• From the onset of Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Prime Minister Petr Fiala and his cabinet consistently criticized the Kremlin’s actions, and the Czech Republic provided some of the greatest per capita assistance to Ukrainians fleeing the violence.
• Czechia’s prewar high dependency on Russian energy imports, on the other hand, continued to hinder its energy security and transformation to a more climate-oriented economy. The country is exempted from the EU embargo on Russian oil imports while intensively looking for alternative sources of energy. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) working in the environmental and energy sectors have pointed out9 that the government so far has been slow to tap the country’s potential in renewable energy.10
• On the domestic level, Czechia continued to suffer during the year from a host of social issues exacerbated by the energy crisis and soaring inflation.11 These include a persistent personal debt crisis (see “Judicial Framework and Independence”), disparities between regions and major urban centers (see “Local Democratic Governance”), and a housing crisis.12
• Czechia has been praised by EU member states and the European Commission for its turn at the EU’s rotating presidency, which it assumed on July 1 and passed to Sweden on December 31. Fiala’s cabinet set up a European Affairs Ministry led by Mikuláš Bek, who, together with Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Lipavský, have reshaped the Czech foreign policy agenda since the populist cabinet of former prime minister Andrej Babiš.13
• Czechia secured a seat on the UN Human Rights Council after a vote at the UN General Assembly in May, and it continued to revive its foreign policy in line with protecting human rights by calling for an international tribunal over crimes committed by the Russian army and security services in Ukraine. In November, the Czech Parliament passed a national resolution calling Russia a terrorist state.14
• Former PM Babiš’s corruption trial epitomized the proliferation of business and politics in Czechia in recent years. In the highly watched proceedings, Babiš and his former manager Jana Nagyová were accused of EU subsidy fraud amounting to 50 million korunas (CZK). Babiš (ANO) was also his party’s presidential candidate during the year at the height of the trial.15 Both the trial and campaign were ongoing at year’s end.
• A government no-confidence vote was held on September 1, but Petr Fiala’s cabinet withstood the challenge from the opposition, relying on its comfortable majority in the lower chamber of Parliament.16 Representatives of the leading opposition party, ANO, cited the foreign intelligence head’s contacts with the controversial Mayors party sponsor Michal Redl, but also used the media coverage to divert attention away from Andrej Babiš’s scandals and to criticize the cabinet for mishandling the country’s energy crisis.

• In 2022, Czechia saw elections to the Senate, the upper house of Parliament, with the first round held together with municipal elections on September 23–24. One third of the Senate’s 81 seats were contested, and three candidates were elected in the first round. Turnout was 42.65 percent,17 compared to 36.74 percent in the previous first-round elections in October 2020.18 However, voter turnout in some of the regional electoral districts was notably lower, including Most District in northern Bohemia where turnout was 32.74 percent. The second round was held in October and, as in previous years, was marked by very low turnout of 19.44 percent.
• The Senate runoff elections featured two opposition candidates, physician Věra Procházková of ANO and first-response worker Eva Chromcová of SPD, in Karlovy Vary District.19 The runoff became a clash between the public’s typical disinterest in politics and the ability of anti-establishment parties to mobilize the electorate.
• On the opposite end of public attention was the second-round duel over Jihlava District between incumbent Senate President Miloš Vystrčil and ANO party challenger Jana Nagyová, who was backed vociferously by the former prime minister and ANO founder Andrej Babiš. This was by far the most closely watched runoff in the national media, yet voter turnout was only 38.74 percent.20 As such, it was the highest second-round turnout of all the contested districts but still well below half of the eligible electorate. Senate runoffs have long suffered from low turnout, and during post-election debates,21 legislators and political scientists pointed out that populist and anti-establishment politicians attacking the Senate as a redundant institution could be discouraging voters.
• The center-right SPOLU coalition secured 18 senators and two independents backed by a coalition of two right-wing parties, Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and TOP 09, and the center-right Christian Democrats.22 This gave SPOLU the majority, with 41 seats in the 81-seat Senate. Together with Pirates and Mayors, the five ruling coalition parties combined for 58 senators, with several independent senators also backing the cabinet. This gives Petr Fiala’s cabinet a very strong majority in both chambers of Parliament.
• In the municipal elections in September, a leader from the parliamentary opposition ANO came in first in 8 of the 13 regional capitals, and the ruling coalition ODS party also recorded gains. The greatest progress was recorded by the far-right and anti-EU Direct Democracy Party (SPD), tripling its overall number of representatives from 161 to 492. SPD also gained representation in the Prague City Assembly for the first time after managing to cross the 5-percent threshold in the local elections. ODS and ANO formed ruling coalitions in nearly half of the cities and towns where the two parties had a chance to rule together. ANO also came in as a surprise runner-up in Prague with nearly 20 percent, followed by Pirate Party (17.73 percent) and Praha Sobě (Prague Together, PS).23
• The presidential campaign involved 9 candidates after the Interior Ministry’s review resulted in the dismissal of 12 candidates, largely over its inability to verify the 50,000 signatures required to back individual candidates before the November 8 deadline. Some appealed the decision at the Supreme Administrative Court. Interior Minister Vit Rakušan told the media that he would put forth a proposal to amend the presidential electoral law after the elections in January 2023.24

