12. Oktober 2023

Kurzbeschreibungen zu den in dieser Anfragebeantwortung verwendeten Quellen sowie Ausschnitte mit Informationen aus diesen Quellen finden Sie im Anhang.

Das Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) schreibt in seinem Jahresbericht über Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Syrien im Jahr 2022, dass die SDF (Syrian Democratic Forces) weiterhin Kinder zum Zweck der Rekrutierung entführe und sie in Ausbildungs- und Rekrutierungslager bringe, wo sie keinen Kontakt zu ihren Familien haben dürften (SNHR, 17. Jänner 2023, S. 87).

Syrians for Truth und Justice (STJ) und 22 weitere Organisationen hätten im Mai 2022 einen offenen Brief unterschrieben, in dem sie die Regierung der AANES dazu aufgefordert hätten, der Rekrutierung von Kindern ein Ende zu setzen. Die kurdische Revolutionäre Jugend (KU: Tevgera Ciwanên Şoreşgerê; AR: Shabiba Al-Thawra; eine der PKK nahestehende Gruppierung (DIS, Juni 2022, S. 43)) führe weiterhin ungestraft weit verbreitete und systematische Entführungen und Rekrutierungen minderjähriger Kinder in den Gebieten der Autonomieverwaltung durch (STJ, 23. Mai 2022).

STJ dokumentierte die Rekrutierung von 24 Minderjährigen im Jahr 2021. Eines der Kinder sei zum Zeitpunkt der Rekrutierung 12 Jahre alt gewesen, fünf seien 13 Jahre alt und drei seien 14 Jahre alt gewesen. Im ersten Halbjahr 2022 (Anfang Jänner bis Ende Juni 2022) habe STJ die Rekrutierung von 29 Minderjährigen dokumentiert. Die rekrutierten Minderjährigen seien 12 Jahre und älter gewesen. Die Rekrutierungen seien von der Revolutionären Jugend (27 der 29 Fälle aus 2022) und den Volksverteidigungseinheiten (YPG) (2 der 29 Fälle) durchgeführt worden. Der Bericht nennt auch die Wohnorte der rekrutierten Jugendlichen und beschreibt in einigen Beispielen, wie die Rekrutierungen durchgeführt worden seien (siehe Anhang) (STJ, 26. Juli 2022). Im Jänner 2023 bestätigt STJ, dass die Revolutionäre Jugend in den Gebieten der AANES weiterhin Minderjährige rekrutiere. Die AANES und ihre Sicherheitskräfte würden keine Maßnahmen dagegen ergreifen. STJ habe in Manbidsch und Ayn Al-Arab (auch Kobane genannt) mehrere Fälle von Kinderrekrutierung dokumentiert. In der zweiten Hälfte des Jahres 2022 habe STJ 20 Fälle dokumentiert. STJ habe Informationen erhalten, dass die Revolutionäre Jugend Kinder im Alter zwischen 14 und 18 Jahren mit gefälschten Ankündigungen über Aktivitäten, wie kostenlose Fotografie- und Fußballkurse, in ihr Hauptquartier in Manbisch locken würde. Sobald ein Kind in die Zentrale komme, um sich nach einem Kurs zu erkundigen oder sich dafür anzumelden, verschwinde es und kehre nie mehr nach Hause zurück (STJ, 25. Jänner 2023).

Der Menschenrechtsrat der Vereinten Nationen (UN Human Rights Council (HRC)) veröffentlicht im Februar 2023 einen Bericht der Unabhängigen Internationalen Untersuchungskommission zur Arabischen Republik Syrien mit einem Berichtszeitraum von Anfang Juli bis Ende Dezember 2022. Laut der Untersuchungskommission habe es 2022 weiterhin Berichte über die Rekrutierung von Kindern in der AANES gegeben. Einige Familien hätten bei bestehenden Kinderschutzämtern in der AANES die Rekrutierung von Kindern im Alter von 14 Jahren gemeldet. Den Familien sei mitgeteilt worden, dass ihnen nicht geholfen werden könne, da die Kinder von der Revolutionären Jugend entführt worden seien (HRC, 7. Februar 2023, S. 17).

Der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen (UNSC) veröffentlicht im Juni 2023 den Bericht des Generalsekretärs über Kinder und bewaffnete Konflikte, dessen Berichtszeitraum das Jahr 2022 umspannt. Es seien im Berichtszeitraum 637 Minderjährige von der SDF (davon 633 von den kurdischen Volksverteidigungseinheiten und Frauenschutzeinheiten (YPG/YPJ)) und 21 von den Inneren Sicherheitskräften der AANES rekrutiert worden (UNSC, 5. Juni 2023, S. 24-25). Weiters sei die Entführung von vier Kindern (zwei durch YPG/YPJ und zwei durch die Revolutionäre Jugend) bestätigt worden. Alle Kinder seien zum Zweck der Rekrutierung entführt worden (UNSC, 5. Juni 2023, S. 25). Der Generalsekretär sei besorgt über die Zunahme bestätigter Fälle der Rekrutierung und des Einsatzes von Kindern durch die SDF (UNSC, 5. Juni 2023, S. 26).

Laut SNHR hätten mit Dezember 2022 SDF-Mitarbeiter·innen weiterhin Kinder zum Zweck der Rekrutierung entführt (SNHR, 3. Jänner 2023, S. 13). SNHR dokumentiert im Dezember 2022 die Entführung eines 2008 geborenen Mädchens in der Stadt Aleppo und eines 2007 geborenen Jungen in der Stadt Manbidsch. Beide seien zu SDF-Rekrutierungszentren gebracht worden (SNHR, 3. Jänner 2023, S. 23).

