Hungary’s internet penetration rate has steadily increased in recent years. The European Union’s (EU) Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) found that 97 percent of Hungarian households had access to the internet in 2022, an increase from 89 percent in 2021.1 Sixty-one percent of households enjoyed speeds of at least 100 megabits per second (Mbps).2

The government also introduced the National Digitalisation Strategy in 2021, which aims to provide an at least 1 gigabit per second (Gbps)–capable network to 95 percent of households by 2030.3 According to Ookla’s SpeedTest, as of May 2023, the median mobile broadband download speed was 49.91 Mbps, while the median fixed broadband download speed was 135.21 Mbps.4

According to 2022 data from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the fixed broadband penetration rate is 35.8 percent, the mobile broadband penetration rate is 81.6 percent, and 90.5 percent of people use the internet.5 Fifth-generation (5G) services covered 18 percent of the country in 2022, significantly lower than the 66 percent EU average, while service providers started to phase out their third-generation (3G) networks.6

Public Wi-Fi hotspots are widely available throughout Budapest, the capital, and other major cities in Hungary.7

The cost of internet access is not prohibitive. According to the ITU, the monthly cost of 5 gigabytes (GB) of fixed broadband internet connection was .75 percent of gross national income (GNI) per capita in 2022, while the monthly cost of a 2 GB mobile data plan was 0.58 percent of GNI per capita.8 In 2021, Hungary’s GNI per capita was $17,740, according to the World Bank.9

Levels of access differ based on geographic and socioeconomic conditions; lower access rates exist in rural areas and among low-income families. A digital divide based on ethnicity has also been observed: Romany people have historically had less access to the internet.10

The government does not restrict commercial information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure,11 and backbone networks are owned by private companies rather than the state.12 Legally, however, the internet and other telecommunications services can be restricted or suspended in the event of an attack on Hungary, for preemptive defense, or during a national emergency.13

The Budapest Internet Exchange (BIX), which distributes Hungarian internet traffic among domestic internet service providers (ISPs), is overseen by the nonprofit Council of Hungarian Internet Service Providers (ISZT)14 without any government interference.15

Score Change: The score declined from 5 to 4 because of market consolidation in the telecommunications sector, driven by 4iG’s acquisition of the majority of Vodafone’s business in Hungary.

The ICT market in Hungary lacks significant competition and 4iG, which is linked to Orbán through its owners, further consolidated the market during the coverage period. However, there are no onerous legal, regulatory, or economic barriers to entry for potential competitors.

Three ISPs—Magyar Telekom, DIGI, and Vodafone (formerly UPC)—controlled over 80 percent of the total fixed broadband market as of August 2021.16 Prior to 2022, there were four major mobile service providers: market leader Magyar Telekom, Yettel (formerly Telenor), Vodafone,17 and DIGI.18 In January 2022, the Romanian-owned DIGI sold 100 percent of the shares of its Hungarian operation to 4iG.19 The deal was deemed to be in the “national strategic interest,” preventing the Hungarian Competition Authority from reviewing it.20

In August 2022, 4iG purchased 51 percent of Vodafone’s fixed-line and mobile business in Hungary for a reported 715 billion forints ($2.2 billion), which made 4iG the country’s second-largest telecommunications operator; Corvinus International Investment, on behalf of the Hungarian state, acquired a 49 percent minority share.21 In January 2023, the Hungarian government once again ruled that the deal was in the “national strategic interest.”22 In March 2023, as a result of a share exchange between 4iG and the Hungarian state, 4iG further increased its share to 70.5 percent of Vodafone’s Hungarian holdings. The exchanged shares belonged to Yettel, providing the Hungarian state with a 25 percent stake in the company.23

A tax on mobile phone calls and text messages was introduced in 2012 at a maximum rate of 700 forints ($1.70) per month per individual subscriber.24 All mobile service providers have since raised their prices.25

There are no specific laws or regulations governing the provision of Wi-Fi hotspots or other public internet connections in Hungary.

The National Media and Communications Authority (NMHH) and the Media Council, established under media laws passed in 2010, are responsible for overseeing and regulating the telecommunications and mass communications industries. The head of the NMHH is appointed by the president, based on the recommendation of the prime minister, for a nonrenewable nine-year term—longer than two full terms of parliamentarians.26 The head of the NMHH also chairs the Media Council, Hungary’s media regulator (see B6). At the end of 2019, five new members were elected to the Media Council, all supported only by votes of members of the ruling coalition. In October 2021, Monika Karas, the head of the Media Council, stepped down prematurely to become the vice president of the State Audit Office. Critics saw her change of position as a means to ensure that Fidesz was able to select her successor prior to the 2022 general elections.27

