The president, who appoints the prime minister, is elected by popular vote for up to two five-year terms. President Nyusi of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) won the presidential contest in 2019 with 73 percent of the vote. Additionally, because FRELIMO won the most votes in all provinces, it received the right to select all 10 of the country’s provincial governors. Turnout was reported at just over 50 percent.

The campaign was marred by violence, much of which targeted opposition members or their supporters, and several politicians and activists were killed. Anastácio Matavel, a respected independent election observer, was killed that October, with members of an elite police unit accused of carrying out the murder. Further violence was reported at dozens of polling stations on election day, as were instances of harassment of poll workers, notably those appointed by the opposition, with police taking part in the intimidation. Additionally, there were credible reports of ballot-box stuffing; interference with the registration of election observers; serious voting-register inaccuracies, particularly in Gaza Province; and tabulation irregularities. As in past elections, FRELIMO enjoyed a strong advantage due to its use of state resources to fund campaign activities and secure media coverage.

Opposition parties denounced the election as fraudulent. Civil society organizations characterized the polls as not free, unfair, nontransparent, and the worst since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1994. They also argued that the ruling party had captured the electoral machinery through the National Elections Commission’s (CNE) appointment process. International observers from the Community of Portuguese Language Countries, the European Union, and the US embassy expressed concern about the reports of irregularities and election-related violence, but ultimately recognized the outcome.

Members of the 250-seat unicameral Assembly of the Republic are elected to five-year terms. The 2019 legislative elections were held concurrently with the presidential election. FRELIMO took 184 seats, up from 144 previously. The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) won 60 seats, down from 89 previously, and the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) took 6 seats, down from 17 previously.

The legislative polls were marred by the same violence, irregularities, and fraud allegations as the presidential election. International observers objected to their conduct but accepted the results; opposition parties rejected the elections; and a coalition of civil society groups called them patently flawed.

Elections are administered by the CNE and a support body, the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration. While the CNE’s members hail from FRELIMO, RENAMO, the MDM, and civil society, FRELIMO effectively controls the selection process. Domestic and international observers have long argued that this structure has led to the politicization of the body and deeply undermines stakeholder confidence in its operations. Seven new CNE members were selected by the FRELIMO-controlled parliament in December 2020.

The CNE’s administration of the 2019 elections drew sharp domestic and international criticism. Among other significant issues, large discrepancies emerged between the CNE’s voter rolls and records kept by the National Institute of Statistics, notably in Gaza Province, a FRELIMO stronghold. CNE records showed more than 300,000 more registered voters in Gaza than voting-age adults counted in the 2017 census.

The right to form political parties is largely respected. While many parties compete, most lack resources to campaign effectively and build a public following. Opposition leaders face harassment and threats for speaking out against the government. Figures within FRELIMO perceived as acting in conflict with the aims of the party can encounter obstacles, including intraparty disciplinary measures. In August 2021, the corruption trial of several former ministers and a son of former president Armando Guebuza began, creating tensions within the ruling party.

FRELIMO first took power when Mozambique gained independence in 1975 and has maintained it since the 1992 agreement that ended the country’s civil war and the 1994 multiparty elections. Since then, FRELIMO has maintained an electoral advantage by using public resources to fund campaign activities.

In 2018, the parliament overwhelmingly approved constitutional reforms that would allow the indirect election of provincial governors, district administrators, and mayors. The changes were viewed as beneficial to RENAMO and a step toward greater decentralization and political stability. However, because FRELIMO secured an overwhelming victory in the severely flawed 2019 elections, ostensibly winning the most votes in all provinces, it selected all the country’s provincial governors, effectively nullifying the constitutional reforms.

Unelected elites in FRELIMO, including military figures and powerful businesspeople, retain great influence and play a large role in shaping the party’s platform. Civil servants face acute pressure to campaign and vote for the ruling party, and to make financial contributions to it. Those who openly support opposition candidates face intimidation by elements of the party embedded in state administration and the police.

