According to the constitution, the president, who holds most executive power, is directly elected for up to two five-year terms. Former president Nazarbaev maintained special constitutional powers as Kazakhstan’s “first president,” which exempted him from term limits and made him chairman of the Security Council for life. Nazarbaev’s constitutional privileges were removed in 2022. In January 2023, the Constitutional Court annulled “leader of the nation” legislation that had offered Nazarbaev and his family immunity from most prosecution.

President Toqaev was reelected in a snap November 2022 election before the end of his term, taking 81.3 percent of the vote according to the election commission. He faced five other candidates, none of whom were considered serious contenders. OSCE observers found that the election was neither free nor fair, while critics said Toqaev engaged in electoral manipulation as Nazarbaev had.

The upper house of the bicameral Parliament is the Senate. The Senate has 54 seats; 44 senators are chosen by the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan and 10 are appointed by the president. The senators, who are officially nonpartisan, serve six-year terms, with half of the elected members up for reelection every three years. The lower house, the Majilis, has 98 members, 30 percent of whom are elected according to a majoritarian system and the rest elected by proportional representation on party lists. Members serve five-year terms.

In the March 2023 snap elections, President Toqaev’s party, Amanat, won 62 Majilis seats. Auyl won 8, Respublica and Aq Jol each won 6, the People’s Party of Kazakhstan won 5, the National Social Democratic Party won 4, and independents won 7. While more parties entered the lower house than in the last term, none of them offer serious opposition to Toqaev. Independent candidates in single-district mandates faced obstacles, including being barred from running on technicalities and the improper counting of ballots in favor of proregime candidates. OSCE observers said the elections were marked by “elements of competitiveness” but were marred by obstacles facing self-nominated candidates and “superficial” media coverage.

Kazakhstan’s legal framework is not sufficient to ensure free and fair elections, and safeguards that do exist are not properly enforced. Electoral laws make it difficult for opposition parties to obtain parliamentary representation. Parties must clear a 5 percent vote threshold to enter the Majilis and are barred from forming electoral blocs, preventing them from pooling votes and campaign resources.

Presidential candidates must also pass a Kazakh language test with unclear evaluation criteria, have at least five years of public-service experience, and submit their medical records. Independent candidates may not run for president, and the eligibility requirements, including those concerning education and residency, are onerous and out of line with OSCE standards.

While constitutional changes made in 2022 made it easier to register political parties by reducing the number of members required from 20,000 to 5,000, the registration process remains onerous, and officials have broad discretion to delay or deny party registration in practice. The law still prohibits parties based on ethnic origin, religion, or gender. Opposition parties have been banned or marginalized via antiextremism laws; their leaders have faced criminal charges and their followers have had their activities restricted.

The opposition party Alga Kazakhstan continues to be denied registration by the Ministry of Justice, despite making numerous attempts. In May 2023, its leader, Marat Zhylanbaev, was jailed on suspicion of financing an extremist organization. Zhylanbaev’s detention was extended after he was charged with taking part in a banned extremist organization later in May. In November, he was found guilty and sentenced to seven years in prison. Another party, Atajurt, which is dedicated to defending the rights of ethnic Kazakhs in China’s Xinjiang region, has also been denied registration. In April, the leader of the unregistered Democratic Party of Kazakhstan, Janbolat Mamai, received a suspended prison term for “organizing mass riots” during the violence of January 2022. Mamai was prohibited from engaging in “social and political” activities for six years.

Kazakhstan experienced its first peaceful transfer of power in 2019 when Nazarbaev stood down as president, though Toqaev was elected in a poll that lacked credible opposition. Opposition parties are locked out of gaining power or influence through legislative elections. The ruling party holds a supermajority of Majilis seats, and the other five parties holding seats there are considered loyal to Toqaev’s regime.

While voters and candidates are not subject to undue influence by the military, the political system is dominated by a small group of elites. The extent of the Russian government’s influence over Kazakhstani politics is unknown.

