The president, who is the head of state, is normally elected by popular vote and may serve up to two five-year terms. However, in August 2020, in the wake of mass antigovernment protests, a group of military personnel known as the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (CNSP) launched a coup d’état. They abducted President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta—who had been reelected in 2018 with 67 percent of the vote—and compelled him to resign. In September 2020, the CNSP selected Bah N’Daou, a former military officer and Keïta-era defense minister, as acting president. Colonel Assimi Goïta, the CNSP’s leader, was made vice president.

In May 2021, after the government announced a new cabinet that excluded two key military leaders, another coup d’état took place: the military arrested both N’Daou and then prime minister Moctar Ouane, and Goïta declared himself transitional president. The move was confirmed by the Constitutional Court a few days later. N’Daou and Ouane were released from house arrest in August 2021. The government announced in June 2022 that presidential elections—which were originally scheduled for February 2022—would be held in March 2024 as part of the planned transition to a civilian government.

The prime minister, the head of government, is appointed by the president. Boubou Cissé was appointed in April 2019, but was removed by the CNSP in the August 2020 coup. Ouane, his successor, was appointed in September 2020 and removed from office following the May 2021 coup. In June 2021, Goïta appointed a new civilian prime minister—Choguel Maïga, a leading member of the June 5th Movement–Rally of Patriotic Forces (M5–RFP) coalition that had spearheaded the anti-Keïta protest movement.

Members of the 147-seat unicameral National Assembly normally serve five-year terms. Thirteen seats were reserved to represent Malians living abroad.

Overdue parliamentary elections were held in two rounds in March and April 2020, but the process was marred by violence, low turnout, and disagreement over the results. Voters were subjected to intimidation, while observers reported vote-buying incidents. COVID-19 restrictions also affected the balloting. A group of civil society observers reported a first-round turnout figure of 7.5 percent.

Keïta dissolved the National Assembly in August 2020 after he was detained by the CNSP, along with then prime minister Boubou Cissé and other officials.

A 121-member National Transitional Council (CNT) was appointed in December 2020, with CNSP member Colonel Malick Diaw as its president. Security forces directly controlled 22 seats, while political parties and organizations were granted 11. The M5–RFP, an alliance of opposition parties and civil society groups, separately held 8 seats.

As of year-end 2022, legislative and local elections, as well as a constitutional referendum, were scheduled for 2023.

A multiyear effort to create a single election management body was realized when the Independent Election Management Authority (AIGE) was operationalized in October 2022. The body comprises 15 representatives, including 8 named by the government, 4 from political parties, and 3 from civil society groups. The United Nations (UN) will provide support for the establishment of AIGE offices in all constituencies to facilitate the administration of the upcoming elections. Electoral operations were previously divided among three administrative bodies: the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), and the General Office of Elections (DGE). The Constitutional Court also participates in the electoral process by validating election results and resolving disputes.

In 2021, the transitional government postponed elections that had been scheduled for February 2022; transitional authorities also proposed further extending the transition period and suspending elections for up to five years. In response, ECOWAS, which had been pressing for Mali’s return to elected civilian rule, imposed economic and travel sanctions on members of the transitional authority in November 2021; ECOWAS also imposed additional sanctions in January 2022. The January 2022 sanctions were lifted that July, shortly after ECOWAS and Mali’s interim government agreed to extend the transition period until March 2024.

A new electoral law was adopted by the CNT and enacted by the transitional president in June 2022. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) praised the CNT’s “inclusive approach” to developing the law, noting that it was generally well-received by political parties and civil society. However, the law permits members of the junta to contest elections if they step down from their posts at least six months ahead of the vote.

The creation and functioning of political parties are governed by a legal framework known as the Political Parties Charter, which is generally fair. The charter prohibits the creation of political parties on an “ethnic, religious, linguistic, regionalist, sexist, or professional basis.”