Ethnic minorities are generally able to participate fully in political life, and people from various ethnic groups hold high-level government positions. However, FRELIMO’s support base lies in the extreme north and extreme south, and ethnic groups concentrated in other regions, such as the Ndau and Macua, are underrepresented. In 2019, three districts affected by the regional conflict in Cabo Delgado Province could not vote for security reasons. Many ethnic-minority voters who live there, notably members of the Makonde and Mwani ethnic groups that are concentrated in the region, were effectively disenfranchised. Women hold 42.4 percent of seats in the parliament, and a few were appointed to notable cabinet roles in a January 2020 reshuffle. Nevertheless, men continue to hold most key political positions.

Power remains generally centralized in the executive branch, which dominates the parliament and all other branches of government. The 2018 constitutional reforms introduced some measures to reduce centralization but were effectively overridden by FRELIMO’s victory in the severely flawed 2019 elections.

Foreign donors have significant influence on policymaking, specifically as it relates to economic policy and public sector reform. Business elites connected to FRELIMO have a strong impact on government decisions, particularly on those related to foreign investment in the oil, gas, and agriculture sectors.

Corruption remains widespread at the highest levels of government. Patronage networks are deeply entrenched, with various groupings competing for state resources. The anticorruption legal framework is undermined by a variety of loopholes: for example, embezzlement is not included in the Anti-Corruption Law. The judiciary, susceptible to pressure from the executive branch, further impedes the enforcement of anticorruption laws.

In August 2021, the corruption trial began for the perpetrators of the 2016 “dividas ocultas” (“hidden debts”) scandal, when three companies secretly and illegally received a more than $2 billion loan. Nineteen defendants—former high-level government officials, former finance minister Manuel Chang who approved the illegal loans, and the son of a former president—have been charged with corruption. President Nyusi, who was minister of defense at the time, has been cited by multiple defendants as having played a prominent role.

However, in November 2021, a South African court ruled that Chang should be extradited to the United States, where he was indicted in a New York district court in 2018; Chang had been imprisoned in South Africa since 2018. Mozambican authorities challenged the ruling.

Despite the passage of a freedom of information law in 2014, it is difficult to obtain government information in practice. The government is especially opaque regarding the Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado Province.

State-run outlets dominate the Mozambican media sector, and authorities often direct such outlets to provide coverage favorable to the government. However, several smaller independent outlets provide important coverage. Journalists frequently experience government pressure, harassment, and intimidation, which encourages self-censorship.

The government is known to retaliate against journalists who criticize them, including by cancelling public advertising contracts. Journalists and political commentators appearing on television programs have been the targets of attacks and kidnappings in recent years.

Police frequently harass, assault, and detain journalists. In October 2021, police officers assaulted reporter Armando Nenane in Maputo after covering a traffic accident; the officers demanded that he erase video footage on his phone.

Religious freedom is generally respected, but government responses to attacks by armed Islamists have involved closing mosques and detaining Muslim leaders, alarming human rights activists.

There are no legal restrictions on academic freedom. However, academics have been hesitant to criticize the government since law professor Gilles Cistac was murdered after supporting RENAMO in a televised appearance in 2015.

Civil society groups claim that authorities monitor criticism of the government posted online. There have been reports of government intelligence agents monitoring the emails of opposition party members.

Freedom of assembly is constitutionally guaranteed, but the right to assemble is subject to notification and timing restrictions. The government frequently disallows protests due to errors in the organizers’ official applications.

Despite these obstacles, protests do take place. In May 2021 in Tete Province, laborers protested outside the headquarters of Brazilian mining company Vale before a meeting between government representatives and the company about compensation claims. During the demonstration, two people were injured and many were detained by police.

Most nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operate without significant legal restriction. However, rights defenders and members of groups perceived as critical of the government continue to report acts of intimidation, which increased ahead of the 2019 election. NGOs involved in election-monitoring activity reported significant obstruction and harassment, including death threats.

The Mozambican Association for the Defense of Sexual Minorities (LAMBDA) has applied for registration multiple times since 2008 without success. While LAMBDA has operated with the occasional cooperation of local authorities, its legal status remains unresolved.

Humanitarian operations in northern Mozambique have some restrictions to operate freely because of violence in the region.

Workers have the right to form unions, but several restrictions impede the right to strike and make the practice rare. Public-sector workers are not allowed to strike.