Das Danish Immigration Service (DIS) veröffentlicht im Juni 2022 einen Bericht über militärische Rekrutierungen in der Provinz Hasaka, für den eine Reihe von Expert·innen im Jänner und Februar 2022 unter anderem über die Rekrutierung von Minderjährigen befragt wurden. Laut einem/r Kinderschutzbeauftragten der AANES rekrutiere die SDF keine Minderjährigen unter Zwang, indem sie sie entführe oder aus ihren Häusern verschleppe. Die Minderjährigen, die sich der SDF angeschlossen hätten, hätten dies freiwillig getan. Gründe inkludierten familiäre Probleme, den Wunsch, die Familie finanziell zu unterstützen sowie den Wunsch, Teil einer Streitkraft zu sein. Einige Minderjährige würden beim Beitritt falsche Dokumente vorlegen. Andere würden angeben, keine Ausweispapiere zu besitzen. In letzterem Fall stütze sich die SDF auf das äußere Erscheinungsbild der Person, um ihr Alter zu bestimmen. In den meisten Fällen sei es schwierig zu erkennen, ob die Person minderjährig oder volljährig sei. Es gebe Beispiele von Minderjährigen, die nach ein bis zwei Tagen Aufenthalt bei der SDF zu ihren Familien zurückgebracht worden seien, weil sie als unter 18 Jahre alt eingeschätzt worden seien. Die Minderjährigen, die sich der SDF anschließen würden, seien überwiegend zwischen 15 und 18 Jahre alt. Sollten Minderjährige in der SDF entdeckt werden, würden sie sofort entlassen. Einige 17-jährige, die ein oder zwei Monate später 18 Jahre alt werden, würden sich weigern, die SDF zu verlassen. Sie würden bis zu ihrem 18. Lebensjahr zivile Arbeiten verrichten. Der/Die Kinderschutzbeauftragte wisse von Familien, die sich darüber beschwert hätten, dass ihre Kinder der Revolutionären Jugend beigetreten seien. Das Büro könne jedoch erst eingreifen, wenn sich das Kind einer SDF-Truppe anschließe (DIS, Juni 2022, S. 40-41). Fabrice Balanche, Associate Professor und Forschungsdirektor an der Universität Lyon 2, erklärt im Interview mit DIS, dass er nicht glaube, dass die Behörden der SDF und AANES Minderjährige zum Zweck der Rekrutierung entführen würden, da es viele Freiwillig gebe, die daran interessiert seien, der SDF beizutreten. Balanche gehe jedoch davon aus, dass die Revolutionäre Jugend versuche, Minderjährige politisch und ideologisch zu ermutigen und sie darauf vorzubereiten, sich der PKK anzuschließen (DIS, Juni 2022, S. 43- 44). Ein/e internationale/r humanitäre/r Koordinator·in („international humanitarian coordinator“) sagt gegenüber DIS aus, dass er/sie weiterhin Berichte über die Rekrutierung von Minderjährigen erhalte. Es handle sie dabei um die Revolutionäre Jugend, die mit der SDF verbündet sei, jedoch den Aktionsplan [gegen Kinderrekrutierung, Anmerkung ACCORD] nicht unterzeichnet habe. Fälle von Zwangsrekrutierung seien selten und es sei unmöglich den Schluss zu ziehen, dass ein Kind gewaltsam in eine bewaffnete Gruppe entführt worden sei, da die Informationen von den Eltern stammen würden. Die Eltern würden in der Regel erklären, dass der/die Minderjährige plötzlich verschwunden sei und sie später von Freund·innen erfahren hätten, dass der/die Minderjährige von einer bestimmten Gruppierung entführt worden sei. Es gebe auch Berichte von Familien darüber, dass die SDF Kinder zwangsrekrutiert habe. Diese Berichte seien jedoch nicht verifizierbar. Die Informationen würden ausschließlich auf den Berichten der Familien basieren und kämen nicht von den Minderjährigen selbst. Laut dem/der Koordinator·in könnten die Familien ein Interesse daran haben, eine veränderte Geschichte zu erzählen, und die Minderjährigen könnten sich freiwillig dazu entschieden haben, den bewaffneten Truppen beizutreten. Einige Minderjährige würden der SDF aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen beitreten. Es würden sich monatlich mindestens 500 Minderjährige an die SDF wenden. Die Quelle gehe jedoch davon aus, dass die SDF die meisten der Kinder ablehne (DIS, Juni 2022, S. 47). Laut einem Universitätsprofessor aus Erbil gebe es im Allgemeinen keine Zwangsrekrutierung junger Menschen, indem sie auf der Straße entführt würden. Es könne Einzelfälle dieser Art geben, aber im Allgemeinen sei die Vorgehensweise von Gruppen, wie der Revolutionären Jugend, eine andere. Eine Kombination sozialer und psychologischer Faktoren (wie niedriges Bildungsniveau, soziale Probleme und ideologische Propaganda) führe dazu, dass junge Menschen sich den Gruppierungen freiwillig anschließen. In Trainingslagern würden junge Menschen ideologisch so beeinflusst werden, dass sie nicht mehr zu ihrer Gemeinschaft und ihren Familien zurückkehren möchten. Diejenigen, die sich der Revolutionären Jugend anschließen, würden schließlich der PKK und nicht der SDF beitreten. Unter den Pro-PKK-Gruppen rekrutiere nur die Revolutionäre Jugend Minderjährige. Laut dem Professor rekrutiere die SDF zum Zeitpunkt des Interviews keine Minderjährigen (DIS, Juni 2022, S. 67-68). Laut Wladimir van Wilgenburg, ein in der Autonomen Region Kurdistan ansässiger, auf kurdische Angelegenheiten spezialisierter Reporter und Analyst, gebe es Fälle von Minderjährigen, die sich ohne Zustimmung ihrer Eltern der SDF anschließen wollten. Während die Minderjährigen sich freiwillig der SDF anschließen würden, würden die Eltern die Rekrutierung ihrer Kinder als Entführung betrachten (DIS, Juni 2022, S. 71).

Enab Baladi veröffentlicht im März 2022 einen Artikel über die gewaltsame Entführung von Kindern aus Aleppo durch die Revolutionäre Jugend. Laut einem lokalen Informanten würden Mitglieder der PYD (Democratic Union Party) zusammen mit der Revolutionären Jugend versuchen, Teenager im Alter zwischen 14 und 18 Jahren davon zu überzeugen, der Revolutionären Jugend beizutreten. Jugendliche würden durch monetäre Anreize und ideologische Diskussionen dazu bewegt, sich der Revolutionären Jugend anzuschließen. Die Jugendlichen würden auch gegen den Willen ihrer Eltern rekrutiert werden. Sollten sich die Jugendlichen weigern, sich der Revolutionären Jugend anzuschließen, käme es zu Entführungen. Manchmal würden die Entführungen bei Tag stattfinden. Es wage niemand darüber zu sprechen, aus Angst verhaftet zu werden (Enab Baladi, 18. März 2022).