The legal ban on parties with an ethnic, religious, or gender focus—combined with the dominance of Amanat—limits the ability of women and minority groups to organize independently and advocate for their interests through the political system. A gender quota for party lists was introduced in 2019, but women held only 18.4 percent of the Majilis’s seats after the March 2023 snap poll. The Kazakh language test for presidential candidates presents an obstacle for non-Kazakh ethnic minorities and many Russian-speaking people.

Government policies are determined by the executive branch irrespective of the constitutionally defined roles of the executive, judiciary, and legislature. Parliament does not serve as an effective check on the executive, and instead largely provides formal approval for the government’s legislative initiatives.

Constitutional changes to 33 articles approved in the June 2022 referendum ostensibly shifted powers from the president to the Majilis. The changes extended the presidential term from five to seven years but limited the office-holder to one term. It also introduced a mixed electoral system, reduced the size of the Majilis, and extended parliamentary powers. Critics argued the reforms were a way for Toqaev to legitimize his rule. The president retained the powers to appoint the prime minister, the prosecutor general, the security chief, local governors, and other senior officials in government.

Corruption is widespread at all levels of government. Corruption cases are often prosecuted at the local and regional levels. Charges against high-ranking political and business elites were historically rare, typically emerging only after an individual had fallen out of favor with the leadership. In restoring order after the violence of January 2022, Toqaev ordered the detention and arrest of former Nazarbaev allies on charges including corruption.

Figures close to Nazarbaev continued to face charges of treason, corruption, and embezzlement in 2023. In April, former National Security Committee chief Karim Masimov, who was dismissed during the violence of January 2022, received an 18-year prison sentence for high treason, the forcible attempt to seize power, and abuse of office. His supporters said his case was politically motivated. In June 2023, Toqaev announced that corruption had been “eradicated” because of the reforms he had introduced. That same month, however, residents affected by wildfires in Abay Province criticized the government’s response, saying it had been hampered by corruption and negligence.

The government and legislature offer little transparency on their decision-making processes, budgetary matters, and other operations. The media and civil society do not have a meaningful opportunity to provide independent commentary and input on pending laws and policies. A law on public access to government information was adopted in 2015 but is poorly implemented in practice. Officials’ asset and income declarations are not publicly available.

The government has failed to release information about the extent of its crackdown on individuals involved in the protests and violence that took place in January 2022.

Media independence is severely limited in Kazakhstan. While the constitution provides for freedom of the press, most of the media sector is controlled by the state or government-friendly owners. Independent outlets and journalists are routinely shut down or harassed, and self-censorship is common. Libel is a criminal offense, and the criminal code prohibits insulting the president and other officials.

Journalists are required to confirm the accuracy of information prior to publication by consulting with relevant government bodies or officials, obtain consent for the publication of personal or otherwise confidential information, and acquire accreditation as foreign journalists if they work for foreign outlets. They are also required to work with a “host” when reporting on government events.

The authorities also use internet blackouts to restrict access to media outlets. In April 2023, the Open Observatory of Network Interference accused Astana of throttling the website of Azattyq, the Kazakh service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), beginning in late 2022, and of doing the same to Current Time TV during the 2022 presidential election.

In July 2023, Toqaev signed a law that penalizes the dissemination of purportedly false news. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) criticized the legislation, saying it would censor journalists and bloggers, who face administrative fines for violating it. The legal changes took effect in September.

New amendments on the law on mass media passed its first reading in November 2023. The amendments, if passed, would allow citizens to sue for libel for up to three years after publication of an article. The current law places no such limit, but journalist organizations called for a one-year limit. The amendments would introduce a single-press-card accreditation system. Critics argue that the amendments would increase state control of media if put into effect.

The constitution guarantees freedom of worship, and some religious communities practice without state interference. However, activities by unregistered religious groups are banned, and registered groups are subject to close government supervision. The government has broad authority to outlaw organizations it designates as “extremist.”

The 2011 Law on Religious Activities and Religious Associations prohibited the distribution of religious literature outside places of worship, required the state approval of all religious literature, and prohibited unregistered missionary activity, among other provisions. In early 2022, amendments to the law came into force, placing further bureaucratic restrictions on holding religious meetings in unregistered places of worship.

