Sri Lanka: Political situation and Rajapaksa regime, including trends in political culture; situation of political opponents, including the All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC), the People's Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna, JVP), the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), and the United National Party (UNP), and their treatment by the authorities and society; state protection (August 2019–May 2022) [LKA200987.E]

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

This Response to Information Request is an update to Response to Information Request LKA200592 of April 2021. For information on the political situation between 2017 and August 2020, including political parties and alliances, see Response to Information Request LKA200300 of August 2020.

1. Political Situation

The 2021 annual report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), covering the events of 2020, notes that, following the election of Gotabaya Rajapaksa as president in November 2019, "[f]undamental human rights protections in Sri Lanka came under serious jeopardy" (HRW 13 Jan. 2021, 625). HRW's report covering 2021 states that "security forces harassed and threatened human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers and the families of victims of past abuses, while suppressing peaceful protests" and that "[t]he government continued to target members of the Tamil and Muslim minority communities using the country's overbroad counterterrorism law, and policies that threaten religious freedom and minority land rights" (HRW 13 Jan. 2022). In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, an analyst with International Crisis Group who has worked in Sri Lanka since 2006, speaking on their own behalf, noted that after Rajapaksa came to power following the 2019 elections, there was a fear that there would be a "risk of grave human rights violations" and a "wave of repression" with a "clamp down" on activists and opposition politicians; the Analyst stated that "to some degree that did happen" with the 20th amendment to the Constitution giving the President "extraordinary power" and that "the whole system reoriented itself back to an aggressive assault on dissent" (Analyst 24 Mar. 2022). A February 2021 Amnesty International report on the repression of dissent in Sri Lanka between November 2019 and January 2021, based on interviews with human rights defenders, lawyers and journalists as well as media reports and case files, states that in the year after the new government assumed power, it "escalated" a "crackdown on dissent" into a "full assault"; "a climate of fear and censorship has quickly expanded around the country, targeting key voices critical of the government and human rights defenders" (Amnesty International 17 Feb. 2021, 4). According to Amnesty International's 2021/2022 report on human rights in the world, the government continued a "crackdown" on dissent with "[e]xcessive force" used by enforcement officers and "marginalization" of Muslims "increased" due to government policies "specifically targeting" Muslims (Amnesty International 29 Mar. 2022, 344). According to Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2022, which "assesses the transformation toward democracy and a market economy as well as the quality of governance in 137 countries," the president holds "disproportionate power over the other arms of government" with a "highly centralized system of government" that has "greatly diminished" the effectiveness of parliament, the public administration and independent oversight agencies (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 2, 14).

1.1 Constitutional Changes

Sources note that, on 22 October 2020, the 20th Amendment to the Constitution was passed with 156 of 225 legislators voting in favour of it (AP 22 Oct. 2020; ICJ 27 Oct. 2020; Wickramasinghe 1 Feb. 2021, 5). Sources report that the 20th Amendment rolls back the 19th amendment, adopted in 2015, which limited the powers of the president and strengthened the role of parliament (Al Jazeera 22 Sept. 2020; The Hindu 22 Oct. 2020; PTI 22 Oct. 2020). Similarly, the February 2021 OHCHR report notes that, in April 2015, Sri Lanka adopted the 19th Constitutional Amendment "which strengthened the independence of key institutions and the system of checks and balances on executive power" (UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 17). Sources report that the 20th Amendment gives the president the power to hold ministries, dismiss [and appoint (AP 22 Oct. 2020)] ministers, and dissolve parliament halfway through a five-year term (AP 22 Oct. 2020; The Guardian 23 Oct. 2020). An October 2020 Guardian article indicates that the 20th Amendment also gives President Rajapaksa "authority over formerly independent commissions that oversee elections, police, human rights and anti-corruption efforts" (The Guardian 23 Oct. 2020). Sources note that the 20th Amendment "undermines" (Amnesty International 17 Feb. 2021, 6) or "erode[s]" (UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 24) the independence of the judiciary and institutions (Amnesty International 17 Feb. 2021, 6; UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 24). The February 2021 Amnesty International report indicates that, under the 20th Amendment, the appointments of the Attorney General and police chief as well as appointments to the senior judiciary and independent commissions such as the Human Rights Commission "are effectively presidential appointments, undermining their independence" (Amnesty International 17 Feb. 2021, 6). The February 2021 OHCHR report states that the 20th Amendment "abolishes the Constitutional Council, which recommended appointments to the President, and re-establishes the Parliamentary Council, which is composed exclusively of politicians and may only make observations" (UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 24). A February 2021 article by Nira Wickramasinghe, a professor and chair of modern South Asian studies at Leiden University in the Netherlands, published in the journal Asian Survey [1], indicates that the 20th Amendment "will subordinate the prime minister and the Cabinet to the president, weaken the parliament's autonomy from the executive, remove all checks and balances on the executive, and render independent oversight and accountability frameworks ineffective" (Wickramasinghe 1 Feb. 2021, 5–6). However, the same source notes that "key constraints" remain, including term limits and a five-year term (Wickramasinghe 1 Feb. 2021, 6). According to a report from the Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) [2], the 20th Amendment "transformed the executive presidency into an all-powerful office with limited checks … ensuring that loyalists of the president and government hold key positions," including the superior courts and the Attorney General being appointed by the President (CPA July 2021, 9).