Das Rasd Syria Network for Human Rights, eine syrische Medieninstitution, die sich auf Menschenrechtsfragen spezialisiert, veröffentlicht im Mai 2023 einen Artikel über den Anstieg der Fälle von Rekrutierungen und Entführungen von Kindern durch die Revolutionäre Jugend. Laut dem Netzwerk sei es zu einem deutlichen Anstieg der rekrutierten Kinder und deren Beteiligung an Kämpfen gekommen. Familien, die sich an offizielle Stellen der AANES gewendet hätten, seien ihre Kinder nicht zurückgegeben worden und sie hätten auch nichts über deren Schicksal oder Aufenthaltsort erfahren. Laut Rasd Syria Network for Human Rights sei die tatsächliche Zahl der (zum Zweck der Rekrutierung) entführten Kinder um einiges höher als die Zahl der dokumentierten Fälle. Familien hätten Angst Fälle offenzulegen, da sie sich durch die Revolutionäre Jugend bedroht fühlen würden. Zu den vom Netzwerk dokumentierten Fällen gehöre die Entführung eines 13-jährigen Mädchens aus der Stadt Qamischli sowie die Entführung eines 15-jährigen Jungen aus der Provinz Raqqa, der an chronischen Krankheiten leide (Rasd Syria Network for Human Rights, 25. Mai 2023).

Syria Indicator veröffentlicht ebenfalls im Mai 2023 einen Artikel über die Situation von Kindern in Nordost-Syrien. Im Artikel stellt Syria Indicator Informationen der ‘Bercav’ Organization for Democratic Development and Media, laut der Kinder unter 15 Jahren nicht rekrutiert würden, Quellen von STJ gegenüber, die Entführung zum Zweck der Rekrutierung von unter 15-jährigen im Jahr 2022 dokumentieren. Laut Syria Indicator seien in den Jahren 2021 und 2022 Dutzende Kinder unter 15 Jahren rekrutiert worden, darunter zwei Jungen im Alter von neun und zehn Jahren in Aleppo im Mai 2022, die jedoch aufgrund von medialem Druck nach einem Tag wieder frei gelassen worden seien, sowie einem 13-jährigen Mädchen aus Qamischli. Insgesamt seien im Zeitraum von 2021 bis 2022 mindestens 97 Kinder rekrutiert worden. Im Jänner und Februar 2023 seien ein Mädchen (15 Jahre) und ein Junge (14 Jahre) von der Revolutionären Jugend in Aleppo entführt worden (Syria Indicator, 17. Mai 2023).

STJ bestätigt die kontinuierliche Rekrutierung von Minderjährigen durch die Revolutionäre Jugend in der Region im Juli 2023. Im ersten Halbjahr 2023 seien mindestens 32 Kinder rekrutiert worden. Die Revolutionäre Jugend habe die meisten Rekrutierungen zu verantworten. Eine Rekrutierung sei durch die YPJ durchgeführt worden. Es seien Mädchen wie auch Jungen rekrutiert worden, zehn davon in Qamischli, fünf in Ayn Al-Arab, vier in Manbidsch, fünf in Raqqa, drei in Al-Hasaka und fünf in Aleppo (STJ, 7. Juli 2023).

Laut dem Rasd Syria Network for Human Rights seien mit September 2023 weiterhin Minderjährige in der AANES rekrutiert und eingesetzt worden. Das Netzwerk habe im September die Entführung zum Ziel der Rekrutierung von zwei Kindern durch die Revolutionäre Jugend dokumentiert (Rasd Syria Network for Human Rights, 1. Oktober 2023).

Weitere Informationen über die Zwangsrekrutierung Minderjähriger in Syrien vor Februar 2022 finden Sie in folgender Anfragebeantwortung von ACCORD:

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Zwangsrekrutierung Minderjähriger (Konzentration auf 14-16-jährige, regionale Unterschiede) [a-11806], 31. Jänner 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2069915.html

 

 

 

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 12. Oktober 2023)

·      ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation: Anfragebeantwortung zu Syrien: Zwangsrekrutierung Minderjähriger (Konzentration auf 14-16-jährige, regionale Unterschiede) [a-11806], 31. Jänner 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/de/dokument/2069915.html

·      DIS – Danish Immigration Service: Syria: Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate, Juni 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2075255/syria_fmm_rappport_military_recruitment_hasakah_governorate_june2022.pdf

·      Enab Baladi: Aleppo children forcibly kidnapped and recruited in SDF’s allied militia, 18. März 2022
https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2022/03/aleppo-children-forcibly-kidnapped-and-recruited-in-sdfs-allied-militia/

·      HRC – UN Human Rights Council: Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/52/69], 7. Februar 2023
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2088857/G2301021.pdf

·      Rasd Syria Network for Human Rights: Eine Erklärung zum Anstieg der Fälle von Entführungen und Rekrutierungen von Kindern durch die Revolutionäre Jugend der Demokratischen Kräfte Syriens [Arabisch], 25. Mai 2023
https://www.rasdsyria.org/statements/7362/

·      Rasd Syria Network for Human Rights: Bericht vom September 2023: Dokumentiert die Tötung von 50 Zivilist·innen und einen Anstieg der Fälle von Verhaftungen, Entführungen und Kinderrekrutierung [Arabisch], 1. Oktober 2023
https://www.rasdsyria.org/news/9137/

·      SNHR – Syrian Network for Human Rights: At Least 2,221 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in Syria in 2022, Including 148 Children and 457 Women (Adult Female), with 213 Cases Documented in December, 3. Jänner 2023
https://reliefweb.int/attachments/3c04e970-9bb3-454b-be71-01d014c3d6d8/M230102E.pdf

·      SNHR – Syrian Network for Human Rights: SNHR’s 12th Annual Report: Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2022; Normalizing Relationships with the Syrian Regime is a Blatant Violation of the Rights of Millions of Syrians, 17. Jänner 2023
https://snhr.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/R221213E.pdf

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: 23 Human Rights, Civil, Feminist Organizations Demand the AANES and the SDF to Eliminate Child Recruitment Policy, 23. Mai 2022
https://stj-sy.org/en/23-human-rights-civil-feminist-organizations-demand-the-aanes-and-the-sdf-to-eliminate-child-recruitment-policy/

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: Northeastern Syria: 29 Children Recruited Over the First Half of 2022, 26. Juli 2022
https://stj-sy.org/en/northeastern-syria-29-children-recruited-over-the-first-half-of-2022/