A 2019 report from a joint international press freedom mission to Hungary questioned the impartiality and transparency of the NMHH and especially of the Media Council.28

With the adoption of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, which entered into force in 2012, the government prematurely ended the six-year term of the data protection and freedom of information commissioner, replacing him and his office with the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information. The head of the new authority is appointed by the president based on the recommendation of the prime minister for a nine-year term and can be dismissed by the president if the prime minister recommends it,29 calling into question the independence of the agency. In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that Hungary failed to fulfill its obligations under EU law when it ended the data protection commissioner’s term.30 The independence of the authority has been called into question several times, including during the Pegasus spyware scandal (see C5), which the authority claimed did not violate the law.31

The government rarely blocks websites, however, in early 2022 it blocked the websites of Russian state-owned media outlets in response to an EU regulation. The government does not place any restrictions on access to social media or communications applications. Unauthorized online gambling is illegal,32 and ISPs block a few hundred unauthorized gambling websites at the request of the National Tax and Customs Administration.33 However, unauthorized gambling websites frequently change their URLs to circumvent blocking.34

In early March 2022, following the Russian government’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the EU’s European Council issued Regulation 2022/350, ordering member states to “urgently suspend the broadcasting activities of” Russian-state owned websites, including Russia Today, Russia Today France, Russia Today Germany, Russia Today Spanish, and Russia Today UK, and block their websites because they “engaged in continuous and concerted propaganda actions targeted at civil society.”35 Soon after, the NMHH confirmed that it would comply with the order, and blocked access to the websites.36 In June 2022, the EU adopted a new package of sanctions, which also included directives to block Russian state-owned broadcasters Rossiya RTR/RTR Planeta, Rossiya 24/Russia 24, and TV Centre International.37

The authorities sometimes block content under a criminal code article banning public denial of the Holocaust, but since many of websites guilty of this offense are hosted outside of Hungary, enforcement of these decisions is often inconsistent.38

The government and its allies sometimes employ court orders to pressure publishers and content hosts to delete content.

In March 2022, major online media platforms, including Facebook, TikTok,39 Twitter,40 and YouTube,41 restricted access to Russia Today and Russian state-owned news agency Sputnik across the EU in response to an order from the European Council (see B1).

Some public figures have sent legal requests to hosting providers to compel them to delete online content. In February 2022, an article by online news outlet Alfahir was removed after Béla Merkely, the current chancellor of Semmelweiss University, made a request to the hosting provider.42

In 2020, courts ordered Forbes Hungary43 and political weekly Magyar Narancs44 to remove or alter articles critical of Hell Energy, based on complaints from the company that invoked the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The courts also fined Forbes Hungary a cumulative €6,000 ($6,800) for violating the GDPR in the Hell Energy case and a case involving a real estate developer. 45 The use of the GDPR to force content removal is an emerging issue in Hungary.

In April 2019, Hungary’s Supreme Court decided that the online news outlet 444.hu violated the privacy rights of István Tiborcz, Orbán’s son-in-law, when it published a video interview with him without his explicit consent, ultimately ordering the outlet to remove the video.46

In the first half of 2022, Facebook restricted access to 162 items based on EU sanctions mandating the removal of content from Russian state-controlled media, 17 items based on a request from Hungary’s National Food Chain Safety Office, and 2 items related to individual reports of defamation.47 In the first half of 2022, Hungarian authorities sent Google 14 content removal requests concerning 31 items, and the company removed 67.7 percent of them. In the second half of the year, authorities sent Google 10 requests concerning 22 items and the company removed 9.1 percent of them.48 Twitter did not produce a transparency report that covered the reporting period.

For the most part, restrictions on the internet are proportional, but vague language in Hungary’s legal framework leaves some online news outlets at risk of unjustified content removal.

Media laws from 2010 stipulate that media content—both online and offline—may not offend, discriminate, or “incite hatred against persons, nations, communities, national, ethnic, linguistic, and other minorities or any majority as well as any church or religious group.”49 Further, by law, media content must respect the constitutional order and human rights, and must not violate public morals.50 However, the legal framework does not define the meaning of “any majority” or “public morals.” If an online news outlet allegedly disobeys the law, the Media Council may oblige it to “discontinue its unlawful conduct,” publish a notice of a resolution on its front page, pay a fine of up to 25 million Hungarian forints ($63,500), or any combination of the three.51 If a website repeatedly violates the law, ISPs can be ordered to suspend the site’s domain, and as a last resort, the NMHH can delete the website from its administrative registry, making it illegal for the website to publish.52 Any such action can be appealed in court.53

Under the criminal code in effect since 2013, websites can be blocked for hosting unlawful content, such as defamation, Holocaust denial, or child abuse.54 Hosts are required to make content inaccessible, either temporarily or permanently, upon receiving a court order stating that the hosted content is illegal.55 The law stipulates that if the illegal content is hosted on a server located outside the country, a Hungarian court can request that the minister of justice block or remove the content.56 The prosecutor, the ISP, and the content provider can appeal the court order within eight days of the decision. The NMHH is the authority designated to manage the list of websites to be blocked based on court orders.57 The list, known as the Central Electronic Database of Decrees on Inaccessibility (KEHTA), went into effect in 2014, with the primary aim of fighting child pornography.

