• Armenia’s transitional democracy continued on a trajectory towards consolidation, even amid a security crisis and protests by opposition parties. Azerbaijani forces’ September incursion into Armenia proper30 and Yerevan’s continued participation in peace negotiations31 triggered wide-scale protests.32 The opposition, which includes the Armenia Alliance and I Have Honor, sought the resignation of the Pashinyan government, but the May–June protests failed to garner major public support.33 The authorities were relatively hands-off when managing demonstrations34 as they ran their course,35 though evidence of authorities engaging in excessive force also surfaced.36 Armenians who answered a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in June viewed Pashinyan more favorably than other nationally known politicians.37 Civil Contract, meanwhile, maintained a notable polling lead over parliamentary groups who are affiliated with the pre-2018 regime.38 The IRI results suggest that pluralism remains limited at the national level, as the Armenian public sides with the prodemocracy incumbent and a democratic opposition force remains absent.
• Civil Contract, which enjoys a parliamentary supermajority, continued to implement an ambitious reform agenda that touched on the military,39 judiciary,40 and constitution. Public discourse on constitutional reform continued in 2022, with a council of experts and civil society representatives participating in a working group.41 The work of the Constitutional Reform Council (CRC) continued, with a new body being seated in January.42 The opposition, in turn, rejected any planned constitutional changes and boycotted the CRC seats allotted to them.43 Similarly, the opposition boycotted most of the year’s parliamentary sessions, refraining from introducing substantive legislation or voting on government-proposed bills. Per Armenian law, parliamentarians may lose their seats if they miss at least half of the votes held in a single semiannual session. This prompted calls by Civil Contract lawmakers to remove absentee members of the opposition,44 which the government did not heed.45 On November 15, however, the opposition announced an end to their boycott.46
• President Sargsyan resigned in January after investigative journalists at Hetq47 revealed that the president held dual passports, a violation of Armenian law.48 Sargsyan’s resignation, which was prompted by media reporting, was a demonstration of accountability and transparency within government. National Assembly president Alen Simonyan temporarily assumed the ceremonial position until lawmakers elected former minister Vahagn Khachaturyan president on March 3.49
• Parliamentarians voted women into two visible and important government posts during the year. Kristine Grigoryan was made human rights ombudsman in January,50 while Anna Vardapetyan was named prosecutor general in June.51 Grigoryan and Vardapetyan were the first women to hold these posts; each selection represented a positive step in closing the gender gap in Armenian politics.

• No nationwide elections were held in 2022, but voters participated in several sets of local and municipal contests. The elections were generally considered free and fair and, in comparison to recent nationwide elections, demonstrated more pluralism and diversity. These elections were conducted in electoral districts drawn in 2021.52 As part of territorial administrative reforms, a municipal amalgamation process was initiated whereby numerous villages were placed within single municipal districts.
• On March 27, the Vedi municipal elections were held in the region of Ararat, south of Yerevan. Three parties initially competed: Civil Contract, the My Powerful Community Party (MYCP), and the Republic Party. The Republic Party, generally aligned with the national incumbent, dropped out. Civil Contract won 58 percent of the vote and 16 seats on the local council, while the MYCP won 42 percent and 11 seats.53 The results were considered free and fair, while observers said the polls were conducted in line with the electoral code.54 That said, the polls in Vedi—which were a rerun of a December 2021 contest that ended in a stalemate—were marred by accusations of vote buying. In addition, Civil Contract supporters allegedly assaulted an MYCP supporter near a polling station during the election.55
• On September 26, 18 municipal elections were held throughout Armenia. A diverse group of political parties contested these polls, and 16 of them proved competitive. Opposition groups performed robustly. Civil Contract won in eight areas: Talin, Tsaghkahovit, Yeghegis, Jrvezh, Skunk, Gyulagarak, Lori Berd, and Areni.56 A variety of other groups prevailed in the remaining 10. In Charentsavan and Tashir, for example, the United Community bloc won with 51 percent and 71 percent of the vote, respectively, while an independent in the village of Alagyaz defeated the Civil Contract candidate and took 64 percent of the vote there.57 Elections in four municipalities yielded no single-party majority, requiring the formation of coalitions.
• The results of the year’s local polls demonstrated growing pluralism at the local level and affirmed the success of electoral changes enacted in 2021. The local results in 2021 were not as diverse as those observed in 2022.58
• The parliament passed legislation in 2021 to amend the electoral code’s provisions on local council elections, requiring the appointment of mayors via open ballot. In mid-2022, the government introduced a new legislative amendment that would reintroduce a secret ballot, arguing that secret balloting would facilitate power-sharing and coalition-building. Civil society activists expressed disapproval, arguing that the change would make the mayoral election process susceptible to overt influence by the ruling party.59
• In early October, the parliament elected Vahagn Hovakimyan, a senior Civil Contract lawmaker, chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC). CSOs objected,60 noting Hovakimyan’s close relationship with Civil Contract and voicing conflict-of-interest concerns.61 The opposition appealed to the Constitutional Court, citing the same concerns and noting that Hovakimyan voted for his own appointment as a lawmaker.62