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: Syria: 49 Cases of Child Soldier Recruitment Verified in AANES Areas in 2022, 25. Jänner 2023
https://stj-sy.org/en/syria-49-cases-of-child-soldier-recruitment-verified-in-aanes-areas-in-2022/

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: Northeastern Syria: The RY Use of Child Soldiers Continues Unabated, 7. Juli 2023
https://stj-sy.org/en/northeastern-syria-the-ry-use-of-child-soldiers-continues-unabated/

·      Syria Indicator: Fueling the Flames of War.. The Plight of Kurdish Children in Northeastern Syria, 17. Mai 2023
https://syriaindicator.org/en/2023/05/17/fueling-the-flames-of-war-the-plight-of-kurdish-children-in-northeastern-syria/

·      UNSC – United Nations Security Council: Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General [A/77/895-S/2023/363], 5. Juni 2023
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2095409/N2314496.pdf

 

Anhang: Quellenbeschreibungen und Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen

Das Danish Immigration Service (DIS) ist die in Dänemark für Einwanderung, Einreise und Aufenthalt von Ausländer·innen zuständige Behörde des Ministeriums für Einwanderung und Integration.

·      DIS – Danish Immigration Service: Syria: Military recruitment in Hasakah Governorate, Juni 2022
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2075255/syria_fmm_rappport_military_recruitment_hasakah_governorate_june2022.pdf

„Whatsapp meeting with a child protection officer, 31 January 2022 […]

Recruitment of minors to armed forces in North and East Syria

9. The SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] does not forcibly recruit minors by kidnapping them or take them from their houses.

10. The minors who have joined the SDF have done so voluntarily. There are three main reasons for minors to join the SDF. The primary reason is due to family issues, where the child decides to run away from a dispute to join the SDF. Second, minors might join for the salaries in order to provide economic support for their families. Third, some join because they are attracted to the idea of being a part of a military force.

11. Some minors will provide false documents to the SDF when joining. Others will say that they do not have any identity documents. In this case, the SDF will rely on the physical appearance of the person to determine his/her age. In most cases, it has been difficult to see if the person has been minor or adult, and SDF has therefore allowed them into its ranks; however, there are examples of minors who have been returned to their families after having been with the SDF for one-two days, because they were assessed to be below 18 years old. In these cases, the families would not have had time to complain to the Office for Protection of Children in Armed Conflict.

12. The source does not know what groups within the SDF the minors join, as the SDF does not provide this information.

13. The majority of minors who join the SDF are from Hasaka Governorate, while there are fewer cases from Arab areas such as Raqqa and Deir Ezzour governorates.

14. The minors who join SDF are mainly between 15-18 years old.

15. Some minors are detected before they have received any military training, i.e. they have only received ideological training, while others mange to receive military training before being detected. Either way, the SDF will dismiss the minor when he/she is detected. A few minors, mainly 17-yearolds who turn 18 one or two months later, refuse to leave the SDF. They will not be armed but perform civil work until they turn 18.

16. There are different ways that the family of a minor become aware that the minor has joined an armed force. Sometimes, the minor has stated before joining that he or she would join a military force. At other times, relatives or friends of the minor tell the family that their child has been seen at a military camp.

17. The child protection officer is aware of families who have complained about their children having joined the Revolutionary Youth, however, it is not until the child joins an SDF force that the Office can intervene.“ (DIS, Juni 2022, S. 40-41)

„Skype meeting with Fabrice Balanche, 9 February 2022 […]

18. Regarding recruitment of minors in SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces], the source does not believe that SDF or AANES [Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria] authorities kidnap minors to make them join the SDF forces, as there are already many volunteers who are interested in joining SDF

19. The source assumes that Revolutionary Youth, which is a PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party]-affiliated political group with offices in for instance Qamishli, Hasakah and Raqqa, tries to politically and ideologically encourage and prepare minors to join PKK in Qandil Mountains. Despite the fact that PKK officially does not recruit new members in northeast Syria, the organisation lay the groundwork for future recruitment of new members through their significant influence on AANES and via activities of Revolutionary Youth.“ (DIS, Juni 2022, S. 43-44)

„Skype meeting with an international humanitarian coordinator, 27 January 2022 […]

3. The international humanitarian coordinator still receive reports about recruitment of minors taking place. These cases revolve around the Revolutionary Youth, which is allied with the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] but has not signed the action plan.

4. Today, it is almost only males who face forced recruitment. The recruitment happens to Revolutionary Youth. The cases of forced recruitment are rare, and it is impossible to conclude that a child has been forcibly abducted into an armed group, unless the child is being interviewed, as the information comes from the parents of the children, [sic]

5. It is the families of the minors that reach out to the international humanitarian coordinator and explain that the minor has been forcibly recruited. The parents usually explain that the minor suddenly disappeared, and that they later learned from friends that the minor was taken by a specific force.

6. There are also reports by families that SDF has forcibly recruited children, but the international humanitarian coordinator has been unable to verify that. The source pointed out that in a conflict situation it can be difficult to find out to where a minor has been recruited.

7. However, the source further pointed out that the international humanitarian organisation does not receive information from the minors themselves and its information is solely bases on the reports from the minors’ families. The families could have an interest in telling an altered story, and that the minors could have decided to join voluntarily against the parents’ will. Sometimes, the parents also explain that their children have been subject to some sort of propaganda.

8. Some minors join SDF for economic reasons. SDF pay its employees between 100-250 USD/month, which is a high salary by local standards. Due to the lack of livelihood opportunities and a high number of female-headed households, children, particularly boys, are pressured to join SDF. At least 500 minors reach out to SDF each month. The source believes that SDF rejects most of these children.

9. Before the action plan was signed, children as young as 12-13 years old were deployed by SDF to battles. However, when the child was very young, he/she was used to guard checkpoints, distribute food and for logistical tasks. From the age of 15 and above, when they could carry weapons, the minors were also placed at the frontline.