In 2020, to comply with regulations of the EU’s new Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the NMHH was given powers to oversee video content shared on platforms like YouTube and Facebook. Platforms are liable for moderating content—for example, disabling harmful content for children—and can be fined up to 100 million forints ($254,000) for failing to comply.58

Though the law generally protects against intermediary liability for content posted by third parties, in some cases courts have held individuals responsible for third-party comments on their websites. In two high-profile cases, Hungarian courts have held online news outlets liable for defamatory third-party content. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has overruled the Hungarian courts in both instances. Additionally, in 2016, László Toroczkai, the far-right mayor of Ásotthalom, was held liable by a court for “disseminating” a defamatory comment posted by another user on his Facebook page, which stated that a journalist “should be hanged.” The court found that, by allowing comments on his page, Toroczkai had accepted responsibility for any unlawful content posted by others.59

According to national legislation, which is based on the EU E-Commerce Directive, ISPs and other intermediaries are not legally responsible for content so long as they serve as “mere conduits.”60 Intermediaries are also not obliged to verify the content they transmit, store, or make available, nor do they need to search for unlawful activity (see C6).61 However, Hungarian courts have tended to argue that this liability regime only applies to e-commerce and is not applicable to content that violates personality rights. Hosts are not liable for hosted content but must restrict access to content deemed illegal by a court.

However, both print and online media outlets bear editorial responsibility if their aim is to distribute content to the public for “information, entertainment, or training purposes.”62 The law fails to clarify what editorial responsibility entails and whether it would imply legal liability for online publications. A member of the Media Council said in 2011 that the provision could apply to a blog if it generates revenue and is registered as a media content provider with the NMHH.63

The EU Directive on Copyright was implemented in Hungary in June 202164 and holds “online content sharing service providers” liable for copyright violations that take place on their platforms.65

The Media Council has also used the 2021 Child Protection Law (see B4), which prevents platforms and media outlets from showing LGBT+ content to children under 18, to demand that platforms based in other countries restrict access to content for children of certain ages. For example, in September 2022 the Media Council ruled that a short kiss between two girl characters in Jurassic World: Camp Cretaceous, an animated show on Netflix, could be harmful for the development of children, arguing it should not be recommended for children under 12 years old. The Media Council also argued that the animated film Baymax! should be subject to the same age recommendation because a character suggests that a boy ask another boy on a date. Because Netflix’s operations are based in the Netherlands, the Media Council lacked jurisdiction and turned to its Dutch counterpart,66 which declined to comment on individual cases.67

Among ordinary users, self-censorship is not common.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the parliament amended the criminal code to extend the legal definition of scaremongering (see C2).68 The amendments punish those who utter or disseminate false information that “undermines the effort to protect the country in a state of emergency” with up to five years’ imprisonment.69 The Hungarian Civil Liberties Union (HCLU) found that healthcare workers and other professionals involved in the fight against COVID-19 had become less likely to speak publicly for fear of retaliation, including under the aforementioned amendments.70

In June 2021, the parliament enacted a law that prevents media outlets, among other institutions, from displaying content that “propagates or portrays divergence from self-identity corresponding to sex at birth, sex change, or homosexuality” to children under 18. According to the Venice Commission, the newly introduced amendments to the law include vague terminology that is “open to abuse in individual cases” and “has a detrimental effect on freedom of expression” (see B3).71

In addition, online media outlets are pressured to only publish politically “safe” content and avoid covering controversial topics such as corruption, for fear of losing government advertisement placements (see B6).72

The ongoing consolidation of online media outlets in the hands of progovernment owners has led to significant manipulation of the online information landscape to benefit the ruling party. According to a December 2019 Mérték Media Monitor study, progovernment media outlets account for roughly 41.3 percent of the online media market and 79.3 percent of the overall media market.73 In November 2018, the owners of almost all government-friendly private media outlets, including many online news outlets, donated their holdings to a newly created Hungarian nonprofit entity called the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), which was exempted from regulatory scrutiny because the government determined its formation was “of national strategic importance in the public interest.”74