Sources report that the government appointed an expert committee to draft Sri Lanka's new Constitution in September 2020 (The Hindu 3 Sept. 2020; UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 25). A January 2021 article by the Island, a daily English-language newspaper in Sri Lanka, reports that the education minister stated that a draft of the new Constitution would be presented to Parliament by the end of 2021 (The Island 18 Jan. 2021). A March 2021 article by the Daily Mirror, an English-language newspaper in Sri Lanka, notes that the chairman of the ruling Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) party stated that "the Government would incorporate provisions in the proposed new Constitution to give legal protection for war heroes" (Daily Mirror 23 Mar. 2021). According to sources, drafting of the new constitution was finalized in October 2021 and it was to be presented to Parliament in January 2022 (EconomyNext 18 Oct. 2021) or early 2022 (PTI 19 Oct. 2021). Information on the new constitution could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

1.2 Accountability Processes

Sources report that, in March 2020, President Rajapaksa pardoned a soldier who was sentenced in 2015 for killing eight [Tamil (The Hindu 27 Mar. 2020; The New York Times 28 Mar. 2020)] civilians, including children (The Hindu 27 Mar. 2020; HRW 27 Mar. 2020; The New York Times 28 Mar. 2020). A March 2020 New York Times article notes that "[t]he pardon reverses one of the very few convictions from the 26-year civil war, during which dozens of militants and military officers were accused of war crimes" (The New York Times 28 Mar. 2020). Similarly, a March 2020 HRW article indicates that the soldier's case was one of "the very few cases of security force personnel being criminally punished for civil war-era atrocities, despite the huge number of credible and extremely serious allegations" (HRW 27 Mar. 2020). A March 2020 press briefing note on Sri Lanka by the Spokesperson for the OHCHR states that "[p]ardoning one of the sole convicted perpetrators of atrocities committed during the Sri Lankan conflict further undermines the limited progress the country has made towards ending impunity for mass human rights abuse" (UN 27 Mar. 2020).

According to a February 2020 Amnesty International article, in 2015 Sri Lanka's government co-sponsored the UN Human Rights Council's (HRC) resolution 30/1, "making commitments to promote reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka" (Amnesty International 27 Feb. 2020). The same source notes that Sri Lanka renewed these commitments with additional HRC resolutions in 2017 and 2019 (Amnesty International 27 Feb. 2020). The February 2021 OHCHR report notes that resolution 30/1 "provided a comprehensive road map of measures to ensure justice, provide redress to victims, achieve reconciliation and undertake important legal and institutional reforms to prevent the recurrence of violations" (UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 15). In February 2020, Sri Lanka's Minister of Foreign Relations, Skills Development, Employment and Labour Relations announced Sri Lanka's decision to withdraw from co-sponsorship of HRC resolution 40/1 on "'[p]romoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka'" and earlier resolutions 34/1 and 30/1 (Sri Lanka 26 Feb. 2020, 7). The Minister noted that Sri Lanka will pursue a "domestically designed and executed reconciliation and accountability process" and will appoint a Commission of Inquiry (COI), led by a Supreme Court justice, to "review the reports of previous Sri Lankan COIs which investigated alleged violations of [h]uman [r]ights and [i]nternational [h]umanitarian [l]aw" (Sri Lanka 26 Feb. 2020, 8). The February 2021 OHCHR report observes that, while previous reports on the implementation of resolution 30/1 indicate that "developments related to transitional justice had been inconsistent and subject to considerable delays," the previous government "made some progress on human rights issues" and "Sri Lanka seemed to be on a new path towards advancing reconciliation, accountability and human rights" (UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 16). The same source states that "developments since November 2019, however, have reversed that trend" (UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 16).