• Armenia’s civil society remains an important and growing force for transparency and accountability, with CSOs challenging the government on some issues while also working with it to consolidate democratization. Civil society representatives were notably influential in the workings of the CRC63 and in the formation of the Anti-Corruption Court.64 Civil society was also active in consulting Pashinyan’s office,65 the Ministry of Justice, and the Corruption Prevention Commission.
• CSOs were vocal in objecting to the October elevation of Vahagn Hovakimyan to the CEC.66 Civil society was equally rigorous in its criticism of the “grave insults” criminal-code provision,67 aligning with the EU68 in articulating its concerns and proving instrumental in securing decriminalization.69
• Civil society did not participate in the opposition protests and rallies that took place intermittently throughout the year. Opposition groups, which are connected to the pre-2018 regime, have displayed hostility toward CSOs.
• Civil society actively contributed to the conversation on war and security in 2022. In February, Armenian CSOs denounced the Russian invasion of Ukraine and called on Yerevan to condemn Moscow’s actions.70 In July, several CSOs provided a report to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination that focused on hate speech on the part of Azerbaijani leaders; acts of torture, executions, and other violence committed by Azerbaijani forces; and the destruction of culturally significant objects in Nagorno-Karabakh.71 In October, CSOs called on the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to intervene a month after Azerbaijani forces made an incursion into Armenia proper.72
• Civil society engaged, organized, and collaborated with large number of partners73 to advance and promote democratic norms and values. A consensus for democratic consolidation, the working relationship between state institutions and CSOs, and the deep nature of these relations signified the strength of Armenia’s civil society.74
• Additionally, civil society representatives continued to develop a more institutionalized relationship with government bodies, making for one of the more important developments of 2022. Civil society’s active and consultative role on judicial reform,75 police reform, election observation, and minority rights76 was integral to government decision-making. Civil society representatives also maintained a formal role on the CRC77 and participated in integrity interviews for Anti-Corruption Court judges.

• Armenia’s media landscape was somewhat freer and more accessible to consumers in 2022, with a growing number of independent outlets making inroads in the media market and with independent online outlets becoming more plentiful. However, the landscape is still shaped by the inherited problems of polarization, misinformation, political groups’ ownership of media outlets,78 and a lack of public trust in the media. That distrust is largely prompted by the presence of hate speech and excessive polarization of outlets.79 Nonetheless, Armenia showed improvement in the 2022 edition of Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index, ranking 51st in the world and climbing 12 places from 2021.80
• Some 33 percent of Armenian respondents who answered a June 2022 IRI poll said that media freedom had improved, 19 percent said it had stayed the same, and 37 percent said it worsened. Some 83 percent of respondents said that media disinformation was at least “somewhat problematic,” with 85 percent supporting government action to address the problem.81
• Independent media outlets were crucial in holding powerful officials to account in 2022, as exemplified by the president’s resignation in January;82 Hetq revealed that the president had violated the law by possessing dual citizenship. Subsequently, investigations conducted by Hetq led to the launch of criminal proceedings against Artak Sargsyan, owner of SAS Supermarket;83 senior Civil Contract lawmaker and former health minister Arsen Torosyan;84 and Vayk mayor Mkhitar Matevosyan, who is also affiliated with Civil Contract.85 Collectively, the media’s growing role in advancing accountability and transparency is contributing to anticorruption efforts, while independent outlets may potentially become a bona fide fourth estate.
• In July, the CivilNet outlet and the Armenia chapter of Transparency International successfully sued the government to obtain information on compliance violations in the country’s mines. The Administrative Court upheld the two organizations’ information requests from the Environmental Protection and Mining Inspection Agency.86 In November, the two groups won another case at the Administrative Court, which ruled that the prime minister’s office had to provide information related to the sale of the Zangezur Copper Molybdenum Combine.87
• In 2021, the parliament amended the criminal code to criminalize “grave insults” leveled against individuals for their “public activities,” which were defined as “journalistic activities, public or political activities, with the performance of official duties, public service and holding a public position.” Some 51 people were subsequently charged by April 2022.88 Rigorous criticism from civil society,89 international organizations,90 and the EU amplified the pressure on Yerevan to remove the amendment. The legality of the provision was appealed to the Constitutional Court, which upheld it in April.91 But in June, with the government facing continued opposition, then justice minister Andreasyan announced that the criminal code would not include the controversial provision.92

