What’s new? Since the coup in May 2021, Mali’s authorities have developed closer relations with Russia, now the country’s preferred military partner. In parallel, they have distanced themselves from several Western and regional partners, notably France.
Why is it important? The Malian authorities’ shift in strategy jeopardises the regional stabilisation architecture developed since 2013. Aside from its break with France, Bamako’s worsening relations with other Western and regional partners also threaten to isolate the country.
What should be done? Bamako should find ways to rebalance relations with its different partners and avoid painting the country into a corner by continuing to rely primarily on military solutions, this time with its Russian ally. Mali’s partners should avoid transposing global geopolitical conflicts onto the Sahel.
I. Executive Summary
Despite the Economic Community of West African States’ (ECOWAS) partial easing in July 2022 of the sanctions it had imposed on Mali in January that year, Bamako’s relations with some of its neighbours and Western partners remain troubled, even conflictual. While delays in the electoral calendar and the return to constitutional order have raised some tensions, the strain mainly stems from Bamako’s decision to break with France and choose Russia as its preferred military partner, including through the Kremlin-linked security company Wagner.
This choice, while partly an assertion of sovereignty, originates to some extent in the failure of previous military efforts to curb the jihadist threat. These interventions have not delivered greater security and the situation has worsened over the past ten years. In that context, Malian authorities see Russia as a reliable and pragmatic partner that is better equipped to fight jihadist groups, in particular by providing rapid access to military equipment and combat forces on the ground. Yet it is far from clear that Russian backing can turn the tide. The Malian army’s efforts in recent months – it has mounted large-scale operations, especially in the centre of the country – have only enjoyed marginal success. The defence and security forces have demonstrated their ability to organise complex operations without French support, but the persistence of jihadist attacks in central and north-eastern Mali and the serious incidents affecting the civilian population show that the security situation remains fragile, despite the authorities’ triumphalist rhetoric.
Having seized power by force rather than through elections, Mali’s leaders are keen to garner strong popular support, which also explains their move toward Russia and away from France. Wearied by years of insecurity, large swathes of the population have applauded the country’s shift in alliances. Fuelling this popular support is strong criticism of previous foreign interventions. The critique owes partly to a Russian-led disinformation campaign, but there is also genuine anger that years of military operations have not checked spreading insecurity. Above all, this popular backing creates the substantial political base the transitional authorities need to govern.
By making Moscow its new strategic partner in a geopolitical context marked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Mali risks isolating itself internationally. Bamako could find itself embroiled in a rivalry between major powers it has no control over. It would gain no lasting benefits from such a scenario. Russia, with its focus on military solutions, will be no more capable than France of fixing Mali’s security problems, which go far beyond the jihadist threat. The authorities’ rhetoric emphasising Mali’s sovereignty, though popular, also has limitations: it has already deprived the country of important support, notably financial backing, and risks being counterproductive over time. The strong financial pressure means that, absent significant security improvements, the authorities’ political support base could swiftly crumble, especially in urban centres.
Although they are unlikely to reject Russian support, the Malian authorities should avoid falling into isolation and take a more balanced approach to foreign relations. They should not underestimate the fallout from an abrupt severance of ties with Mali’s allies, mainly in the West. Such a break could have harmful consequences for the country, notably in its access to international aid and to stabilisation.
To prevent such a scenario, Mali’s leaders should abandon confrontational diplomacy and instead work toward settling their differences with neighbouring countries and rekindling relations with those Western partners most amenable to compromise. They should avoid overblown rhetoric and impulsive decisions that damage the country’s good relations with its regional partners and those further afield. Mali is entitled to reassert its sovereignty and its partners should respect that right. Yet protecting its sovereignty should not counteract efforts to maintain or reestablish partnerships with those Western and regional allies that remain committed to helping the country on its path to stability. In particular, Bamako should lift its highly obstructive restrictions on the UN’s stabilisation mission in Mali. The authorities could also send stronger signals they will respect the electoral calendar agreed with ECOWAS in July 2022.
Mali’s Western partners, meanwhile, should be pragmatic and flexible in their cooperation, not allowing tensions to boil over and keeping the country out of a global confrontation with Russia. They should encourage Malians to debate their future choices for the transition, particularly in regard to political and institutional reforms. The Malian authorities’ inability to tackle insecurity, even with the support of their new Russian partner, suggests that the solution lies not in a new alliance, but in locally developed political strategies that respond to people’s expectations.
To emerge from a particularly difficult situation, Mali will need both military and financial support from its partners. The country should also adopt a strategy that focuses on strengthening governance and explores the possibility of dialogue with jihadist groups. Several partners, including France, had long been opposed to the latter, giving de facto precedence to the fight against terrorism. Despite switching partners, Mali has persisted in an essentially military response, which continues to take a heavy toll on civilians. Bamako should rather make use of the space left by France’s departure to devise an approach that strikes a better balance between political and military solutions.
Bamako/Dakar/Brussels, 9 February 2023