Observers have noted the increasing number of independent online outlets, including the country’s preeminent online news outlet Index.hu,75 that have been acquired or partially acquired by progovernment entities in recent years; these acquisitions are often followed by shifts toward a more government-friendly editorial voice.76 In January 2022, former Index.hu editor Balázs Gabay detailed the reasons for his resignation from the company in a social media post, claiming that several articles published anonymously on the site obviously favored the government and discredited the opposition.77

In addition to favorable coverage from privately owned online media, the government enjoys editorial control over several state-run media outlets that publish online. State-owned news agency Magyar Távirati Iroda (MTI) offers its news free of charge, making it difficult for other actors to compete. Many online media outlets that have been impacted by the economic crisis lack staff to produce original reporting and tend to republish MTI wire stories.78

In March 2022, independent outlet Direkt36 reported on the inner workings of MTI based on leaked emails. Direkt36’s reports found that Bertalan Havasi, the prime minister’s chief of press, ordered the news agency to write a story and provided the article’s title and lead paragraph. Direkt36 also reported that employees at the agency are forbidden from changing the title and lead of press statements issued by ministries.79 MTI failed to report altogether on the inaugural opposition primaries in 2021,80 and leaked recordings have previously revealed that senior editors at MTI prevented reporters from covering the opposition or criticizing the government.81

Government-sponsored disinformation continued to mar Hungary’s online information environment. Historically, progovernment content manipulation intensified before elections. Ahead of the April 2022 elections, the government promoted the false narrative that Péter Márki-Zay, the opposition candidate for prime minister, had stated that he would deploy troops in Ukraine.82 A June 2023 report by the EU Disinfo Lab noted that compared with other governments in the EU, Hungary is a “special case” because “one of the major sources of disinformation is the government itself.”83

In January 2018, online media outlet 444.hu reported on a sophisticated network of unpaid users coordinated by the ruling Fidesz party that share progovernment content on Facebook.84 Researchers at Oxford University also found evidence that progovernment bots, or automated accounts, were spreading friendly narratives, attacking the political opposition, and engaging in other forms of information manipulation on Facebook.85

Far-right blogs and news websites are known to circulate pro-Russia propaganda.86 Some spam Facebook with fake news.87 Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Hungarian progovernment media outlets and pundits continued to disseminate Russian disinformation,88 and amplified their content on social media.89 These trends continued in the coverage period.90

During the 2022 election campaign, Facebook pages were set up to smear opposition candidates in specific districts. These pages spent significant resources targeting their posts, and most of the administrators' contact information proved insufficient for those trying to reach the individuals responsible for the pages.91

A 2023 report from the UK-based NGO #ShePersisted found that women in Hungary, particularly those working in politics and activism, have been targeted with disinformation, often accusing them of working on behalf of foreign interests.92

In Hungary, online media outlets in particular face economic and regulatory obstacles to their operation.

The Media Council is the NMHH’s decision-making body in matters related to media outlets. Its responsibilities include allocating television and radio frequencies and penalizing violators of media regulations. All online media outlets are required to register with the NMHH within 60 days of starting operations.93

Some Media Council decisions have been regarded as politicized. For instance, the Media Council permitted the progovernment KESMA (see B5) to skirt a regulation aimed at preventing market concentration,94 while preventing other independent media outlets from merging. 95

In November 2022, tax authorities questioned Zoltán Varga, the owner of the biggest nongovernment media portfolio, based on the complaint of a Fidesz lawmaker.96

Any online media outlets that publish critical content are far less likely to attract revenue from state advertising or private companies owned by government-friendly oligarchs.97 As the digital advertising market is not yet fully developed, this loss in revenue poses a significant threat to the operations of independent news websites.

On the other hand, the Hungarian government has increasingly channeled advertising revenue to benefit outlets that publish progovernment content. So-called national consultations and other large-scale, state-financed media campaigns are an integral part of the government’s communications strategy. In recent years, the government has allocated tens of billions of forints to finance its communication campaigns,98 and as of December 2022 the state remained the biggest advertiser on the market.99 The political nature of government advertising, which gives partisan outlets a financial advantage, has further distorted the online media landscape.100

In 2016, the NMHH began enforcing EU net neutrality regulations. Two mobile internet providers, Magyar Telekom101 and Telenor,102 were found to be in violation of the regulations for giving certain video streaming services preferential treatment. The NMHH ordered the providers to cease the discriminatory practice. The providers appealed, but the decision was upheld in the Telenor case in 2017. In September 2020, the CJEU found that Telenor’s ”zero tariff” packages—which zero-rated certain apps—were incompatible with EU net neutrality regulations.103

The online media environment remains relatively diverse, though independent news websites face increasing pressure to conform to progovernment narratives. The purchase of online media outlets by progovernment entities has negatively impacted diversity (see B5), and the number of independent and opposition-affiliated news websites continues to decline. According to Dunja Mijatović, the commissioner of human rights for the Council of Europe, “the combined effects of a politically controlled media regulatory authority and distortionary state intervention in the media market have eroded media pluralism and freedom of expression in Hungary.”104