• The government has undertaken expansive economic development projects to improve regions outside of the capital, working with international financial institutions, the EU,93 and the United States.94 Such economic development packages have been supported by an emerging democratic culture as demonstrated by the highly competitive, pluralistic nature of local elections (see “Electoral Process”), which have contributed to the growth of democratic culture in the relatively traditional, rural areas of Armenia. The government has also exerted efforts to bridge the urban-rural divide.
• In October, representatives from the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure met with local authorities, civil society members, and international bodies to discuss a coming local-governance law at an event facilitated by the Council of Europe (CoE). The CoE was still fulfilling a 2019–22 action plan for the country and was specifically supporting local decentralization efforts.95
• The general success of recent local elections was marred by the arrests of opposition candidates on corruption charges. In January 2022, a top opposition-party member criticized the government over arrests made after the 2021 local polls. Also in January 2022, the newly elected head of the council in Vartenis was prohibited from assuming that post after Civil Contract sued.96
• In July, the government said it would spend $26.8 million to improve roadways throughout the country.97
• Armenians are largely satisfied with the performance of local government according to an IRI survey conducted in December 2021 and released in January 2022. Some 63 percent of respondents nationwide voiced satisfaction with local bodies. Approval in urban areas outside Yerevan stood at 67 percent, while approval from rural respondents stood at 70 percent. A clear majority of respondents also agreed they could influence government decisions.98

• Armenia’s government proceeded to enact a rigorous judicial reform agenda, especially under Karen Andreasyan, who served as justice minister for much of 2022. The US-trained lawyer has been an advocate of vetting and integrity investigations, as well as streamlining the judiciary.99 Legislation passed in 2021 empowered the Ministry of Justice to request the initiation of punitive action by the SJC, which can sanction and discipline judges. In 2022, the ministry and the SJC worked to investigate judges suspected of corruption. Judges reputed to be aligned with the pre-2018 regime joined opposition lawmakers and appealed to the Constitutional Court to declare the practice unconstitutional,100 but the court allowed the 2021 law to stand. The Venice Commission of the CoE generally voiced support for the government’s judicial reform effort in a March 2022 report but voiced reservations on how judges are disciplined.101 In its response to the Venice Commission, the Ministry of Justice noted the limitations of existing legal instruments to enable judicial streamlining (the government was instead relying on an existing constitutional article to introduce a vetting mechanism for judges), and noted pressure from civil society to reform the judiciary.102
• In February, the National Assembly amended the law guiding the operational structure of the SJC, allowing the investigation and sanctioning of judges to be initiated by 5 of the SJC’s 10 members (the previous threshold was 7).103 An Armenia Alliance lawmaker criticized the lower threshold, noting that Civil Contract–appointed SJC members could meet it on their own. From the government’s perspective, the new threshold will limit institutional protections for SJC members installed by the pre-2018 regime and advance structural reforms.
• In January, a group of judges criticized the government’s reforms, saying it was disciplining judges in a politicized manner at a parliamentary committee meeting held by opposition lawmakers.104 In February, lawyers for judge Boris Bakhshiyan accused the SJC of authorizing his arrest for political reasons, thereby infringing on judicial independence; Bakhshiyan had granted bail for an opposition supporter in a case.105 Bakhshiyan was freed from custody in May.106 In February, then justice minister Andreasyan criticized judges who accused the government of weakening judicial independence, while reiterating claims that a large number of judges were corrupt.107
• In June, Ruben Vartazaryan, who was suspended as SJC chairman in 2021, accused acting successor Gagik Jhangiryan of blackmail by releasing a recording of a conversation between the two. In it, Jhangiryan apparently said Vartazaryan could avoid criminal prosecution by resigning from the body.108 Vartazaryan was dismissed later in June 2022.109 Jhangiryan himself resigned in July after receiving significant criticism from civil society.110 111
• According to the judicial code, the Anti-Corruption Court shall have at least 15 judges; at least 10 must be specialized in criminal corruption and at least 5 must have civil specialization.112 The Anti-Corruption Committee conducts the bulk of corruption investigations in conjunction with prosecutors and the National Security Service, and will refer completed cases and charges to the Anti-Corruption Court. In September 2022, the Ministry of Justice presented a draft bill that would create an Anti-Corruption Court of Appeal for public discussion.113
• The Prosecutor General’s Office clashed with the Anti-Corruption Committee over the case of Vladimir Gasparyan, a former chief of police who faces accusations of enrichment, embezzlement, and fraud.114 Prosecutors refused to proceed with the case against Gasparyan on two occasions in 2022, citing insufficient evidence. The Anti-Corruption Committee accused prosecutors of engaging in “illegal and unfounded” behavior.115 Similarly, the Prosecutor General’s Office refused to proceed on a case against Aram Harutyunyan, a fugitive former environment minister who was charged by the Anti-Corruption Committee, in January.116
• Judges displayed independence through their rulings on two significant cases that were made or took effect in 2022. The Constitutional Court ruled in December 2021 that the government’s vaccination requirements for state employees was unconstitutional; the ruling took effect in 2022. Further, the court ruled that the Ministry of Health’s authority to enforce such requirements superseded its institutional powers.117 In 2020, Hrayr Tovmasyan, then a senior judge in the Constitutional Court, filed a lawsuit against Prime Minister Pashinyan for defamation. In June 2022, a Yerevan court ordered Pashinyan to rescind the claim that Tovmasyan “offered his services,” though it did not find another statement made by Pashinyan to be slander.118

