The president is directly elected for seven-year terms. There are no term limits. Since the early 1990s, elections have not been considered credible or competitive by international observers. President Ilham Aliyev—who succeeded his father, Heydar, in 2003—won a fourth term in 2018 with some 86 percent of the vote amid evidence of electoral fraud and a boycott by the main opposition parties. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observers said the election lacked genuine competition due to a restrictive political environment in which the seven nominal opposition candidates did not openly confront or criticize the president.

In 2017, President Aliyev appointed his wife, Mehriban Aliyeva, as vice president. The post was created via constitutional changes that were pushed through in 2016 without meaningful parliamentary debate or public consultation. The prime minister and cabinet are appointed and dismissed by the president. Prime Minister Ali Asadov was appointed in 2019.

In December 2023, a snap presidential election was scheduled for February 2024, one year early. Some analysts suggested that Aliyev called the vote in order to consolidate public support after the successful military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh. The top two opposition parties, the Azerbaijani Popular Front Party (APFP) and Musavat, said they would boycott the election; the APFP chair called the planned poll “fakery in the name of elections, which is an imitation of democracy.”

The 125 seats in Azerbaijan’s unicameral Milli Mejlis, or National Assembly, are filled through elections in single-member districts, with members serving five-year terms.

Aliyev dissolved the parliament in December 2019, and snap elections were held in February 2020. The ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) won 70 parliamentary seats, while independents won 41 and the remainder went to smaller parties; contests for 4 seats were not immediately decided. Turnout stood at 46.8 percent. A major opposition alliance, the National Council of Democratic Forces, boycotted the elections.

OSCE monitors criticized the conduct of the polls, noting that “the restrictive legislation and political environment prevented genuine competition … despite a high number of candidates.” It added that “significant procedural violations during counting and tabulation raised concerns whether the results were established honestly.”

The electoral laws and framework fall short of international standards and do not ensure free and fair elections. The nomination process for members of electoral commissions places the bodies under the influence of the ruling party. Commission members have been known to unlawfully interfere with the election process and obstruct the activities of observers. Complaints of electoral violations do not receive adequate or impartial treatment.

Election observers have repeatedly condemned restrictions on freedom of assembly, the inability of candidates to obtain permission to hold rallies or appear on television, political interference with courts investigating electoral violations, and noncompliance with past European Court of Human Rights decisions on election issues.

In March 2023, President Aliyev introduced a new regional management model in which he would appoint special presidential representatives for different regions. The move sparked debate about whether it signified potential constitutional reforms and increased local empowerment, or was merely a symbolic shift in governance. Several special representatives were appointed as part of the initiative, such as in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.

The political environment in Azerbaijan is neither pluralistic nor competitive. The ability of opposition parties to operate and engage with the public is limited by the dominance of the YAP. A number of laws restrict candidates’ efforts to organize and hold rallies, and the opposition has virtually no access to coverage on television, which remains the most popular news source. The regime has cracked down violently on any Islamic political movement that reaches national prominence.

A political dialogue between the government and the opposition began in 2020, resulting in the creation of new political parties for the first time since 2011. However, critics say that the new parties are not genuine opposition groups and that the dialogue has been dominated by the government.

In December 2022, the parliament passed a controversial law on political parties that imposed strict conditions for party registration. The law prompted protests and international criticism, particularly due to a new requirement that parties have at least 5,000 enrolled members, up from 1,000 previously. The legislation also mandated the reregistration of existing parties, and implemented new penalties for activity by unregistered parties. The APFP, Musavat, and the Republican Alternative (REAL) party were denied registration in July 2023. In September, however, the Ministry of Justice reversed its decision without explanation, granting registration to all three parties.

The Aliyev family has held the presidency since 1993. The biased electoral framework and repressive media and political environment effectively make it impossible for opposition parties to gain power through elections. The traditional opposition parties boycotted the most recent parliamentary, presidential, and municipal elections rather than take part in an unfair process.

In July 2023, Gubad Ibadoglu, leader of the Azerbaijan Democracy and Prosperity Movement, was arrested on charges of involvement in a counterfeiting operation; he was also accused of religious extremism over alleged links to the movement of Turkish religious leader Fethullah Gülen. The Ministry of Justice refused to place Ibadoglu in a prison hospital, even as he experienced diabetes-related sickness and complications from scoliosis. His lawyers called the charges politically motivated, and members of the European Parliament, the US Senate, and the international human rights community expressed concern over his arrest.

The authoritarian system in Azerbaijan excludes the public from any genuine and autonomous political participation. The regime relies on abuse of state resources, corrupt patronage networks, and control over the security forces and criminal justice system to maintain its political dominance.

