Document #2092918

Freedom House (Author)

Nations in Transit 2023 - Ukraine

TRANSITIONAL OR HYBRID REGIME
39
/ 100
Democracy Percentage 39.29 / 100
Democracy Score 3.36 / 7
LAST YEAR'S DEMOCRACY PERCENTAGE & STATUS
39 / 100 Transitional or Hybrid Regime
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.
 

Author

Nazar Boyko

Score changes in 2023

  • The Civil Society rating improved from 5.00 to 5.50 due to civil society’s consolidated efforts in responding to the humanitarian and military needs, and the ongoing and increasing inclusion of civil society as a key actor in the country’s reform process.
  • The Independent Media rating decreased from 3.50 to 3.25 due to the exclusion of three opposition channels from the broadcasting in digital network and the implementation of the “Law on Media” that posed risks of government control over the media sphere.

As a result, Ukraine’s Democracy Score remained unchanged.

Executive Summary

The year 2022 proved to be the most arduous and demanding period for Ukraine since the nation achieved independence in 1991. The full-scale Russian military invasion that began on February 24, 2022, dramatically affected the country and upended the lives of millions of Ukrainian citizens. By the end of the year, Russia occupied 18 percent of Ukraine’s territory including Crimea and much of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions.1 Besides more than 17,000 civilian casualties, almost 7,900,000 refugees and 5,900,000 internally displaced persons fled their homes in 2022.2 The cost of postwar reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine amounted to $349 billion by September 2022, and this figure was expected to grow as the war continues.3 Although the Russian army caused significant damage to Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, the government acted swiftly to assure citizens’ access to basic communal goods such as power, heating, and water in most of the controlled territories.

The war significantly impacted the functioning of state institutions, altered the ongoing process of reforms, and influenced spheres critical to the democratic development of the country. It brought to the surface a set of security-versus-democracy dilemmas in which Ukrainians were forced to respond to foreign invasion and associated influence within the country without doing harm to domestic democratic institutions.

On February 24th, 2022, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy declared martial law for a period of 30 days.4 The designation was prolonged five times—from February 24 through the rest of 20225 —and permitted the restrictions of some political rights and civil liberties provided for in the Constitution for the sake of basic security in a time of war. Among them were the right to free speech, the right to elect and be elected, and the right to peaceful assembly and strike.

Consequently, the government and other state institutions adapted to the new conditions brought on by wartime and developed new legal frameworks and regulations. An illustrative example of such institutional adaptation is the Central Election Commission of Ukraine, which effectively kept control over the national system of electoral governance. It took steps to protect the safety of election administrators in the temporarily occupied territories and developed the framework for the postwar elections. The decisions and actions of the government, especially the president’s, were met with high levels of public support throughout the year.

Nevertheless, some adjustments prompted concern. In March, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) issued a set of wartime media regulations. National news channels were obliged to unite under a single information platform that was a 24-hour joint news telethon. In March, media experts welcomed these decisions considering them appropriate in wartime.6 However, by the end of the year, the experts had become more critical. Some of them considered it a government tool to control television, and a threat to Ukraine’s democratic image7 . The introduction of united telethon was followed by the unexplained exclusion of three opposition television channels from Ukrainian digital broadcasting packages. While the channels were still accessible in cable packages and online, the development raised concerns regarding the freedom of media in Ukraine. Implementation of the “Law on Media” that granted the government greater control over media was another warning signal.

On June 17, the European Commission recommended granting Ukraine candidate status for European Union (EU) membership. To hold the status Ukraine must continue progress in seven areas of reforms, with the reform of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (CCU) at the top of the list. At the end of the year, though, the parliament passed and the president signed a questionable law on the procedures of the CCU’s judges selection. One of the loopholes in the law provides the government with veto power in the process of candidates’ nominations.

In previous years, decentralization had been considered one of the most successful reforms. However, in 2022, progress in decentralization slowed. The most significant decentralization laws that were scheduled to be implemented during the year were either put on hold or failed to pass in the Verkhovna Rada (the parliament). At the same time, certain legislative initiatives related to urban planning and construction that might impose restrictions on local government were supported by the Rada. The initiative faced harsh reactions from local councils and mayors all around Ukraine, as well as from decentralization watchdogs.

The appointment of the chair of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO) in July was a long-awaited event, and the adoption of the Anti-Corruption Strategy was a significant milestone in the fight against corruption. A set of high-profile corruption cases that opened during the year demonstrated that corrupt practices continued in wartime. Nevertheless, public opinion surveys indicated a sharp increase in intolerance toward corruption. Moreover, Ukrainians recognized the fight against corruption as one of the key priorities in postwar Ukraine, and a decrease in corruption was considered by the citizens a major expectation of the reforms.

In 2022, the oligarchs’ influence was reduced. This outcome can be credited to two factors. Firstly, the implementation of anti-oligarch laws provided an impetus for oligarchic figures to withdraw from involvement in politics and the media industry. Secondly, the majority of oligarchs experienced considerable financial setbacks due to the ongoing war, rendering it impossible for them to maintain their political and media networks at previous levels. The most illustrative case was that of steel magnate Rinat Akhmetov, the wealthiest man in Ukraine, who announced in July that his Media Group Ukraine was ceasing operations.

Civil society achieved significant success throughout the year, particularly through the efforts of volunteer organizations. These groups were at the forefront of providing essential resources for civilians amid the ongoing humanitarian crisis: for example, by managing evacuations and assisting vulnerable communities. Both large and well-established volunteer initiatives, as well as smaller and recently established ones, made significant contributions toward assisting the Ukrainian Armed Forces. In a short time, volunteers developed strong capacities in fundraising, procurement, logistics, networking, and communications. The significance of their efforts was widely recognized nationally and internationally. However, some law enforcement agencies appear to have wrongfully prosecuted volunteers for misuse of humanitarian aid.

In June 2022, the Ukrainian parliament ratified and the president signed a bill on ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention).

Over the year, the advancement of democratization was not uniform across all domains. The ongoing war and the imposition of martial law granted the government extraordinary powers not typical during peacetime. The motives behind government decisions were not always apparent, and the absence of public explanation at times gave rise to speculation that the government sought to gain political advantages during the war.

At a Glance

Even as the government demonstrated effectiveness during the war, some actors in government and elsewhere attempted to undermine critical democratic institutions. Despite the legal prohibition on holding elections under martial law, the system of election management was upheld and protected. Civil society proved to be resilient and effective during times of crisis, despite the existential risks faced by activists in the occupied territories and the attempts of law enforcement bodies in the controlled territories to prosecute volunteers. With oligarchs and other media owners losing much of their influence, the media sector, especially television, became vulnerable to government influence and control. Local government was adversely impacted by certain provisions of the martial law regime, as well as the deceleration of the decentralization reform. Some positive steps toward greater judicial independence were counterbalanced by the government’s attempt to maintain control over the procedures determining the selection of the judges of Constitutional Court. Corruption is still one of the greatest challenges to the democratization of Ukraine, despite some significant positive changes in anticorruption institutional infrastructure.