10. The source has not heard of recruitment of minors to the Self-Defence Forces (HXP).“ (DIS, Juni 2022, S. 47)

„Meeting with a university professor, Erbil, 28 January 2022 […]

11. There is, in general, no forced recruitment of young people to groups like the Revolutionary Youth by a car coming and kidnapping them on the street. There might be a few cases like this, but in general, mafia-like methods of terrorising people or kidnapping is not the modus operandi of such groups. It is rather a combination of a number of social and psychological factors, which makes young people to join these groups voluntarily; factors like poor educational background, social problems, which the individual is facing in his or her community and in Syria in general, ideological propaganda by the Revolutionary Youth etc. For instance, when a girl leaves her family because of social and cultural issues, she faces a vacuum, which is filled and exploited by the Revolutionary Youth. Once a young person is recruited to the Revolutionary Youth and has been through their ideological programs and training in their training camps, his or her mind will be so affected by the group’s ideology, he or she will not even wish to return to his or her community and family. The fact that new recruits live in a training camp and see other young people like themselves, and that they are constantly bombarded by the group’s ideology has a huge psychological impact on their minds. Those, who join the Revolutionary Youth, will eventually join the PKK [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] and not the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces].

12. Among the pro-PKK groups, it is only the Revolutionary Youth who recruit minors into their ranks.

13. As far as the source is informed, the SDF do currently not recruit minors. Previously, the source knew of individual cases of minors being recruited to the SDF, as these cases came to public attention. However, those identified cases were resolved as the minors in question were dismissed. The source does not know of new cases of SDF recruitment of minors. According to the source, reports about the recruitment of minors are sometimes politically motivated by the political fractions who are opposed to the AANES [Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria] and the SDF.“ (DIS, Juni 2022, S. 67-68)

„Meeting with Wladimir van Wilgenburg, Erbil, 26 January 2022 […]

There have been examples of minors who wanted to join the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] without their parents’ approval. These minors ran away and joined the SDF voluntarily, whilst their parents called it kidnapping. According to the source, it is often a matter of definition when it is reported by the parents that their child has been ‘kidnapped’; the parents tend to consider recruitment of minors without their consent as ‘kidnapping’ although the minor has joined the SDF by his or her own will.“ (DIS, Juni 2022, S. 71)

Enab Baladi ist eine regierungskritische syrische Medienorganisation.

·      Enab Baladi: Aleppo children forcibly kidnapped and recruited in SDF’s allied militia, 18. März 2022
https://english.enabbaladi.net/archives/2022/03/aleppo-children-forcibly-kidnapped-and-recruited-in-sdfs-allied-militia/

„The civil society in Aleppo, and Syrian and international human rights organizations, have frequently accused the Kurdish-led forces of establishing training camps for kidnaped children, who were forced to be recruited far from their original areas.

The child soldiers have been prevented from contacting their families amid fears for their fate, rights advocates say.

Kidnapped in public

Nidal, 40, whose full name was withheld by Enab Baladi for security reasons, said: ‘Affiliates of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) are cooperating with the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM). Their task centered on searching for teenagers between (14-18 years old) in order to persuade them to join the RYM for a monthly stipend,’ he added.

But if the young people refuse to join the RYM, the kidnapping becomes inevitable, according to Nidal, who works in an electrical equipment store.

‘Sometimes the kidnapping takes place during daylight hours, ‘but no one dares to talk about what is happening, even some people watch what is happening, but they do not speak out for fear of arrest,’ he added. […]

The recruitment in first steps stands on merits and rewards financially to motivate young people to join the ranks of the ‘Revolutionary Youth.’ Also, it stands on meetings in the streets, alleys, and cafes where discussions tackle revolutionary ideas, change will, and common ideological backgrounds.

People whose job is to recruit young people are said to receive financial rewards and even an unlimited fund to cover the expenses while searching for child recruits.

Nidal says: ‘People who recruit boys are known in the Ashrafiya and Sheikh Maqsoud areas, and when the parents see their son while he is with these people, they fear that they have brainwashed their son, and therefore he may have been convinced to join. Even if the parents refuse and the boy agrees, he is taken against his parents’ will. This has happened several times.‘“ (Enab Baladi, 18. März 2022)

Der Menschenrechtsrat der Vereinten Nationen (UN Human Rights Council (HRC)) ist ein zwischenstaatliches Gremium innerhalb der Vereinten Nationen, das sich für die Förderung und den Schutz der Menschenrechte weltweit einsetzt.

·      HRC – UN Human Rights Council: Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [A/HRC/52/69], 7. Februar 2023
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2088857/G2301021.pdf

„This reporting period also saw continuing reports of child recruitment, which persist despite the June 2019 action plan signed by SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict to end and prevent the recruitment and use of children under the age of 18; the 2020 establishment, by the Executive Council of the self-administration, of child protection offices and ongoing efforts by SDF to put an end to this practice. Some families approached child protection offices to report cases of children as young as 14 being recruited, but were told that no action could be taken as the children had been taken by the Kurdish revolutionary youth movement. Despite requests by families, the whereabouts of some recruited children remained unknown.“ (HRC, 7. Februar 2023, S. 17)

Das Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) ist eine 2011 gegründete unabhängige Menschenrechtsorganisation, die Menschenrechtsverletzungen in Syrien beobachtet und dokumentiert.

·      SNHR – Syrian Network for Human Rights: At Least 2,221 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in Syria in 2022, Including 148 Children and 457 Women (Adult Female), with 213 Cases Documented in December, 3. Jänner 2023
https://reliefweb.int/attachments/3c04e970-9bb3-454b-be71-01d014c3d6d8/M230102E.pdf

„SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] personnel also continue to abduct children for the purpose of military conscription, taking these children to training and recruitment camps where they are not allowed to contact their families, who are not allowed to have any knowledge of their fate.“ (SNHR, 3. Jänner 2023, S. 13)

„Lam’en Mahmoud Othman, a female child born in 2008 from Karzeleih village, administratively affiliated with Afrin city in norther Aleppo governorate, lives in al-Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood in Aleppo city, was abducted in the east of the neighbourhood on Saturday, December 10, 2022, by the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces]’s al-Shabiba al-Thawriya, ‘Joanne Schurchkar’ group for the purpose of military conscription. She was taken to an SDF recruitment center.