According to sources, in March 2021, the HRC adopted resolution 46/1 which establishes a new accountability process to "collect, analyze, and preserve evidence of international crimes committed in Sri Lanka for use in future prosecutions" (Ochab 1 Apr. 2021; HRW 25 Mar. 2021). In its resolution 46/1, the HRC also states that trends in the past year point to

a deteriorating situation of human rights in Sri Lanka, including the accelerating militarization of civilian government functions; the erosion of the independence of the judiciary and key institutions responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights; ongoing impunity and political obstruction of accountability for crimes and human rights violations in "emblematic cases"; policies that adversely affect the right to freedom of religion or belief; increased marginalization of persons belonging to the Tamil and Muslim communities; surveillance and intimidation of civil society; restrictions on media freedom, and shrinking democratic space; restrictions on public memorialization of victims of war, including the destruction of a memorial; arbitrary detentions; alleged torture and other cruel, inhuman degrading treatment or punishment, and sexual and gender-based violence; and that these trends threaten to reverse the limited but important gains made in recent years ... (UN 16 Mar. 2021, para. 7)

According to sources, the resolution was passed with 22 votes in favour, 11 votes against, and 14 abstentions (BBC 23 Mar. 2021; HRW 25 Mar. 2021; Reuters 24 Mar. 2021). Sources report that Sri Lanka's government opposed the resolution (HRW 25 Mar. 2021; Ochab 1 Apr. 2021; Reuters 24 Mar. 2021).

According to sources, in January 2020 the President established a Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) "to Investigate Allegations of Political Victimization" from 2015 to 2019 (US 30 Mar. 2021, 7; HRW 30 Apr. 2021). According to the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020, the PCoI "conducted 10 months of closed-door hearings, interrogating opposition politicians, as well as police, lawyers and judges who had led investigations into corruption and alleged human rights abuses and presented its findings to the government in December in a confidential 2,000-page report" (US 30 Mar. 2021, 7). According to HRW, the PCoI is a means to "derail investigations of [President Rajapaksa's] relatives and allies begun by the previous administration" (HRW 30 Apr. 2021). According to the same source, the Bar Association of Sri Lanka noted that the report from the PCoI, "'may undermine the Rule of Law in this country, impair the independence of the Judiciary, and erode the impartial and efficient functioning of the Attorney General's Department'" (HRW 30 Apr. 2021). The BTI report notes that the powers given to the PCoI by the administration were "unprecedented and potentially unconstitutional and illegal" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 13). The Analyst stated that the PCoI published a report "delegitimizing" "dozens" of cases opened by the previous administration, and also as part of the commission, "every single" person of prominence, senior politicians that had been in the previous government or had assisted in the election in 2015, or from other parties who did not end up being in government, "every single senior leader" in those parties were named in the report as "being involved in the conspiracy to politically victimize the Rajapaksas" and were named as "worthy" of having their civil rights revoked, such as voting or holding office (Analyst 24 Mar. 2022). The same source further noted that while the PCoI commission is operational, it has not made any decisions (Analyst 24 Mar. 2022).

1.3 Economic Crisis

According to sources, Sri Lanka is experiencing an economic crisis (Reuters 2 Apr. 2022; CNN 3 Apr. 2022). Sources note that protests occurred on 31 March 2022 outside of the President's residence with 53 protesters arrested (Al Jazeera 1 Apr. 2022; Reuters 2 Apr. 2022) and local media organizations stated that five news photographers were "held and tortured at a local police station" (Al Jazeera 1 Apr. 2022). On 1 April 2022, President Rajapaksa declared a state of emergency (Al Jazeera 1 Apr. 2022; Reuters 2 Apr. 2022), which allows for arrest and detention without trial (Al Jazeera 1 Apr. 2022). The Associated Press (AP) reports that the emergency powers give the President the ability "to protect public order, suppress mutinies, riots or civil disturbances or for the maintenance of essential supplies, … authorize detentions, seizure of property and search of premises … [and] change or suspend any law except the constitution" (AP 5 Apr. 2022). Sources report that a country-wide curfew was put in place from 2 to 4 April 2022 (Reuters 2 Apr. 2022) or for 36 hours starting the evening of 2 April (CNN 3 Apr. 2022; UN 5 Apr. 2022) and social media networks were shut down for 15 hours on 3 April (UN 5 Apr. 2022). According to CNN, despite the curfew, protests took place on 2 April and 664 people were reportedly arrested for violating curfew (CNN 3 Apr. 2022).