 
National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 2.50 / 7.00
  • On February 24, the Ukrainian government issued a plan of action for the martial law regime,8 applicable to the functioning of both national and local authorities during wartime. Key state governing bodies continued their operations on a regular basis throughout the year. The government maintained democratic civilian control over the military and security forces in controlled and liberated territories.
  • There was turnover of top-level executives at the central and local levels.9 During the first months of the war, the president dismissed several heads of state administrations and appointed people with military backgrounds instead.10 But the most resonant cases were the dismissals of the chief of the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) Ivan Bakanov, and the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (PGU) Iryna Venediktova,11 during the summer. The president justified their removal by pointing to, respectively, the numerous cases of collaboration by SSU employees with Russian forces in the temporarily occupied territories, and procrastination of the prosecutor’s office regarding the appointment of the head of Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO).12 The dismissals of Bakanov and Venediktova were legally questionable, as the Ukrainian constitution stipulates that it is not only the president but also the parliament that has a say in the appointment and removal of these positions.13 As a result of the removals, the parliamentary opposition accused the Office of the President of the “removal of the parliament from the decision-making process.”14 Shortly after the dismissal of the SSU head on July 17, the president also purged heads of SSU regional offices.15
  • On May 7, the anti-oligarchic law that had passed in September 2021 took effect.16 Individuals who may be subject to the law were given a six-month period to eliminate two out of the four criteria that are used to determine whether someone is an oligarch.17 It had been assumed, that in May 2022 the National Council of Security and Defense (NCSD) would start the “first nomination meetings” to identify those potentially subject to the law’s enforcement after the six-month period’s expiration.18 In late July, Oleksiy Danilov, chair of the NCSD, indicated that there could be 86 individuals who meet the oligarch criteria. However, he did not disclose any names specifically.19 In October, the NCSD announced a tender for the development of software for the register. As of the end of 2022, the register was still incomplete due to the lack of an opinion from the Venice Commission on the law, as well as the disruptive effects of the war.20 Although the implementation of the anti-oligarch law was one of the requirements for maintaining the status of an EU candidate country, the law may not have much impact as many individuals who were deemed oligarchs lost their influence due to the war.21
  • On March 20, the president enforced the decree that suspended the activities of 10 political parties until the end of the martial law regime, based on their connections with the aggressor state.22 Among them, there was the parliamentary political party The Opposition Platform–For Life’ (OPZZh) and the Opposition Bloc party represented by six lawmakers elected in single-seat districts. The parliamentary faction of OPZZh was dissolved in May and its former members united into the new Platform for Life and Peace parliamentary group.23
  • On May 3, the parliament approved a law outlining a special procedure for dissolving political parties considered pro-Russian, and the president signed it on May 14.24 Under the law, the activities of the political parties that justify, recognize as legitimate, deny, or glorify Russian aggression against Ukraine are prohibited.25 By the end of October, 12 parties had been banned under the law.26 While polls found that 86 percent of Ukrainians supported the termination of pro-Russian parties,27 some considered the banning of such parties to be primarily driven by political rather than security reasons.28
  • Before February 24, when the invasion began, polls showed that just 41 percent of citizens supported the president.29 Right after the Russian invasion the level of support for Zelenskyy skyrocketed to 91 percent,30 and never fell below 80 percent during the year.31 Such a high support level may be attributed to a “rally-around-the-flag” phenomenon, when citizens become more supportive of state leaders during times of war and crisis. This effect did not spread equally to all the state institutions. For instance, despite the increase, support for the cabinet varied from 40 to 60 percent during the year.32 However, most state agencies experienced an unprecedented increase in support and trust from citizens.
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 4.50 / 7.00
  • Legal provisions of martial law prohibit the holding of national and local elections and national and local referenda.33 The Central Election Commission (CEC) suspended ongoing by-elections to the parliament in single-seat district 206, in Chernihiv Oblast, and postponed elections in single-seat districts 57 and 60 in Donetsk Oblast, and single-seat district 176 in Kharkiv Oblast.34 The CEC also temporarily suspended two referendums that were still in the initiation stage. One was focused on legalizing marijuana in Ukraine, while the other contained four questions related to strategic-property sales, agricultural-land sales, the legalization of gambling businesses, and natural-gas trading at the national market.35 According to regulations, the Verkhovna Rada is required to schedule the postponed elections within a period of 90 days after the martial law ends. In addition, the referendum processes should continue within 30 days after the termination of martial law.36
  • The CEC developed a draft law, “On the peculiarities of ensuring the organization and holding of national elections after the termination or abolition of martial law in Ukraine.”37 The draft addresses some of the most critical issues that relate to management of the first postwar elections, including the provision of millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and millions of Ukrainian refugees around the world with access to ballot boxes. Despite some apparent deficiencies, in general the draft offers reasonable mechanisms to guarantee the voting rights of Ukrainian citizens, including IDPs and refugees. This and other proactive actions the CEC took to safeguard systems of electoral governance reflected its institutional capacities during wartime.
  • Despite the prohibition of all types of elections, the regime of martial law does not forbid the recognition and registration of new lawmakers in cases where those who had been elected via the party lists then resigned from office.38 In 2022, the CEC registered 4 new lawmakers,39 all candidates from the list of Zelenskyy’s party, Servant of People. Two lawmakers who had been elected through the Opposition Platform–For Life (OPZZh) party list and resigned were not substituted.40 The CEC justified its decision by referring to the resolution of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) that had terminated the activities of 11 political parties, including OPZZh,41 on grounds of anti-Ukrainian political stances and collaborationist intentions.
  • The CEC continued to perform its functions on the dismissal and appointment of the territorial election commissions (TEC) personnel. The body substituted the resigned OPZZh-nominated TEC managers with new representatives, demonstrating political neutrality by appointing figures from different parties. At the end of October, the CEC dissolved the regional TEC of Zaporizhzhia,42 which had refused to register four local deputies of the Servant of People party and did not react to the CEC’s open calls for the deputies’ registration. Many TEC members found themselves in the territories under the occupation of Russian troops. The commissioners informed the CEC about the threats to them personally and to members of their families and asked CEC to resign from their positions. The Commission ultimately suspended the functioning of the TECs in the occupied territories for the whole period of the martial law regime.43
  • The CEC maintained its capacity to manage processes within the system of electoral governance. On February 24, it CEC suspended the operation of the State Register of Voters (SRV) for the period of martial law, in light of risks related to the potential compromise of the SRV database in territories occupied by the Russian troops; the commission sought to protect the personal data of citizens from unauthorized access, illegal use, copying, or destruction.44
  • At the end of September 2022, the Russian occupation administration held pseudoreferendums in the occupied parts of the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions. The Ukrainian government issued a call to the citizens in the occupied territories to ignore the fake plebiscites.45 The Security Service of Ukraine identified hundreds of individuals who facilitated “referendums” in the occupied territories and accused them of encroaching on the territorial integrity and inviolability of Ukraine.46
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 5.25 / 7.00
  • In 2022, Ukrainian civil society proved its maturity, integrity, and robustness. During wartime, it not only consolidated efforts in responding to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and humanitarian needs, but continued to be one of the key actors in the ongoing process of democratic reform.47
  • During the year, the Ukrainian government continued the work on the National Strategy for Promoting the Development of Civil Society in Ukraine 2021–26, which had been approved by the president in 2021.48 On July 7, the cabinet issued an open call for the discussion of the draft order On the Approval of the Plan of Measures 2022–24, regarding the implementation of National Strategy.49 The plan contained more than 50 events aiming to ensure effective procedures of public participation in the development and implementation of state policy, and to enhance favorable conditions for the institutional development of civil society organizations (CSOs). Despite poor safety conditions in light of the war, CSOs and volunteering organizations were able to hold a set of offline professional public events in the capital and other cities. They included, among others, the 11th Civil Society Development Forum held in Kyiv; the first and second Kyiv Forums of Volunteers; and the third Feminist Forum held in Lviv—all attended by hundreds of participants.50 These and other similar events demonstrated the vibrancy and adaptability of the Ukrainian civic sector to wartime.
  • In the occupied territories of Ukraine, evidence emerged that the Russian military was purposefully persecuting and capturing local activists. In the Kherson Region alone, 300 activists were captured by the Russian army by the end of July.51 In many cases, the activists were targeted over their participation in collective actions like marches and protests against the occupying forces.52 Such actions were organized and run in many occupied cities during the first few months after the full-scale invasion.53
  • Civil society took an active part in the collection of the evidence and documentation of war crimes and crimes against humanity since the very first days of the Russian invasion. More than thirty CSOs united into the 5:am coalition to “protect victims of armed Russian aggression in Ukraine and bring to justice top leadership of the Russian Federation and direct perpetrators of war crimes.”54 Besides the coalition, there are many other individual initiatives in Kyiv city and regions that collect and systematize information and data about war crimes. The Center for Civic Liberties, one of the Nobel Peace Prize 2022 recipients,55 and Euromaidan SOS created a map of violent disappearances of human rights defenders, journalists, activists, and representatives of local self-government bodies.56 The Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union collected one of the largest databases of potential war crimes, which contains more than 36,500 cases.57 The Ukraine Health Care Center developed a map that documents attacks on Ukraine’s health care facilities.58 Other local initiatives collect facts about the crimes of the Russian army in the Zaporizhzhia,59 Kharkiv,60 and Ivano-Frankivsk61 Oblasts.
  • Ukrainian civil society remains financial unstable, and this challenged became more acute during the war and humanitarian crisis caused by it. Lack of funds was a key challenge for women’s CSOs—82 percent indicated a shortage in financial resources in 2022.62 Underdevelopment of national sources of funding left CSOs largely dependent on international financial assistance.63 On the contrary, however, Ukrainian charitable foundations demonstrated tremendous efficiency in fundraising, networking, and logistics in providing for the needs of the AFU. The largest ones, Come Back Alive and Charitable Foundation of Serhiy Prytula, fundraised 5.6 and 3.5 billion hryvnia ($151 million and $94 million) in 2022, respectively.64
  • Law enforcement bodies made attempts to persecute the activists, in some cases accusing CSO workers and volunteers collecting aid of fraud.65 However, these accusations were grounded in imperfections in national legislation and discrete actions of law enforcement agencies rather than in the intentional wrongdoings of volunteers.66 Many public figures and representatives of CSOs offered support for those accused and called for the punishment of the law enforcement agents who sought to charge them.67 One of the consequences of the public outcry was the establishment of a working group in the Law Enforcement Committee in the parliament to study the practice of applying criminal liability for the illegal use of humanitarian aid, charitable donations, or free assistance for profit.68 The head of the group, Maryan Zablotskiy, of the Servant of the People party, studied many cases related to the volunteers and found no basis for any of them.69
  • On August 17, the president signed a law simplifying the regulation of labor relations in the small- and medium-sized business sector.70 This law introduced a contractual mode of employment between employers and employees. The basic conditions of work under the law are determined by the employer individually for each employee according to an individual contract. Trade unions had criticized the document since its first presentation, arguing that it significantly curtails the rights of workers.71
  • On December 1, Zelenskyy implemented an NSDC decision calling for the cabinet and the parliament to ban the activities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine (UOC–MP). 72 Some time before, as the part of counterintelligence security measures, the Security Service of Ukraine had conducted searches in the facilities of UOC–MP in Kyiv city,73 Chernivtsi,74 Ivano-Frankivsk,75 Kirovograd,76 Rivne,77 Zhytomyr,78 and Zakarpattia regions.79 At the searched facilities, the SSU found pro-Russian literature and propaganda that justified aggression against Ukraine.80 Despite the attempts of UOC–MP to distance itself from the Russian Orthodox Church,81 there were subsequent reports of UOC–MP clergy supporting the invasion82 and collaborating with the Russian military.83 According to an opinion poll, 54 percent of Ukrainians supported a complete ban of the UOC–MP, while 24 percent preferred state supervision and control over the church and its representatives.84
  • From February 24 to June 30, more than 3,000 charitable organizations and 1,000 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) were registered in Ukraine, significantly higher figures than those for 2021.85 The participation of the citizens in volunteering activities varied from 33 to 37 percent during the year,86 Trust in NGOs increased from 47 percent in 2021 to 65 percent in 2022, while trust in volunteer organizations rose from 63 percent to 85 percent, according to polls, exceeding even the reported level of confidence in president.87
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 3.25 / 7.00
  • The Ukrainian media landscape changed dramatically in 2022. At the beginning of the year, it was diverse and competitive, even as some outlets openly favored particular political forces. However, by the end of the year, some of the country’s major media outlets had disappeared, while others had more limited coverage and audience reach as a progovernment agenda became dominant in the national media space. While most of the changes were brought about by the Russian invasion and reactions of the Ukrainian authority to the war, some of them might still be attributed to the government’s efforts to curb the influence of oligarchs.
  • On February 25, four television channels—1+1, Inter, ICTV, and Rada—voluntarily started a joint news and information telethon. The next day two more channels, Ukraine24 and Suspilne, a public broadcaster, joined the telethon. The channels divided time slots among themselves and jointly broadcasted the news, some of which was aired by other national and regional channels. National media experts positively evaluated the joint news project, with one commentator considering them “Ukrainian know-how” and a “kind of information air defense” against Russian disinformation.88