Ibrahim Jneid al-Faraj, a male child born in 2007 from Ibed village in the eastern suburbs of Aleppo governorate, lives in Manbej city, in the eastern suburbs of Aleppo governorate. He was recruited on Tuesday, December 20, 2022, by the SDF’s al-Shabiba al-Thawriya, ‘Joanne Schurchkar’ group, who took him from his place of work in Manbej city. He was taken to an SDF recruitment center.“ (SNHR, 3. Jänner 2023, S. 23)

·      SNHR – Syrian Network for Human Rights: SNHR’s 12th Annual Report: Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2022; Normalizing Relationships with the Syrian Regime is a Blatant Violation of the Rights of Millions of Syrians, 17. Jänner 2023
https://snhr.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/R221213E.pdf

„SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces] personnel also continue to abduct children for the purpose of military conscription, taking these children to training and recruitment camps where they are not allowed to contact their families, who are not allowed to have any knowledge of their children’s fate.“ (SNHR, 17. Jänner 2023, S. 87)

Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) besteht aus einem Team von Forscher·innen, Anwält·innen und Freiwilligen, die sich der Aufdeckung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen in ganz Syrien widmen.

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: 23 Human Rights, Civil, Feminist Organizations Demand the AANES and the SDF to Eliminate Child Recruitment Policy, 23. Mai 2022
https://stj-sy.org/en/23-human-rights-civil-feminist-organizations-demand-the-aanes-and-the-sdf-to-eliminate-child-recruitment-policy/

„We, the undersigned organizations, are calling you in your capacity as the rulers of the area, to take serious action to quickly close the file on child kidnapping and recruitment. Children must be returned to their families and those involved in acts of child recruitment, which may amount to war crimes, must be held accountable.

The Kurdish Revolutionary Youth Movement/Tevgera Ciwanên Şoreşgerê continue to carry out widespread and systematic kidnapping and recruitment of underage children in the Autonomous Administration areas with impunity.“ (STJ, 23. Mai 2022)

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: Northeastern Syria: 29 Children Recruited Over the First Half of 2022, 26. Juli 2022
https://stj-sy.org/en/northeastern-syria-29-children-recruited-over-the-first-half-of-2022/

„Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) documented the recruitment of at least 29 male and female teenagers in the areas held by the Autonomous Administration, within the provinces of Aleppo and al-Hasakah, over the first half of 2022. The enlistments were perpetrated by the Revolutionary Youth (RY)—an entity licensed by the Administration, and the People’s Protection Units (YPG)—an affiliate of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The RY was responsible for 27 of the cases, while the YPG carried out the remaining two.

In all 29 reported cases, the recruits are under-18, among them 15 females and 14 males. […]

Teenage Boy A. Ja’afou

A. was born in 2008 and hails from Kerzayhel village, in Afrin region. A. and his family fled hostilities in Afrin and settled in Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city. For details on the enlistment of A., STJ reached out to two sources informed of the incident, including an eyewitness and a relative of the teenager. The eyewitness narrated:

‘Around 2:00 PM, on 22 June 2022, A. and four other teenagers were hanging out in Afrin Park, near the Younes Saba’awi School, in Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood. The boys were playing when they were approached by a man, who identifies himself as Aziz. He told the boys that he will buy them cigarettes and food. The boys were naturally overjoyed and accepted. However, one of the boys left the group and escaped. A. and the remaining three boys stayed. Nearly 10 minutes later, Aziz returned, accompanied the boys out of the park, and forced them to get into a car. They left the place.’

For his part, A’s. relative recounted:

‘A.’s father searched for his son for three days. He inquired into his whereabouts at the RY center in Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood. The RY denied having him. Three days later, the father received a call. He was informed that A. was in Manbij and that he will be relocated to al-Hasakah within hours to participate in combat. The caller also told the father that he should be proud of his son. The family failed to obtain any other information about their son.’ […]

Teenage Girl A. Abdullah

A. was born on 2 June 2009 and hails from Krehbreh village, administratively affiliated with al-Qahtaniah district, in al-Hasakah province. To gain insights into the case, STJ reached out to one of the little girl’s relatives. The relative said:

‘On 11 May 2022, A. and her mother were shopping in one of the neighborhoods in Qamishli/Qamishlo city. As they navigated the market, A. suddenly disappeared. We had no idea where she went. We searched for her for two days and posted her photo and name on Facebook. Later, we learned that the RY had her. Her father went to several official entities, but they all refused to disclose her whereabouts. Later, the family received information that she was in a camp in Magloujah area in Mount Abdulaziz, west of al-Hasakah. However, the family has not yet been able to reach her.’ […]

Teenage Girl H. Moussa

H. was born on 3 January 2008. According to a relative that STJ talked to:

‘On 19 May 2022, H. and her younger brother were playing near the public park. They quarreled. This caught the attention of an RY member, who was at the RY center, adjacent to the park. The RY member intervened and took the siblings into the center. Two hours later, the RY sent the brother home and kept H.’

The relative added:

‘When the family learned of the incident, H.’s father headed to the center immediately and demanded that they return his daughter. In the beginning, the RY members denied she was there and then said that they sent her to her aunt’s house. However, she was not there. After a week of heated talks between the family and the center’s members, the members admitted that they recruited her. They refused to decommission her and said that she was attending training at a closed camp. They did not allow the family to see her.’

The source added that the family resorted to several official entities in Qamishli/Qamishlo city, including the Children Protection Office. However, all their efforts were to no avail. The family continues to wait for their daughter to be returned home, even though the RY threatened to kill the father if he asked about his daughter again.

Teenagers Recruited in 2022 

1.      Teenage girl S. Melhem, 15, was enlisted by the RY on 16 January 2022. She hails from Fatoumeh village, in Ayn al-Arab/Kobanî region.

2.      Teenage boy M. Hasan, 15, was enlisted by the RY on 16 February 2022. He hails from al-Hasakah city.

3.      Teenage girl S. Darwish, 14, was enlisted by the RY on 1 March 2022. She hails from Ashma village, in Ayn al-Arab/Kobanî region.

4.      Teenage girl N. Habash, 16, was enlisted by the RY on 1 March 2022. She hails from Ashma village, in Ayn al-Arab/Kobanî region.

5.      Teenage boy M. Isma’il, 14, was enlisted by the RY on 5 March 2022. He hails from Tal Hajeb village.

6.      Teenage boy D. Muhammad, 14, was enlisted by the RY on 5 March 2022. He hails from Tal Hajeb village. He was subsequently reunited with his family.

7.      Teenage boy M. Abdullah Issa, 15, was enlisted on 6 March 2022. He hails from Shiran village, in Ayn al-Arab/Kobanî region.

8.      Teenage boy M. Shaikh Baker, 16, was enlisted on 12 March 2022. He hails from Illajaneh village, in Ayn al-Arab/Kobanî region.