• The government in Yerevan proceeded in 2022 with an aggressive anticorruption drive, implementing an overall anticorruption strategy,119 operationalizing120 the Anti-Corruption Committee,121 and finalizing the Anti-Corruption Court. This is being undertaken through collaboration with the CoE122 and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.123 The Anti-Corruption Committee has undertaken high-profile investigations since becoming operationalized (see “Judicial Framework and Independence”). In June, the committee signed a memorandum of understanding with the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.124
• Corruption cases were initiated against current and former officials in 2022. Trials against former defense minister Davit Tonoyan, General Artak Davtyan, and arms dealer Davit Galstyan, who were charged with fraud and embezzlement for arms-procurement dealings, proceeded in January.125 Prosecutions against Tonoyan and Davtyan proceeded despite the defendants’ close political ties to Prime Minister Pashinyan. Similarly, in March, Minister of Emergency Situations Andranik Piloyan was arrested in the course of an investigation initiated by the Anti-Corruption Committee. Piloyan and 12 other individuals were formally charged in September.126 Pashinyan commended law enforcement agencies and vowed “zero tolerance for corruption” after Piloyan’s arrest.127 Former prosecutor general Aghvan Hovsepyan, a powerful figure in the pre-2018 regime, was charged by the Anti-Corruption Committee in 2021 and remained in custody as of mid-2022.”128
• Local opposition leader Aharon Khachatrian was arrested for corruption after the December 2021 elections in Vardenis, as was Mamikon Aslanyan in Vanadzor.129 Both remained under custody in 2022 pending investigation. In July, Aslanyan was transferred to a hospital due to a deterioration in his condition; his lawyer blamed his treatment in custody for his declining health.130 Goris mayor-elect Arush Arushanian was similarly arrested on several charges, receiving a suspended sentence in March 2022 on some charges but being acquitted of vote buying.131
• Public support for anticorruption efforts remained robust according to a USAID-supported public opinion study published in October 2022. Some 85.6 percent of respondents supported judicial integrity investigations, 83.8 percent approved the confiscation of illegally obtained property, 77.5 percent approved widespread declaration of income, 77.5 percent approved the creation of specialized anticorruption courts, and 79.6 percent approved the formation of the Anti-Corruption Committee. Some 57.5 percent noted that corruption had diminished to a large extent, while 21 percent said it had completely been diminished.132
• That same month, however, CivilNet reported on a Caucausus Research Resource Center poll in which a majority of respondents viewed political parties, media outlets, and the judiciary as corrupt. A majority of respondents also said that bribery, money laundering, kickbacks, and nepotism were “common manifestations” of corruption.133

Author: Dr. Nerses Kopalyan is an assistant professor-in-residence of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His fields of specialization include international relations, geopolitics, political theory, and philosophy of science. He has conducted extensive research on polarity, superpower relations, security studies. He is the author of World Political Systems After Polarity (Routledge, 2017) and the co-author of Sex, Power, And Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). His current research concentrates on geopolitical and great power relations with an emphasis on Eurasia. He has also done extensive work on political developments in Armenia prior and subsequent to the Velvet Revolution.