The political system does not allow women or minority groups to organize independently or advocate for their respective interests. There are no meaningful mechanisms to promote increased representation of women and ethnic or religious minorities. The government has worked to stifle public expressions of ethnic Talysh and Lezgin identity, among other targeted groups.

Internally displaced persons (IDPs) who left Nagorno-Karabakh and settled in other parts of Azerbaijan after the 1994 cease-fire have been unable to participate in municipal elections where they subsequently settled, and are instead directed to vote for their former districts.

Neither the president nor members of parliament are freely or fairly elected, and the parliament is unable to serve as a meaningful check on the powerful presidency. Lawmakers and lower-level elected officials essentially carry out the instructions of the ruling party.

Corruption is pervasive. In the absence of a free press and independent judiciary, officials are held accountable for corrupt behavior only when it suits the needs of a more powerful or well-connected figure. Investigative reports published by foreign media in recent years have revealed evidence that members of the Aliyev family have used their positions to amass large private fortunes.

Government operations are opaque. Although public officials are nominally required to submit financial disclosure reports, procedures and compliance remain unclear, and the reports are not publicly accessible. There are legal guarantees for citizens’ access to information, but also broad exceptions to this right, and authorities at all levels systematically refuse to respond to information requests.

Constitutional guarantees for press freedom are routinely and systematically violated, as the government works to maintain a tight grip on the information landscape. Defamation remains a criminal offense. Legal amendments passed in 2017 extended government control over online media, allowing blocking of websites without a court order if they are deemed to contain content that poses a danger to the state or society. Independent news sites are regularly blocked or struck with cyberattacks.

Journalists face detention or imprisonment on false charges, along with travel bans. In November 2023, authorities launched an intense crackdown on remaining independent media. Several journalists and media leaders, including directors and editorial teams from Abzas Media and Kanal 13, were placed in pretrial detention on charges such as smuggling, illegal construction, and resisting police. In September, journalist Nurlan Gahramanly alleged that he was threatened with rape by the State Security Service during an interrogation; he said he believed the threat was linked to his posts on social media opposing Azerbaijani military operations in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Journalists are also subject to surveillance. In 2021, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) reported that Azerbaijani journalists were among those targeted with the Pegasus spyware tool, which was likely supplied to the Azerbaijani government.

A 2021 presidential decree called for “media reforms” and created a new regulator, the Media Development Agency, while a 2022 law required journalists to register with the authorities and media owners to reside in Azerbaijan.

The regime exercises control over religion through state-affiliated entities such as the Caucasus Muslim Board. Religious communities that attempt to operate independently face burdensome registration requirements, interference with the importation and distribution of printed religious materials, and arrest and harassment of religious leaders who have international ties or a significant following. For example, members of the Muslim Unity Movement, a nonviolent conservative Shiite group, have been subjected to mass arrests, torture, and imprisonment as part of a crackdown that began in 2015. In 2023, Azerbaijani authorities arrested hundreds of religious Shiite Muslims, with progovernment media labeling some as spies working for Iran even as most were arrested on drug-related charges. Rights activists claimed that over 500 religious Shiites were arrested, and some reported torture in custody.

A number of mosques have been closed in recent years, ostensibly for registration or safety violations. Jehovah’s Witnesses face harassment as well as prosecution for refusing military service.

The authorities have long curtailed academic freedom. Some educators have reported being dismissed for links to opposition groups, and students have faced expulsion and other punishments for similar reasons. The Azerbaijani curriculum is known to include negative and discriminatory references to Armenians.

Law enforcement bodies monitor private telephone and online communications—particularly of activists, political figures, and foreign nationals—without judicial oversight. The escalation of government persecution of critics and their families has undermined the assumption of privacy among ordinary residents and eroded the openness of private discussion. Even state officials have been punished for their and their family members’ social media activity, and activists have been imprisoned on unrelated, fabricated charges in reprisal for critical social media posts. In recent years, civic activists have been targeted by spear-phishing campaigns designed to install malicious software on their computers or steal personal information. They report that harassment on social media, often highly sexualized for women activists, is commonplace.

Social media users and antiwar activists who have called for a peaceful resolution to the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh face harassment and arrest on charges such as disobeying police. The campaign against antiwar activists intensified in 2023, with the mainstream media labeling them as “traitors” and connecting them to “foreign interests,” particularly the promotion of LGBT+ people’s rights, feminism, and “antinational” ideas.

In 2021, the OCCRP reported that people who had casual or familial connections to activists and journalists were targeted with Pegasus.