9.      Teenage girl R. Muhammad Shaikho, 16, was enlisted on 30 March 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

10.   Teenage girl Z. Subhi Koujar, 16, was enlisted on 31 March 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

11.   Teenage girl K. Topal, 13, was enlisted on 2 April 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

12.   Teenage boy A. Hasan, 14, was enlisted on 8 April 2022. He was relocated to a center in Tall Rifat town.

13.   Teenage girl J. Abdo Dahdoh, 13, was enlisted on 21 April 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

14.   Teenage girl S. Kar Abdo, 15, was enlisted on 22 April 2022, from Ashrafieh neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

15.   Teenage girl A. Abdullah, 12, was enlisted on 16 May 2022 in Qamishli/Qamishlo city.

16.   Teenage girl H. Moussa, 13, was enlisted on 19 May 2022 in Qamishli/Qamishlo city.

17.   Teenage girl S. Ja’far Hamid was enlisted on 21 May 2022 in al-Shahbaa area, in Aleppo’s countryside.

18.   Teenage girl S. Hussain hailed from al-Malikiyah/ Dêrik area. She was killed during clashes with Turkish forces in Iraq on 22 May 2022.

19.   Teenage girl L. Hussain, 13, was enlisted on 22 May 2022 in Qamishli/Qamishlo city.

20.   Teenage boy I. Shawqi Youssef was enlisted on 8 June 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

21.   Teenage boy M. Shawqi Youssef was enlisted on 8 June 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

22.   Teenage boy M. Habash, 17, was enlisted by the YPG on 13 June 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

23.   Teenage girl Kh. Hamak, 13, was enlisted by the RY on 15 June 2022, from Baghdik village, in Ayn al-Arab/Kobanî region, in Aleppo’s countryside.

24.   Teenage boy A. Jafou was enlisted on 22 June 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

25.   Teenage boy A. Khelo was enlisted on 22 June 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

26.   Teenage boy H. Bilal was enlisted on 22 June 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

27.   Teenage boy A. Ja’fou was enlisted on 22 June 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

28.   Teenage boy Ali (Unidentified surname) was enlisted on 22 June 2022, from Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, in Aleppo city.

29.   Teenage girl Gh. Mahmoud, 14, was enlisted by the YPG on 26 June 2022 from Qamishli/Qamishlo city.

Teenagers Recruited in 2021 

1.      Teenage girl N. Shukri, 14, was enlisted on 1 January 2021. The case was documented in a former STJ report.

2.      Teenage boy A. Rami, 16, was enlisted on 1 February 2021. The case was documented in a former STJ report.

3.      Teenage boy M. Hasan, 17, was enlisted on 9 February 2021. The case was documented in a former STJ report.

4.      Teenage boy Kh. Ali, 17, was enlisted on 10 February 2021. The case was documented in a former STJ report.

5.      Teenage girl S. Mahou, 16, was enlisted on 12 February 2021. The case was documented in a former STJ report.

6.      Teenage girl A. Bahri, 13, was enlisted on 16 February 2021. The case was documented in a former STJ report.

7.      Teenage boy F. al-Hamdo, 15, was enlisted on 16 February 2021. The case was documented in a former STJ report.

8.      Teenage girl R. Hasan, 13, was enlisted on 19 April 2021.

9.      Teenage boy W. Ibrahim, 17, was enlisted on 24 July 2021.

10.   Teenage boy A. Amin, 16, was enlisted on 1 August 2021.

11.   Teenage girl S. al-Osman, 13, was enlisted on 9 August 2021.

12.   Teenage girl F. Nu’man, 15, was enlisted on 13 August 2021.

13.   Teenage boy Sh. Hasan, 14, was enlisted on 10 October 2021.

14.   Teenage girl A. Abdulaziz, 16, was enlisted on 2 November 2021.

15.   Teenage girl M. Farid, 12, was enlisted on 16 November 2021.

16.   Teenage girl H. Antar, 16, was enlisted on 21 November 2021.

17.   Teenage girl A. Ibrahim, 15, was enlisted on 21 November 2021.

18.   Teenage girl A. Khalil, 15, was enlisted on 21 November 2021.

19.   Teenage boy A. Mustafa, 14, was enlisted on 22 November 2021.

20.   Teenage boy A. Issa, 13, was enlisted on 23 November 2021.

21.   Teenage boy Kh. Hussain, 15, was enlisted on 24 November 2021.

22.   Teenage girl D. Hasan, 13, was enlisted on 26 November 2021.

23.   Teenage girl F. Ibo Kashtan, 15, was enlisted on 17 December 2021.

24.   Teenage girl S. Kado, 16, was enlisted on 19 December 2021.“ (STJ, 26. Juli 2022)

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: Syria: 49 Cases of Child Soldier Recruitment Verified in AANES Areas in 2022, 25. Jänner 2023
https://stj-sy.org/en/syria-49-cases-of-child-soldier-recruitment-verified-in-aanes-areas-in-2022/

„The al-Shabiba al-Thawria/Revolutionary Youth (RY) armed group, active in the areas of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) continues to recruit minors into its ranks without restraint. The AANES and its security forces remained silent over the RY violations taking none of the expected actions like curbing or banning the group’s activities or closing up its headquarters. Despite pledging to halt all recruitment and participation of those under 18 years of age in armed groups, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the AANES have still not taken action toward fulfilling that pledge. The AANES security offices even refuse to register complaints against the RY by families of children enlisted. […]

Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) monitored the RY child use in Manbij and Ayn al-Arab/Kobanî and documented several cases of child soldier recruitment. However, only five families of the children recruited agreed to testify to STJ while others refrained, for fear of the RY’s reprisal. […]

Keeping tabs on the violations against children, STJ documented 20 child recruitment – the RY is to blame for 18 of which – in the second half of 2022.

In total, STJ was able to document no less than 49 cases of child recruitment in the AANES areas over 2022.