For example, after the 2018 parliamentary elections, both the print and online editions of the 80-year-old Magyar Nemzet, one of the leading daily newspapers, were closed due to financial struggles at the paper.105 In February 2019, the political daily newspaper Magyar Idők was rebranded continued and its operations under the name Magyar Nemzet with a strong progovernment bent.106

In January 2022, 444.hu launched the country’s first fact-checking site, lakmusz.hu, in cooperation with Agence France-Presse (AFP).107

The government and state authorities have also banned journalists, including those who work online, from physically entering hospitals108 and conferences. In May 2022, the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), which brings together conservative activists and elected officials, was held in Budapest, and only Hungarian outlets aligned with the government were granted access to the venue.109 In May 2023, a reporter from The Guardian was escorted out of the CPAC venue in the middle of an interview, allegedly because her registration was accepted only due to a “system error.”110 In February 2022, Orbán issued a decree overturning a court ruling that hospital directors had the right to determine whether journalists were allowed to enter hospitals, not the Ministry of Human Resources. The initial case was launched in 2021 by Telex.hu after the ministry denied journalists access to hospitals.111

During Pope Francis’ April 2023 visit to Hungary, 444.hu photojournalist Dániel Németh was denied access to official events on the basis that his presence would pose a criminal, public safety, or national security risk. Németh was previously surveilled with Pegasus (see C5).112

Independent online media outlets have given a voice to minorities, including Hungary’s Roma,113 LGBT+ people, and religious groups.

In Hungary, social media platforms are freely available and are a popular tool for advocacy and protest organization. Teachers, students, and parents took to the internet to organize several rallies in the fall of 2022 protesting the working conditions of teachers, low wages, and the general state of the Hungarian education system.114 In May 2023, people organized to protest the “status law,” which was passed in July 2023, after the coverage period; the law stripped teachers of their status as public servants.115

In the fall of 2021, six opposition parties held a single open primary to choose their candidates for the parliament, and for prime minister, as a coalition for the 2022 elections. Voters were able to cast their ballot in-person and online. More than 850,000 people voted in at least one of the two rounds of the primaries.116

In December 2020, the parliament passed a law effectively banning same-sex couples from adopting children. In response, LGBT+ social media users started a hashtag campaign with the slogan “Family is Family,” which achieved broad popularity.117

According to a law on assembly that came into effect in October 2018, organizers are obliged to notify the police of any demonstration 48 hours before publicly announcing it. Those who fail to notify the police can be charged with a misdemeanor and can be fined. Additionally, inviting participants to a demonstration banned by the police was criminalized.118 In January 2019, a member of Momentum, an opposition political party, was fined 100,000 forints ($254) for publishing a call for a demonstration on Facebook prior to notifying local police.119 Previously, the police accepted notification through email, but under the 2018 law, organizers must obtain an official account on a multipurpose e-government platform and fill in a dedicated form. In March 2019, one protest organizer received a warning after notifying the police via email instead of the e-government platform.

After the adoption of a law (dubbed the “Slave Law”) in December 2018 allowing employers to extend overtime quotas, large-scale demonstrations—often organized via Facebook—were held in Budapest and other major cities.120

The Fundamental Law of Hungary acknowledges the right to freedom of expression and defends “freedom and diversity of the press,”121 although there are no laws that specifically protect online expression. Additionally, in 2013, the Fundamental Law was amended to specify instances in which freedom of speech could be limited. Article 9.2 states that freedom of speech may not be exercised with the aim of violating the dignity of the Hungarian nation or of any national, ethnic, racial, or religious community. The amendment has been criticized for its overly broad scope and lack of clarity.122 An amendment inserted into the Fundamental Law in 2016 gives the government the power to override acts of the parliament for up to 15 days if a state of emergency is declared following a terrorist attack.123 In June 2018, another amendment was inserted into the Fundamental Law, which declares that freedom of expression cannot violate the private and family lives of others or the integrity of the home.124

At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the parliament passed a law extending the executive’s power to rule by decree in a “state of danger” (a type of state of emergency) from 15 days to an indefinite period; the government subsequently declared a state of danger that initially lasted three months.125 The extraordinary legal order was introduced again in November 2020 and extended repeatedly, lasting until the end of May 2022.126

In May 2022, the Fundamental Law was amended to enable the declaration of a state of danger in case of an “armed conflict, war or humanitarian disaster in a neighboring country.”127 A state of danger was declared, then extended through May 2023128 and later to November 2023,129 under which the government is able to rule by decree, “suspend the application” of certain laws, and take other extraordinary measures.130

