Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Overview

In an interview with the Research Directorate, a professor of comparative criminal justice at a university in Virginia who specializes on the Middle East indicated that public information is limited regarding the SSFC and that they are a "secretive" institution (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). In an interview with the Research Directorate, two representatives of SALAM for Democracy and Human Rights (SALAM DHR) [1] stated that information on the different ranks within the SSFC is "not commonly publicized," making it "difficult" to obtain specific details (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022).

Sources report that the SSFC is often referred to as "riot police" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 26; Assistant Professor 31 Dec. 2021a). A 2019 report [2] on the Ministry of Interior's (MOI) police force by Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB), an NGO that promotes "awareness of and support for democracy and human rights in Bahrain and the Middle East" "by documenting and highlighting human rights violations" (ADHRB n.d.), states that the SSFC is also "often referred to collectively as the 'commandos,['] … or 'special forces'" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 26). The Professor indicated that the SSFC is sometimes referred to as the "Special Security Forces" (SSF) or "special forces" (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). Sources stated that the SSFC can also be referred to as "mercenaries" (murtazaqa) (Professor 10 Jan. 2022; Assistant Professor 31 Dec. 2021a). The SALAM DHR representatives stated that the "English translation" of the SSFC's name "varies," and the "Arabic name" [قيادة قوة الأمن الخاصة (BIRD 13 Jan. 2022; ADHRB 14 Jan. 2022)] is "not always translated as SSFC" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022).

According to sources, the SSFC falls under the administration of the MOI (Barany 9 Dec. 2016, 11; SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022; ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 18–19). A 2011 report by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) [3] indicates that the "Special Forces Department" "report[s] directly" to the Public Security Forces (PSF) of the MOI (BICI 23 Nov. 2011, 52). According to the Executive Director of ADHRB, in correspondence with the Research Directorate, the SSFC is "under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Public Security Chief for Community Affairs through the Directorate of Community Police" (ADHRB 28 Dec. 2021).

The ADHRB report describes the SSFC as the "elite, paramilitary branch of the MOI," "its lead counterterror agency," the "premiere unit" of the PSF, and "the single unit most directly implicated in the vast majority of Bahrain's extrajudicial killings" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 26). According to a report by the US Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), the "Special Security Forces of MOI are the paramilitary law enforcement arm and include the riot police, SWAT and explosive team" (US 3 Sept. 2021, 3). The ADHRB report states the following:

In effect, the SSFC serves as the tip of the spear for crushing dissent in Bahrain, violently enforcing the government's ban on nonviolent criticism and peaceful protest under expanded anti-terror legislation that grounds its perpetual deployment. The SSFC lead near daily police assaults on pro-democracy demonstrations, and they are regularly at the forefront of nightly home raids in pursuit of individuals wanted by the [General Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Forensic Science (GDCIFS)]. (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 26)

A report by Zoltan Barany, a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) [4] and a professor of government at the University of Texas who specializes in Gulf state armies, states the following:

The SSFC is a paramilitary force that actually does much of the direct engagement with insurgents and the hostile segment of the opposition. They man the checkpoints and have become active in a new, post-2011 community-policing program (which now involves around 1,000 personnel) whose main caseload is composed of low-intensity incidents, such as domestic disturbances. Crucially, the community police personnel is not equipped with firearms: this detail is important because it allows the authorities to boost the number of Shi'a in the police—thereby scoring points with foreign critics—without actually creating a potential force of armed opponents. (Barany 9 Dec. 2016, 1, 11, 36)

Corroborating information on the SSFC's role in Bahrain's community-policing program could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The ADHRB report states that SSFC personnel "routinely employ excessive and often lethal force in dispersing protesters, storming homes, and making arrests," and ADHRB has "recorded 46 cases of individual abuse directly implicating the SSFC as the lead perpetrator, including 25 extrajudicial killings" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 27–28).

The ADHRB report states that SSFC members are "commonly identifiable" by their "red berets and black body armor" adorned with "SSFC" and that "[e]lite SSFC officers are often masked" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 26, 67).

The SALAM DHR representatives stated that the SSFC is "distributed across all four" of Bahrain's governorates, and their "main headquarters" for "training" is in Safra (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The same source added that the SSFC have "fire brigades" in Sitra, Budaiya, and the Naim "area," a "training center" in the "Muharraq area near the coastguard," as well as "two centers that they use for torture," including one "near Sitra (close to the coastguard)" and "another elsewhere used for any type of detention and spot torture" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). According to the same source, the SSFC also "uses" the MOI headquarters in Manama (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The ADHRB Executive Director stated that the SSFC "has a camp in [the village of] Askar," and officers are "deployed during cases of emergency" including "protests, riots in prison, raids, etc." (ADHRB 28 Dec. 2021).