Tempting Minors into Recruitment

Information obtained by STJ confirmed that the RY lured children between the ages of 14 and 18 with fake announcements of holding entertaining activities, like free photography and football courses, to attract them to its headquarters, located in near the municipal stadium in Manbij. Once a child gets into the headquarters to inquire about a course or register for it, he disappears and never returns home.“ (STJ, 25. Jänner 2023)

·      STJ – Syrians for Truth and Justice: Northeastern Syria: The RY Use of Child Soldiers Continues Unabated, 7. Juli 2023
https://stj-sy.org/en/northeastern-syria-the-ry-use-of-child-soldiers-continues-unabated/

„The Revolutionary Youth (RY), locally known as Taveras Ciwanên Şoreşger, continues to recruit minors in Syria’s northeastern areas, sometimes through kidnapping. […]

Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) has been able to document at least 32 child recruitment cases in the first half of 2023. It is verified that the RY was responsible for most of these cases, while the Women’s Protection Units was to blame for one.

Thirteen of the documented cases were of under-18 girls and the rest of male children, carried out as such; 10 cases in Qamishli/Qamishlo, five cases in Ayn al-Arab/Kobanî, four cases in Manbij, five cases in Raqqa, three cases in al-Hasakah, five cases in al-Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood, Aleppo.

Pursuing its task of monitoring human rights violations, especially those committed against children, STJ documented child use and recruitment cases by all parties to the Syrian conflict. In 2022, the organization verified; the recruitment of 49 children in the AANES [Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria] areas, the use of children as mercenaries in the Libyan conflict by Turkish-backed Syrian armed rebel groups, and the involvement of Harakat al-Tahrir wa-l-Binaa/Liberation and Construction Movement (LCM) in such cases.“ (STJ, 7. Juli 2023)

Syria Indicator ist ein unabhängiges Journalismusprojekt, das investigative Berichte über die Lage innerhalb und außerhalb Syriens produziert.

·      Syria Indicator: Fueling the Flames of War.. The Plight of Kurdish Children in Northeastern Syria, 17. Mai 2023
https://syriaindicator.org/en/2023/05/17/fueling-the-flames-of-war-the-plight-of-kurdish-children-in-northeastern-syria/

„Farouk Haji Mustafa, director of the ‘Bercav’ Organization for Democratic Development and Media, denied the recruitment of children at the age of 9 but acknowledged the presence of youth between 15 and 17. Mustafa denied such claims considering discussions about younger ages as political exploitation.

However, Mustafa’s statements contradict the findings documented by ‘Syrians for Truth and Justice.’ The investigation uncovered cases such as the abduction of Ibrahim Shawqi Youssef (9) and Muhammad Shawqi Youssef (10) from Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood for compulsory conscription by the Revolutionary Youth in May 2022. Media pressure led to their release after one day. Another case involved the kidnapping of 13-year-old Lorraine Khaled Hussein from Qamishli, who was forced into recruitment within the ranks of the SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces].

These incidents are not isolated, as dozens of children under the age of 15 were documented to have been recruited in 2021 and 2022. Despite Mustafa’s denial of recruiting children under 15, he acknowledges that children under 18 should not be involved in partisan military or political activities, asserting that their place should be in schools and universities. […]

A comprehensive investigation conducted by ‘Syria Indicator,’ in collaboration with human rights organizations and activists, has unveiled a distressing reality: the ongoing kidnapping and recruitment of young girls and boys by the Revolutionary Youth Movement (Joanne Shoreshkar), licensed by the Autonomous Administration authority.

Recent cases brought to light through the joint efforts of the investigation and ‘Syrians for Truth and Justice’ organization involve Hala D. (15 years old) and Muhammad H. (14 years old), both abducted by the Revolutionary Youth in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud neighborhood on January 18 and February 28, 2023, respectively.

Testimonies collected from various regions under the Autonomous Administration indicate a systematic approach to these kidnappings. The investigation, having interviewed families and relatives of 20 victims between 2021 and 2022, cross-referenced their accounts with data obtained from Syrians for Truth and Justice, validating the methodology behind these cases of abduction and recruitment.

Shockingly, the investigation has documented the recruitment of 55 underage girls and 42 boys during the period from 2021 to 2022, bringing the total number of recruited children to 97. Analysis reveals a clear focus on the recruitment of female children, accounting for 56.7% of the abductees, while males represent 43.3%.

These operations, described as recruitment, deception, or even ‘kidnapping’ by affected individuals, have been reported in various regions and cities under the control of the Kurdish Autonomous Administration and its military wing, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The persistent nature of these incidents demands urgent attention and action to safeguard the rights and well-being of these vulnerable children.“ (Syria Indicator, 17. Mai 2023)

Der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen (UNSC), eines der sechs Hauptorgane der UNO, ist dafür verantwortlich, Frieden und internationale Sicherheit aufrechtzuerhalten. Der UNSC veröffentlicht regelmäßig Berichte über ihre internationalen Missionen und weltweiten Entwicklungen, die Politik, Sicherheit, Menschenreche etc. betreffen.

·      UNSC – United Nations Security Council: Children and armed conflict, Report of the Secretary-General [A/77/895-S/2023/363], 5. Juni 2023
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2095409/N2314496.pdf

„A total of 1,696 children (1,593 boys, 103 girls) were verified as recruited and used by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) (637) (the Kurdish People’s Protection Units and Women’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ) (633), other components of SDF (4)) and the Internal Security Forces, under the umbrella of the self-administration in northern and eastern Syria (21) (the Internal Security Forces); the opposition Syrian National Army (SNA) (611) (Ahrar al-Sham (27), Jabhah al-Shamiyah (25), Faylaq al-Rahman (17), Faylaq al-Sham (15), Suqur al-Sham (14), Sultan Murad Division (10), Jaysh al-Sharqiyah (10), Hamzah Division (9), Jabhah al-Sharqiyah (6), Firqa al-Sahiliyah (1), unidentified factions (477)); Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (383); Syrian government forces (15) and pro-government militias (10); the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (10); Nour al-Din al-Zanki (5); and Da’esh (4). Most children (1,688) were used in combat. In addition, the recruitment and use of 3 children (2 boys, 1 girl) by YPG/YPJ (2) and the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (1) that had occurred in previous years were verified in 2022.“ (UNSC, 5. Juni 2023, S. 24-25)

„The abduction of 4 children (1 boy, 3 girls) by YPG/YPJ (2) and the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement (2) was verified. All the children were abducted for recruitment and use.“ (UNSC, 5. Juni 2023, S. 25)

„However, I am deeply concerned by the increase in verified cases of child recruitment and use by SDF [Syrian Democratic Forces], and I urge SDF to immediately end all violations and to recommit to the 2019 action plan.“ (UNSC, 5. Juni 2023, S. 26)