The law imposes tight restrictions on freedom of assembly, which is contingent on the protection of “public order and morals.” Activists have complained that in practice, the obstacles to public gatherings include additional, extralegal measures. Unsanctioned assemblies can draw a harsh police response and fines for participants, and the government largely stopped issuing permits for rallies in Baku in 2019. Even when permits are issued, the government typically confines demonstrations to relatively isolated locations, where it can track attendees through facial-recognition technology and mobile-phone data.

Unlike in previous years, the police did not prevent a rally held by women’s rights activists on International Women’s Day in March 2023. Also that month, about 200 villagers in Saatli District protested water shortages in the Kura and Aras Rivers, and were met with police violence involving rubber bullets and tear gas. The protests were fueled by allegations of resource exploitation by government-connected elites and foreign companies. In the Gabaday Region village of Soyudlu, participants in a June environmental protest similarly faced rubber bullets and tear gas; seven residents were arrested and sentenced to 20 days’ detention.

Repressive laws on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have been used to pressure both local and foreign organizations, many of which have suspended operations when their bank accounts were frozen or their offices raided. Nearly all organizations or networks that work on human rights are forced by the state to operate in a legal gray zone. The government has refused to permit the European Union to provide grant support for local civil society groups. Civic activists are routinely subjected to harassment, intimidation, detention, and abuse by police. Activists also risk surveillance; a 2021 OCCRP report noted that over 40 Azerbaijani activists were likely targeted with Pegasus, along with family members.

Activists continue to be arrested on spurious charges. Human rights defender Bakhtiyar Hajiyev was arrested on hooliganism charges in December 2022; his lawyer called the case “manufactured,” saying it was connected to his activism. In March 2023 Hajiyev ended his 51-day hunger strike amid concerns that intimate images and conversations from his Facebook account had been exposed, with feminist activists expressing concern for the safety of the women featured in the leaked content. Supporters believe the material’s appearance was part of a smear campaign orchestrated by the government.

In June, the General Prosecutor’s Office confirmed the termination of criminal cases against certain NGOs targeted in a 2014 crackdown. However, the government did not disclose the names of these NGOs, leading to speculation about its intent.

Although the law permits the formation of trade unions and the right to strike, the majority of unions remain closely affiliated with the government, and many categories of workers are prohibited from striking. Most major industries are dominated by state-owned enterprises, in which the government controls wages and working conditions.

In August 2023, Afieddin Mammadov, the chairman of an independent trade union confederation and a critic of Aliyev, was arrested and sentenced to 30 days of administrative imprisonment after participating in a press conference with the couriers’ union; they criticized new rules for motorcycle licenses at the event. Mammadov was reportedly arrested by people in civilian clothing and denied access to a lawyer when brought before the court. He was arrested again in September on assault charges, which he rejected as false. In November, reports emerged that the judge at his hearing asked whether he had written social media posts regarding the military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The judiciary is corrupt and subservient to the executive. Judges are appointed by the parliament on the proposal of the president. The courts’ lack of political independence is especially evident in the many trumped-up or otherwise flawed cases brought against opposition figures, activists, and critical journalists.

Constitutional guarantees of due process are not upheld. Arbitrary arrest and detention are common, and detainees are often held for long periods before trial. Political detainees have reported restricted access to legal counsel, fabrication and withholding of evidence, and physical abuse to extract confessions.

Although nominally independent, the Azerbaijani Bar Association (AVK) acts on the orders of the Ministry of Justice and is complicit in the harassment of human rights lawyers. Legal amendments that took effect in 2018 stipulated that only AVK members could represent clients in court. Since then, the association has disbarred, suspended, or threatened most of the country’s active human rights lawyers for speaking to the media about violations of their clients’ rights. In nearly all disciplinary cases, the courts have upheld AVK decisions without a thorough assessment or public justification.

In 2023, a controversial case in which a suspect was sentenced to 18 years in prison for the kidnapping and murder of a 10-year-old child deepened public mistrust in the country’s law enforcement and judicial systems. The case against the suspect featured discrepancies such as mismatched blood types, fabricated evidence, and allegations of torture during detention.

International observers have consistently concluded that both torture and impunity for the perpetrators of such abuse are endemic in the Azerbaijani criminal justice system. Police regularly beat suspects during arrest or while breaking up protests. Prison conditions are substandard. Medical care is generally inadequate, and overcrowding is common.