According to The Wire, an Indian non-profit news website, the President fired his brother Basil Rajapaksa as the finance minister and appointed Ali Sabry who resigned one day later on 5 April (The Wire 5 Apr. 2022). Reuters states that on 4 April 2022, the President revoked the state of emergency after 41 lawmakers left the ruling coalition to become independent members, forcing his government to a minority (Reuters 5 Apr. 2022). According to AP, on 5 April 2022 a group of governing party lawmakers called for the appointment of an interim government and "urged the speaker of Parliament to lead discussions with all parties to select an interim prime minister with the support of a majority of legislators" (AP 5 Apr. 2022). Reuters states that the President sought to form a unity government which was rejected by the opposition parties (Reuters 5 Apr. 2022). According to AP, the SJB, the largest opposition party, which holds 54 seats in Parliament, stated that it would not support any interim government and called for the resignation of the President (AP 5 Apr. 2022). The same source further states that to "pacify public anger," two brothers of the President—Basil Rajapaksa, who was finance minister, and Chamal Rajapaksa, who was irrigation minister—as well as the prime minister's son, Namal Rajapaksa, who was sports minister, resigned from their positions (AP 5 Apr. 2022). According to sources, on 9 May 2022, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa (brother of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa) resigned (Al Jazeera 9 May 2022; The Guardian 9 May 2022). The Guardian further notes that the President is the only remaining member of the Rajapaksa family still in power (The Guardian 9 May 2022). Sources note that Ranil Wickremesinghe was appointed as new Prime Minister and it will be his sixth time holding this position (Al Jazeera 12 May 2022; BBC 12 May 2022). The BBC notes that Wickremesinghe is the leader of the UNP and is "seen as being close to the Rajapaksa family" (BBC 12 May 2022).

1.4 Freedom of Expression, Association and Assembly

According to the BTI report, the right to freedom of association and assembly as guaranteed under the constitution is "restricted" in the Northern and Eastern provinces due to the history of civil war and these regions experience "extensive surveillance and military presence" with "[i]ndividuals claiming to be military intelligence routinely interview[ing]" activists and with protests and gatherings restricted and "subject to surveillance" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 10). The same source further notes that COVID-19 regulations have been used to prevent protests and demonstrations, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 10). The Analyst noted that there is "on the ground repression" of activists and NGOs who face "regular" questioning by police and security forces, including interrogations about their funding and why they oppose the government (Analyst 24 Mar. 2022). The same source also noted that there were "a lot" of arrests of protesters and that during COVID-19, quarantine was used punitively against protestors (Analyst 24 Mar. 2022).

According to the HRW 2022 annual report, "[t]he government suppressed freedom of expression, including by detaining and interrogating journalists" (HRW 13 Jan. 2022, 622). Sources state that 53 protesters were arrested at a protest in June 2020, and all individuals arrested were released on bail (The Hindu 10 June 2020; EconomyNext 11 June 2020). An article by the Hindu, an English-language Indian newspaper, notes that "most" of the individuals who were arrested were members of the Frontline Socialist Party (The Hindu 10 June 2020). According to sources, in February 2021 authorities attempted to ban a protest organized by Tamils and Muslims through court orders against the protest (ColomboPage 7 Feb. 2021; The Morning 24 Feb. 2021); the protest was led by the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and "several Tamil and Muslim political parties"; on the last day of the march, it was joined by "all the political parties that [had been] divided in the North" (ColomboPage 7 Feb. 2021). According to the Morning, a Sri Lankan newspaper, organizers and protesters were "vilif[ied]" in the media, and "some" faced "intimidation and reprisals" (The Morning 24 Feb. 2021). According to sources, in [July (HRW 13 Jan. 2022, 622)] 2021, protesters opposing an education bill were arrested (HRW 13 Jan. 2022, 622; Amnesty International 29 Mar. 2022, 345) and "some" spent "more than" 75 days in detention (Amnesty International 29 Mar. 2022, 345). According to sources, in April 2022 protesters responding to the economic crisis faced tear gas (The Wire 5 Apr. 2022) or tear gas and water cannons (Amnesty International 1 Apr. 2022; CNN 3 Apr. 2022) from police (The Wire 5 Apr. 2022; Amnesty International 1 Apr. 2022; CNN 3 Apr. 2022). According to a report from the International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP) [3], which interviewed fifteen Sri Lankan individuals who underwent "torture" while held in detention who then sought asylum in the UK; the individuals were "brutally beaten in detention, burned with hot metal rods, asphyxiated with petrol-soaked polythene bags, half drowned and then gang raped by the security forces" (ITJP Sept. 2021, 3–4). The source adds that interrogations focused on "why they had campaigned against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa in elections, or on why they were working against the Government by participating in peaceful protests or commemoration events for friends and relatives who had died in the civil war" (ITJP Sept. 2021, 3–4).