There are more than 100 registered political parties in Mali, though fewer than 20 are active. Parties are usually built around a particular personality, and policy differences between them are not always clear. Moreover, parties are often poorly funded, which hampers their ability to effectively organize and win voter support.

Electoral competition is normally open to opposition forces. A 2014 law institutionalized specific privileges for opposition parties in the parliament, such as the ability to choose an official leader of the opposition. However, in 2016 the ruling majority adopted amendments to the electoral code that favored establishment and majority parties by requiring presidential candidates to make a significant financial deposit and receive support from a certain number of incumbent elected officials. Opposition figures faced violent attacks during parliamentary elections in 2020.

In July 2022, the Supreme Court issued arrest warrants for former prime minister Boubou Cissé and several other former officials; regime critics have expressed concern that the warrants represent a possible attempt to prevent the Keïta-era officials from contesting the 2024 presidential election.

Before the August 2020 coup d’état, citizens’ political choices were relatively free, though they were occasionally influenced by the promise of patronage appointments or other benefits in exchange for political support. The military junta that first took power in 2020 and consolidated its authority in the May 2021 coup has since appointed key officials and set election timetables without meaningful public consultation. Nevertheless, there have been some opportunities for civil society and political parties to participate in consultative processes, including ahead of the June 2022 electoral law changes.

No law limits political rights for members of minority groups, and no single ethnic group dominates the government or security forces. Tuareg pastoralist groups in the north have historically occupied a marginal position in national political life.

Societal attitudes can discourage women from participating in political processes. While a 2015 gender quota law mandates that 30 percent of elected and appointed positions are to be filled by women, just over 28 percent of CNT seats are held by women, and the 25-member cabinet that was established in June 2021—after the second coup d’état—included only six women.

President Keïta was elected in a generally credible poll in 2018, and the National Assembly that took office in 2013 was also freely elected. That parliament remained in place beyond the end of its mandate, however, with elections eventually held in March and April 2020. The August 2020 coup d’état replaced an elected national government with a military regime; a second coup in May 2021 reinforced the military’s hold on power, causing renewed uncertainty about the reintroduction of civilian rule. A civilian, Choguel Maïga, was appointed as prime minister in June 2021, but several key government positions were filled by military leaders. Prime Minister Maïga was temporarily replaced by Colonel Abdoulaye Maïga in August 2022 after suffering a stroke; the civilian prime minister was reinstated in December.

A transition deadline of March 2024 was formalized in June 2022 as part of an agreement reached by ECOWAS and Malian authorities. The agreement was followed by the lifting of the sanctions ECOWAS had placed on Mali that January in response to delays in the planned transition to civilian government. Though there has been some consultation with political parties and civil society, the transition process has also been criticized as unilateral and undemocratic by some stakeholders.

In June 2022, Goïta announced that the government had created a commission to draft a new constitution, which would be put to a referendum in 2023. A preliminary draft constitution was delivered to Goïta in October, but was not made public; a final draft had not been completed before year’s end. Opposition figures criticized the proposed constitution on a number of grounds, expressing concern that it would concentrate power in the hands of the president and dismay that it had not been drafted by a democratic, civilian government.

The volatile security situation in northern and central Mali has limited the effective territorial reach of government authority. There have been credible reports in recent years, including 2022, that the Wagner Group—a Russian government–linked private military group—was operating in Mali. Malian authorities have confirmed the presence of Russian military advisers in Mali, but have denied that Wagner mercenaries are operating in the country.

Corruption remains a problem in government, notably in public procurement. Bribery and embezzlement of public funds is common, and impunity for corrupt officials is the norm. The Office of the Auditor General is an independent agency responsible for analyzing public spending, but despite its identification of sizable cases of embezzlement, very few prosecutions have taken place.

