Under the 2012 provisional constitution, the president is elected by a two-thirds vote in the Federal Parliament to serve a four-year term. The president shares executive power with a prime minister, who must have the support of Parliament.

Farmaajo’s term expired in early 2021, but he controversially remained in office amid repeated electoral postponements. In May 2022, a month after the indirect lower house elections finally concluded, former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud (2012–17) was chosen to serve another term after three rounds of voting by lawmakers. He took 214 votes, compared with 110 for Farmaajo, who ultimately conceded defeat.

Hamza Abdi Barre took office as prime minister in June 2022, replacing Mohamed Hussein Roble, and a new cabinet consisting of 75 ministers, deputy ministers, and state ministers was appointed in August.

Somalia has not held direct legislative elections since 1969. Members of the 54-seat Upper House are elected by state assemblies. The lower house, the House of the People, is elected under a system in which clan elders choose delegates, who in turn select lawmakers. Upper House elections were begun in July 2021 and completed that November after months of political disputes. Elections for the lower house started in November 2021 and were also highly divisive, finally concluding in late April 2022. That month, 40 out of 54 Upper House members and 250 out of 275 lower house members were officially sworn in. Opposition groups and observers criticized both sets of elections, alleging political manipulation, improper interference, and vote buying.

Federal member states similarly employ clan-based power-sharing systems rather than direct popular elections to form their legislatures.

The electoral framework does not provide for universal suffrage. Balloting is the result of an ad-hoc process based on lengthy negotiations among the country’s main clans.

Legislation enacted in 2016 allowed the first formal registration of political parties since 1969. The National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) has since registered more than 100 parties. However, because the 2021–22 parliamentary elections maintained a clan-based system and plans for direct voting were further postponed, the significance and role of political parties remains unclear.

The lack of direct elections prevents any group from gaining power through democratic means. However, the 2022 indirect presidential balloting resulted in defeat for the incumbent, who ultimately conceded and allowed a transfer of power to his rival, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud.

Score Change: The score improved from 0 to 1 because an opposition candidate won the indirect presidential election, leading to an orderly rotation of power.

Ordinary citizens are largely unable to participate in the political process as voters, and clan delegates are generally expected to vote based on their clan affiliation rather than their own political choice.

Presidential candidates are required to be Muslim, according to the provisional constitution.

The current political system is designed to ensure some representation for the country’s many clans, but the prevailing “4.5” formula gives the four largest groups—the Hawiye, Darod, Dir, and Rahanweyn—eight out of every nine positions, marginalizing all other clans. The system is also affected by intraclan rivalries and dominated by clan leaders, who do not necessarily represent the common interests of their respective groups.

Women’s political participation is limited by discriminatory attitudes and hostility from incumbent elites, and the interests of women are poorly represented in practice. The parliamentary framework mandates a 30 percent quota for women’s representation, but the elections that ended in April 2022 resulted in only 54 women in the House of the People (less than 20 percent); there are 14 women in the Upper House (less than 26 percent).

The government, which is not democratically elected, has little practical ability to implement its laws and policies even in parts of the country it controls. Relations between the federal government and the administrations of the federal member states remain poor.

Responding to claims that Farmaajo had attempted to centralize power at the expense of the prime minister and other institutional checks, President Hassan promised to focus on political reconciliation in 2022, but the practical effects of these pledges remained uncertain at year’s end.

Corruption is rampant in Somalia, and state agencies tasked with combating it do not function effectively. Impunity is the norm for public officials accused of malfeasance.

A 2019 law called for the creation of state and national anticorruption commissions; the members of the national commission were appointed in 2021. The government ratified the African Union (AU) Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption in 2020. However, these steps have yet to result in tangible progress toward accountability and deterrence.

Government transparency is limited. Officials are not required to make public declarations of their income and assets, and oversight procedures for public contracts are not well enforced. There is no law guaranteeing public access to government information.

In October 2022, the new administration decided—with no public consultation—to approve an oil deal with the US firm Coastline Exploration. An earlier version of the agreement, signed and then disavowed by the previous government, had drawn accusations that it did not protect Somalia’s financial interests.

While the provisional constitution calls for freedom of the press, journalists regularly face harassment, arbitrary detention, suspension, fines, and violence from both state and nonstate actors. In 2020, the president signed amendments to the media law that included ostensible protections for journalists’ rights but also featured vaguely worded provisions criminalizing the dissemination of “false information,” reports that conflict with the “national interest,” and incitement to violence and clan divisions. The law grants the Ministry of Information broad powers to regulate the media.

Journalists continued to face arrests and physical violence during 2022. Abdalle Ahmed Mumin, head of the Somali Journalists Syndicate, was arrested in October after his organization criticized a government directive banning the “dissemination of extremist ideology,” which it said could limit free speech. Abdalle was charged with bringing the state into contempt, among other offenses, and the case was pending at year’s end. Separately, the Committee to Protect Journalists documented the deaths of two journalists as a result of bomb blasts in September and October.

Nearly all Somalis are Sunni Muslims, though there is a very small Christian community whose members generally do not practice their religion in public. Conversion from Islam is illegal in some areas, and suspicions of conversion can draw societal harassment throughout the country. Despite containing clauses that promote religious freedom and outlaw religious discrimination, the provisional constitution recognizes Islam as the state religion and forbids the promotion of any other faith.