Judicial independence is hampered by the dominance of the executive branch. The attorney general is directly appointed by the president, with no legislative confirmation process. Pressure from FRELIMO’s leadership often impedes investigations into corruption and fraud. While former president Armando Guebuza and members of his administration have been implicated in fraud and embezzlement, prosecutions were not promptly launched against them, though Guebuza-era finance minister Manuel Chang was eventually charged for corruption in late 2020. Observers claim that this historical inaction results from the influence of FRELIMO’s leadership.

Although due process rights are constitutionally guaranteed, these rights are not always respected in practice. RENAMO leaders assert that the police arrest members of their party arbitrarily. Due to resource constraints and an understaffed judiciary, lengthy pretrial detentions are common.

Fighting between RENAMO and FRELIMO lasted for over a year before the parties agreed to a truce in late 2016. While a formal agreement was reached in August 2019, a dissident group of RENAMO fighters resisted demobilization. In August and September 2020, this group reportedly launched several attacks against civilians in central Mozambique, leading to several dozen deaths. Mariano Nhongo, the leader of the dissident group, was killed in October 2021 in an apparent military operation, though the details are unclear.

Residents of Cabo Delgado Province continue to suffer from violence and displacement due to an ongoing Islamist insurgency. Insurgents captured towns in the north during 2020, killing and kidnapping civilians. Fighting continued in 2021, and the government reluctantly accepted support from regional partners, including Rwanda and the SADC, who helped reclaim significant territory. Security forces deployed to fight the insurgents have also been accused of extrajudicial killings, kidnappings, and other abuses.

Mozambican police reportedly discriminate against Zimbabwean, Somali, and Chinese immigrants. People with albinism continued to face discrimination, persecution, and violence.

Women experience discrimination in education and employment; on average, women are less educated and earn less than men. Sexual harassment in the workplace and at schools remains widespread. Homosexuality was decriminalized in 2015, but LGBT+ people face significant discrimination.

The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has increased in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces due to the escalating conflict. In September 2021, a Rwandan refugee living in Mozambique was murdered. Many Rwandan refugees, some of whom fled violence perpetrated by the Rwandan military, have reported feeling unsafe due to the Rwandan army’s presence in Cabo Delgado.

Although Mozambicans face no formal restrictions on domestic or international travel, movement is hampered by the presence of checkpoints manned by corrupt police officials, who often harass and demand bribes from travelers.

Hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans have been displaced due to the ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado Province. In December 2021, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recorded over 744,000 IDPs in Mozambique, mostly from Cabo Delgado. Many IDPs resided in the provincial capital of Pemba, pushing authorities to create a resettlement plan to decongest the city. Authorities in Niassa Province have also asked for help managing the displaced population.

The law does not recognize private property outside urbanized areas; citizens instead obtain land use rights from the government. Many citizens are uninformed about the land law and fail to properly register their holdings. The government must approve all formal transfers of land use rights in an often opaque and protracted process. As a result, most land transactions occur on an extralegal market.

There is no legal restriction to private business. However, businesspeople do face kidnappings and extortion.

Under customary law, women usually cannot inherit property. The government does not frequently intervene to protect women’s property rights when inheritance is denied.

Domestic violence is pervasive in Mozambique and laws against it are infrequently enforced. Early and forced marriages remain common in rural areas.

Mozambique has historically possessed one of the world’s highest rates of child marriage, though the government passed legislation closing a loophole that previously allowed the practice in 2019. Children and women have been especially impacted by ongoing violence in Cabo Delgado. Insurgents have kidnapped children to be used as soldiers, and women are being captured as sexual slaves.

Many women and girls from rural areas are at risk of becoming drawn into sex trafficking and domestic servitude. Government efforts to confront trafficking are improving but remain inadequate, according to the US State Department’s 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report, which also stated that the authorities did not proactively identify survivors outside of criminal cases and have not enacted an action plan or legislation that would better support them.

Child labor is permitted for children between 15 and 17 years old with a government permit. However, children under 15 frequently labor in the agriculture, mining, and fishing sectors, where they often work long hours and do not attend school. Many observers note that the government’s 2017 plan of action to address the high number of children who are employed has been ineffective.