After the 2020 coup d’état, the CNSP launched a crackdown on apparent abuses by government officials but took little action to fight corruption within the military. In July 2022, arrest warrants were issued for a number of former government officials, including former prime minister Cissé, purportedly for the crime of forgery, among other things. However, some have expressed concern that the warrants represent a possible attempt to prevent the officials from contesting the 2024 presidential election.

In 2021, former prime minister Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga and former finance minister Bouaré Fily Sissoko were arrested on fraud charges in connection with the 2014 purchase of a presidential plane and $40 million in military equipment contracts. Maïga remained in custody until his death in March 2022.

Government operations remain generally opaque, and Mali does not have a comprehensive legal framework for freedom of information. While numerous laws provide for public access to some official documents and information, they are replete with extensive and vague exceptions. Journalists have faced obstacles when attempting to obtain information, particularly about military expenditures.

Opposition figures have criticized the constitution drafting process undertaken in 2022, and some have called for a more democratic drafting process. The draft constitution was not made public when it was submitted to military leadership in October.

Though the media environment in Bamako and in the rest of the south was relatively open prior to the 2020 and 2021 coups, reports of censorship, self-censorship, and threats against journalists have risen significantly in recent years. Reporting on the situation in the north remains dangerous due to the presence of active militant groups. Defamation is a crime that can draw fines or prison time.

In February 2022, the transitional government suspended the accreditation process for journalists. Later that month, Benjamin Roger, a French journalist working for Jeune Afrique, was arrested soon after arriving in Mali and was forced to return to France after authorities confiscated his visa, saying that he did not have the required press accreditation.

The government suspended French broadcasters Radio France Internationale (RFI) and France 24 in March after the outlets reported on alleged abuses by Malian security forces; the suspensions were confirmed to be “definitive” in April. Domestic outlet Joliba TV News received a two-month suspension in November after it criticized the military-led government. Journalist Malick Konaté reported being threatened by both state and nonstate actors in November after he contributed to reporting on the Wagner Group’s presence in Mali.

During 2021, transitional authorities began to seek justice for past instances of violence against members of the media. That July, transitional authorities arrested General Moussa Diawara, former head of the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE), and issued an international arrest warrant for Karim Keïta, son of the former president, in connection with the 2016 disappearance of journalist Birama Touré. In February 2022, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) reported that its investigation into Touré’s disappearance found that the journalist had been secretly held by the DGSE and had “very probably died as a result of being tortured.”

Freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed in Mali, which is a secular state, and discrimination on the basis of religion is prohibited. The population is predominantly Sunni Muslim, and Sufism plays a role in the beliefs of most residents.

Armed extremist groups have terrorized northern and central Mali since the 2012 Islamist uprising, attacking those whom they perceive as failing to follow their strict interpretation of Islam. Such groups have occasionally carried out targeted kidnappings of Christians and subjected them to sometimes violent harassment.

Academic freedom is upheld in areas with a consolidated government presence but severely limited in areas affected by conflict and militant activity. As of the end of 2022, the security situation had forced 1,726 schools to close, disrupting the education of over half a million children. In areas controlled by Islamist militant groups, schools have been forced to use curriculums in line with the groups’ ideologies.

In January 2022, economics professor Étienne Fakaba Sissoko was arrested for so-called subversive speech after he criticized the government. Sissoko was released in June, but remained banned from traveling through at least August.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because hundreds of schools have been forced to close for security reasons, Islamist militant groups have attempted to impose their ideology in schools under their control, and an economist was detained for several months by authorities in Bamako in response to his public commentary.

Private discussion was generally open and free in areas under government control prior to the 2020 and 2021 coups, but has since become more constricted. In August 2022, the UN Independent Expert on Mali described a shrinking civic space in the country, featuring increased self-censorship among individuals, especially online. Such self-censorship has largely been attributed to a fear of reprisals by the military-led government or its supporters. In July, online commentator Alhassane Tangara was detained by authorities after a progovernment group denounced him on Facebook.

Expression is also restricted in areas with a militant presence or where intercommunal violence has flared.