• In 2022, a series of far-right protests were organized by the platform “Czechia First.”25 Their initial demonstration on September 4 drew a crowd of 70,00026 and was also attended by far-left speakers and representatives of the pro-Kremlin Czech Communist Party.27 On November 17, several thousand joined in a march to the Czech TV headquarters demanding access to the channel’s live stream, accusing the public broadcaster of alleged bias in favor of Ukraine and the EU.28
• The pro-democracy platform Million Moments for Democracy organized or co-organized a number of protests in response to these far-right and pro-Russian rallies, including one with an address by Ukrainian first lady Olena Zelenska and attended by thousands in October.29
• In November, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP27) conference coincided with the anniversary of the Czech Republic’s Velvet Revolution. Students in major university cities occupied faculty buildings in protest of the government’s inaction on climate change.30 The protests culminated in a march on November 17 through the capital Prague, including demonstrations in front of the EPH energy group headquarters, which sparked negative responses from conservative media and energy company representatives.31
• Charges were pressed against former legislator and TOP 09 politician Dominik Feri over three accounts of rape, revealed by acclaimed journalists Apolena Rychlíková and Jakub Zelenka in a 2021 investigation. Analysts and commentators32 hoped that the trial would prompt authorities to take cases of sexual assault more seriously.33 On the other hand, the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combatting violence against women and domestic violence remained unratified by Czechia in 2022 despite persistent calls from NGOs, women’s rights groups, and other civic platforms.34

• In October, the Czech Parliament passed a legislative proposal aimed at making the process of electing members to the public broadcasting council immune to political manipulation,35 which had become a common practice under the Babiš cabinet. According to the proposal, the Senate will elect one-third of council members after nominations by long-standing civic organizations.
• Lack of sufficient funding has been a persistent issue for Czech public media, which are praised as the most resilient in the region regarding outside pressure from political as well as nonpolitical actors.36 While the current fee model insulates Czech Radio and Czech TV from political meddling, it also does not reflect the rising costs of quality broadcasting. In October, the International Press Institute pointed out37 that lack of funding, along with disinformation and political pressure from ANO and SPD, are the main risks to maintaining the public media’s trusted position.38
• Disinformation continued to thrive in Czechia on alternative outlets, channels, and in the form of chain emails despite the new cabinet’s pledge to do more to tackle it than the previous government. These platforms often replicate Kremlin propaganda in the Czech context, such as blaming the current cabinet or EU sanctions against the Kremlin for the country’s energy crisis. Anti-green narratives were frequently amplified by large commercial media, including outlets from the Czech News Center and Mafra, the two largest publishing houses in the country, as well as by populist and nationalist politicians, including Miloš Zeman (SPO), Andrej Babiš (ANO), and Tomio Okamura (SPD).
• In February, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the government requested that internet service providers block websites that disseminate Kremlin propaganda,39 the most visible action taken by the cabinet that nevertheless sparked criticism over freedom of speech.
• In February, Mafra Publishing ran a front page image of Andrej Babiš with the headline “Do you trust media?”40 This move epitomized the outsized influence that opposition leader Babiš wields over the media market through his links to Agrofert and ownership of Mafra, which also includes several popular radio stations.
• Corporate influence on the media was evident during the year, such as energy interests represented in privately owned media. Efforts to implement a windfall tax in line with EU recommendations in May were regularly ridiculed by private conservative media. Student climate protests were also smeared by business influencers on social media platforms (see “Civil Society”). The NGO Re-Set found that media making such claims do so to “support the interests of their owners.”41
• Award-winning journalist Lukáš Valášek received a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP)42 following his series of investigations into covert Chinese influence campaigns.