  • On March 18, the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) took decisions on unified information policy during martial law and threats to state information security,89 and Zelenskyy enacted them the following day.90 Due to the decrees the government subordinated digital television to the state and obliged national news channels to unite under a single information platform that was a 24-hour joint news telethon. In March, media experts welcomed these decisions considering them appropriate at the wartime.91 However, by the end of the year, the experts had become more critical. Some of them considered it a government tool to control television, and a threat to Ukraine’s democratic image92 .
  • On April 4, 5 Channel and Pryamiy, channels affiliated with former president and current opposition lawmaker Petro Poroshenko, and the channel Espreso, some of its shareholders were connected with Poroshenko’s party European Solidarity, were excluded from the T2 digital network that covered 40 percent of the households with the access to television.93 While these channels were still available in cable packages and online, it was unclear what institution issued an order to exclude them from the digital network and the reasons for the order.94 The development drew condemnation from Ukrainian media experts. The Institute for Mass Information characterized the shutdown of three channels as an “unprecedented case of censorship” and “legal pressure,” for example.95 Assessing the side effects of the joint telethon and indirectly connecting them with the exclusion of the opposition channels from T2, Detector Media watchdog talked about “the actual disappearance of the informational alternative in the all-Ukrainian television space.”96 On April 18, an official petition calling on the government to “immediately take appropriate measures to return the television channels Espreso, 5 Channel, and Pryamiy to the digital air” was registered on the website of the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers.97 The petition collected the necessary number of signatures of 25,000 by the middle of July. It was considered by the cabinet with no substantive effects: the excluded channels were not restored to digital broadcasting in 2022.
  • For 2023, the government allocated 1.94 billion hryvnia ($52.5 million) for the needs of the joint telethon instead of the previously planned 535 million ($14.5 million).98 On the one hand, considering the significant decrease in the television advertisement market in 2022, these funds are substantive support for the channels involved in the production of the telethon. On the other hand, the government may use access to funding as leverage over the channels and, thus, influence their information policies and content.
  • On July 12, the company System Capital Management (SCM), owned by the steel magnate and richest man in Ukraine Rinat Akhmetov, announced that its Media Group Ukraine ceased operations and renounced its media licenses.99 The media group consisted of 10 broadcast and satellite television channels, web resources, print media, media agencies, and productions with 4,000 employees and total investments of $1.5 billion.100 SCM explained the decision to close the media group by the adoption of the anti-oligarch law (formally known as the law “on preventing threats to national security associated with excessive influence by persons who wield significant economic and political weight in public life [oligarchs]).101 Akhmetov may have eliminated his media empire to avoid the assignment of the status of an oligarch; he also may have closed the media holding to save money on its expenditures during wartime, especially under the conditions when he did not get political benefits from such assets.102
  • On December 13, the parliament approved a new media law103 that significantly expanded the powers of the National Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting (NCTRB), the state media regulator. The NCTRB was responsible for issuing licenses and monitoring compliance with their conditions by terrestrial, satellite, and cable television channels and radio stations. However, following the passage of the new law, the NCTRB was granted the authority to regulate the operations of all types of media. Criticism of the law is based on concerns regarding the potential dependence of the NCTRB on the government, as half of its members are appointed by the president and the parliament.104 While the law was supported by both the progovernment party and opposition parties, it was repeatedly criticized by the national and international professional organizations including the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine, the Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine, and International Federation of Journalists.105 These organizations stated that the law enforced state control over information and allowed monopolization of the media environment by state media.
  • During 2022, the Institute for Mass Information recorded 567 freedom of speech violations. Most of the recorded cases were committed by Russian forces, including 43 killings of journalists (8 of whom were killed while fulfilling their professional duties).106 The number of cases unrelated to the Russian invasion totaled 97, significantly less than in the previous years. These cases fell into three main categories: obstruction of legal journalistic activities, restriction of access to public information, and cybercrime.107
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 3.50 / 7.00
  • Ongoing decentralization reforms—among the most successful reforms in Ukraine—were disrupted in 2022. A variety of draft laws were set to be passed at the start of the year;108 these covered various topics related to the administrative-territorial system of governance,109 the powers of local executive bodies110 and local government,111 public service in local government,112 and communal property.113 They also addressed the issue of transparency in local government.114 However, at the end of 2022, parliament had not implemented any of the drafts.
  • As of the end of November 2022, a total of 329 United Territorial Communities (UTC) were situated in areas affected by hostilities, combat actions, or under temporary occupation or encirclement.115 It totaled 22.4 percent of all UTCs in Ukraine with exception of Crimea.
  • In certain territories that were occupied by Russia and subsequently liberated by the Ukrainian Army, military administrations (MA) were established. They are temporary bodies called upon to replace the functions of local government in territories where the latter is incapable or absent due to various reasons related to the war. The legal status of MA is determined by the law “On legal regime of martial law.”116 Introduced MAs should function by the end of the martial law regime. After the martial law is over and regular elections are held, Mas will be substituted by the local government bodies. In 2022, the president issued 138 orders for the appointment of military administration heads. Out of these orders, 92 were designated for city military administrations, while 46 were for village MAs. The majority of military administrations were established in the regions of Kherson (44), Donetsk (29), Kharkiv (26), and Luhansk (23).117 While MAs are an inevitable solution in wartime, they carry the risk of being incorporated into the executive hierarchy as their chairs are appointed by the president.118
  • In late 2022, the Yavoriv District Court determined that the mayor of Chernihiv, Vladyslav Atroshenko, had violated conflict-of-interest laws and as a result, stripped him of his right to hold his position for a period of one year.119 The conflict of interest arose from the fact that, at the outset of the war, the mayor’s wife had departed Ukraine using her husband’s official vehicle, which was subsequently returned to Ukraine by Atroshenko’s driver.120 The mayor argued that the punishment for what he described as an administrative violation was excessive.121 Vitaliy Klitschko, the mayor of Kyiv, Andriy Sadovyi, the mayor of Lviv, and Sergiy Suchomlyn, the mayor of Zhytomyr, along with members of the Chernihiv city council, appeared in court to show their support for Atroshenko.122 The board of the Association of Cities of Ukraine issued a statement in support of the Chernihiv mayor, calling the decision “an unprecedented case in the history of independent Ukraine, in the history of Ukrainian self-government.”123 Considering the tense relationships of the Chernihiv mayor with the president’s office, there were suspicions that the case was politically motivated.124 In the recent local elections, Atroshenko received support from 77.49 percent of voters.125
  • On December 13, the parliament voted for the draft of the law on reforming urban planning.126 The adoption of the law prompted a wave of criticism from local governments and civic activists.127 The key problematic issues of the law were the emergence of private controllers for developers, “amnesty” for buildings erected without permits, restrictions on the supervision of architects, and threats to the historical centers of the cities.128 A petition calling on the president to veto the law received the necessary 25,000 signatures within 24 hours after it was passed in parliament.129 While the law was neither signed nor vetoed by the president at the end of 2022, it was still considered a threat to the powers of local government.130
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 2.25 / 7.00
  • In 2022, there were significant personnel turnovers in the Constitutional Сourt of Ukraine (CCU). Three new judges took position, two who were appointed by the president in 2021131 but took their positions May 19132 and September 21,133 2022. Watchdogs warned about potential nepotism and conflict of interests regarding these two candidates. The third judge was appointed by Parliament on July 27, 2022.134 Before taking the office, she was a lawmaker with the Servant of People faction in Verkhovna Rada.135 On December 7, three judges of CCU were dismissed based on personal statements of resignation.136 At the end of the year, 5 out of 18 positions of the CCU judges were left vacant. While there was a quorum that allowed the CCU to hold meetings and make decisions, the court twice failed to elect a head of the institution.137
  • On December 13, the Verkhovna Rada voted for the law on the procedure of CCU candidate judges selection, and on December 20 the president signed it.138 The law envisaged the creation of a special body, the Advisory Group of Experts (AGE), to screen candidates to CCU. The six-member AGE will include delegates from the president’s office, the parliament, and the Congress of Judges. The European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) and international organizations will delegate one and two AGE members, respectively. Among the key concerns revealed by the national and international experts regarding the status of the AGE were the risks of the institution’s political bias and potential deadlocks due to the even number of AGE members.139 The Venice Commission (VC)140 consequently recommended an increase in the number of AGE members from six to seven, with the seventh member on an international quota. However, the recommendation was introduced six days after the law was adopted by the parliament and one day before it was signed by the president. And, as a result, it was not considered. Sixteen NGOs called on the president to veto the law, though unsuccessfully.141 National watchdogs warned that the adopted law would facilitate the subordination of the CCU to the government and appealed to the Venice Commission and other international organizations not to delegate their representatives to the AGE until the adoption of the recommendations of VC.142
  • On June 20, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office sued the head and judges of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv (DACK) on charges of committing actions aimed at seizing state power, participating in a criminal organization, and abusing their influence.143 Both the DACK and its head were long-standing symbols of judicial corruption and circular bail.144 On December 13, the parliament supported a draft law on the liquidation of the DACK.145 The decision of the parliament was preceded by the US Department of State’s imposition of personal sanctions on the DACK’s chairman, Pavlo Vovk, for “soliciting bribes in return for interfering in judicial and other public processes.”146
  • The Office of the Prosecutor General documented war crimes and crimes against humanity to use the collected materials in national and international courts.147 The prosecutors ensured proper documentation of war crimes in accordance with international norms and practices. By the end of November 2022, the office had registered 47,000 war crimes.148
  • At the end of 2022, the judicial system of Ukraine was among the least trusted institutions in the state. The share of citizens that did not trust Ukrainian courts varied from 56 to 72 percent during the year.149
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 2.25 / 7.00
  • On June 20, the parliament voted in favor a draft law150 that envisaged anticorruption strategy for 2021–25. The strategy focused on corruption in the most vulnerable spheres like customs affairs and taxation, courts and law enforcement bodies, construction, and land affairs. The strategy would clearly allocate responsibility for the implementation of specific anticorruption measures to certain state institutions.151 The head of Parliament stated that under preliminary estimates, the anticorruption Strategy would recover two hundred billion hryvnia yearly.152
  • On July 19, Oleksandr Klymenko took the position of the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO). While Klymenko had been selected for the position in 2021, the decision was not implemented for more than half a year.153 The European Commission’s (EC) decision to grant Ukraine the status of a European Union candidate was linked to the appointment of the SAPO head; it was among the EC’s seven requirements that Ukraine should fulfill to proceed with European integration.154
  • In 2022, the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine reported about 293 launched investigations, 149 suspects, and 34 indictments sent to court. A record number of the exposed corrupt officials, 149, received suspicion notices from the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) and SAPO in 2022.155
  • During the year parliamentary parties received hundreds of millions’ worth of hryvnia in state funding. The parties were not obliged to report for the obtained funds. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and provisions of the martial law regime, the reporting was postponed.156 The parliamentary party OPPZh received from the state budget more than 33 million hryvnia ($900,000).157 The suspension of its activities in March and ultimate ban in September 2022 left the issue of the party’s reporting for the public finances unresolved. At the end of the year the party had neither refunded the money to the state budget nor reported on its spending.
  • At the beginning of October, the head of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), Kyrylo Shevchenko, resigned from his position. Right after his resignation, the Higher Anti-Corruption Court of Ukraine upheld the decision on indefinite detention without the right to pay bail for Shevchenko, as he was accused of embezzling funds from the state Ukrgasbank by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine. The former NBU head and four other high-ranking officials were suspected of withdrawing 206 million hryvnia ($5.6 million) from the bank.158
  • In 2022 one of the private firms connected with the head of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast state administration, Valentyn Reznichenko, received 1.5 billion hryvnia ($40 million) for the maintenance of the roads in the region.159 This was a significant outlier compared to state funds allocated to other regions for the same needs. Due to wartime restrictions, the information on the specific repaired objects is closed and not accessible. However, an investigative journalist got access to the respective financial documentation and identified suspicious transactions worth hundreds of millions of hryvnia. The Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office opened criminal proceedings on this case.160
  • In 2022, public opinion demonstrated more positive assessments of both the government’s efforts in fighting corruption, and the progress of anticorruption reform. In 2022, four times more citizens perceived that corruption had decreased compared to 2021 (29 percent and 4 percent accordingly).161 The number of citizens who said they had personally faced corruption decreased from 49 percent in 2021 to 34 percent in 2022.162 Eighty-five percent of Ukrainians considered giving bribes, unofficial services, or gifts for solving personal problems unjustifiable, 12 percent more than in 2021.163 And, 44 percent and 84 percent of Ukrainians revealed readiness to report known cases of corruption in 2021 and 2022, respectively.164 At the end of 2022, three out of four Ukrainian citizens considered reduced corruption as the most expected result of the reforms.165 Finally, corruption was indicated as the second top-priority issue that should be resolved after the end of the war, and overcoming corruption was recognized among the top goals of the upcoming 10 years.166