Score Change: The score declined from 3 to 2 because personal expression has been increasingly restricted since the 2021 coup, with the threat of reprisals by state security forces or Islamist militant groups serving as an incentive for self-censorship.

The constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, but participants in public gatherings risk violence by state security forces, and the government has occasionally restricted social media use to prevent activists from organizing protests.

Several protests took place in 2022 and were largely peaceful. Numerous progovernment rallies, including protests against ECOWAS sanctions, and demonstrations against French involvement in Mali were held throughout the year without being disrupted. Smaller protests against the military-led government took place in January and May.

Many NGOs have operated in Mali without state interference, but the ability of civil society groups to engage in human rights work has grown increasingly restricted since the 2021 coup. Such groups have reported facing death threats and threats of detention, as well as physical harassment and violence.

In November 2022, the government banned all NGOs that received French financing or material or technical support. The ban impacted nearly 300 organizations. In an effort to enforce the ban, the government imposed new reporting requirements on NGOs in December, which included making all NGOs’ funding streams subject to mandatory government review. Separately, in December, the government suspended Geneva Call (Appel de Genève), a Swiss humanitarian organization that was supporting humanitarian dialogue between civilians and former rebels, for alleged “illicit activities.”

Ongoing insecurity in some parts of the country hampers NGO efforts to provide aid and services to returning refugees and others affected by instability. In its October 2022 report to the UN Security Council (UNSC), MINUSMA noted frequent interference in its operations by both the government and nonstate actors.

Score Change: The score declined from 2 to 1 because the government disrupted civil society work on human rights and humanitarian aid, including by forbidding the operation of any organizations that receive French funding and expelling a Swiss humanitarian group from the country.

The constitution guarantees workers the right to form unions and to strike, with some limitations for workers in essential services and requirements involving compulsory arbitration. The government has broad discretionary power over the registration of unions and recognition of collective bargaining, and the authorities do not effectively enforce laws against antiunion discrimination.

In November 2022, three trade unions, including the country’s largest trade union, the National Union of Workers of Mali (UNTM), held a two-day strike in Gao to condemn the government’s failure to address growing insecurity in the region.

The judiciary is beholden to the executive, despite constitutional guarantees of judicial independence. Judges are appointed by the president, while the minister of justice supervises both law enforcement and judicial functions.

In July 2020, President Keïta announced the removal of Constitutional Court judges as part of an effort to resolve the country’s postelection political impasse. That August, nine judges were appointed to the court; three were named by Keïta, three by National Assembly president Moussa Timbine, and three by a judicial council. The appointments were met with criticism due to the involvement of a Keïta ally in the judges’ installation.

Militant attacks against judicial personnel have prompted some judges to vacate their posts.

Due process rights are inconsistently upheld. Detainees are not always charged within the 48-hour period set by law, and arbitrary arrests are common. Detainees also face extended pretrial detention periods. High costs and lengthy procedures inhibit access to the justice system.

After a deadly 2015 terrorist attack in Bamako, a national state of emergency remained in force for several years. The emergency designation gave security services greater authority to search homes without a warrant, detain suspects, and restrict protests. The military government suspended that state of emergency after taking power in August 2020, though a COVID-19-related state of emergency was declared in late December 2020. Due process rights were not consistently upheld for high-ranking officials detained by the military in the August 2020 coup d’état.

The Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission created in 2014 is responsible for investigating human rights violations committed since 1960, but its activities are restricted by the rise of terrorist activities and intercommunal tensions within Mali’s borders.

Due process is not upheld in areas under militant control.

The security situation in Mali continued to deteriorate in 2022, leading to a decline in the protection of human rights in the country; MINUSMA documented a nearly 50 percent increase in human rights violations and abuses during the first half of the year compared with the previous six months.