1.1 History

According to sources, the SSFC was created in the [late (Bahrain Dec. 2017, 23)] 1930s to protect the country's "oil infrastructure" (Bahrain Dec. 2017, 23; ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 26).

The SALAM DHR representatives stated that after 1975, "when the National Assembly was dissolved," the SSFC "became active in the riots that ensued" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). Throughout the 1980s, the representatives added, the SSFC "developed larger groups and grew its ranks" amidst "unrest" and "demonstrations" as "a majority" of Bahraini Shia "opposed the authorities" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The SALAM DHR representatives stated that the SSFC continued to "expand their presence all over the country" during the 1990s (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022).

Sources indicated that in the early 2000s, there was a "lessening of antagonisms" between security forces and opposition groups (Professor 10 Jan. 2022) or demonstrators "were not attacked by security forces" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The Professor described this time as a "thawing period" (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). In 2006, according to the SALAM DHR representatives, SSFC forces were "rarely" encountered "in the streets" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The Professor indicated that since the Arab Spring events of 2011 in the Middle East, however, Bahrain has seen a "ramp up" during which "everything" has become "worse" and rather "draconian" in Bahrain "in terms of repression" (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). The SALAM DHR representatives stated that since February 2011, the SSFC are "much more prevalent" and can be seen in "huge numbers" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022).

2. Leadership, Structure, and Hierarchy of Ranks
2.1 Leadership

Bahrain News Agency (BNA), a state-run media company (BBC 8 Jan. 2019), reports that Decree 43/2019 made public the appointment of Brigadier Waleed [Walid] Abdullah Al Shamsi as "Commander of the Special Security Force in the rank of Director-General" (BNA 9 June 2019). According to a representative of the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), a non-profit organization advocating for democracy and human rights in Bahrain (BIRD n.d.), Brigadier Waleed Abdullah Al Shamsi has been "confirmed" as SSFC leader "as recently as" 28 September 2021 (BIRD 4 Jan. 2022).

Sources report that the Chief of Public Security is Lieutenant-General (BNA 17 June 2021; The Daily Tribune 9 Dec. 2021) or Major General (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 18) Tariq Al Hassan [Tariq al-Hassan] (BNA 17 June 2021; ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 18; The Daily Tribune 9 Dec. 2021). The SALAM DHR representatives explained that his role as the head of public security places him "in charge of the SSFC" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The ADHRB report, citing information released by Bahrain's Police Media Center, indicates that in 2016 Brigadier Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa was "appointed Deputy Chief of Public Security," "making him second-in-command of … national units like the SSFC" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 84).

2.2 Structure and Hierarchy of Ranks

According to the ADHRB Executive Director, rankings within the SSFC are "the same as" those of PSF "officers," "where individuals start as lance corporals, then progress to corporals, then sergeants, and so on" (ADHRB 28 Dec. 2021). The website of the International Encyclopedia of Uniform Insignia, which provides images of rank insignia, badges, and other military labels (International Encyclopedia of Uniform Insignia n.d.), provides the following ascending list of PSF rankings (as of 9 March 2013):

• lance corporal (jundi awwal)
• corporal (arif)
• sergeant (raqib)
• second lieutenant (mulazim thani)
• first lieutenant (mulazim awwal)
• captain (naqib)
• major (ra'id)
• lieutenant colonel (muqaddam)
• colonel (aqid) (International Encyclopedia of Uniform Insignia 9 Mar. 2013).

The Professor, however, stated that SSFC rankings "mirror" the 16 ranks found in the Bahraini police force (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). In follow-up correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Professor indicated that while the lowest five ranks are available to "non-college graduates," the remaining ranks require "college graduation," and the "highest rank [that can be] given to a woman is brigadier" (Professor 13 Jan. 2022). The same source provided the following ascending list of the 16 police rankings:

• officer (shirta)
• first officer (shirta aula)
• corporal (shirta naeeb areef)
• sergeant (areef)
• sergeant major (areef arfai)
• assistant second lieutenant (musaid mulazim thani)
• assistant first lieutenant (musaid mulazim aula)
• second lieutenant (mulazim thani)
• first lieutenant (mulazim aula)
• major (naqeeb)
• captain (raeed)
• lieutenant colonel (muqadam)
• colonel (aqeed)
• brigadier (ameed)
• major general (liwa)
• general (fareeq) (Professor 13 Jan. 2022).

