricted by complex notification and mediation requirements. Strikes are infrequent on both the mainland and Zanzibar.

Judges are political appointees. The underfunded judiciary does not have an independent budget, making it vulnerable to political pressure. The results of such pressure have been particularly evident in cases involving opposition figures and government critics, as well as legal changes that suppress free and fair competition and protect the regime from prosecution. Politicized courts have enforced laws that attack human rights and are selectively invoked to keep the government in power. Lower-level courts are especially affected by political influence and corruption. Under a 2020 Court of Appeal ruling, the government can hold suspects without bail for several offenses including money laundering—a charge commonly levied against political opponents.

Lawyers and judges critical of the government sometimes face harassment. In August 2023, a lawyer who led a legal objection to the DP World deal was arrested and accused of incitement to violence and treason; he was held for several days before being released. In November, prominent lawyer Mpale Mpoki—who has been involved in successful strategic litigation against the government—was arbitrarily suspended for six months after expressing his client’s wish to appeal a verdict. Human rights groups, including the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), have called the suspension unjust and a violation of Mpoki’s rights.

Due process guarantees are poorly upheld in civil and criminal matters. Policies and rules governing arrest and pretrial detention are often ignored, and pretrial detention commonly lasts years due to case backlogs and inadequate funding for prosecutors. Legal activists have been known to suffer repercussions for seeking justice through courts. Arbitrary and often violent arrests of opposition politicians, journalists, and civil society leaders have been commonplace, including during the summer of 2023 in response to the widespread backlash over the government’s DP World ports deal and attempts to forcibly evict Maasai living in Ngorongoro.

Security officers and militia members engaged in violence against opposition activists and civilians in Zanzibar after being deployed during the 2020 election but have not faced justice since.

Reports of abuse and torture of suspects in police custody are common, and police have been accused of extrajudicial killings and other violence in recent years. Rights organizations have reported on alleged human rights abuses against Tanzania’s pastoralist communities by security forces, including the Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA); TANAPA rangers have been accused of engaging in extreme violence against members of these communities, including torture, sexual assault, and murder. In June 2023, Amnesty International released a report documenting Tanzanian authorities’ “brutal” and excessive use of force against pastoralist Maasai communities that the government seeks to evict from their ancestral land in Ngorongoro. Several individuals who faced arbitrary arrests for their opposition to the mass evictions have reported being tortured while in the custody of the security services.

Women’s rights are constitutionally guaranteed but not uniformly protected. Women face de facto discrimination in employment, including sexual harassment, which is rarely addressed through formal legal channels. Women’s socioeconomic disadvantages are more pronounced in rural areas and in the informal economy.

Same-sex sexual relations are punishable by lengthy prison terms, and LGBT+ people face discrimination and police abuse, leading most to hide aspects of their identities. Men who are suspected of same-sex sexual activity have been arrested and forced to undergo anal examinations. Additional laws targeting LGBT+ people were proposed by legislators in 2023, with some pushing for harsher penalties—including the death penalty—for people who engage in same-sex sexual activity. A number of books mentioning LGBT+ people or books otherwise deemed to violate “cultural and moral standards” were banned in Tanzanian schools in February; in Zanzibar, the use of rainbow colors in schools was banned in May.

Nearly 115,000 Burundian refugees resided in Tanzania as of November 2023. Burundian refugees have been forcibly repatriated and tortured with collaboration from the Tanzanian government.

Pastoralist ethnic groups do not enjoy equal treatment, particularly when it comes to land disputes. These groups often live near lucrative national parks, and the government has engaged in heavy-handed treatment of those who refuse to comply with government directives to move. In 2023, the government continued its attempts to forcibly evict Maasai people living in Ngorongoro, including by seizing livestock and cutting off the communities’ access to water and to public services like schools and healthcare clinics.

Residents enjoy some basic freedoms pertaining to travel and changes of residence, employment, and education. The government has wide discretion in enforcing laws that can limit movement, particularly in Zanzibar, where the approval of local government appointees is often required for changes in employment, personal banking, and residency.

Since at least 2009, a large number of pastoralist Tanzanians have been forcibly evicted from their homes in northern Tanzania in order to free the land for game reserves and tourism, among other things. As of 2023, the government’s forced removals of pastoralist communities have reportedly led to the displacement of thousands.

In recent years, the authorities have arbitrarily arrested and deported some Kenyans, many of whom had been granted Tanzanian citizenship. The government imposes travel restrictions on activists, human rights researchers, opposition figures, and other prominent individuals.

Tanzanians have the right to establish private businesses but are often required to pay bribes to license and operate them. The state owns all land and leases it to individuals and private entities, leading to clashes over land rights between citizens and companies engaged in extractive industries. These laws have been used to expropriate the resources and lands of opposition politicians. President Hassan has sought to reassure domestic and international investors that the government would take a less active role in the economy and has courted investors since taking office.

Rape, domestic violence, and female genital mutilation (FGM) are prevalent but rarely prosecuted. Laws and practices regarding marriage, divorce, and other personal status issues favor men over women, particularly in Zanzibar. Tanzania’s adolescent fertility rate is more than twice the global average. In 2019, the government encouraged women to help increase the country’s birth rate and spur the economy.

In 2017, the government prohibited those who had given birth from returning to school. President Hassan overturned this ban in 2021. In 2022, she called on families to use contraceptives. The government is still working to increase family-planning funding annually through 2030.

Sexual and labor exploitation remain problems, especially for children living in poor rural areas who are drawn into domestic service, agricultural labor, mining, and other activities. Child labor in gold mines, where working conditions are often dangerous, is common.

Most Tanzanians do not benefit from the country’s extensive natural-resource wealth. Tanzania has one of the world’s highest levels of income inequality, and the poverty rate remains high.