Islamist militant groups that were not party to a 2015 peace agreement signed in Algiers continue to carry out acts of violence against civilians in the northern and central regions. In August 2022, the UN Independent Expert on Mali noted that the country was experiencing a resurgence of extremist violence; that December, multiple northern armed groups pulled out of the Algiers peace agreement. Since 2012, militant groups affiliated with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have regularly enforced brutal punishments—including stoning and amputation—on civilians they accuse of crimes.

Ongoing instability has contributed to the spread of organized crime and accompanying violence and kidnappings. In April 2021, French journalist Olivier Dubois was abducted by the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM), a militant group with reported links to Al-Qaeda. Dubois was still being held hostage at year-end 2022.

Hundreds of civilians were killed in conflict throughout 2022. The Katibat Macina armed group killed some 132 civilians in a two-day period in June during multiple attacks in Bankass district.

Malian military personnel have been known to engage in human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests. In March 2022, Malian military forces and members of the Wagner Group allegedly executed 300 civilian men over a five-day period in Moura, a town in central Mali.

Foreign forces have played an important role in supporting the government’s fight against violent extremist organizations. After nine years of providing military support in Mali, the French government announced plans to withdraw its troops in February 2022; the last French soldiers left in August. Several other countries announced plans to withdraw their forces from MINUSMA during 2022. The UK cited the presence of the Wagner Group as part of its reason for leaving.

In July, Malian authorities arrested 49 Côte d’Ivoire soldiers upon their arrival in Mali, claiming that they were mercenaries who had entered the country without permission. Ivorian officials condemned the arrests, saying that the soldiers had been sent to take part in MINUSMA. In December, a Malian court sentenced 46 of the soldiers to 20 years in prison for undermining Malian security; the other 3 soldiers, who had been released in September, were issued death sentences in absentia.

Prisons are characterized by overcrowding, insufficient medical care, and a lack of proper food and sanitation.

Members of a northern caste known as Black Tamasheqs face societal discrimination, including slavery-like treatment and hereditary servitude. Authorities sometimes deny them official documents or discriminate against them in housing, schooling, and police protection.

Arabs and Tuaregs also face discrimination. In 2020, Arab and Tuareg merchants in Timbuktu reported that they commonly faced blame for criminal and jihadist activity in the region.

Same-sex sexual acts are legal, but LGBT+ people face discrimination, including cases of violence by family members that is meant as a corrective punishment.

Although the constitution nominally guarantees equal rights and prohibits discrimination based on sex, men and women do not have the same legal status, and women are required by law to obey their husbands. Sexual harassment is not prohibited by law and is a common practice in schools and the workplace.

Conditions in northern Mali have left many refugees unable or unwilling to return, as continuing insecurity in the region complicates resettlement. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) counted almost 198,000 Malian refugees living in asylum countries and more than 440,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of the end of 2022.

Freedom of movement and choice of residence remain constrained by insecurity, especially in northern and central Mali. At the end of 2022, there were over 440,000 IDPs in Mali.

Citizens have the right to own property and engage in private enterprise, but these rights are not consistently respected, and widespread corruption hampers normal business activities. It is generally necessary to pay bribes in order to operate a business.

Traditional customs sometimes undermine the right of women to own property. The law discriminates against women in matters of inheritance.

The law puts women at a disadvantage on personal status issues including marriage and divorce. Rape and domestic violence against women are widespread, and most such crimes go unreported. There are no specific laws prohibiting spousal rape or domestic violence. Female genital mutilation (FGM) is legal and commonly practiced in the country. Same-sex couples cannot form civil unions, marry, or adopt children in Mali.

Although trafficking in persons is a criminal offense, prosecutions are infrequent. Many judicial officials remain unaware of the antitrafficking law, and the police lack adequate resources to combat trafficking. Traditional forms of slavery and debt bondage persist, particularly in the north, with thousands of people estimated to be living in such conditions.

The government has taken steps to eliminate child labor, but it is a significant concern. Armed groups regularly recruit and use child soldiers.