1.5 Militarization

The January 2021 HRW report notes that "President Rajapaksa transferred responsibility for large areas of civil administration to the Ministry of Defense, including the government's response to the Covid-19 pandemic" (HRW 13 Jan. 2021, 625). The February 2021 OHCHR report notes that "the past year has seen a deepening and accelerating militarization of civilian government functions" (UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 20). Similarly, an August 2020 article published in the Diplomat, a current affairs magazine covering the Asia-Pacific region (The Diplomat n.d.), reports that under President Rajapaksa, "the militarization of civilian institutions is mounting" (The Diplomat 7 Aug. 2020). A July 2020 article by Laxmanan Sanjeev, "a legal advisor and human rights activist from Sri Lanka," published in Foreign Policy (FP), states that "Rajapaksa has embarked on rapidly militarizing the state administration" and "has appointed a number of retired military officers to key positions in the civil administration" (Sanjeev 17 July 2020). Sources report that more than 30 agencies have been placed under the authority of the Ministry of Defence (Sanjeev 17 July 2020; HRW 13 Jan. 2021, 629). The February 2021 OHCHR report indicates that, on 29 December 2019, Sri Lanka's government brought 31 entities under the control of the Ministry of Defence, including the police, the National Secretariat for NonGovernmental Organizations, the National Media Centre, the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission, the Information and Communication Technology Agency, the National Dangerous Drugs Control Board, the Disaster Management Centre, and the Department of Immigration and Emigration (UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 21). The same source notes that, on 20 November 2020, the President placed the police under the new Ministry of Public Security, which is led by a former navy admiral (UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 21). The January 2021 HRW report notes that "retired and serving military officers were appointed to numerous key posts previously held by civilians" (HRW 13 Jan. 2021, 629). The OHCHR report also states that, "[s]ince the beginning of 2020, the President has appointed at least 28 serving or former military and intelligence personnel to key administrative posts" (UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 22). The CPA report notes that military officials holding key government positions is "undermining and side-lining subject matter experts and experienced civilian administrators" and that importance is given to Sinhala "nationalist ideology" which has made the military "increasingly partisan and political" (CPA July 2021, 9–10).

The February 2021 Amnesty International report notes that "many members of the armed forces, including some who were involved in the last phase of the war where the Sri Lankan forces are accused of committing serious [international humanitarian law] and [international human rights law] violations, have been promoted within military ranks or appointed to positions in the new government" (Amnesty International 17 Feb. 2021, 23). The February 2021 OHCHR report notes that "these appointments include senior military officials who have been alleged in United Nations reports to be implicated in alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity during the final years of the conflict," including Lieutenant General Shavendra Silva, who was appointed as Army Chief in August 2019, and Major General (retired) Kamal Gunaratne, who was appointed as Secretary to the Ministry of Defence in November 2019 (UN 9 Feb. 2021, para. 23).

1.6 Government's Response to COVID-19

Nira Wickramasinghe notes that Sri Lanka has taken "strong measures" to manage the COVID-19 pandemic and that starting on 20 March 2020, Sri Lanka entered "a police-managed lockdown with severe restrictions on civilian movements and zero tolerance of social gatherings" (Wickramasinghe 1 Feb. 2021, 2). The same source states that the military "is shouldering the responsibility for the national response—from overseeing quarantine centers to contact tracing" and that "[t]he [COVID-19] pandemic has created the space for a normalization of the military['s] presence in the civilian sphere" (Wickramasinghe 1 Feb. 2021, 3). The February 2021 Amnesty International report notes that the appointment of an army commander to lead the National Operation Centre for the Prevention of COVID-19 Outbreak "has set the tone for a militarized approach to the COVID-19 response" (Amnesty International 17 Feb. 2021, 24). An April 2020 situation brief on Sri Lanka's response to COVID-19 by the Adayaalam Centre for Policy Research (ACPR), a Jaffna-based "not-for-profit research think-tank that works on public policy issues in Sri Lanka with a special focus on issues affecting the Tamil polity" (ACPR n.d.), states that Sri Lanka's response to COVID-19 has been "heavily militarised" and that "[u]nlike other countries where the response is lead by public health officials who utilise the military as necessary, in Sri Lanka the military is squarely in charge of all aspects of the response" (ACPR 30 Apr. 2020, 5). The same source indicates that the military is also in charge of running quarantine centres (ACPR 30 Apr. 2020, 6). According to the HRW report covering 2021, the military response to the COVID-19 pandemic has "led to further serious rights violations" (HRW 13 Jan. 2022).