The ADHRB report states that it is "unclear precisely how many companies the SSFC maintains," but that comments made by in 2017 SSFC Commander Brigadier Abdullah Al Zayed to Bahrain's Police Media Center about the SSFC indicated that it "consist[s] of at least two 'brigades'" which according to ADHRB "suggest[s] a total strength of approximately 12 companies" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 98). The same report indicates that the SSFC is composed of "several heavily armed battalions" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 26).

The ADHRB report states that the SSFC first began recruiting women to create a "female wing" of the SSFC in 2004 (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 26).

Sources report that in 2005 the SSFC formed a K-9 [canine] unit (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 26; Bahrain 25 July 2017). The MOI indicates that the unit's duties include "supporting the operations related to the maintenance of order and fighting riots, vandalism, crimes, terrorism and trafficking" as well as "carrying out search and rescue operations and VIP protection" (Bahrain 25 July 2017). The same source states that the K-9 unit also includes sections dedicated to "breeding and veterinary" (Bahrain 25 July 2017).

According to the Professor, owing to the fact that the "majority Shia [population] are described as being anti-government," Shia are excluded from joining the SSFC, and detainee reports have stated that SSFC members are "always Sunni and never Shia" (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). The Professor indicated that within the SSFC, there exists a "high demand for regime loyalty" (Professor 10 Jan. 2022).

2.3 Tasks for Ranks

Information on the specific tasks associated with SSFC ranks was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to the ADHRB Executive Director, tasks at the lowest ranks of the SSFC "are usually similar" to one another, while new tasks are "added on with each rank" (ADHRB 28 Dec. 2021). The same source, however, added that "eventually" tasks "change completely" [when personnel achieve a particular rank] (ADHRB 28 Dec. 2021).

2.4 Training and Promotion

According to the ADHRB Executive Director, recruits "who enter General Security undergo a training camp for 6 months" before they are "assigned" to specific units including the SSFC (ADHRB 28 Dec. 2021).

In his 2017 comments, the SSFC Commander Brigadier indicated that SSFC member training includes six months of "initial training," followed by "intensive training" over the next three months, before three additional months of training in "'anti-riot procedures'" (Bahrain Dec. 2017, 24). The same source stated that SSFC members must "pass other courses" in order to "rise up the career ladder" (Bahrain Dec. 2017, 24). The SSFC Commander Brigadier added that training courses, conducted by the "training school," a "specialised centre" of the SSFC, include courses on communications, "special naval operations," "air carriers, respirators, rescue and inspection systems, ammunition … , intelligence and security" (Bahrain Dec. 2017, 24).

The ADHRB report indicates that "mid-level and senior officers" from the MOI's security forces including the SSFC are "[v]irtually immune from prosecution"; they "are typically only reprimanded for failing to effectively suppress dissent" and they "rise through the ranks at a rapid pace" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 79).

3. Job Duties and Activities

In his December 2017 comments, the SSFC Commander Brigadier stated that SSFC tasks include "maintaining order, combatting terrorism, and 'protecting important installations'," and carrying out evacuations during "'disaster'" events (Bahrain Dec. 2017, 23). According to the ADHRB report, the SSFC is "regularly tasked with a wide array of responsibilities," including "crowd-control" and "coordinating security for major nation-wide events," and "maintains command responsibility for 'anti-riot' operations" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 26, 28). The Professor indicated that while the "main function" of the SSFC is to "respond to riots," noting that "even peaceful protests are considered riots," they are also tasked with conducting investigations on cases considered "politically sensitive" (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, an assistant professor of Middle East studies at Hamad Bin Khalifa University in Qatar and the author of a book on Bahrain's political history stated that the "nature of policing in Bahrain is that in times of crisis" public security forces including the SSFC "might be expected to undertake operations outside their defined roles," which "reflects" the SSFC's "poor training and poor role delineation" (Assistant Professor 31 Dec. 2021a).

According to the SALAM DHR representatives, "some SSFC officers have been sent" for training in the US (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The ADHRB report indicates that the SSFC is "one of the primary MOI beneficiaries of US security support" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 29).