Author: Nazar Boyko is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at West Virginia University. He is a founder and chief executive at CIFRA Group, a Ukrainian NGO that studies and observes elections in Ukraine and abroad. Since the early 2000s, he has observed all national and local elections in Ukraine, and organized and participated in more than twenty international election observation missions in Albania, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Lithuania, Moldova, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Footnotes

  • 1New York Times, “Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine”, New York Times website, 14 November 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html
  • 2UN Human Rights Office of High Commissioner, “Ukraine: civilian casualty update 19 December 2022”, UN Human Rights Office of High Commissioner official website, 19 December 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/12/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-…; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Operational Data Portal. Ukraine Refugee Situation”, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees official website, https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine; IOM UN Migration, “Ukraine internal displacement report. General population survey. Round 11. 25 november - 5 december 2022”, IOM UN Migration official website, November-December 2022, https://dtm.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1461/files/reports/IOM_Gen%20Po…
  • 3World Bank, “Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Estimated $349 Billion”, World Bank official website, 9 September 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/09/09/ukraine-reco…
  • 4President of Ukraine, “Указ Президента України №64/2022 Про введення воєнного стану в Україні” [Decree of the President of Ukraine №64/2022 On the introduction of martial law in Ukraine], President of Ukraine official website, 24 February 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/642022-41397
  • 5President of Ukraine, “Указ Президента України №133/2022 Про продовження строку дії воєнного стану в Україні” [Decree of the President of Ukraine №133/2022 On the extension of the martial law in Ukraine], President of Ukraine official website, 14 March 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1332022-41737 ; President of Ukraine, “Указ Президента України №259/2022 Про продовження строку дії воєнного стану в Україні” [Decree of the President of Ukraine №259/2022 On the extension of the martial law in Ukraine], President of Ukraine official website, 18 April 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/2592022-42237; President of Ukraine, “Указ Президента України №341/2022 Про продовження строку дії воєнного стану в Україні” [Decree of the President of Ukraine №341/2022 On the extension of the martial law in Ukraine], President of Ukraine official website, 17 May 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/3412022-42617; President of Ukraine, “Указ Президента України №573/2022 Про продовження строку дії воєнного стану в Україні” [Decree of the President of Ukraine №573/2022 On the extension of the martial law in Ukraine], President of Ukraine official website, 12 August 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5732022-43633; President of Ukraine, “Указ Президента України №757/2022 Про продовження строку дії воєнного стану в Україні” [Decree of the President of Ukraine №757/2022 On the extension of the martial law in Ukraine], President of Ukraine official website, 7 November 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/7572022-44873
  • 6Detector Media, “Єдина інформаційна політика: що значать рішення влади щодо «Зеонбуду» та марафону”, [Unified information policy: what do the government's decisions on 'Zeonbud' and the telethon mean], Detector Media official website, 22 March 2022, https://detector.media/rinok/article/197726/2022-03-22-iedyna-informats…
  • 7Galyna Korba, “Телемарафон: як він змінює українське суспільство та медіаринок” [The Telethon: how it changes Ukrainian society and medimarket], BBC News Україна official website, 30 December 2022, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-64112594
  • 8Cabinet of ministers of Ukraine, Розпоряджкння “Питання запровадження та забезпечення здійснення заходів правового режиму воєнного стану в Україні” [Order "Issues of Introduction and Ensuring the Implementation of the Legal Regime of Martial Law in Ukraine"], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 24 February 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/181-2022-%D1%80#Text
  • 9Peter Saidel, “Ukraine’s Parliament Dismisses Human-Rights Chief”, Wall Street Journal, 31 May 2022, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news-2022-05-31/…; Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, “Head Of Ukraine's National Bank Resigns, Citing Health”, RFERL, 4 October 2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-national-bank-head-quits/32065352.html; Slovo i Dilo analytic portal, “Які кадрові ротації відбулися у владі протягом року” [What personnel rotations took place in the government during the year], Slovo i Dilo analytic portal website, 27 December 2022, https://www.slovoidilo.ua/2022/12/27/infografika/polityka/yaki-kadrovi-….
  • 10Ukrinform, “Зеленський змінив голів Одеської та Черкаської областей” [Zelensky changed the heads of the Odessa and Cherkasy regions], Ukrinform official website, 2 March 2022 https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-regions/3417785-zelenskij-zminiv-goliv-…; Valentyna Romanenko, “Зеленський змінив голову Київської ОДА” [Zelensky changed the head of the Kyiv Regional State Administration], Ukrainian Truth, 21 May 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/05/21/7347639/
  • 11Anastasiia Lapatina, Oleksiy Sorokin, and Olga Rudenk, “Zelensky fires prosecutor general Venediktova, security service chief Bakanov”, The Kyiv independent, 17 July 2022, https://kyivindependent.com/national/zelensky-fires-prosecutor-general-…
  • 12Olha Holovina, “​​Zelenskiy's sudden dismissal of top officials”, Geneva Solutions, 19 July 2022, https://genevasolutions.news/ukraine-stories/zelenskiy-sudden-dismissal…; Olha Chekis, “Зеленський пояснив відсторонення Баканова і Венедіктової: САП має отримати керівника” [Zelensky explained the suspension of Bakanov and Veneditkova: SAPO should get a chair], Mirror Weekly official website, 17 July 2022, https://zn.ua/ukr/POLITICS/zelenskij-pojasniv-vidstoronennja-bakanova-i…
  • 13Pavlo Vujec, Vitaliy Taranenko, “Мінус Баканов і Венедіктова. Хто захопив владу на Банковій?” [Minus Bakanov and Veneditkova. Who seized power in Bankova?], Glavkom, 18 July 2022, https://glavcom.ua/country/politics/minus-bakanov-i-venediktova-hto-zah…
  • 14Iryna Gerashchenko, Post, Iryna Gerashchenko’s, “Europen Solidarity” MP, official Facebook page, 18 July 2022, https://www.facebook.com/iryna.gerashchenko/posts/pfbid0Cx2eFQvETgeqdw5…
  • 15State Audit Service of Ukraine, “Моніторинг Указів Президента України” [Monitoring of Decrees of the President of Ukraine], State Audit Service of Ukraine official website, 10 January 2023, https://dasu.gov.ua/ua/plugins/userPages/3434
  • 16Dasha Zubkova, “Law On Oligarchs Comes Into Force On May 7, 2022”, Ukranews, 8 November 2022, https://ukranews.com/en/news/812808-law-on-oligarchs-comes-into-force-o…
  • 17Khrystyna Morkovnyk, “РНБО розпочне наповнювати реєстр олігархів у двадцятих числах травня – Малюська” [National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine will start filling the register of oligarchs in the twenties of May - Maliuska], Mind, 8 November 2021, https://mind.ua/news/20232985-rnbo-rozpochne-napovnyuvati-reestr-oligar…
  • 18Denis Malyuska, Post, Denis Malyuska’s, Minister of Justice of Ukraine, official Facebook page, 8 November 2021, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1553306721716711&id=1…
  • 19Rostyslav Khotyn, “Думали, що можна порахувати на пальцях двох рук». Чи справді в Україні до сотні олігархів?” [Translation: "They thought they could count them on the fingers of two hands." Is it true that there are up to a hundred oligarchs in Ukraine?], Radio Liberty, 23 July 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/ukrayina-oliharkhy-zakon-reyestr-danilov…
  • 20Interfax, “Імплементація закону про олігархів затримується через відсутність висновку Венеціанської комісії - Малюська” [Implementation of the oligarch law is delayed due to the lack of a conclusion from the Venice Commission - Maliuska], Interfax, 29 November 2022, https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/875363.html
  • 21Sergiy Sydorenko, “Кандидат авансом: 7 вимог, які має виконати Україна, щоб ЄС не скасував її новий статус” [Candidate in advance: 7 requirements that Ukraine must meet so that the EU does not revoke its new status], European Truth, 18 June 2022, https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2022/06/18/7141516/; Ira Krycka, Sergiy Shevchuk, “Фонд покаяння» для росіян, конфіскація активів Медведчука та Шарія, питання до Новинського, Ярославського та Фрідмана. Інтерв'ю очільника НАЗК про українські санкції” [Repentance Fund" for Russians, confiscation of assets of Medvedchuk and Shariy, questions to Novinsky, Yaroslavsky, and Friedman. Interview with the head of the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (NAPC) about Ukrainian sanctions], Forbes Ukraine, 9 June 2022, https://forbes.ua/inside/fond-pokayannya-dlya-rosiyan-konfiskatsiya-akt…
  • 22Radio Liberty, “РНБО призупинила діяльність низки партій, в тому числі ОПЗЖ і «Партії Шарія» – Зеленський” [NSDC suspended the activities of a number of political parties, including the OPZZh and the “Shariy’s Party” - Zelensky], https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zelensky-rnbo-nyzka-partii/31761657…
  • 23RBK-Ukraine, “У Раді ліквідували фракцію ОПЗЖ, - нардеп” [In Rada OPZZH faction was terminated], RBK-Ukraine official website, https://www.rbc.ua/ukr/news/rade-likvidirovali-fraktsiyu-opzzh-nardep-1…
  • 24Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України щодо заборони політичних партій” [Draft Law on Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of Ukraine regarding the Prohibition of Political Parties], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official websites, 3 May 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/39307
  • 25Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Закон України Про політичні партії в Україні” [The Law of Ukraine On Political Parties in Ukraine], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official websites, 5 April 2001, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2365-14#Text
  • 26Yevgeniya Lucenko, “В Україні остаточно заборонили діяльність 12 проросійських партій” [In Ukraine, 12 pro-Russian parties have been definitively banned], Hromadske, 22 October 2022, https://hromadske.ua/posts/v-ukrayini-ostatochno-zaboronili-diyalnist-1…
  • 27Rating Pollster Group, “Восьме загальнонаціональне опитування: Україна в умовах війни (6 квітня 2022)” [Eighth national opinion poll: Ukraine in the conditions of war (April 6, 2022)], Rating Pollster Group official website, 8 April 2022, https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/vosmoy_obschenacionalnyy_opros_…
  • 28Volodymyr Ishchenko, “Why did Ukraine suspend 11 ‘pro-Russia’ parties?”, Aljazeera, 21 March 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2022/3/21/why-did-ukraine-suspend-11…
  • 29Rating Pollster Group, “Електоральні настрої населення (11-18 лютого 2022)” [Electoral sentiments of the population (11-18 February 2022)], Rating Pollster Group official website, 23 February 2022, https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/elektoralnye_nastroeniya_nasele…
  • 30Rating Pollster Group, “Загальнонаціональне опитування: Україна в умовах війни (26-27 лютого 2022)” [National opinion poll: Ukraine in the conditions of war (February 26-2, 2022)], Rating Pollster Group official website, 27 February 2022, https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/obschenacionalnyy_opros_ukraina…
  • 31Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, “Opportunities and challenges facing Ukraine’s democratic transition, Nationwide Telephone Survey, May 2-11, 2022”, KIIS official website, 30 June 2022, https://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20220630_m/NDI%20Survey%20ENG.pdf; Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, “Opportunities and challenges facing Ukraine’s democratic transition, Nationwide Telephone Survey, August 2-9, 2022”, KIIS official website, 20 September 2022, https://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20220920_o/August%202022_wartime%2…; Razumkov Center, “Оцінка громадянами ситуації в країні, довіра до соціальних інститутів, політико-ідеологічні орієнтації громадян України в умовах російської агресії (вересень–жовтень 2022р.)” [Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country, trust in social institutions, political and ideological orientations of Ukrainian citizens in the conditions of Russian aggression (September-October 2022)], Razumkov Center official website, 28 October 2022, https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-…
  • 32Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, “Opportunities and challenges facing Ukraine’s democratic transition, Nationwide Telephone Survey, May 2-11, 2022”, KIIS official website, 30 June 2022, https://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20220630_m/NDI%20Survey%20ENG.pdf; Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, “Opportunities and challenges facing Ukraine’s democratic transition, Nationwide Telephone Survey, August 2-9, 2022”, KIIS official website, 20 September 2022, https://www.kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20220920_o/August%202022_wartime%2…; Rating Pollster Group, “Опитування IRI: суспільно-політичні погляди в Україні (червень, 2022)” [IRI Poll: Public and political views of Ukraine (June 2022)], Rating Pollster Group official website, 15 August 2022, https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/opros_iri_obschestvenno-politic…; Razumkov Center, “Оцінка громадянами ситуації в країні, довіра до соціальних інститутів, політико-ідеологічні орієнтації громадян України в умовах російської агресії (вересень–жовтень 2022р.)” [Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country, trust in social institutions, political and ideological orientations of Ukrainian citizens in the conditions of Russian aggression (September-October 2022)], Razumkov Center official website, 28 October 2022, https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-…