The February 2021 Amnesty International report states that the "COVID-19 pandemic presented further opportunities for imposing sweeping measures to restrict the rights to freedom of movement and expression" (Amnesty International 17 Feb. 2021, 23). According to the same source, "[i]n April 2020, the police announced that legal action would be taken against those criticizing the government's COVID-19 response" and that, in the first month of the lockdown, 17 people were arrested for sharing "'fake news'" (Amnesty International 17 Feb. 2021, 6). According to the HRW report covering 2021, the government implemented regulations to "prevent sharing information related to the pandemic" and that according to the Bar Association of Sri Lanka police orders "to combat 'fake news'" "'could' be misused by police" "'to stifle the freedom of speech and expression'" (HRW 13 Jan. 2022). A February 2021 HRW report on accountability for human rights abuses in Sri Lanka reports that in "a little over two months" authorities arrested "over 66,000 people for allegedly violating curfew restrictions" (HRW Feb. 2021, 17). The same source notes that "[t]he presence of security forces at checkpoints was particularly severe in the predominantly Tamil Northern Province" (HRW Feb. 2021, 17). Amnesty International notes that in May 2021, "the Secretary to the Ministry of Health issued an order threatening disciplinary action against health sector employees who spoke to the media about difficulties in tackling the Covid-19 pandemic" (Amnesty International 29 Mar. 2022, 345).

2. Treatment of Political Opponents

According to Freedom House, political parties are "able to operate freely and participate in elections," and opposition groups are "generally free" to conduct "peaceful political activities" and "are able to win power through elections" (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. B1, B2). The CPA report notes that in the 2020 Parliamentary elections, the results positioned the SJB as the main opposition, followed by the TNA who won ten seats, and the National People's Power (NPP) who won 3 seats and the Tamil National People's Front (TNPF) and Thamizhi Makkal Tesiya Kootani (TMTK) entered Parliament (CPA July 2021, 40). Freedom House notes that the UNP, which split from the SJB in "early 2020," received one national list seat (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. A2). Sources note that the SLFP secured one seat (CPA July 2021, 40; Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. A2). According to the BTI report, "[o]pposition parties are weak, disorganized and ineffective" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 35). The same source notes that members of the SJB are prone to joining the SLPP and smaller parties such as the JVP, and "over the last decade" the TNA, has regularly taken stances on the "importance of democracy" but lacks "broad popular support" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 35).

2.1 Treatment by Authorities

In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, a professor at an American university, who studies South Asian politics, stated that being a member of a political party is unlikely to cause someone to face harassment and that criticizing the government is not something people need to fear (Professor 18 Mar. 2022). The same source noted that the All Ceylon Makkal Congress (ACMC), JVP, SJB, SLFP, and the UNP are Sinhalese parties with minority members, and that these predominantly Sinhalese parties are "vocal and criticize the government" but individuals are not "in danger" for being a member (Professor 18 Mar. 2022). The same source added that over the past 25 years, the JVP has entered "mainstream" politics and their leaders are "the most critical" of the government (Professor 18 Mar. 2022). According to the Analyst, the main opposition parties have held rallies and are free to speak to the media and in parliament (Analyst 24 Mar. 2022). US Country Reports 2020 notes, however, that "according to civil society and political leaders," authorities used COVID-19 health recommendations "in some instances" to prevent political rallies from the opposition, but progovernment rallies were able to proceed (US 30 Mar. 2021, 19).

The Professor also noted that being connected to Tamil parties linked to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or being a member of a Muslim party or "associated" with the Easter bombings of 2019, including if an individual was taken into custody under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), even with no connection to the bombing, can be a reason for people to be "persecuted" (Professor 18 Mar. 2022). The Analyst stated that the opposition does not face formal limits to speech and platforms, but the government can "make their life difficult" with courts and police loyal to the regime (Analyst 24 Mar. 2022). The same source further stated that if an opposition member speaks out in parliament, "the next day they may be questioned as a form of intimidation," and they could be held under the PTA "indefinitely" (Analyst 24 Mar. 2022). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Executive Director of Law & Society Trust (LST), a not-for-profit organization "engaged in legal research, advocacy and human rights documentation" (LST n.d.) noted that "[s]everal opposition parliamentarians have been arrested and jailed" and that until the recent economic crisis, it was not possible to hold protests free of intimidation (Executive Director 15 Mar. 2022). Similarly, the Analyst noted that there are currently a "large number" of legal cases against key political opposition members (Analyst 24 Mar. 2022).

