In August 2020, in the wake of mass antigovernment protests, a group of military personnel known as the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) staged a coup d’état and compelled President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta to resign. In September 2020, the CNSP selected Bah N’Daou, a former military officer and Keïta-era defense minister, as acting president. Colonel Assimi Goïta, the CNSP’s leader, was made vice president. In May 2021 another coup d’état took place and Goïta declared himself transitional president.

The prime minister, the head of government, is appointed by the president. Boubou Cissé was appointed in April 2019, but was removed by the CNSP in the August 2020 coup. Moctar Ouane, his successor, was appointed in September 2020 and removed from office following the May 2021 coup. In June 2021, Goïta appointed a new civilian prime minister—Choguel Maïga, a leading member of the June 5th Movement–Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5–RFP) coalition that spearheaded the anti-Keïta protest movement.

In September 2023, the government announced yet another delay of the next presidential election, which had been scheduled to take place in February 2024, citing issues with electoral data and a new constitutional provision. At the end of 2023 it was unclear when the next presidential elections would occur.

Prior to the 2020 coup, members of the 147-seat unicameral National Assembly served five-year terms. Thirteen seats were reserved to represent Malians living abroad.

Overdue parliamentary elections were held in two rounds in March and April 2020, but the process was marred by violence, low turnout, and disagreement over the results. Voters were subjected to intimidation, while observers reported vote-buying incidents. COVID-19 restrictions also affected the balloting. A group of civil society observers reported a first-round turnout figure of 7.5 percent.

Keïta dissolved the National Assembly in August 2020 after he was detained by the CNSP, along with then–prime minister Boubou Cissé and other officials. A 121-member National Transitional Council (CNT) was appointed in December 2020, with CNSP member Colonel Malick Diaw as its president. Security forces directly controlled 22 seats, while political parties and organizations were granted 11. The M5–RFP, an alliance of opposition parties and civil society groups, separately held 8 seats.

In September 2023, the government announced that legislative elections scheduled for the end of 2023 would not go ahead as planned.

A multiyear effort to create a single election management body was realized when the Independent Election Management Authority (AIGE) became operational in October 2022. The body comprises 15 representatives, including 8 named by the government, 4 from political parties, and 3 from civil society groups. Electoral operations were previously divided among three administrative bodies: the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), and the General Office of Elections (DGE). The Constitutional Court also participates in the electoral process by validating election results and resolving disputes.

In 2022, the transitional president enacted a new electoral law that establishes the procedures and guidelines governing elections, including the eligibility criteria for candidates, the composition and the mandate of the AIGE, the duration of the electoral campaign period, and the litigation process that those contesting the election results must follow. Under the new electoral system presidential and legislative candidates must still win a majority of the votes, either in the initial vote or a runoff. Despite earlier promises to the contrary, the law now permits members of the junta to compete in elections if they step down from their posts at least six months ahead of the vote.

According to official information on the constitutional referendum that took place in June 2023, 97 percent voters were in favor of the new constitution, which expanded presidential powers. The official turnout was 38 percent. Opposition figures expressed concern that it would concentrate power in the hands of the president and dismay that it had not been drafted by a democratic, civilian government.

The creation and functioning of political parties are governed by a legal framework known as the Political Parties Charter, which is generally fair. The charter prohibits the creation of political parties on an “ethnic, religious, linguistic, regionalist, sexist, or professional basis.”

There are more than 100 registered political parties in Mali, though fewer than 20 are active. Parties are usually built around a particular personality and poorly funded. Policy differences between them are not always clear.

Throughout 2022 and 2023, individuals, groups, and parties who were critical of the transitional government faced harassment and arbitrary arrests. Clément Dembéle, the leader of an anticorruption platform, was arrested in November 2023, and many potential presidential candidates have also faced legal action. In July 2022, the Supreme Court issued arrest warrants for former prime minister Boubou Cissé and several other former officials.

Many expressed concern that these arrests are meant to intimidate opponents of the junta to challenge their political dominance in the next elections. Leaders in the major political parties have chosen to self-censor when it comes to the human rights violations and the reoccurring postponements of the elections by the junta. The February 20 coalition, an organization that demands a swift return to a democratically elected government, remains one of the few organizations that is openly critical of the junta.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to instances where political parties critical of the junta faced repression.

Prior to the coup, electoral competition was open to opposition forces. A 2014 law institutionalized specific privileges for opposition parties in the parliament, such as the ability to choose an official leader of the opposition. However, in 2016 the ruling majority adopted amendments to the electoral code that favored establishment and majority parties by requiring presidential candidates to make a significant financial deposit and receive support from a certain number of incumbent elected officials. Opposition figures faced violent attacks during parliamentary elections in 2020.