  • 33Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Закон України Про правовий режим воєнного стану” [The Law of Ukraine On the Legal Regime of Martial Law], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 12 May 2015, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/389-19#Text
  • 34Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “Комісія розглянула питання щодо проведення проміжних виборів нардепа в ОВО № 206 та місцевих виборів у зв’язку з введенням в Україні воєнного стану” [The commission considered the issue of holding by-elections for a deputy in the electoral district № 206 and local elections in connection with the introduction of martial law in Ukraine], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 24 February 2024, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/novini/komisiya-rozglyanula-pitannya-shhodo-prov…; Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “Комісія розглянула питання про призначення проміжних виборів народних депутатів” [The commission considered the issue of scheduling interim elections for Members of Parliament], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 11 July 2022, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/novini/komisiya-rozglyanula-pitannya-pro-priznac…; Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “Комісія розглянула питання про призначення проміжних виборів народного депутата” [The commission considered the issue of scheduling interim elections for Member of Parliament], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 23 September 2022, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/novini/komisiya-rozglyanula-pitannya-pro-priznac…
  • 35Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “Про деякі питання ініціювання проведення всеукраїнського референдуму за народною ініціативою у зв’язку із введенням воєнного стану в Україні” [On certain matters related to initiating a nationwide referendum through popular initiative in connection with the introduction of martial law in Ukraine], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 24 February 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v0060359-22#Text
  • 36Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Конституція України” [Constitution of Ukraine], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 28 June 1996, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/254%D0%BA/96-%D0%B2%D1%80#n4412
  • 37Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “Постанова Центральної Виборчої Комісії “Про пропозиції щодо вдосконалення законодавства України, спрямовані на забезпечення підготовки та проведення виборів після припинення чи скасування воєнного стану в Україні” [Resolution of the Central Election Commission On proposals for improving Ukraine's legislation aimed at preparing and conducting elections after the termination or cancellation of the martial law in Ukraine], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 27 September 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/v0102359-22#Text
  • 38Rukh Chesno, “Перекличка нардепів. Верховна Рада-2022 у цифрах та фактах” [Roll call of people's deputies. Verkhovna Rada-2022 in figures and facts], Glavcom website, 12 September 2022, https://glavcom.ua/country/politics/pereklichka-nardepiv-verkhovna-rada…. Due to the Constitution, Verkhovna Rada should consist of 450 members. However, in 2019, due to the Russian occupation of Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, elections in certain single-seat districts were not held. As the result, the composition of the Parliament was 423 MPs. By September 2022, there were 420 registered MPs in Rada due to the early dismissal of some deputies from their positions.
  • 39Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “Комісія визнала Олександра Божкова обраним народним депутатом України” [The commission recognized Oleksandr Bozhkov as an elected member of the Ukrainian parliament], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 31 March 2022, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/novini/komisiya-viznala-oleksandra-bozhkova-obra…; Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “Комісія визнала обраними двох народних депутатів України” [The commission recognized two members of parliament of Ukraine as elected], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 2 August 2022, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/novini/komisiya-viznala-obranimi-dvoh-narodnih-d…; Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “ЦВК зареєструвала нового народного депутата” [The CEC registered a new member of parliament], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 26 August 2022, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/novini/tsvk-zareiestruvala-novogo-narodnogo-depu…; Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “ЦВК визнала Максима Хлапука обраним народним депутатом України” [The CEC recognized Maxim Khlapuk as an elected member of parliament of Ukraine], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 10 October 2022, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/novini/tsvk-viznala-maksima-hlapuka-obranim-naro…
  • 40Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “Комісія розглянула питання визнання обраним народним депутатом України” [The commission considered the issue of recognizing an elected member of parliament of Ukraine], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 4 April 2022, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/novini/komisiya-rozglyanula-pitannya-viznannya-o… ; Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “Комісія розглянула питання визнання обраним народним депутатом України” [The commission considered the issue of recognizing an elected member of parliament of Ukraine], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 9 September 2022, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/novini/tsvk-rozglyanula-pitannya-viznannya-obran…
  • 41National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, “Рішення “Щодо призупинення діяльності окремих політичних партій” [Decision “On suspension of the activities of certain political parties], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 18 March 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0005525-22#Text
  • 42Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “ЦВК достроково припинила повноваження всього складу Запорізької обласної ТВК та визнала обраними чотирьох депутатів Запорізької облради” [The CEC prematurely terminated the powers of the entire composition of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Election Commission (REC) and recognized four deputies of the Zaporizhzhia Regional Council as elected], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 31 October 2022, https://cvk.gov.ua/novini/tsvk-dostrokovo-pripinila-povnovazhennya-vsog…
  • 43Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “ЦВК зупинила повноваження та діяльність ТВК та їх членів на територіях, де перебувають російська війська” [The CEC has suspended the powers and activities of the TECs and their members in the territories where Russian troops are present], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 4 April 2022, https://cvk.gov.ua/novini/tsvk-zupinila-povnovazhennya-ta-diyalnist-tvk…
  • 44Central Election Commission of Ukraine, “Комісія тимчасово припинила функціонування АІКС “Державний реєстр виборців” на час дії воєнного стану” [The commission temporarily suspended the operation of the AICS "State Register of Voters" for the duration of martial law], Central Election Commission of Ukraine official website, 24 February 2022, https://www.cvk.gov.ua/novini/komisiya-timchasovo-pripinila-funktsionuv…
  • 45BBC news Ukraine, "Не відчиняйте двері". Українська влада закликає ігнорувати "референдуми" на окупованих територіях” ["Do not open the door." The Ukrainian government calls for ignoring "referendums" in the occupied territories], BBC news Ukraine, 23 September 2022, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-62989667
  • 46Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ ідентифікувала більше 1,5 тис. осіб, яких ворог планує залучити до організації псевдореферендуму на Запоріжжі (відео)” [The SSU has identified more than 1.5 thousand people whom the enemy plans to involve in the organization of a pseudo-referendum in Zaporizhzhia (video)], Security Service of Ukraine official website, 23 September 2022, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-identyfikuvala-bilshe-15-tys-osib-yakykh-…; Ukrinform TV, “СБУ викрила плани рф щодо псевдореферендуму на Херсонщині” [The SSU exposed Russia's plans for a pseudo-referendum in Kherson region], Ukrinform TV YouTube channel, 1 August 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V7NAOdPKMvg; Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ повідомила про підозру ще 9 організаторам незаконних референдумів рф на тимчасово окупованих територіях сходу України” [The SBU reported suspicion to 9 more organizers of illegal referendums by Russia in the temporarily occupied territories in eastern Ukraine], Security Service of Ukraine official website, 1 October 2022, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-povidomyla-pro-pidozru-shche-9-orhanizato…; Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ ідентифікувала колаборантів, які ініціювали «приєднання» Донеччини до рф” [SSU identified collaborators who initiated the "joining" of Donetsk to the Russian Federation], Security Service of Ukraine official website, 17 November 2022, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-identyfikuvala-kolabornativ-yaki-initsiiu…
  • 47Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Supporting Ukraine’s democracy after the war. Key Issues, Comparative Experience and Best Practices”, IDEA official website, 14 Ocotber 2022, https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/supporting-ukrain…; United Kingdom Humanitarian Innovation Hub, “Enabling the local response: Emerging humanitarian priorities in Ukraine March–May 2022”, Humanitarian Outcomes, June 2022, https://www.humanitarianoutcomes.org/sites/default/files/publications/u…
  • 48President of Ukraine, “Національна Стратегія сприяння розвитку громадянського суспільства в Україні на 2021-2026 роки” [National Strategy to promote the development of civil society in Ukraine for 2021-2026], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 7 September 2021, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/487/2021#n23
  • 49Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, “Запрошуємо до обговорення проекту розпорядження Кабінету Міністрів України «Про затвердження плану заходів на 2022 – 2024 роки щодо реалізації Національної стратегії сприяння розвитку громадянського суспільства в Україні на 2021-2026 роки»” [The invitation to discuss the draft order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On approval of the action plan for 2022-2024 to implement the National Strategy for promoting the development of civil society in Ukraine for 2021-2026], cabinet of Ministers of Ukrsine official website, 7 July 2022, ”https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/zaproshuiemo-do-obhovorennia-proektu-rozpor…
  • 50Key Element, XI форум розвитку громадянського суспільства України [XI Forum for the Development of Civil Society in Ukraine], Unity official website, 5 December 2022, https://forum.ednannia.ua/; Dasha Grisina, “У Києві відбувся масштабний волонтерський форум” [A large-scale volunteer forum took place in Kyiv], Evening Kyiv official website, 15 July 2022, https://vechirniy.kyiv.ua/news/69052/; Dasha Grishina, “У Києві відбувся другий масштабний волонтерський форум” [The second large-scale volunteer forum took place in Kyiv], Evening Kyiv official website, 8 December 2022, https://vechirniy.kyiv.ua/news/75462/; Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, “ІІІ Феміністичний форум: діалог жіночих організацій з Урядом та донорами, і роль жінки у відновленні України” [III Feminist Forum: a dialogue between women's organizations, the Government, and donors, and the role of women in Ukraine's recovery], Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine official website, 13 December 2022, https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/iii-feministychnyi-forum-dialoh-zhinochykh-…
  • 51Ukrinform, “Гуманітарна та соціальна ситуації в Херсонській області” [Humanitarian and social situation in Kherson region], Ukrinform official YouTube channel, 25 July 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z_i8tWQQl5s
  • 52Ukrainian Truth, “​​У Херсоні і Каховці мітинги проти окупантів: Забирайтеся додому” [In Kherson and Kahovka, rallies were held against the occupiers: "Go back home"], Ukrainian Truth, 20 March 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/03/20/7333020/; Radio Liberty, “У Мелітополі і Приморську – акції протесту цивільного населення проти російської присутності” [In Melitopol and Prymorsk, there are protests by civilians against Russian presence], Radio Liberty, 10 march 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-zaporizka-oblast-protesty/31746598…
  • 53Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Research, “Низові практики громадянського суспільства України у відповідь на широкомасштабну агресію Російської Федерації на території України” [Grassroots practices of Ukrainian civil society in response to the large-scale aggression of the Russian Federation on the territory of Ukraine], UICPR official website , June 2022 http://ucipr.org.ua/ua/publikatsii/doslidzhennia/nizovi-praktiki-gromad…
  • 54“5:am” Coalition, https://www.5am.in.ua/
  • 55The Nobel Peace Prize, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2022/center-for-civil-liberties…