In areas under their control, the Shabaab use violence to enforce their interpretation of Islam, including execution as a penalty for alleged apostasy.

Despite limited funding and infrastructure, as well as other challenges, universities operate in major cities. Academics reportedly practice self-censorship on sensitive topics. Islamic instruction is required in all schools except those operated by non-Muslim minority groups. Schools under Shabaab control integrate radical interpretations of Islam into the curriculum.

Individuals enjoy some freedom of expression in more secure areas of the country, but criticism of powerful figures in the state and society can draw reprisals, and social media posts that touch on sensitive political or religious topics are subject to criminal punishment. Open debate is severely restricted in areas controlled or threatened by the Shabaab.

Although the provisional constitution guarantees freedom of assembly, security officials require approval for demonstrations and have used violence—including gunfire—to suppress unauthorized protests.

Local civil society groups, international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and UN agencies have been able to conduct a wide range of activities in some parts of the country, but they face difficult and often dangerous working conditions. Regional authorities and security forces have reportedly harassed, extorted, obstructed, and attempted to control NGOs and aid groups, and the Shabaab generally do not allow such organizations to operate in their territory.

Independent labor unions are active in Somalia and have worked to expand their operations and capacity. However, constitutional and legal protections for union activity are not always respected. The Federation of Somali Trade Unions has reported threats, dismissals, attempts at co-optation, and other forms of repression and interference from both government officials and private employers.

The judicial system in Somalia is fractured, understaffed, and rife with corruption. Its authority is not widely respected, with state officials ignoring court rulings and citizens often turning to Islamic or customary law as alternatives.

In 2020, the cabinet approved the appointment of five members to the Judicial Service Commission, a constitutionally required body tasked with overseeing the federal courts. Political opposition and civil society groups argued that the appointments were made without proper authority or consideration of the candidates’ qualifications and independence.

The country’s police, intelligence, and military services do not observe safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention, and their work is undermined by corruption. Clan politics and other external factors often play a role in the outcome of court cases. Military courts routinely try civilians, including for terrorism-related offenses, and do not respect basic international standards for due process.

The ongoing armed conflict with the Shabaab has featured numerous terrorist attacks on government, international, and civilian targets, as well as indiscriminate lethal violence and excessive force against civilians by government security services, international troops, and local militias. The Shabaab also engage in public executions of those they suspect of working with the government or international forces.

Hundreds of civilians were killed by the Shabaab in 2022, whether through bombings, assassinations, or clashes between Shabaab militants and villagers. The Shabaab stepped up attacks during the elections period in 2022, assassinating at least five candidates and disrupting voting in several areas. In March, 48 people, including a legislator, were killed in an attack on the seat of government in Beledweyne, capital of the Hiran region.

The AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) began operations in April 2022, replacing the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the force that had been assisting Mogadishu in its fight against the Shabaab.

Tensions increased in Galmudug State in 2021 following fighting between the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ) militia and state and federal security forces. Negotiations to resolve the ASWJ’s political status within the Galmudug administration continued in 2022.

Government authorities carry out executions ordered by military courts after flawed proceedings. Detainees in government custody are at risk of torture, and perpetrators generally enjoy impunity.

While the provisional constitution and legal system offer some formal protections against discrimination based on sex, clan, and other categories, they have little force in practice. Women face widespread disadvantages in areas including housing, education, and employment, and members of marginalized clans and some non-Somali ethnic groups suffer disproportionately from economic exclusion and violence.

LGBT+ people generally do not make their identity public. Same-sex sexual activity can be punished with up to three years in prison under the penal code, and individuals accused of engaging in such activity are subject to execution in Shabaab-controlled areas.

Travel throughout Somalia is dangerous due to periodic combat, attacks on civilians, and the presence of checkpoints controlled by security forces, militias, the Shabaab, and other armed groups that commonly extract arbitrary fees and bribes from travelers.

Approximately 2.9 million people were internally displaced in Somalia as of December 2022, having been forced to move due to conflict and insecurity as well as drought, flooding, and other disasters.

The provisional constitution guarantees property rights, but securing ownership is complicated by a mixture of formal and informal or traditional systems governing land rights. Procedures for registering property and businesses are impeded by corruption and other barriers, and disputes can lead to intimidation and violence. The Shabaab and other extremist groups manage elaborate extortion and “taxation” schemes, placing tremendous pressure on business owners.

Women do not enjoy equal rights to inherit property and are often denied the assets to which they are legally entitled due to discriminatory social norms.

Forced and child marriages are widespread, and the Shabaab impose forced marriages with their fighters. Individuals can face strong societal pressure to marry or not marry within certain clans. Female genital mutilation is extremely common despite a formal ban.

Sexual violence remains a major problem, especially for displaced persons. Perpetrators include government troops and militia members.

Child labor and trafficking in persons for the purposes of sexual exploitation or forced labor are common. Refugees and internally displaced people are particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Children are abducted or recruited to serve as fighters by the Shabaab and to a lesser extent by government and militia forces.