Sources report that SSFC units "provided base security" at the US's Camp Leatherneck [in Helmand Province (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 98)] in Afghanistan (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 98; US 15 Dec. 2010). In follow-up correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Assistant Professor stated that "the fact [that] SSFC were trained at some point by US military forces" indicates "increasing paramilitarisation and loose role delineation" (Assistant Professor 31 Dec. 2021b).

3.1 Responding to Protests and "Crowd Control"

The ADHRB report indicates that since 2011, when Saudi National Guard troops and Emirati police officers entered the country and "assumed protection duty for important installations … from the SSFC," the SSFC has focused its attention on "suppressing demonstrations and dissident activity" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 26). According to the Professor, the SSFC was "fundamental" to the Bahrain government's response to the country's Arab Spring "unrest" in 2011 (Professor 10 Jan. 2022).

The ADHRB report states that "MOI security forces, and especially the SSFC, regularly use unnecessary or excessive force to apprehend targets and disperse protests" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 57). The report adds that the SSFC's "riot police units" "routinely respond to demonstrations, funeral marches, and other peaceful gatherings with overwhelming force," which includes the use of "dangerous 'crowd control' equipment and outright violence" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 57). One of the SALAM DHR representatives stated that in response to their organization of and participation in 2004 protest marches against US military operations in Iraq, they were "shot in the head" by SSFC forces who were "asked" by the MOI to "shoot at the protestors" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The other SALAM DHR representative added that in 2017, after they "gave details" to the media of an SSFC "attack" on a "gathering of people" in Duraz village resulting in the "killing of five people," they were "detained" (along with the reporting journalist) and both were "tortured" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022).

Sources report that in its efforts to disperse crowds, the SSFC uses weapons including tear gas and birdshot (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022; ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 57). The SALAM DHR representatives add that SSFC forces also use "sound bombs" and "rifles" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The SALAM DHR representatives stated that "it is common" for the SSFC to be deployed "in advance" of "marches or demonstrations," where they will have "one or two security vehicles in the road" and be "armed" with instruments including birdshot, sound bombs, rifles, and tear gas (as well as gas masks for their own protection)" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022).

According to the ADHRB report, in "dispersing protests" the SSFC and local governate personnel "routinely conduct mass arbitrary arrests," as in the May 2017 "detain[ment]" of 286 people following a "peaceful sit-in" in Diraz, which also resulted in "five protestors dead and hundreds injured" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 39, 85).

The ADHRB report indicates that the SSFC works "closely" with the police directorates of Bahrain's four governates "to execute protest raids and apprehend political activists, human rights defenders, religious leaders, and other suspected dissidents or critics active in their region" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 29). The same report indicates that the SSFC is supported by the Police Aviation unit in "'carry[ing] out operations and conduct[ing] security checks" in regions experiencing "disturbances and riots'" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 28).

3.2 Allegations of Detainment, Home Raids, and Interrogation

According to the 2019 ADHRB report, the SSFC is one of the "lead perpetrators" (alongside the Criminal Investigation Directorate (CID)) of "arbitrary detention and warrantless home raids," which are Bahrain's "most common human rights violations" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 39). According to the Professor, since 2011 the SSFC has been "one of the groups primarily involved" in conducting "night raids," in which someone the regime is "interested in detaining" will be "dragged out of their home in the middle of the night" (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). The same source indicated that the SSFC is also involved in "interrogating" those subjected to "night raids" (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). The ADHRB report states that when the SSFC and CID detain individuals, they "almost universally refuse to present legal grounds for their actions" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 39). According to the SALAM DHR representatives, the MOI will receive "assistance" from the SSFC when they "need to detain someone who they believe is a security threat" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The same source added that the SSFC will also "help authorities to pursue someone at checkpoints" in the country (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The ADHRB report states that since 2011, units within the MOI "particularly the CID with support of the SSFC ... have disappeared hundreds of individuals" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 42).