2.2 Treatment by Society

Information on the treatment of political opponents by society was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response. According to the CPA report, there has a been a "spate of criticism" against the SJB, due to the opposition's inability to challenge the current government's issues, such as "corruption, discrimination and violence" (CPA July 2021, 39).

3. State Protection

Information on availability of state protection for political opponents could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

4. Counterterrorism Laws

According to the HRW report covering 2021, the PTA has "for decades been used to enable prolonged arbitrary detention and torture" (HRW 13 Jan. 2022, 621). The Analyst noted that the PTA has been used to arrest those who organize criticism of the government, including activists, lawyers and political protestors (Analyst 24 Mar. 2022). HRW further states that in 2021, President Rajapaksa issued two ordinances that would make the law "more abusive," including an order issued in March that would "allow two years of 'rehabilitation' detention without trial for anyone accused by the authorities of causing 'religious, racial, or communal disharmony'" (HRW 13 Jan. 2022, 621–622). Similarly, Amnesty International notes that the PTA targets critics from minority communities using arbitrary arrests and prolonged detention, with the new regulations "issued under the Act" "effectively" denying suspects a hearing, and forcing them to attend mandatory "'rehabilitation'" (Amnesty International 29 Mar. 2022, 344). HRW also notes that "many" prisoners, particularly from minority communities, are kept in pretrial detention for "many years" under the PTA, or are serving lengthy sentences after convictions based on confession obtained under torture (HRW 13 Jan. 2022, 622). According to Amnesty International, in January 2022 the government announced amendments to the PTA, but these amendments "fail to address critical gaps in the law" and do not "bring it in line with international law or standards" (Amnesty International 18 Mar. 2022).

According to the CPA report, since 2019 the PTA, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and other pieces of legislation have been used to "silence dissent" with members of minorities "disproportionately" targeted (CPA July 2021, 33). The BTI report notes that the PTA and the ICCPR have been used by the police "to arrest and detain persons expressing legitimate political opinions" and that individuals arrested include "Muslim and Tamil civil society activists, poets and some Sinhala writers who have criticized Buddhist monks" (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2022, 11).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] Asian Survey is an academic journal by the University of California Press (UC Press) that publishes articles on a range of topics, including diplomacy, disarmament, defence, military, modernization, ethnicity, ethnic violence, economic nationalism, elections, and global capitalism, with a focus on South, Southeast, and East Asian nations (Asian Survey n.d.).

[2] The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) aims to "strengthen the civil society contribution to public policy making through programmes of research and advocacy in the areas of democratic governance and peace with human rights as an overarching priority" (CPA n.d.).

[3] The International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP) is an independent, non-profit organization based in South Africa which publishes reports and press releases and aims "to protect and promote justice and accountability in Sri Lanka" (ITJP n.d.).

References

Adayaalam Centre for Policy Research (ACPR). 30 April 2020. Covid-19: Sri Lanka's Militarised Response Poses Grave Threats to Human Rights. Situation Brief No. 3. [Accessed 29 Mar. 2021]

Adayaalam Centre for Policy Research (ACPR). N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 1 Apr. 2021]

Al Jazeera. 12 May 2022. Aanya Wipulasena. "Ranil Wickremesinghe: Sri Lanka's Returning Prime Minister." [Accessed 13 May 2022]

Al Jazeera. 9 May 2022. "Sri Lanka PM Mahinda Rajapaksa Resigns as Crisis Worsens." [Accessed 13 May 2022]

Al Jazeera. 1 April 2022. "Sri Lanka Declares State of Emergency as Protests Spread." [Accessed 5 Apr. 2022]

Al Jazeera. 22 September 2020. "Sri Lanka: Bill Granting More Powers to President Tabled." [Accessed 30 Mar. 2021]

Amnesty International. 1 April 2022. "Sri Lanka: Authorities Must Respect Peoples' Right to Protest." [Accessed 5 Apr. 2022]