• The 2022 Senate elections saw a surprise victory by museum historian Martin Krsek over Ústí nad Labem mayor Petr Nedvědický (ANO). Krsek described poverty in the regions as the single most important issue for the country to tackle, claiming that “in 30 years since the [November 1989] revolution no government has done any important systematic step to even out differences between the regions.”43 Krsek joined forces with Senator Přemysl Rabas to push for legislation to improve living conditions in the country’s impoverished coal regions.44
• Coalition talks in Prague’s city government stalled over the criminal investigation of Christian Democrat Jan Wolf, one of the leaders of the victorious conservative formation SPOLU, and Pirate Party’s insistence on including Praha Sobě, a local anticorruption party, until January 2023. SPOLU insisted on a coalition that would include Pirates and Mayors, replicating the national government’s ruling coalition.45
• A proposal for a community energy bill, long advocated by NGOs aiming to decentralize Czechia’s energy industry, was filed for consultations between relevant ministries after being recalled by the Industry Ministry earlier in the year. The bill paves the way for establishing sustainable energy sharing communities in villages, small towns, or town quarters. Community energy sharing could speed up the development of renewable energy and decentralize the current energy status quo dominated by the corporate trio EPH, ČEZ, and Sev.En Group.46
• The “Dozimetr” corruption scandal and Brno police raids (see “Corruption”) demonstrated the persistence of regional power strongholds that conflate business interests with politics, from Zlín to Brno to Prague.47

• Pavel Blažek has been one of the most controversial figures in Prime Minister Fiala’s cabinet since his appointment as Justice Minister in 2021, due to his involvement in various corruption scandals (see “Corruption”).48 In August, Blažek was accused by a professional association of judges as well as Transparency International CZ49 of meddling with prosecutorial appointments related to an investigation that implicated the minister himself, a clear conflict of interest that could undermine the probe.50
• The Justice Ministry’s long-awaited amendment to the law on state prosecutors had yet to be implemented by year’s end. The latest ministerial proposal was criticized by the Supreme State Prosecutor in November as well as ruling coalition ministers despite Blažek’s pledges that his proposal would have wide support.51 The latest developments were also challenged by the Constitutional Court.52
• In October, Parliament adopted the country’s own version of the U.S. Magnitsky Act, which will enable the sanctioning of individuals or organizations as well as regimes that violate human rights or use terrorist methods or cyberattacks.53 It will also enable the state to forbid entry to Czechia and to seize assets of individuals and organizations that qualify under the new law.
• The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs introduced “Milostivé léto II” from September 1 to November 30. This new measure further addresses Czechia’s prevailing personal debt crisis,54 following Milostivé léto I, which terminated 50,000 debt collection proceedings, and was welcomed by NGOs. However, these efforts are still far short of making a meaningful impact for the nearly 700,000 citizens trapped in personal debt,55 half of whom have likely been facing enforced debt collection proceedings for a decade or longer.56
• A same-sex marriage bill was drafted by MPs from Pirates and Mayors party in May, causing a backlash from conservative MPs from the opposition as well as ruling coalition parties.57
• President Zeman pressed his controversial candidate for Deputy Public Defender in October58 but was overridden by Parliament in favor of the Senate candidate Vít Alexander Schorm. The former deputy Monika Šimůnková resigned in August over disputes with Public Defender Stanislav Křeček following his demeaning comments about Czech Roma.59
• Upholding Roma minority rights and securing equal opportunities for the community in Czechia continued to be of concern. The government approved its Strategy for the Equality, Inclusion, and Participation of Roma (Romani Integration Strategy) for 2021–30 in November, which included the appointment of Lucie Fuková as Commissioner for Romani Minority Affairs in December.60 Still, 2022 saw double standards61 by Czech authorities towards the human rights of Romani, such as Roma war refugees from Ukraine who were stranded at train stations in Prague and Brno before temporary shelters were set up.62
• Czech authorities have been criticized by human rights organizations63 as well as Czech Human Rights Commissioner Klára Laurenčíková64 for rejecting applications for state compensation due to forced sterilizations of Romani women, allegedly for failing to provide evidence that the sterilizations were involuntary. In June, the Health Ministry released an update65 informing applicants that the online system is overloaded, causing delays.66