A 2011 overhaul of the judiciary called into question the independence of the court system. In 2020, the government further consolidated its control over the courts.131 In December 2022, the European Commission tied the payment of Hungary’s recovery and resilience plan to the fulfillment of 27 "super milestones,” four of which relate to the independence of the judiciary.132 In May 2023, the parliament adopted a comprehensive amendment reforming the laws regulating the judiciary.133 According to experts, the reform “shows a willingness to fulfill” the super milestones, but compliance is “still deficient.”134

Members of the judiciary are sometimes publicly attacked for political reasons. Progovernment media outlets attempted to pressure two judges who are members of the National Judicial Council to resign in November 2022, after they attended a meeting with US ambassador David Pressman.135

There are several laws that could potentially be misused to penalize legitimate online activities. The Hungarian criminal code bans humiliation of national symbols (the national anthem, flag, and coat of arms), dissemination of totalitarian symbols (the swastika and the red star), denial of the sins of National Socialism and communism, and public scaremongering through the media.136 Article 337 of the criminal code, as amended in March 2020, punishes the spread of “any untrue fact or any misrepresented true fact that is capable of hindering or preventing the efficiency of protection” with up to five years in prison.137 It also punishes information spread “with regard to the public danger that is capable of causing disturbance or unrest in a larger group” with up to three years in prison.

In May 2023, parliament passed a law partially decriminalizing defamation and slander that is “within a scope of discussion of public affairs and is committed by means of a press product or media service,” but exempting cases where a claim is “aimed at an obvious and seriously humiliating denial of the victim’s human dignity.”138 The law was welcomed by experts, although they pointed out that the political intent behind the amendment may be to protect progovernment media commentators from criminal charges that are brought against them for coordinated smear campaigns of opposition figures.139

For cases that do not meet these new criteria, Hungarian law does not distinguish between traditional and online media outlets in libel or defamation cases, and the criminal code stipulates that if slander is committed “before the public at large,” it can be punished by imprisonment of up to one year.140 Anyone publishing defamatory video content can be punished with up to one year in prison, while anyone publishing such an audio recording can be imprisoned for up to two years. If the video is published on a platform with a wide audience or causes significant harm, the sentence can increase to up to three years in prison.141 Defamation cases have decreased since a 1994 Constitutional Court decision that asserted that a public figure’s tolerance of criticism should be higher than that of an ordinary citizen.142

The civil code also protects citizens from defamation and insults to their honor,143 and compels those who are found responsible to pay restitution.144 The code includes a provision that may limit the free discussion of public affairs in cases where the human dignity of a public figure is violated.145

The law known as the “Stop Soros” law, passed in June 2018 and named to reference Jewish philanthropist George Soros and to pander to antisemitic conspiracy theorists, includes vaguely worded provisions penalizing any activity that “facilitates or supports illegal immigration” or assists individuals who are entering or remaining in Hungary illegally.146 These penalties presumably applied to online activities. However, there have been no prosecutions under the law to date. In November 2021, the European Court of Justice found that the measure breaches EU law,147 and it was subsequently amended in January 2023.148 Although the wording is still problematic, the amended law clarifies that it does not apply to online activities.149

Score Change: The score improved from 4 to 5 because fewer users were detained or prosecuted for content protected under international human rights standards.

Users occasionally are arrested, detained, and prosecuted for their online activities, although not systematically, and fewer individuals were penalized for online activities during the coverage period.

In March 2022, the government ordered law enforcement to use fearmongering laws to investigate every case in which false information about the country’s petrol shortage was disseminated.150

In March 2023, a woman was arrested after she claimed that she had placed a bomb in the house of Dániel Deák, a professor at Budapest’s Corvinus University and a prominent Fidesz supporter, in a comment on one of Deák's Facebook posts. In the comment, she indicated that the threat was satirical. Deák called the fire department, which did not find a bomb.151 In June 2023, after the coverage period, she was charged with “threatening to cause public danger.”152

In May 2021, officials charged a hacker known as Nerbot with committing a crime against an information system. Nerbot had uploaded a video in September 2020 that showed a bot he made automatically responding to the government’s “National Consultation” surveys, which ask citizens several questions that usually contain progovernment propaganda.153 The police concluded the investigation in November 2022 without pressing charges.154

In Hungary, online media outlets frequently face civil proceedings related to the content they produce, and many have in-house counsel to deal with the volume of claims. An editor from 444.hu reported that the online media outlet is sued “basically every day,” declaring nearly every suit is “frivolous.”155