  • 56Centre for Civil Liberties, “Interactive map of enforced disappearances in Ukraine”, Centre for Civil Liberties official website, https://ccl.org.ua/tools/mapa-nasylnyczkyh-znyknen-v-ukrayini/
  • 57Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, “T4P’s database of war crimes: Statistical information”, Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union official website, https://t4pua.org/stats
  • 58Ukraine Healthcare Center, “Attacks on Health Care in Ukraine”, Ukraine Healthcare Center official website, https://www.attacksonhealthukraine.org/
  • 59Association of relatives of political prisoners of the Kremlin, “Документування воєнних злочинів” [Documentation of war Crimes], Association of relatives of political prisoners of the Kremlin official website, https://www.relativespp.org/documentation
  • 60Kharkiv Tribunal Nurnberg 2022, Kharkiv Tribunal Nurnberg 2022 official website, https://www.nurnberg2022.org/en
  • 61Galytchyna Ivano-Frankivsk regional TV, “Центр документування та дослідження воєнних злочинів” [Center for Documentation and Research of War Crimes], Galytchyna Ivano-Frankivsk regional TV official website, 25 august 2022, https://galtv.if.ua/video/centr-dokumentuvannya-ta-doslidzhennya-voyenn…
  • 62UN Women, “​​Швидка оцінка: вплив війни в Україні на організації жіночого громадянського сУспільства” [Rapid assessment: the impact of the war in Ukraine on women's civil society organizations], UN Women official website, 4-10 March 2022, https://eca.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/Rapid%20Assessment%…
  • 63USAID, “Factsheet. Civil society and media”, USAID official website, May 2022, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/USAID_Ukraine_Factshe…
  • 64Come Back Alive, “Fund Reporting”, Come Back Alive official website, 2022 https://savelife.in.ua/en/reporting-en/; Roman Kravec, “Мільярди гривень, "помста", бронетехніка, політика. Репортаж з фонду Притули” [Billions of hryvnias, "revenge", armored vehicles, politics. A report from the Prytula Foundation], Ukrainian Truth, 5 Decemebr 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/12/5/7379223
  • 65Texty, "Шкідництво під час війни". Відомі українці закликають владу припинити переслідування волонтерів” ["Sabotage during the war". Prominent Ukrainians call on the government to stop persecuting volunteers], Texty, 9 September 2022, https://texty.org.ua/fragments/107677/ ; Marta Kogut, “Поліція провела обшуки у помешканні львівського волонтера Святослава Літинського” [The police conducted searches in the residence of Lviv volunteer Sviatoslav Litynsky], Zaxid.net official website, 8 December 2022, https://zaxid.net/politsiya_obshukuye_pomeshkannya_lvivskogo_volontera_…; Espresso, “​​У львівського культурного діяча і волонтера Олеся Дзиндри провели обшуки. Його затримали” [Searches were conducted at the residence of Lviv cultural activist and volunteer Oles Dzyndra. He was detained], Espreso official website, 4 August 2022, https://zahid.espreso.tv/u-lvivskogo-kulturnogo-diyacha-i-volontera-ole…; Zmina, “Апеляційний суд зняв арешт з гуманітарної допомоги та особистих речей, вилучених у львівського волонтера Олега Яницького” [The appellate court lifted the arrest on humanitarian aid and personal belongings seized from Lviv volunteer Oleh Yanitsky], Zmina official website, 17 November 2022, https://zmina.info/news/apelyaczijnyj-sud-znyav-aresht-z-gumanitarnoyi-…
  • 66Press Club Lviv, “(Не) безпечне волонтерство” [(Im)security of volunteering], Press Club Lviv official YouTube channel, 13 September 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RVYrPsyjdsU; Ljudmyla Tjagnyrjadno, “Переслідування волонтерів за незаконне використання гуманітарки: що не так із законодавством і як це можна змінити” [Persecution of volunteers for illegal use of humanitarian aid: what's wrong with legislation and how it can be changed], Zmina official website, 27 January 2023, https://zmina.info/articles/yak-volonteram-shyyut-kryminalnu-vidpovidal…
  • 67Language unites, “Репресіями проти громадських активістів влада руйнує українську демократію та суспільну єдність під час війни” [By repressing civil activists, the government is destroying Ukrainian democracy and social unity during the war], Language unites Facebook page, 8 September 2022, https://www.facebook.com/zakonpromovu5670/posts/pfbid0Mvt8jxXLfdEh3MGfz…; Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, “In the light of the recent high-profile searches conducted in respect of volunteers, civil society organizations call for a dialogue with the law enforcement agencies”, CEDEM official website, 20 September 2022, https://cedem.org.ua/en/news/zayava-obshuky-u-volonteriv/
  • 68Information Department of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “У Комітеті з питань правоохоронної діяльності створено робочу групу щодо вивчення практики застосування кримінальної відповідальності за незаконне використання з метою отримання прибутку гуманітарної допомоги, благодійних пожертв або безоплатної допомоги” [A working group has been established within the Committee on Law Enforcement to study the practice of criminal liability for the illegal use of humanitarian aid, charitable donations or free assistance], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 7 October 2022, https://www.rada.gov.ua/print/228955.html
  • 69Dmytro Djenkov, Yaroslav Vinokurov, “Вони перетворили роботу з ПДВ для бізнесу на гру в рулетку". Нардеп про роботу Податкової та нову концепцію "10-10-10” [They turned the VAT process for businesses into a roulette game. " MP on the work of the Tax Service and the new "10-10-10" concept], Economics Truth, 12 December 2022, https://www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2022/12/12/694866/
  • 70Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів щодо спрощення регулювання трудових відносин у сфері малого і середнього підприємництва та зменшення адміністративного навантаження на підприємницьку діяльність” [Draft Law on Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts on Simplifying the Regulation of Labor Relations in the Field of Small and Medium Enterprises and Reducing the Administrative Burden on Entrepreneurial Activity], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 17 August 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/26241
  • 71Federation of Professional Unions of Ukraine, “Керівники глобальних профспілок заявляють, що законопроєкт № 5371 має бути відхилений!” [Leaders of global trade unions say that draft law No. 5371 should be rejected!], Federation of Professional Unions of Ukraine official website, 19 July 2022, https://fpsu.org.ua/napryamki-diyalnosti/mizhnarodna-robota/22790-keriv…; Trade Union of Education and Science Workers of Ukraine, “Законопроєкт № 5371 суттєво зачіпає права та інтереси найманих працівників та профспілок” [Bill No. 5371 significantly affects the rights and interests of employees and trade unions], Trade Union of Education and Science Workers of Ukraine official website, 4 September 2022, https://pon.org.ua/novyny/9668-zakonoproiektu-suttievo-zachipaie-prava-…
  • 72National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, “Указ Президента України “Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 1 грудня 2022 року "Про окремі аспекти діяльності релігійних організацій в Україні і застосування персональних спеціальних економічних та інших обмежувальних заходів (санкцій)” [Decree of the President of Ukraine "On the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated December 1, 2022 "On certain aspects of the activity of religious organizations in Ukraine and the application of personal special economic and other restrictive measures (sanctions)], National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine official website, 1 December 2022, https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/ua/Ukazy/5935.html
  • 73Mirror Weekly, “В СБУ підтвердили та прокоментували обшуки в Лаврі” [The SBU confirmed and commented on the searches in Lavra], Mirror Weekly official website, 22 November 2022, https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/v-sbu-pidtverdili-ta-prokomentuvali-obshuki-v…
  • 74Mirror Weekly, “СБУ провела обшуки в Чернівецько-Буковинській Єпархії УПЦ: що знайшли слідчі” [The SBU conducted searches in the Chernivtsi-Bukovyna Diocese of the UOC: what did the investigators find], Mirror Weekly official website, 25 November 2022, https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/sbu-provela-obshuki-u-chernivetsko-bukovinski…
  • 75Mirror Weekly, “СБУ проводть обшуки у Івано-Франківській єпархії УПЦ” [The SBU conducts searches in the Ivano-Frankivsk Diocese of the UOC], Mirror Weekly official website, 27 November 2022, https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/sbu-provodit-obshuki-u-ivano-frankivskij-jepa…
  • 76Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ провела обшуки у керівництва УПЦ МП у Кіровоградській області” [The SSU searched the leadership of the UOC-MP in the Kirovohrad region], Security Service of Ukraine official website, 31 October 2022, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-provela-obshuky-u-kerivnytstva-upts-mp-u-…
  • 77RIVNE1 TV channel, “СБУ перевірила храми Рівненської єпархії УПЦ МП: що кажуть настоятелі? (ВІДЕО)” [The SSU inspected the churches of the Rivne Diocese of the UOC-MP: what do the abbots say? (VIDEO)], RIVNE 1 TV channel official website, 2 December 2022, https://rivne1.tv/news/140879-sbu-perevirila-khrami-rivnenskoi-eparkhii…
  • 78Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ виявила в єпархіях УПЦ (МП) пропагандистські «методички» кремля, «вчення про сатанізм» і нацистську символіку” [The SSU discovered Kremlin propaganda "methods", "teachings about Satanism" and Nazi symbols in the dioceses of the UOC-MP], Security Service of Ukraine official website, 2 December 2022, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-vyiavyla-v-yeparkhiiakh-upts-mp-propahand…
  • 79Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ перевірила монастир УПЦ (МП) на Закарпатті, де черниці закликали до «пробуждения матушки-Руси” [SSU checked the UOC-MP monastery in Zakarpattia, where the nuns called for the "awakening of Mother Russia"], Security Service of Ukraine official website, 1 December 2022, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-pereviryla-monastyr-upts-mp-na-zakarpatti…
  • 80Security Service of Ukraine, “СБУ виявила в єпархіях УПЦ (МП) пропагандистські «методички» кремля, «вчення про сатанізм» і нацистську символіку” [The SSU discovered Kremlin propaganda "instructions", "teachings about Satanism" and nazi symbols in the dioceses of the UOC-MP], Security Service of Ukraine official website, 2 December 2022, https://ssu.gov.ua/novyny/sbu-vyiavyla-v-yeparkhiiakh-upts-mp-propahand…
  • 81Ukrainian Orthodox Church, “Постанова Собору Української Православної Церкви від 27 травня 2022 року” [Resolution of the Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church dated May 27, 2022], Synodal information and educational department of the UOC-MP, 27 May 2022, https://news.church.ua/2022/05/27/postanova-soboru-ukrajinskoji-pravosl…
  • 82Mariana Mygal, “Правоохоронці вивчатимуть, за що моляться у Києво-Печерській Лаврі – Ткаченко” [Law enforcement officers will study what they pray for in the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra - Tkachenko], Glavcom, 13 November 2022, https://glavcom.ua/country/society/pravookhorontsi-vivchatimut-za-shcho…
  • 83Andrew E. Kramer, “Clergymen or Spies? Churches Become Tools of War in Ukraine”, New York Times, 31 December 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/31/world/europe/orthodox-church-ukraine…; Mirror Weekly, “Священник УПЦ МП, який «зливав» позиції ЗСУ в Сєвєродонецьк, отримав 12 років в’язниці - СБУ” [The priest of the UOC-MP, who "leaked" the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Severodonetsk, received 12 years in prison - SSU], Mirror Weekly official website, 7 December 2022, https://zn.ua/ukr/UKRAINE/svjashchenik-upts-mp-jakij-zlivav-pozitsiji-z…; Nadia Klochko, “Колаборанти в УПЦ МП. Банкова нарешті визнала проблему” [Collaborators in the UOC MP. Bankova finally recognized the problem], Glavcom, 4 October 2022, https://glavcom.ua/country/society/kolaboranti-v-upts-mp-bankova-naresh…
  • 84BBC News Ukraine, “КМІС: Більшість українців - за заборону УПЦ (МП)” [KIIS: The majority of Ukrainians are in favor of banning the UOC-MP], BBC News Ukraine official website, 29 December 2022, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-64112628
  • 85Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law, “4,365 NGOs and charitable organizations established in Ukraine during the full-scale war”, CEDEM official website, 21 July 2022, https://cedem.org.ua/en/news/4365-gromadskyh-ta-blagodijnyh/
  • 86Rating Pollster Group, “Восьме загальнонаціональне опитування: Україна в умовах війни (6 квітня 2022)” [Eighth national opinion poll: Ukraine in the conditions of war (April 6, 2022)], Rating Pollster Group official website, 8 April 2022, https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/vosmoy_obschenacionalnyy_opros_…; Rating Pollster Group, “Опитування IRI: суспільно-політичні погляди в Україні (червень, 2022)” [IRI Poll: Public and political views of Ukraine (June 2022)], Rating Pollster Group official website, 15 August 2022, https://ratinggroup.ua/research/ukraine/opros_iri_obschestvenno-politic…; Zoja Zherelnikova, “«Все для фронту»: благодійність та волонтерство українців з початку повномасштабної війни” ["All for the Front": Charity and Volunteering of Ukrainians Since the Beginning of the Full-Scale War], VoxUkraine, 30 August 2022, https://voxukraine.org/vse-dlya-frontu-blagodijnist-ta-volonterstvo-ukr…
  • 87Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initivatives Foundation, “Довіра до держави: як зберегти національну єдність заради перемоги” [Trust in the State: How to Preserve National Unity for the Sake of Victory], DIF official website, 15 September 2022, https://dif.org.ua/en/article/dovira-do-derzhavi-yak-zberegti-natsional…
  • 88Detector Media, “Спільний телемарафон — інформаційна ППО в цивілізаційній війні” [Joint telethon - an informational weapon in the civilization war], Detector Media official website, 15 March 2022, https://detector.media/kritika/article/197522/2022-03-15-spilnyy-telema…