3.3 Allegations of Prison Oversight and Torture

The Professor stated that the SSFC "appears consistently" in human rights reporting on cases of "torture" in Bahrain, and often "specifically" as the "main source" of such torture (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). The same source stated that they were aware of an incident in which a man claimed the SSFC had "tortured" him, including by forcing him to stand for long periods, beating him, and subjecting him to isolation, electric shocks, and cold exposure (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). According to the ADHRB report, SSFC personnel have been "directly implicated in torture at [General Directorate of Reformation and Rehabilitation (GDRR)] detention centers" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 28). The same source cites a March 2015 incident in which the SSFC was "deployed" to Jau Prison, where they "utilized excessive force" in support of the GDRR's "quelling" of protests against conditions in the facility, before "subject[ing] the entire inmate population to collective punishment including torture" and "depriving them of food and sleep" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 28, 44). The same report states that according to "[m]ultiple prisoners," during the March 2015 Jau Prison events the SSFC also drew upon its K-9 unit by instructing "police dogs to maul inmates," and "several inmates identified an SSFC lieutenant as the commander of the dog attacks" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 28, 99–100). The report also indicates that "SSFC units and other MOI personnel fired tear gas into enclosed spaces and beat inmates indiscriminately, including minors" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 44).

3.4 Allegations of Extrajudicial Killings

The ADHRB report indicates that the SSFC is "the sole MOI agency most clearly implicated in the deaths of dozens of protesters since 2011," which are "linked predominantly" with "the SSFC and the weaponization of teargas and other crowd control equipment" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 28, 61). The same source states that in April 2011, SSFC units were "directly implicated in at least two extrajudicial killings," including the "killing of a six-year-old boy" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 98). The same report adds that in June 2011, the SSFC was "implicated" in four "extrajudicial killings" "committed" by the MOI (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 98).

4. Foreign Recruitment and Allegations of Sectarian Prejudice

The Professor indicated that there is "a lot of" foreign recruitment for the SSFC, and that is why it is "often" referred to as "the mercenaries" (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). The same source added that foreign recruits are Sunni Muslims who come from countries including Pakistan, Jordan, and Sudan (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). According to the SALAM DHR representatives, the SSFC recruits personnel from countries including Yemen, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Syria, Jordan, India, and Sudan, with "many" Syrian and Pakistani recruits at present (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The SALAM DHR representatives stated that "authorities use a systematic approach" to avoid employing "many Bahrainis" in the SSFC, and estimated that "90 percent" of SSFC personnel are "non-Bahrainis" who "cannot speak Arabic" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022).

The Professor indicated that foreign recruitment for the SSFC emerges partly because while Sunnis are a minority in Bahrain, they are the "ruling elite"; however, the elite view policing as a "lower class job," and thus need to employ Sunnis from abroad to staff policing positions (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). The same source noted that the ruling family in Bahrain propagates the idea that the country's Shia are part of a "transnational Shia collective" "led by Iran" that is "motivated to overthrow them," and they view Sunnis from abroad as "tied" to the royal family (Professor 10 Jan. 2022). The SALAM DHR representatives stated that because of the "sensitive nature and security dimension" of SSFC roles, "the leadership wants complete obeyance of their rules" and "feels" these roles "should be" filled by "non-Bahrainis" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022).

According to the SALAM DHR representatives, the SSFC "began employing" foreign recruits after 2011 (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The ADHRB report, citing reporting from Al Jazeera, indicates that between March and June 2011 the government "recruited over 2,500 former soldiers from Pakistan," "[n]one" of whom were Shia, "for service in both the MOI's SSFC riot police and the National Guard" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 68). The SALAM DHR representatives noted that foreign recruits, "especially Syrians," will "become naturalized after some time," and indicated that this was part of the government's effort to "change the demographics in the country to ensure greater loyalty" (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022).

The SALAM DHR representatives added that "all jails in Bahrain" have non-Bahraini guards (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022). The same source stated that SSFC "normal guards are often non-Bahrainis," while officer roles "can be [held by] Bahrainis" and "recently" "some" non-Bahrainis have been "allowed" to become officers (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022).

The SALAM DHR representatives indicated that a "policy" exists which requires that "each SSFC security vehicle … have four different nationalities represented," one of which can be Bahraini (SALAM DHR 5 Jan. 2022).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] SALAM for Democracy and Human Rights (SALAM DHR) is an NGO that "conducts monitoring and analysis, produces reports, develops recommendations on policy and legislation, organises advocacy campaigns, [and] conducts trainings," with the goal "of influenc[ing] British, European and UN representatives to improve the situation in the Middle East, and foster awareness of human rights and democracy" (SALAM DHR n.d.).