In June 2021, the second instance court found that a caricature of Jesus published by news outlet Népszava, which ridiculed the national chief medical officer, violated the “personality rights” of the Christian community. Népszava was ordered to pay 400,000 forints ($1,015) to the plaintiff, a member of Fidesz, and to cover the costs of the court proceedings. In the same case, the first instance court found no violation of personality rights.156

In March 2021, hvg.hu columnist Árpád W. Tóta was found guilty of violating the dignity of the members of the Hungarian nation under the civil code. He was sued over a satirical article that called Hungarian ancestors arriving to Europe “dirty migrants.” The court ordered Tóta to remove the defamatory expressions from his article, publish an apology, and pay 400,000 forints as damages to the two plaintiffs.157

Some laws restrict online anonymity in Hungary. Generally, users who wish to comment on web articles need to register with the website by providing an email address or their social media credentials. The operator of a website may be asked to provide the authorities with a commenter’s internet protocol (IP) address, email address, and other data in case of an investigation (see B6).158 Additionally, users must provide personal data upon purchasing a SIM card in order to sign a contract with a mobile service provider.159

In 2016, new antiterrorism legislation sought to expand the authorities’ access to encrypted content online. The legislation amends the Online Trade Services and Services Connected to the Information Society Act, and obligates providers of encrypted services, including messaging platforms, to grant authorized intelligence agencies access to the communications of their clients upon request, unless the communication is encrypted end-to-end, making compliance impossible. Providers of encrypted services must store their clients’ messages and metadata for up to one year (see C6).160 The legislation revealed the authorities’ intent to undermine encryption, though it is unclear how it is enforced.

The lack of judicial oversight of state surveillance of ICTs and the Hungarian government’s use of invasive surveillance technology have raised concerns about the degree to which the right to privacy online is protected. Concerns that the government is abusing state surveillance powers abound.

In July 2021, Amnesty International and Forbidden Stories identified phone numbers linked to Hungarian journalists and lawyers in a leaked dataset. Investigators describe the dataset as a list of people of interest to clients of the company NSO Group, which sells the spyware product Pegasus.161 According to a forensic investigation, Pegasus infected mobile devices belonging to Direkt36 journalists Szabolcs Panyi and András Szabó in 2019.162 The mobile device of Brigitta Csikász, an experienced investigative reporter, was also infected with the spyware,163 while former hvg.hu journalist Dávid Dercsényi had many of his former phone numbers selected for targeting.164 Prominent Hungarian lawyers and Zoltán Varga, owner of the media company Centrál Médiacsoport, also had their phone numbers selected for targeting.165

Initially, the government declined to confirm its use of Pegasus spyware, but in November 2021 it was acknowledged by officials.166 Oversight of its use by parliament was limited, as the hearing of the National Security Committee was confidential, and the minutes cannot be disclosed until 2050. The data protection authority investigated “hundreds” of Pegasus-related cases but, in January 2022, concluded that none of them constituted violations of any laws or regulations.167 The HCLU has initiated dozens of legal procedures since news of the scandal broke, but they have been unsuccessful because the law allows government use of spyware without prior judicial oversight on “national security” grounds.168

An April 2023 report from Citizen Lab, a research center based at the University of Toronto, found servers produced by QuaDream, an Israeli company known for selling spyware to government clients, in Hungary. The spyware enables operators to obtain access to targets’ iOS devices through a zero-click exploit, which can take over a phone without any action from the user, such as clicking on a link or an attachment.169

In March 2020, during the legal declaration of a state of danger (see C1), the government issued a decree allowing the minister for innovation and technology to access and handle “any available data” to address and prevent the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic.170 With neither proper safeguards nor any transparency, this regulation allowed for the formation of a vast database that included data of internet users. In early May 2020, a government decree suspended several provisions of the GDPR for the duration of the extraordinary legal order, while the start date of time limits for certain legal procedures protecting privacy rights was postponed.171

In November 2018, investigative news website Átlátszó.hu reported that the Hungarian government had contracted a private company to monitor content on various social media platforms.172

Government representatives, including Fidesz MP Szilárd Németh, have attempted to justify potential surveillance of local NGOs by claiming the organizations are “foreign agents” whose primary goal is to undermine the government, frequently referencing George Soros.173

Prior to the Pegasus revelations, several civil society organizations claimed that the authorities had purchased potentially invasive surveillance technologies. In 2015, files leaked from the Milan-based commercial spyware company Hacking Team revealed that the Hungarian government was a client.174

The Electronic Communications Act obliges service providers to collect the data of their users indiscriminately and transfer it to state authorities when requested. The process lacks transparency. As a member of the EU, entities in Hungary must also abide by the GDPR.