Local officials continue to harass groups defined as “nontraditional,” including Protestant Christians, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Muslims who do not adhere to the government-approved version of Islam. In 2021 the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention called for the immediate release of nine Muslims who had been jailed for participating in an online religious discussion. All nine remained imprisoned as of September 2023.

Academic freedom remains constrained by political sensitivities surrounding certain topics, including Nazarbaev and his inner circle, as well as relations with Russia. Self-censorship on such topics is reportedly common among scholars and educators. Past reports claimed that approximately 130 higher-education institutions are owned by elites or their relatives.

Authorities are known to monitor social media, and users are regularly prosecuted on charges such as inciting social and ethnic hatred, insulting government officials, and promoting separatism or terrorism. The media law makes it impossible for internet users to leave anonymous comments online, further limiting free expression.

The authorities surveil and block access to material deemed inappropriate. Mobile service providers instruct customers to install encryption software on mobile phones that allows security services to intercept data traffic and circumvent email and messaging applications’ encryption. Those who do not install the software face difficulties in accessing the internet, particularly social media platforms.

In 2022, President Toqaev approved amendments to the law on the protection of children’s rights, requiring social media companies with over 100,000 daily visitors to register and open offices in Kazakhstan within six months, ostensibly to prevent cyberbullying. Critics claim the revisions were meant to further silence dissidents by shutting down social media companies which fail to meet the new registration requirements.

Despite constitutional guarantees, the government imposes tight restrictions on freedom of assembly. President Toqaev revised the public assembly law in 2020, forcing groups to give notification three to seven days in advance of a protest and then wait for approval by the local administration. Only officially registered groups may give notification, and gatherings are only allowed in state-approved sites, which are often located far from city centers. Organizers and protest participants who do not comply face fines and imprisonment. In April 2023, striking oil workers in Zhanaozen were detained for violating that law. In May, supporters of exiled opposition leader Mukhtar Ablyazov were arrested after holding an unsanctioned rally in Almaty.

Ahead of the March 2023 elections, Toqaev announced tougher sanctions on those who call for mass unrest, a criminal offense. In late March, one unsuccessful parliamentary candidate, Duman Mukhammedkarim, was detained for 25 days for an administrative-code offense, after he vowed to publicly protest the outcome. In April, two opposition activists were detained for holding election-related demonstrations. In October, several activists were detained for 15 days ahead of planned opposition rallies.

Authorities continue to prosecute participants of the January 2022 protests, including opening cases against some who died in the events. In August 2023, relatives of those who died in those protests were arrested after demonstrating in Shymkent.

NGOs continue to operate but face government harassment when they attempt to address politically sensitive issues. There are extensive legal restrictions on the formation and operation of NGOs, including onerous financial rules and harsh penalties for noncompliance. Organizations can incur fines and other punishments for vaguely defined offenses like interfering with government activities or engaging in work outside the scope of their charters.

Workers have limited rights to form and join trade unions or participate in collective bargaining. The government is closely affiliated with the largest union federation and major employers, while genuinely independent unions face repressive actions by the authorities. The country’s major independent trade union body, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions (KNPRK), was dissolved in 2017. The International Labour Organization argues that Astana is not meeting its obligations under its convention for the freedom of association and protection of unions.

In August 2023, the Trade Union of Fuel and Energy Complex Workers, a KNPRK affiliate, was granted registration with the Ministry of Justice after it won a lawsuit against the ministry.

The judiciary is effectively subservient to the executive branch, with the president nominating or directly appointing judges based on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council, which is itself appointed by the president. Judges are subject to political influence, and corruption is a problem throughout the judicial system.

Ongoing trials and prosecutions of participants in the events of January 2022 are considered by critics to be politically motivated.

Attorneys are required to become members of a state chamber and to register with a government-controlled digital information system. Local and international lawyers’ associations have criticized the law, saying it imposes undue state control over legal professionals and threatens their independence.