  • 89National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Рішення “Щодо реалізації єдиної інформаційної політики в умовах воєнного стану” [Decision on the implementation of a unified information policy in conditions of martial law], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 18 March 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0004525-22#Text; National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Рішення “Про нейтралізацію загроз інформаційній безпеці держави” [On neutralization of threats to the information security of the state], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 18 March 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/n0003525-22#Text
  • 90President of Ukraine, “Указ Президента України №152/2022 Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 18 березня 2022 року "Щодо реалізації єдиної інформаційної політики в умовах воєнного стану" [Decree of the President of Ukraine № 152/2022 on the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated March 18, 2022 'On the implementation of a unified information policy in conditions of a state of war'], President of Ukraine official website, 18 March 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1522022-41761?fbclid=IwAR0C-HehS…; President of Ukraine, “Указ Президента України №151/2022 Про рішення Ради національної безпеки і оборони України від 18 березня 2022 року “Про нейтралізацію загроз інформаційній безпеці держави” [Decree of the President of Ukraine № 151/2022 on the decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated March 18, 2022 'On neutralization of threats to the information security of the state'], President of ukraine official website, 18 March 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/1512022-41757
  • 91Detector Media, “Єдина інформаційна політика: що значать рішення влади щодо «Зеонбуду» та марафону”, [Unified information policy: what do the government's decisions on 'Zeonbud' and the telethon mean], Detector Media official website, 22 March 2022, https://detector.media/rinok/article/197726/2022-03-22-iedyna-informats…
  • 92Galyna Korba, “Телемарафон: як він змінює українське суспільство та медіаринок” [The Telethon: how it changes Ukrainian society and medimarket], BBC News Україна official website, 30 December 2022, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-64112594
  • 93​​5 Channel, "Еспресо", "Прямий" та "5 канал" вимкнули з цифрового ефіру” [Espreso", "Priamyi" and "5 Channel" have been switched off from digital broadcasting], 5 Channel official website, 5 April 2022, https://www.5.ua/suspilstvo/espreso-priamyi-ta-5-kanal-iz-tsyfrovoho-ef… ; Andriy Partyka, “Відновлення панелі буде, але яким? Відповіді на найважливіші питання ринку” [There will be the restoration of the panel, but how will it look like? Answers to the most important questions of the market], Detector Media official website, 6 December 2022, https://detector.media/rinok/article/205653/2022-12-06-vidnovlennya-pan…
  • 94Detector Media, «Шо ого?» Як на парламентському комітеті шукали винних у відключенні 5 каналу, Прямого і «Еспресо» (СТЕНОГРАМА) ['Sho oho?' How they were looking for those responsible for switching off 5 Channel, Priamyi and Espreso at the parliamentary committee (TRANSCRIPT)], Detector Media official website, 13 May 2022, https://detector.media/infospace/article/199186/2022-05-13-sho-ogo-yak-…; Espreso, “Why Espresso was taken off the air”, Espreso official website, 21 June 2022, https://global.espreso.tv/why-espresso-was-taken-off-air
  • 95Institute of Mass Information, “FREEDOM OF SPEECH BAROMETER FOR APRIL 2022”, IMI official website, 6 May 2022, https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/freedom-of-speech-barometer-for-april…
  • 96Detector Media, “Десять найважливіших подій медіаринку у 2022 році” [Ten most important events in the media industry in 2022], Detector Media official website, 5 January 2023, https://detector.media/rinok/article/206703/2023-01-05-desyat-nayvazhly…
  • 97Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, “Петиція Про повернення в цифровий ефір українських телеканалів «ЕСПРЕСО», «5-ГО» і «ПРЯМИЙ»” [Petition for the return of Ukrainian TV channels 'Espreso', '5 Channel', and 'Priamyi' to digital broadcasting], Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine official website, 18 April 2022, https://petition.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/Petition/View/4163?fbclid=IwAR0N0GOzbru…
  • 98LB, “Бюджет-23: армія, дороги і марафон” [Budget-23: army, roads, and telethon], LB official website, 5 November 2022, https://lb.ua/economics/2022/11/05/534879_byudzhet23_armiya_dorogi_i_ma…
  • 99System Capital Management, “SCM starts procedures to terminate publishing of printed publications and surrender licences of Media Group Ukraine (MGU)”, System Capital Management official website, 12 July 2022, https://www.scm.com.ua/en/news/scm-rozpochinaye-proceduri-pripinennya-v…
  • 100Media Group Ukraine, “Заява Ріната Ахметова щодо активів Медіа Група Україна” [Statement by Rinat Akhmetov regarding the assets of Media Group Ukraine], Media Group Ukraine official website, 11 July 2022, https://mgukraine.com/press-center/news/890-zayava-rinata-ahmetova-shch…
  • 101President of Ukraine, “Президент невідкладно підписав ухвалений Верховною Радою антиолігархічний закон” [The President urgently signed the anti-oligarchic law adopted by the Verkhovna Rada], President of Ukraine official website, 5 November 2021, https://www.president.gov.ua/news/prezident-nevidkladno-pidpisav-uhvale…
  • 102Ukrinform, “Про канали Ахметова. Треба ж сказати й усю правду до кінця” [About Akhmetov's channels. We need to tell the whole truth to the end], Ukrinform official website, 24 July 2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3535679-pro-kanali-ahmetova-tre…
  • 103Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про медіа” [Draft Law on Media], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 13 December 2022, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=69353
  • 104Igor Burdyga, “Новий закон про медіа: чи очікувати обмежень свободи ЗМІ?” [New media law: should we expect restrictions on media freedom?], Deutsche Welle official website, 20.12.2022, https://www.dw.com/uk/novij-zakon-pro-media-ci-ocikuvati-v-ukraini-obme…
  • 105Espreso, “Міжнародна федерація журналістів закликає український уряд переглянути новий закон про ЗМІ” [The International Federation of Journalists calls on the Ukrainian government to review the new media law], Espreso official website, 13 January 2023, https://espreso.tv/mizhnarodna-federatsiya-zhurnalistiv-zaklikae-ukrain…
  • 106Institute of Mass Information, “​​567 Freedom of speech violations recorded by IMI in 2022. Over 80% committed by Russia”, Institute of Mass Information official website, 9 January 2023, https://imi.org.ua/en/monitorings/567-violations-of-freedom-of-speech-w…
  • 107Ibid.
  • 108Decentralization, “10 важливих для децентралізації законопроектів, які вже у Верховній Раді” [10 Important Decentralization Bills Already in the Ukrainian Parliament], Decentralization official website, 18 January, 2022 https://decentralization.gov.ua/news/14464
  • 109Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про порядок вирішення питань адміністративно-територіального устрою України” [Draft Law on the procedure for resolving Issues of the administrative-territorial structure of Ukraine], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 16 February 2022, https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=70936
  • 110Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про внесення змін до Закону України "Про місцеві державні адміністрації" та деяких інших законодавчих актів України щодо реформування територіальної організації виконавчої влади в Україні” [Draft Law on amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On local state administration" and some other legislative acts of Ukraine on the reform of the territorial organization of the executive power in Ukraine], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 18 November 2021, https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=70293
  • 111Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про внесення змін до Закону України "Про місцеве самоврядування в Україні" щодо розподілу повноважень органів місцевого самоврядування у зв'язку зі зміною адміністративно-територіального устрою” [Draft Law on amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On local self-government in Ukraine" regarding the distribution of powers of local self-government bodies in connection with the change of administrative-territorial structure], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 8 November 2021, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=73150
  • 112Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про службу в органах місцевого самоврядування” [Draft Law on service in local self-government bodies], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 16 November 2022, https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=73563
  • 113Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про внесення змін до Закону України "Про місцеве самоврядування" щодо комунальної власності” [Draft Law on amendments to the law of Ukraine "On local self-government" regarding communal property], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 30 December 2021, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=73528
  • 114Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про внесення змін до Закону України "Про місцеве самоврядування в Україні" щодо забезпечення прозорості місцевого самоврядування” [Draft Law on Amendments to the Law of Ukraine "On Local Self-Government in Ukraine" Regarding Ensuring Transparency of Local Self-Government], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 15 February 2022, https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=73380
  • 115Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, “Перелік територіальних громад, які розташовані в районі проведення воєнних (бойових) дій або які перебувають в тимчасовій окупації, оточенні (блокуванні) станом на 23 листопада 2022 року” [List of territorial communities located in the area of military (combat) operations or those which are temporarily occupied, surrounded (blocked) as of November 23, 2022], Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine official website, 23 November 2022, https://www.minre.gov.ua/sites/default/files/field/docs/1._dodatok_do_n…
  • 116State Tax Service of Ukraine, “Закон України від 12.05.2015 № 389-VIII "Про правовий режим воєнного стану" (із змінами)” [Law of Ukraine dated May 12, 2015 № 389-VIII "On the legal regime of martial law" (with amendments)], GOV.UA government websites of Ukraine, 12 July 2022, https://tax.gov.ua/diyalnist-/zakonodavstvo-pro-diyalnis/zakoni-ukraini…
  • 117President of Ukraine, Orders of the President of Ukraine, President of Ukraine official website, January-December 2022, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/instructions
  • 118Maria Solodovnik, Roman Kryvko, “Що означає створення на Харківщині військових адміністрацій: пояснення експерта” [What does the creation of military administrations in Kharkiv Oblast mean: an expert's explanation], Suspilne official website, 5 October 2022, https://suspilne.media/288762-so-oznacae-stvorenna-na-harkivsini-vijsko…
  • 119Viktoria Eismunt, “Суд позбавив мера Чернігова права обіймати цю посаду впродовж року” [The court deprived the mayor of Chernihiv of the right to hold this position for a year], Zaxid.net official website, 7 December 2022, https://zaxid.net/sud_pozbaviv_mera_chernigova_prava_obiymati_tsyu_posa…
  • 120Viktoria Eismunt, “«Це рішення проти всієї України». За що судять мера Чернігова” ["This decision is against the whole of Ukraine". What is the mayor of Chernihiv being tried for?], Zaxid.net official website, 1 February 2023, https://zaxid.net/za_shho_sudyat_mera_chernigova_n1557062
  • 121Vlasta Lazur, “«Я рятував свою сім’ю»: як мер Чернігова Атрошенко коментує рішення суду про своє відсторонення” ["I was saving my family": how the mayor of Chernihiv Atroshenko comments on the court's decision on his suspension], Radio Liberty, 9 December 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/mer-chernihova-atroshenko-rishennya-sudu…
  • 122Ivan Stanislavskiy, “Очільника Чернігова Атрошенка приїхав підтримати у суді Кличко та мери інших міст” [Klitschko and mayors of other cities came in court to support Chernigov mayor Atroshenko], LB, 27 January 2023, https://lb.ua/pravo/2023/01/27/544002_ochilnika_chernigova_atroshenka.h…
  • 123Association of Ukrainian Cities, “Заява Правління Асоціації міст України” [The statement of the Board of the Association of Cities of Ukraine], Association of Ukrainian Cities official website, 8 December 2022, https://auc.org.ua/novyna/zayava-pravlinnya-asociaciyi-mist-ukrayiny
  • 124Suspilne news, “Спрямовано на приниження мене особисто", — Атрошенко про невипуск за кордон і конфлікт з Тимошенком” [Directed at personally discrediting me," Atroshenko on being denied exit abroad and the conflict with Tymoshenko], Suspilne official website, 6 July 2022, https://suspilne.media/257671-spramovano-na-prinizenna-mene-osobisto-at…; LB, “Кирило Тимошенко розписався в перешкоджанні роботі мера Чернігова, - Атрошенко” [Kyrylo Tymoshenko signed up for obstructing the work of the mayor of Chernihiv, - Atroshenko], LB, 3 July 2022, https://lb.ua/news/2022/07/03/522023_kirilo_timoshenko_rozpisavsya.html
  • 125Sophia Mindzhosa, “У Чернігові на пост мера переобрали Атрошенка, до міськради пройшли 5 партій” [Atroshenko was reelected as Chernihiv mayor, five parties entered city council], 24 TV channel, 4 November 2020, https://vybory.24tv.ua/vibori-mera-chernigiv-2020-tsvk-rezultati-golosu…
  • 126Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України щодо реформування сфери містобудівної діяльності” [Draft Law on amendments to some legislative acts of Ukraine on reforming the field of urban planning activities.], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 13 December 2022, https://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=72212