The National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information is tasked with enforcing data protection legislation, but its impartiality has repeatedly been called into question (see A5). According to a December 2022 report by Human Rights Watch, “when faced with complaints that implicate government abuse of personal data, the NAIH has demonstrated that it is not always willing or able to act as an independent authority.”175

Mobile service providers and ISPs in Hungary must retain user data for up to one year and provide that data to the authorities upon request.176 Following a 2016 appeal from the HCLU, the Constitutional Court found this law unconstitutional and called on parliament to amend the legislation by the end of 2022,177 but parliament failed to comply. There is no publicly available information on how often providers hand over user data, despite the fact that the government has a legal obligation to provide the European Commission with statistics on user data requests made by investigating authorities.178 By law, “electronic service providers” are also obligated to cooperate with intelligence agencies.179 Additionally, the Electronic Communications Act states that service providers must agree with the National Security Special Service upon written request “about the conditions of the use of tools and methods for the covert acquisition of information and covert acquisition of data.”180

National security services can currently gather metadata “from telecommunications systems and other data storage devices” without a warrant.181 Security agents can access and record the content of communications transmitted via ICTs, though a warrant is required to do so.182 Privacy experts say the authorities have installed black boxes allowing them direct access to ISPs’ networks.183 There is no data on the extent to which, or how regularly, the authorities monitor ICTs.

Critics of the government who speak out online brave coordinated, targeted harassment from government officials and progovernment actors, including government-friendly media outlets and anonymous trolls.184 A 2023 report from #ShePersisted (see B5) found that women in politics and activism are targeted with online harassment, including by being doxed.185 Far-right actors are also known to wage smear campaigns against perceived enemies.186

In March 2021, Dunja Mijatović reported that Hungarian human rights defenders and investigative journalists face “sustained smear campaigns.”187 For example, in April 2021, a state television channel launched a smear campaign against Austrian journalist Franziska Tschinderle, a journalist for the Austrian news magazine profil, after she questioned Fidesz representatives at the European Parliament. Péter Szijjártó, Hungary’s foreign minister, subsequently took to Facebook to accuse Tschinderle of spreading “fake news.”188

András Dezső, a journalist covering national security and criminal issues, revealed in October 2021 that officers of the Constitution Protection Office, who alleged they had damaging private information about him, attempted to blackmail him in 2015 for his coverage of the U.S.’s decision to ban Hungarian officials, but he refused to cooperate.189

In August 2020, political activists painted satirical slogans on the asphalt of the parking lot in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after the foreign minister was accused of accepting an expensive yacht trip from a wealthy businessman. Police officers searched a 444.hu journalist who was taking pictures of the slogans.190

Hate speech—including against LGBT+ people, Roma, and migrants and refugees—is commonplace on the Hungarian internet.

Bloggers and ordinary ICT users are not generally subject to physical violence by state authorities or any other actors. There were no reported incidents of retributive physical violence during the coverage period. In 2017, a 444.hu reporter was allegedly intimidated and assaulted by a government official during a public forum.191 While the police found no evidence of illegal activity, they declined to distribute the video that served as the journalist’s evidence, and later found her guilty in a defamation suit filed by the official.192

Independent media outlets continue to face cyberattacks attacks. In April 2023, 444.hu was targeted with DDoS attacks for several days.193 In August 2023, after the coverage period, the International Press Institute, a press freedom watchdog group, reported that at least 40 media outlets in Hungary, including Telex, hvg.hu, 444.hu, Magyar Hang, and Népszava, had experienced DDoS attacks since April.194 The report noted that the attacks increased in May and June and the attacker appeared to be based in Hungary, because of messages in Hungarian found in the code. Following the publication of the statement, IPI’s website was hit with DDoS attacks and other cyberattacks in September 2023, which rendered the site inaccessible for three days.195

In November 2022, the state-run education software used in all schools, KRÉTA, was hacked as a result of a phishing attack, giving the hackers access to all data in the system.196 The police accused two teenagers of conducting the hack.197

In October 2021, servers of the opposition primaries (see B8) were repeatedly impacted by DDoS attacks, which prevented voters abroad from casting their votes and forced the organizers to extend the deadline for voting by 48 hours.198 The voting systems for the second round of the primaries were once again affected by a DDoS attack. In the same month, news outlets reporting on the results of the primaries, including Mérce, 24.hu, and 444, were also targeted by a coordinated DDoS attack.199

In March 2022, ahead of the parliamentary elections, several news websites owned by Mediaworks, a government-friendly media group, were hacked and defaced with messages in support of the opposition. In the messages posted on the websites, the attackers alleged they represented the hacking group Anonymous.200

Beginning in the second half of 2021, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade was allegedly hit with repeated cyberattacks by hackers linked to Russian intelligence services, including the Federal Security Service (FSB) and the Main Intelligence Director (GRU). The attacks, which gave hackers access to diplomatic communications, persisted into 2022.201