[2] The 2019 Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) report on the Ministry of Interior's police force is based on "reliable open-source information" and information from ADHRB's UN Complaint Program and internal case database, which is a collection of "discrete case[s] or incident[s]" based on "extensive interviews and primary source documentation obtained through [ADHRB's] fieldworkers and processed by [its] legal team" (ADHRB 3 Apr. 2019, 8).

[3] The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) is "'[a]n independent Commission of Inquiry … established" in 2011 by the King of Bahrain to "report on the events [which] occurr[ed] in Bahrain in February/March 2011" (BICI 23 Nov. 2011, 1).

[4] The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) is a Washington, DC-based "bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization" interested in security (CSIS n.d.).

References

Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB). 14 January 2022. Correspondence from the Executive Director to the Research Directorate.

Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB). 28 December 2021. Correspondence from the Executive Director to the Research Directorate.

Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB). 3 April 2019. Anatomy of a Police State: Systematic Repression, Brutality, and Bahrain's Ministry of Interior. [Accessed 12 Jan. 2022]

Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB). N.d. Homepage. [Accessed 4 Jan. 2022]

Assistant Professor, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar. 31 December 2021a. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Assistant Professor, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Qatar. 31 December 2021b. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Bahrain. December 2017. Ministry of Interior (MOI), Police Media Center. Hani Al Amoush. "May the Force Be with You: SSF Pledges Top Class Security." Al Amn. No. 98. [Accessed 4 Jan. 2022]

Bahrain. 25 July 2017. Ministry of Interior (MOI), Police Media Center. "Chief of Public Security Inspects K9 Unit." [Accessed 6 Jan. 2022]

Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI). 23 November 2011 (revised 10 December 2011). Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. [Accessed 11 Jan. 2022]

Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD). 13 January 2022. Correspondence from a representative to the Research Directorate.

Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD). 4 January 2022. Correspondence from a representative to the Research Directorate.

Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD). N.d. "About BIRD." [Accessed 11 Jan. 2022]

Bahrain News Agency (BNA). 17 June 2021. "Interior Minister Visits the Special Security Force." [Accessed 15 Dec. 2021]

Bahrain News Agency (BNA). 9 June 2019. "HM King Appoints Interior Ministry Officials." [Accessed 5 Jan. 2022]

Barany, Zoltan. 9 December 2016. The Bahrain Defence Force: The Monarchy's Second-to-Last Line of Defense. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). [Accessed 14 Dec. 2021]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 8 January 2019. "Bahrain Profile – Media." [Accessed 13 Jan. 2022]

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 13 Jan. 2022]

The Daily Tribune. 9 December 2021. "Interior Minister Attends RAP Graduation Ceremony." [Accessed 11 Jan. 2022]

International Encyclopedia of Uniform Insignia. 9 March 2013. "Rank Insignia - Police & Security: Bahrain." [Accessed 13 Jan. 2022]

International Encyclopedia of Uniform Insignia. N.d. Homepage. [Accessed 18 Jan. 2022]

Professor, a university in Virginia. 13 January 2022. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Professor, a university in Virginia. 10 January 2022. Interview with the Research Directorate.

SALAM for Democracy and Human Rights (SALAM DHR). 5 January 2022. Interview with representatives.

SALAM for Democracy and Human Rights (SALAM DHR). N.d. "About." [Accessed 11 Jan. 2022]

United States (US). 3 September 2021. Department of State, Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). OSAC Country Security Report Bahrain. [Accessed 15 Dec. 2021]

United States (US). 15 December 2010. Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Media Activity (DMA), Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS). "Bahraini Security Forces Transfer Authority." By Mark Garcia. [Accessed 12 Jan. 2022]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Gulf Centre for Human Rights; Human Rights First; Human Rights Watch; Organisation mondiale contre la torture; Project on Middle East Democracy; specialist in political behaviour in the Arab Gulf states at a university in Qatar.

Internet sites, including: Al Jazeera; Amnesty International; Australia – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Bahrain Center for Human Rights; Bahrain Mirror; Bertelsmann Stiftung; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Center for Civilians in Conflict; ecoi.net; EU – European Asylum Support Office; Factiva; FairSquare; GlobalSecurity.org; The Guardian; Gulf Centre for Human Rights; Gulf Daily News; Gulf Weekly; Human Rights First; Human Rights Watch; International Crisis Group; Jane's Country Risk Daily Report; Middle East Eye; Middle East Institute; Organisation mondiale contre la torture; Project on Middle East Democracy; UN – Human Rights Council, Refworld; The Wall Street Journal; The Washington Post.