In September 2023, the transitional government announced that the legislative elections scheduled for the end of the year would not take place, and that the current government’s priority was to organize the next presidential elections. At the end of 2023 it was unclear when the country would hold elections for any office.

Score Change: The score declined from 1 to 0 because the postponement of elections denied the opposition an opportunity to compete for power.47

The military junta that took power in August 2020 has consolidated its authority. It has appointed key officials and set election timetables without meaningful public input. Although there have been some opportunities for civil society and political parties to participate in consultative processes, including ahead of the June 2022 electoral law changes, there was little to no opportunity for them to provide input on the new constitution, which significantly expanded presidential powers.

No law limits political rights for members of minority groups, and no single ethnic group dominates the government or security forces. Tuareg pastoralist groups in the north have historically occupied a marginal position in national political life.

Societal attitudes can discourage women and ethnic, religious, and other minority groups from participating in political processes. While a 2015 gender quota law mandates that 30 percent of elected and appointed positions are to be filled by women, just over 28 percent of CNT seats are held by women, and the 25-member cabinet that was established in June 2021—after the second coup d’état—included only six women.

The August 2020 coup d’état replaced an elected national government with a military regime; a second coup in May 2021 reinforced the military’s hold on power, causing renewed uncertainty about the reintroduction of civilian rule. A civilian, Choguel Maïga, was appointed as prime minister in June 2021, but several key government positions were filled by military leaders, and the junta has remained firmly in control of the government. Prime Minister Maïga was temporarily replaced by Colonel Abdoulaye Maïga in August 2022 after he suffered a stroke but was ultimately reinstated in December 2022.

A transition deadline of March 2024 was formalized in June 2022 as part of an agreement reached by ECOWAS and Malian authorities. The agreement was followed by the lifting of the sanctions ECOWAS had placed on Mali that January in response to delays in the planned transition to civilian government.

Corruption remains a problem in government, notably in public procurement. The suspension of the country’s institutions and the junta’s intimidation of critical voices within Malian civil society has likely worsened the problem. Bribery and the embezzlement of public funds is common, and impunity for corrupt officials is the norm. The Office of the Auditor General is an independent agency responsible for analyzing public spending, but despite its identification of sizable cases of embezzlement, very few prosecutions have taken place. Corruption and criminal activity in the government has fed alienation among citizens.

After the 2020 coup d’état, the CNSP launched a crackdown on apparent abuses by government officials but took no action to fight corruption within the military. In July 2022, arrest warrants were issued for a number of former government officials, including former prime minister Cissé, purportedly for the crime of forgery, among other things. In September 2023, arrest warrants were also issued for the former security minister, Salif Traoré, and the former minister for transport, Traoré Zeynabou Diop. However, some have expressed concern that the warrants represent a possible attempt to prevent the officials from contesting the 2024 presidential election.

In 2021, former prime minister Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga and former finance minister Bouaré Fily Sissoko were arrested on fraud charges in connection with the 2014 purchase of a presidential plane and $40 million in military equipment contracts. Maïga died in custody in March 2022.

Government operations remain opaque, and Mali does not have a comprehensive legal framework for freedom of information. While numerous laws provide for public access to some official documents and information, they are replete with extensive and vague exceptions. Journalists face obstacles when attempting to obtain information, particularly about military expenditures.

Opposition figures have criticized the constitution drafting process undertaken in 2022, and some have called for a more democratic drafting process. The draft constitution was not made public when it was submitted to military leadership in October 2022, and the transitional government did not provide precise information about its contents in the run-up to the June 2023 constitutional referendum.

Though the media environment in Bamako and in the rest of the south was relatively open prior to the 2020 coup, reports of censorship, self-censorship, and threats against journalists have risen significantly since then.

Members of the media who are perceived to be critical of the transitional government are targeted by harassment and intimidation. News outlets face pressure to report “patriotic news” that glorifies the junta and its approach toward politics. Defamation is a crime that can draw fines or prison time. Mali’s High Communication Authority (HAC) continues to undermine outlets with independent perspectives, and local media sources sometimes report the disappearance of journalists. In May 2023, 30 civil rights organizations published an open letter to the Malian government demanding an end to media freedom violations.

The accreditation process for foreign journalists is intrusive, and it has become effectively impossible for independent foreign journalists to become accredited. French broadcasters Radio France Internationale (RFI) and France 24 remain banned from broadcasting.

Reporting on the situation in the north remains dangerous due to the presence of active militant groups. In April 2021, French journalist Olivier Dubois was abducted by the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), a militant group with reported links to Al-Qaeda. He was released in March 2023 after being held hostage for almost two years.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 due to increased harassment and intimidation of members of the media who criticize the transitional government.

Freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed in Mali, which is a secular state, and discrimination on the basis of religion is prohibited. The population is predominantly Sunni Muslim, and Sufism plays a role in the beliefs of most residents.

Armed extremist groups have terrorized northern and central Mali since the 2012 Islamist uprising, attacking those whom they perceive as failing to follow their strict interpretation of Islam. Such groups have occasionally carried out targeted kidnappings of Christians and subjected them to sometimes violent harassment.

While academic freedom is upheld in areas with a consolidated government presence, universities are affected by violence and crime. Academics critical of the junta face repression and threats of dismissal. According to researchers, Mali is no longer compliant with some of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) recommendations on academic freedom.

Academic freedom is severely limited in areas affected by conflict and militant activity. In areas controlled by Islamist militant groups, schools have been forced to use curriculums in line with the groups’ ideologies. Roughly half a million children have seen their schools close due to violent conflicts in several parts of the country.

Since the August 2020 military coup freedom of expression has become restricted. It can be dangerous for individuals to discuss the deteriorating security situation or to criticize the junta-led transition process. Online journalists report that the government uses sophisticated online surveillance mechanisms to identify potential regime opponents. Even in cases where there is insufficient evidence to incarcerate journalists, individuals can be thrown into prison temporarily.

The United Nations and several international human rights associations describe a shrinking civic space in the country, featuring increased self-censorship among individuals, especially online. In March 2023 the UN Commissioner for Human Rights echoed these concerns, noting that they are especially relevant as Mali embarks on a political transition in which ideas ought to flourish.

Expression is also restricted in areas with a militant Islamist presence or where intercommunal violence has flared.

The constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, but participants in public gatherings risk violence by state security forces, and the government has occasionally restricted social media use to prevent activists from organizing protests.

Several protests took place in 2022 and were largely peaceful. Numerous progovernment rallies, including protests against ECOWAS sanctions, and demonstrations against French involvement in Mali were held throughout the year without being disrupted. Smaller protests against the military-led government have also taken place.

Since the August 2020 coup the work of organizations engaged in human rights or governance-related work has become restricted and repressed.

Such groups have reported facing death threats and threats of detention, as well as physical harassment and violence. This is particularly true for organizations that research conflicts in northern and central Mali, as well as organizations that portray Russia and Wagner’s engagement in Mali in a critical light.

In November 2022, the government banned nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that received financing from the French government. The ban impacted around 40 out of the approximately 300 organizations formally registered in Mali. Many of the affected NGOs provide humanitarian aid and have had difficulty finding alternative donors. As a result of the new policy all NGOs’ funding streams subject to mandatory government review.

Ongoing and worsening insecurity and violence in some parts of the country hamper NGO efforts to provide aid and services to returning refugees and others affected by instability.

The constitution guarantees workers the right to form unions and to strike, with some limitations for workers in essential services and requirements involving compulsory arbitration. The government has broad discretionary power over the registration of unions and recognition of collective bargaining, and the authorities do not effectively enforce laws against antiunion discrimination.

Trade unions are represented in the CNT and were represented on the committee that drafted the new constitution. Throughout 2023, there were several interunion conflicts over which union was representing which employees, as well as several minor strikes throughout the country.

The judiciary is beholden to the executive, despite constitutional guarantees of judicial independence. Judges are appointed by the president, while the minister of justice supervises both law enforcement and judicial functions. The violent conflict in northern and central Mali hinders judicial procedures. The military justice system still exercises its jurisdiction over crimes military personnel commit against civilians while on duty.

In July 2020, President Keïta announced the removal of Constitutional Court judges as part of an effort to resolve the country’s postelection political impasse. That August, nine judges were appointed to the court; three were named by Keïta, three by National Assembly President Moussa Timbine, and three by a judicial council. The appointments were met with criticism due to the involvement of a Keïta ally in the judges’ installation. The transitional government thus far has not meddled with the judicial system.

Militant attacks against judicial personnel have prompted some judges to vacate their posts.

Due process rights are inconsistently upheld. Detainees are not always charged within the 48-hour period set by law, and arbitrary arrests are common. Detainees also face extended pretrial detention periods. High costs and lengthy procedures inhibit access to the justice system.

In 2023 a state of emergency was in place for the whole country due to tense security conditions.

Due process rights were not consistently upheld for high-ranking officials detained by the military in the August 2020 coup d’état.

The Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (CJVR) created in 2014 is responsible for investigating human rights violations committed since 1960, but its activities have been restricted by terrorist activities and intercommunal tensions within Mali’s borders. In June 2022, the Commission held its fifth and last public hearing in Bamako. Its investigators ultimately collected testimony from tens of thousands of victims, and according to the prime minister the Malian state is currently examining the idea of financial reparations. Two bodies will be created to further promote transitional justice: the Agency for Reparations and the Center for the Promotion of Memory, Unity, and Peace.

Due process is not upheld in areas under militant control.

The security situation in Mali continued to deteriorate, leading to a decline in the protection of human rights across the country. In 2023, Islamist militant groups continued to carry out acts of violence against civilians in the northern and central regions. In addition to attacks and violence by Islamist groups, Tuareg groups that were party to a 2015 peace agreement resumed hostilities against the Malian state.

According to data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), violence targeting civilians increased by 38 percent between January and September of 2023. ACLED reported that these attacks spread to new locations in northern Mali. Hundreds of civilians were killed in conflicts throughout 2023.

In June 2023, the Malian government called on MINUSMA to depart the country “without delay” at the UN Security Council meeting. Several peacekeepers were injured by attacks as MINUSMA began its withdrawal, and MINUSMA’s departure strengthened the secessionist Tuareg rebel forces in northern Mali.

All major democratic partners that have supported Mali’s security sector since January 2013 have decided to suspend or are in the process of suspending military aid to the country. Foreign forces have played an important role in supporting the government’s fight against violent extremist organizations. After nine years of providing military support in Mali, the French government announced plans to withdraw its troops in February 2022; the last French soldiers left in August. Several other countries announced plans to withdraw their forces from MINUSMA during 2022. The UK cited the presence of the Wagner Group as part of its reason for leaving.

In May 2023, the UN published its report on the 2022 Moura massacre, which found that the Malian armed forces and their Russian partners participated in the mass execution of hundreds of civilians during sweep operations in the town of Moura in central Mali. The investigation was conducted in collaboration with the MINUSMA Human Rights Division, provoking speculation that the report motivated the government to end the MINUSMA mission.

Since 2012, militant groups affiliated with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have regularly enforced brutal punishments—including stoning and amputation—on civilians they accuse of crimes. Ongoing instability has contributed to the spread of organized crime and accompanying violence and kidnappings. Malian military personnel have been known to engage in human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests.

In July 2022, Malian authorities arrested 49 Côte d’Ivoire soldiers upon their arrival in Mali, claiming that they were mercenaries who had entered the country without permission. In January 2023 the Malian government pardoned the soldiers.

Prisons are characterized by overcrowding, insufficient medical care, and a lack of proper food and sanitation.

Members of a northern caste known as Black Tamasheqs face societal discrimination, including slavery-like treatment and hereditary servitude. Authorities sometimes deny them official documents or discriminate against them in housing, schooling, and police protection.

Arabs and Tuaregs also face discrimination. In 2020, Arab and Tuareg merchants in Timbuktu reported that they commonly faced blame for criminal and jihadist activity in the region.

Same-sex sexual acts are legal, but LGBT+ people face discrimination, including cases of violence by family members that is meant as a corrective punishment.

Although the constitution nominally guarantees equal rights and prohibits discrimination based on sex, men and women do not have the same legal status, and women are required by law to obey their husbands. Sexual harassment is not prohibited by law and is a common practice in schools and the workplace.

Conditions in northern Mali have left many refugees unable or unwilling to return, as continuing insecurity in the region complicates resettlement.

Freedom of movement and choice of residence remain constrained by insecurity, especially in northern and central Mali. In 2023 there were over 375,000 internally displaced people in Mali, and the transitional government restricted MINUSMA’s access and freedom of movement.

Citizens have the right to own property and engage in private enterprise, but these rights are not consistently respected, and widespread corruption hampers normal business activities. It is generally necessary to pay bribes in order to operate a business.

Traditional customs sometimes undermine the right of women to own property. The law discriminates against women in matters of inheritance.

The law puts women at a disadvantage on personal status issues including marriage and divorce. Rape and domestic violence against women are widespread, and most such crimes go unreported. There are no specific laws prohibiting spousal rape or domestic violence. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is legal and commonly practiced in the country. Same-sex couples cannot form civil unions, marry, or adopt children in Mali.

Although trafficking in persons is a criminal offense, prosecutions are infrequent. Many judicial officials remain unaware of the antitrafficking law, and the police lack adequate resources to combat trafficking. Traditional forms of slavery and debt bondage persist, particularly in the north, with thousands of people estimated to be living in such conditions.

The government has taken steps to eliminate child labor, but it is a significant concern. Armed groups regularly recruit and use child soldiers.