  • 127BBC news Ukraine, “Закон 5655 про містобудування спричинив скандал і посварив "слуг народу" [The law 5655 on urban planning caused a scandal and a rift among 'Servant of the People' party members], BBC news Ukraine, 21 December 2022, https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-64055725
  • 128Veronika Masenko, ”Що не так із законом 5655 про реформу містобудування. Пояснюють юристка та архітектори” [What's wrong with the law 5655 on urban planning reform. Explained by a lawyer and architects], The Village, 19 December 2022, https://www.the-village.com.ua/village/city/asking-question/334133-zako…
  • 129President of Ukraine, Петиція “Накласти вето на законопроект N5655 - котрий призведе до хаотичної забудови міст та знищення історичних пам'яток великими забудовниками” [Petition on “Vetoing the bill N5655 - which will lead to chaotic development of cities and destruction of historical landmarks by large developers”], President of Ukraine official website, 12 December 2022, https://petition.president.gov.ua/petition/173046
  • 130Anna Kyriy, “Законопроєкт 5655 – реформа містоґвалтування” [Bill 5655 - reform of the urbanraping], Economics Truth, 2 December 2022, https://www.epravda.com.ua/columns/2022/12/2/694533/
  • 131President of Ukraine, “Указ Президента України №596/2021 Про призначення О.Грищук суддею Конституційного Суду України” [Decree of the President of Ukraine № 596/2021 On the appointment of O. Hryshchuk as a judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine], President of Ukraine official website, 26 November 2021, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5962021-40713 ; President of Ukraine, “Указ Президента України №597/2021 Про призначення О.Петришина суддею Конституційного Суду України” [Decree of the President of Ukraine № 597/2021 On the appointment of O. Petryshyn as a judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine], President of Ukraine official website, 26 November 2021, https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5972021-40717
  • 132Suspilne news, “Новопризначена суддя КСУ Грищук склала присягу” [The newly appointed judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, Hryshchuk, took an oath], Suspilne news, 19 May 2022, https://suspilne.media/241142-novopriznacena-sudda-ksu-grisuk-sklala-pr…
  • 133Radio Liberty, “Новий суддя КСУ як науковець дав «зелене» світло на балотування Кучми втретє, посилаючись на досвід Росії” [The new judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, as a scholar, gave the 'green light' for Kuchma's third candidacy, referring to Russia's experience], Radio Liberty, 21 September 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-skhemy-ksu-petryshyn/32044742.html
  • 134Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Постанова “Про призначення Совгирі О.В. на посаду судді Конституційного Суду України” [Resolution “On the appointment of Sovgyra O.V. as a judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine”], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 27 July 2022, https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2442-20#Text
  • 135Dejure Foundation, “Draft law № 7662 as a direct way for the politically loyal composition of the Constitutional Court until the end of April”, Dejure Foundation official website, 7 December 2022, https://en.dejure.foundation/tpost/rvk2ymb4s1-politically-loyal-composi…
  • 136Constitutional Court of Ukraine, “Three Judges Were Dismissed from the Office of Judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and Resigned”, Constitutional Court of Ukraine official website, 7 December 2022, https://ccu.gov.ua/en/novina/three-judges-were-dismissed-office-judge-c…
  • 137Ukrinform, “У КСУ розповіли, коли обиратимуть голову суду” [The Constitutional Court of Ukraine has announced when the court's chairman will be elected], Ukrinform, 28 December 2022, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/3642346-u-ksu-rozpovili-koli-ob…
  • 138Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про внесення змін до деяких законодавчих актів України щодо удосконалення порядку відбору кандидатур на посаду судді Конституційного Суду України на конкурсних засадах” [Draft law on amendments to certain legislative acts of Ukraine regarding improvement of the procedure for selecting candidates for the position of judge of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on a competitive basis], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 13 December 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/40213
  • 139Council of Europe (Venica Commission), “Urgent Opinion on the Draft Law "On amending some legislative acts of Ukraine regarding improving procedure for selecting candidate judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on a competitive basis", Council of Europe official website, 23 November 2022, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2022)046-e ; Dejure Foundation, “Draft law № 7662 as a direct way for the politically loyal composition of the Constitutional Court until the end of April”, Dejure Foundation official website, 7 December 2022, https://en.dejure.foundation/tpost/rvk2ymb4s1-politically-loyal-composi…
  • 140Council of Europe (Venica Commission), “Opinion on the Draft Law “On amending some legislative acts of Ukraine regarding improving procedure for selecting candidate judges of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on a competitive basis", Council of Europe official website, 16-17 December 2022, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2022)054-e
  • 141Dejure Foundation, “We call on the President to veto the law on the Constitutional Court reform”, Dejure Foundation official website, 15 December 2022, https://en.dejure.foundation/tpost/pls00yu0d1-we-call-on-the-president-…
  • 142AntAC, “Закликаємо міжнародних партнерів не делегувати членів ДГЕ, а народних депутатів негайно змінити закон про КСУ” [We call on international partners not to delegate members of the AGE and for MPs to immediately change the law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine], AntAC official website, 20 December 2022, https://antac.org.ua/news/zaklykaiemo-mizhnarodnykh-partneriv-ne-delehu…
  • 143Babel, “«Плівки ОАСК»: НАБУ скерувало до суду справу проти суддів Окружного адмінсуду” [“DACK Films": NABU has filed a case against judges of the District Administrative Court in court], Babel, 20 June 2022, https://babel.ua/news/80225-plivki-oask-nabu-skeruvalo-do-sudu-spravu-p…
  • 144Dejure Foundation, “5 кроків до життя без ОАСКу” [5 steps to life without DACK], Dejure Foundation official website, https://dejure.foundation/library/5-krokiv-bez-oask
  • 145Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про ліквідацію Окружного адміністративного суду міста Києва та утворення Київського міського окружного адміністративного суду” [Draft Law on the liquidation of the District Administrative Court of Kyiv and the establishment of the Kyiv City District Administrative Court], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 13 December 2022, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/26276
  • 146U.S. Department of State, “Combating Global Corruption and Human Rights Abuses”, United States Government official website, 9 December 2022, https://www.state.gov/combating-global-corruption-and-human-rights-abus…
  • 147Office of the Prosecutor General, https://warcrimes.gov.ua/en/
  • 148Detector Media, “Генпрокуратура зафіксувала вже понад 68 тисяч злочинів Росії проти України” [The Prosecutor General's Office has already recorded more than 68,000 crimes committed by Russia against Ukraine], Detector Media official website, 25 November 2022, https://detector.media/infospace/article/205330/2022-11-25-genprokuratu…
  • 149Razumkov Center, “Політичні підсумки 2022 року: оцінка громадянами ситуації в країні та дій влади, довіра до соціальних інститутів (грудень 2022р.)” [Political results of 2022: Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country and the actions of the authorities, trust in social institutions (December 2022)], Razumkov Center official website, 25 January 2023, https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/politych…; Razumkov Center, “Оцінка громадянами ситуації в країні, довіра до соціальних інститутів, політико-ідеологічні орієнтації громадян України в умовах російської агресії (вересень–жовтень 2022р.)” [Citizens' assessment of the situation in the country, trust in social institutions, political and ideological orientations of Ukrainian citizens in the conditions of Russian aggression (September-October 2022)], Razumkov Center official website, 28 October 2022, https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-…
  • 150Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, “Проект Закону про засади державної антикорупційної політики на 2020-2024 роки” [Draft Law on the Basics of State Anti-Corruption Policy for 2020-2024], Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine official website, 20 June 2022, ” http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=70007
  • 151National Agency of Corruption Prevention, “Верховна Рада ухвалила Антикорупційну стратегію на 2021–2025 роки” [The Verkhovna Rada adopted the Anti-Corruption Strategy for 2021-2025], NAZK officia website, 20 June 2022, https://nazk.gov.ua/uk/novyny/verhovna-rada-uhvalyla-antykoruptsijnu-st…
  • 152Tetiana Voitjuk, “Допоможе заощаджувати до 200 млрд гривень щороку. Парламент ухвалив Антикорупційну стратегію” [It will help to save up to 200 billion hryvnias every year. The Parliament adopted the Anti-Corruption Strategy], Suspilne news, 20 June 2022, https://suspilne.media/252077-parlament-uhvaliv-antikorupcijnu-strategi…
  • 153New Voice of Ukraine, “Competition commission for anti-corruption body approves decision to appoint new chief”, New Voice of Ukraine, 19 July 2022, https://english.nv.ua/nation/sapo-commission-finally-approves-decision-…
  • 154Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, “EU Commission's Recommendations for Ukraine's EU candidate status”, An official website of the European Union, 17 June 2022, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/eu-commissions-recommend…
  • 155National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine, “​​293 new investigations, 149 suspects, 68 accused - NABU, SAPO's results in the second half of 2022”, National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine official website, 10 February 2023, https://nabu.gov.ua/en/novyny/293-new-investigations-149-suspects-68-ac…
  • 156National Agency of Corruption Prevention, “Наказ від 20.01.2022 №31/22 “Про розподіл бюджетних коштів” [Order dated January 20, 2022 № 31/22 "On the distribution of budget funds"], National Agency of Corruption Prevention official website, 21 January 2022, https://nazk.gov.ua/uk/documents/nakaz-vid-20-01-2022-31-22-pro-rozpodi…
  • 157National Agency of Corruption Prevention, “Наказ від 20.01.2022 №33/22 “Про перерахування бюджетних коштів політичним партіям” [Order dated January 20, 2022 № 33/22 "On the transfer of budget funds to political parties"], National Agency of Corruption Prevention official website, 21 January 2022, https://nazk.gov.ua/uk/documents/nakaz-vid-20-01-2022-33-22-pro-pererah…
  • 158Ivan Nosalskyi, “ВАКС обрав запобіжний захід ексголові Нацбанку Шевченку ” [Higher Anti-corruption Court chose preventive measures against Shevchenko, the former head of the National Bank], RBK-Ukraine, 8 December 2022, https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/vaks-obrav-zapobizhniy-zahid-eks-glavi-nats…
  • 159Natalia Sedlecka, Valeriya Yegoshyna, Georgiy Shabayev, Kira Tolstyakova, “Велика відбудова. Керівник Дніпропетровщини платить бюджетні мільярди своїй супутниці – розслідування” [Great rebuilding. The head of Dnipropetrovsk region pays budget billions to his companion - investigation], Radio Liberty, 2 November 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/skhemy-velyke-budivnytstvo-dnipropetrovs… ; Mykhailo Tkach, “Фітнес-тренерка на мільярд. Як компанія близької подруги керівника Дніпропетровської ОДА стала найбагатшою під час війни” [Fitness trainer for a billion. How the company of a close friend of the head of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional State Administration became the richest during the war], Ukrainian Truth, 2 Novemebr 2022, https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2022/11/2/7374579/
  • 160Radio Liberty, “After investigations by "Schems" and "UT" about the head of Dnipropetrovsk region Reznichenko, the Specialized Anti-corruption Prosecution opened criminal proceedings”, Radio Liberty, 2 November 2022, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/news-skhemy-sap-reznichenko/32112584.html
  • 161Engage, “CEP 2022: Surge in Civic Activism, Overwhelming Support to Resisting the Enemy and Fundamental Shift in Perceiving Corruption”, Engage official website, 21 November 2022, https://engage.org.ua/eng/cep-2022-surge-in-civic-activism-overwhelming…
  • 162Ibid.
  • 163Ibid.
  • 164Ibid.
  • 165Ilona Sologub, Yelizaveta Dorontseva, “Reforms, corruption and civic activism: opinion of Ukrainians in October-2022”, Voxukraine, 27 December 2022, https://voxukraine.org/en/reforms-corruption-and-civic-activism-opinion…
  • 166Ibid; International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey of Residents of Ukraine | June 2022”, IRI official website, 11 August 2022, https://www.iri.org/resources/public-opinion-survey-of-residents-of-ukr…
ecoi.net description:
Report on democratisation (electoral process, civil society, independent media, governance) and rule of law (corruption) in 2022
Country:
Ukraine
Source:
Freedom House (Author)
Original link:
https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/nations-transit/2023
Document type:
Periodical Report
Language:
English
Published:
24 May 2023
Available on ecoi.net since:
13 June 2023
Document ID:
2092918

ecoi.net is run by the Austrian Red Cross (department ACCORD) in cooperation with Informationsverbund Asyl & Migration. ecoi.net is funded by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Austrian Ministry of the Interior and Caritas Austria. ecoi.net is supported by ECRE & UNHCR.