Police reportedly engage in arbitrary arrests and detentions and violate detained suspects’ right to assistance from a defense lawyer. Prosecutors, as opposed to judges, are empowered to authorize searches and seizures. Defendants are often held in pretrial detention for long periods. Politically motivated prosecutions and prison sentences against activists, journalists, and opposition figures are common.

Security forces illegally detained, tortured, and denied legal representation to hundreds of peaceful protesters in January 2022.

Conditions in pretrial detention facilities and prisons are harsh. According to RFE/RL reporting, the number of suicides among prisoners has increased in recent years.

Police regularly use excessive force during arrests, and torture is widely employed to obtain confessions, with numerous allegations of physical abuse and other mistreatment documented each year. Those who engage in such mistreatment are rarely brought to justice. Video evidence of prisoners being beaten and tortured in a facility in the country’s north was widely shared on social media after it was filmed in August 2023.

Terrorist violence within the country is rare, though some Kazakhstanis have traveled abroad to support the Islamic State (IS) militant group. In September 2023, an unidentified man received a six-year prison term for having travelled to Syria to join the IS.

While the constitution guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination based on gender, race, and other categories, it does not explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. Major segments of society face discrimination in practice, particularly ethnic minority groups and migrant workers, who are often undocumented and are frequently exploited. Traditional cultural biases limit economic and professional opportunities for women, and the law offers no protection against sexual harassment in the workplace. Members of the sizable Russian-speaking minority have complained of discrimination in employment and education.

LGBT+ people continue to face societal discrimination, harassment, and violence, despite the decriminalization of same-sex relations in 1998. Calls to limit the discussion of LGBT+ issues have been commonly issued in recent years. Majilis member Ardak Nazarov in April 2023 called for a ban on “LGBT+ ideology.”

Under pressure from Beijing, government authorities sometimes detain ethnic Kazakhs fleeing China and threaten them with the prospect of deportation, even though they are subject to discrimination and torture upon return. In October 2023, the parliament ratified a treaty with the Chinese government regarding an exchange of information about citizens of both countries. The agreement allows both countries to monitor migration and obliges Kazakhstani authorities to return Chinese citizens to China on Beijing’s request; critics argued that ethnic Kazakhs would have more difficulty escaping persecution in Xinjiang as a result.

Kazakhstani citizens can travel freely but must register their permanent residence with local authorities. Citizens must register temporary residences lasting more than a month with local authorities or face fines.

While the rights of entrepreneurship and private property are formally protected, they are limited in practice by bureaucratic hurdles and the undue influence of politically connected elites, who control large segments of the economy.

NGOs continue to report instances of early and forced marriage, particularly in rural areas. Women are also encouraged to support large families; those who raise at least six children receive a medal from the government, along with tax breaks and modest monthly benefits.

Domestic violence is a serious problem that often goes unpunished, as police are reluctant to intervene. Modest legislation meant to address the problem was adopted in April 2023, though Human Rights Watch (HRW) noted that domestic violence in itself is not considered a criminal offense under the new legislation. Kuandyk Bishimbaev, a former government minister, was arrested in November after allegedly killing his wife, Saltanat Nukenova, in an Astana restaurant. Bishimbaev was still being held at year’s end. A petition calling for tougher penalties against domestic abusers gained over 150,000 signatures by early December, obligating the authorities to consider the request. In December, the Ministry of Justice stated that authorities would not do so because the petition’s format was no longer accepted.

Migrant workers from neighboring countries often face poor working conditions and a lack of effective legal safeguards against exploitation. Both migrants and Kazakhstani workers from rural areas are vulnerable to trafficking for the purposes of forced labor and prostitution in large cities. Government authorities identified 110 criminal cases of human trafficking in the first half of 2023. Some experts claim that official statistics do not fully depict the extent of trafficking in Kazakhstan, which serves as a source, destination, and transit country for human trafficking. The authorities reportedly make little effort to assist foreign victims of trafficking. An antitrafficking bill was submitted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the parliament in May 2023.