• In March, President Zeman issued a controversial pardon for Miloš Balák, head of the Presidential Forests Administration.67 Just days earlier, Balák had been sentenced to three years in prison for his role in fixing a CZK 200 million public tender for the Klíčava water retention project in Lány forest.68
• In a continuation of the “Dozimetr” scandal, police carried out raids in June that implicated several MPs (Mayors).69 At the center of this latest scandal was Mayors sponsor Michal Redl, whose contacts with high-ranking Mayors-elected officials served as one of the opposition’s arguments for filing a no-confidence vote against the cabinet on September 1 (see “National Democratic Governance”).
• AVE CZ, one of Czechia’s largest waste management companies, was charged for systematic evasion of environmental taxes amounting to CZK 3.76 billion.70 AVE CZ’s key shareholder is billionaire Daniel Křetínský, also a majority shareholder of EPH, the country’s largest private energy company.
• In October, there were two rounds of police raids of offices in Brno that targeted municipal and city leaders. These local ODS politicians included Brno mayor Markéta Vaňková and council member Otakar Bradáč, close collaborators of Justice Minister Blažek.71
• Legislation requiring qualifying legal entities to disclose their ownership structure was amended in October to redefine “beneficial owners” and clarify exemptions. The amendment came less than two years after the law was introduced, prompted by EU directive 2015/849 on the prevention of money laundering and financing of terrorism. The directive’s transposition was one of the conditions for Czechia drawing EU funds under the post-COVID Recovery and Resilience Facility.72
• In November, the Czech cabinet belatedly approved a whistleblower protections act, transposing EU directive 2019/1937. The bill’s final version was criticized73 by anticorruption NGOs for providing only elementary protections yet failing to reflect recommendations made by the cabinet’s council for coordination to combat corruption.74
• The trial of former prime minister Andrej Babiš and former Agrofert manager Jana Nagyová began in the fall over conflicts of interest that have entangled Babiš since he entered national politics in 2013, and was still ongoing at year’s end.

Author: Albin Sybera, a Czech national living in Slovenia, is a freelance journalist, news reporter at bne Intellinews, and Foresight Editor at the Warsaw-based think tank and magazine Visegrad Insight. He is a doctoral student at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, researching constructions of Czech national identity in the media. His interviews, commentaries, and analyses regularly appear in the Guardian, Balkan Insight, Just Security, Czech Radio, RTV Slovenia, N1, and Hospodářské noviny. Sybera holds degrees in Philosophy from Carleton University, Ottawa, and Reading European Cultures from the University of Glasgow.