In late 2022, 19 individuals who had been arrested and sentenced to between 7 and 20 years in prison in the so-called Tartar case were acquitted and released. The case dated to 2017, when hundreds of Azerbaijani soldiers were detained on suspicion of treason, and many were allegedly tortured. Two of the original defendants who had died under torture, Mehman Huseynov and Elkhan Agazadeh, were posthumously found not guilty.

Azerbaijanis have been affected by armed conflict over control of Nagorno-Karabakh and parts of Armenia, with more than 3,000 soldiers and a number of civilians killed in cross-border shelling and other fighting since 2020. Nearly 200 Azerbaijani soldiers were killed during the military offensive in September 2023.

Members of ethnic minority groups have complained of discrimination in areas including education, employment, and housing. Women are subject to discrimination in employment, including both de facto bias and formal exclusion from certain types of work under the labor code.

While Azerbaijani IDPs from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that ended in 1994 are entitled to special assistance, they face severe infringements on their economic and social rights and freedom of movement. Many are housed in dormitories or substandard housing and are unable to change their place of residence, which is often located out of range of sources of employment or adequate medical care.

Although same-sex sexual activity is legal, LGBT+ people experience societal discrimination and risk harassment by the police. In 2022, openly gay LGBT+ activist Avaz Shikhmammadov—known as Avaz Hafizli—was murdered by his cousin, Amrulla Gulaliyev, who confessed to killing Hafizli because of his sexual orientation. Gulaliyev was sentenced to nine years and six months in prison later that year. Hafizli’s murder was not prosecuted as a hate crime.

The government restricts freedom of movement, particularly foreign travel, for opposition politicians, journalists, and civil society activists. While travel bans were lifted for some dissidents during 2019, many others were left in place, including for some of the political prisoners released that year; others fled the country to avoid further persecution. Some travel bans remained in effect in 2023 and have been extended to the families of political emigrants.

Azerbaijani IDPs from the first Nagorno-Karabakh conflict enjoy freedom of movement in law, but not in practice. IDPs are legally registered at their place of initial resettlement, which are sometimes in rural areas and far from any source of employment. The process of changing registration is difficult, and IDPs who change their place of registration risk losing their status and accompanying state assistance. As a result, many families are separated, with usually male wage-earners relocating to urban centers for work while their families remain at their place of registration.

In 2023, about 420 families who had been displaced in the 1990s were reportedly resettled on land captured by Baku following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The government has outlined plans to relocate more than 34,000 Azerbaijani families to Nagorno-Karabakh by 2026. However, critics have raised concerns about the program’s feasibility and transparency. Aliyev also announced the return of IDPs to the city of Lachin by the end of 2023, highlighting ongoing efforts to reconstruct housing and infrastructure in the area.

All of Azerbaijan’s land borders remained closed in 2023, ostensibly for health reasons. The closure was extended in December 2023 to the following April, with the government again citing the COVID-19 pandemic as justification, even though many other pandemic-related restrictions had been lifted.

People with disabilities and psychiatric patients are routinely institutionalized; there is no clear procedure to review their confinement.

Property rights are affected by government-backed development projects that often entail forced evictions, unlawful expropriations, and demolitions with little or no notice. Corruption and the economic dominance of state-owned companies and politically connected elites pose obstacles to ordinary private business activity.

The law generally grants women and men the same rights on personal status matters such as marriage, divorce, and child custody. A law that took effect in 2021 imposed mandatory mediation on those seeking to divorce. The law introduced a number of obstacles for those wishing to divorce, especially for people outside of large cities who may not have access to official mediation services. Critics warned that the law would disproportionately disadvantage people who cannot secure legal representation or those who are otherwise vulnerable, such as survivors of domestic abuse attempting to divorce their abuser.

Domestic violence is a notable problem, and related legal protections are inadequate. Conservative social norms contribute to the widespread view that domestic violence is a private matter, which discourages victims from reporting perpetrators to the police. However, the growth of social media and the movement of rural populations to Baku in recent years have spurred public discussion of the issue.

Other forms of gender-based violence are also a persistent problem. Sexual assaults frequently go unreported, and those that are reported often are not prosecuted.

Legal safeguards against exploitative working conditions are poorly enforced, and many employers reportedly ignore them without penalty. Children are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and forced labor. The government has taken some steps to combat forced labor and sex trafficking, including by prosecuting traffickers and providing services to victims, but the problem persists, notably among Romany children and foreign household workers. In early 2023, the authorities extended a preexisting moratorium on labor inspections through the end of 2024.

As a result of corruption and a lack of public accountability for the allocation of resources, the state’s oil and gas revenues tend to benefit privileged elites rather than the general population, narrowing access to economic opportunity.