Amnesty International. 29 March 2022. "Sri Lanka." Amnesty International Report 2021/2022: The State of the World's Human Rights. [Accessed 4 Apr. 2022]

Amnesty International. 18 March 2022. "Amnesty International Commentary on the Prevention of Terrorism Act Amendment Bill." [Accessed 5 Apr. 2022]

Amnesty International. 17 February 2021. Old Ghosts in New Garb: Sri Lanka's Return to Fear. (ASA 37/3659/2021) [Accessed 29 Mar. 2021]

Amnesty International. 27 February 2020. "Sri Lanka: Withdrawal from UN Commitments Requires Robust Response by Human Rights Council." [Accessed 26 Mar. 2021]

Analyst, International Crisis Group. 24 March 2022. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.

Asian Survey. N.d. "About." [Accessed 30 Mar. 2021]

Associated Press (AP). 5 April 2022. Bharatha Mallawarachi and Eranga Jayawardena. "Sri Lankan Lawmakers Seek Interim Government to Solve Crisis." [Accessed 5 Apr. 2022]

Associated Press (AP). 22 October 2020. Krishan Francis. "Sri Lanka Parliament Votes to Strengthen Presidential Power." [Accessed 29 Mar. 2021]

Bertelsmann Stiftung. 2022. "Sri Lanka Country Report." Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) 2022. [Accessed 7 Apr. 2022]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 12 May 2022. George Wright. "Ranil Wickremesinghe: Sri Lanka's New Prime Minister Faces Uphill Battle." [Accessed 13 May 2022]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 23 March 2021. "UN to Collect Evidence of Alleged Sri Lanka War Crimes." [Accessed 1 Apr. 2021]

Cable News Network (CNN). 3 April 2022. Rukshana Rizwie, Iqbal Athas and Julia Hollingsworth. "Sri Lanka Is in an Economic Crisis. Here’s What It's Like for People on the Ground." [Accessed 5 Apr. 2022]

Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA). July 2021. Bhavani Fonseka and Uvin Dissanayake. Sri Lanka’s Vistas of Prosperity and Splendour: A Critique of Promises Made and Present Trends. [Accessed 6 Apr. 2022]

Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA). N.d. "About." [Accessed 8 Apr. 2022]

ColomboPage. 7 February 2021. "Protest March by Tamil Political Parties and Civil Society Against Suppression of Minorities in Sri Lanka Concludes." [Accessed 6 Apr. 2022]

Daily Mirror. 23 March 2021. Kelum Bandara. "Provisions in New Constitution to Protect War Heroes – Minister." [Accessed 6 Apr. 2021]

The Diplomat. 7 August 2020. Sudha Ramachandran. "Sri Lanka: The Rajapaksas Rise Again." [Accessed 26 Mar. 2021]

The Diplomat. N.d. "The Diplomat." [Accessed 1 Apr. 2021]

EconomyNext. 18 October 2021. "Sri Lanka's Proposed New Constitution to Be Ready by Jan 2022: Minister." [Accessed 8 Apr. 2022]

EconomyNext. 11 June 2020. Arjuna Ranawana and Imesh Ranasinghe. "Cabinet 'Disapproves' of the Way Police Handled Black Lives Matter Demos in Colombo on Tuesday – Bandula." [Accessed 6 Apr. 2022]

Executive Director, Law & Society Trust (LST). 15 March 2022. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.

Freedom House. 3 March 2021. "Sri Lanka." Freedom in the World 2021. [Accessed 6 Apr. 2022]

The Guardian. 9 May 2022. Hannah Ellis-Petersen. "Sri Lanka's PM Resigns After Weeks of Protests over Economic Crisis." [Accessed 13 May 2022]

The Guardian. 23 October 2020. Hannah Ellis-Petersen. "Sri Lanka President Tightens Grip with Constitutional Changes." [Accessed 29 Mar. 2021]

The Hindu. 22 October 2020. Meera Srinivasan. "Sri Lanka: Controversial 20th Amendment Passed." [Accessed 30 Mar. 2021]

The Hindu. 3 September 2020. Meera Srinivasan. "Sri Lankan Cabinet Appoints Panel to Draft New Constitution." [Accessed 30 Mar. 2021]

The Hindu. 10 June 2020. Meera Srinivasan. "Concern over 'Police Brutality' in Sri Lanka." [Accessed 6 Apr. 2022]

The Hindu. 27 March 2020. Meera Srinivasan. "Sri Lanka Frees Soldier Who Killed 8 Tamils." [Accessed 30 Mar. 2021]

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 13 January 2022. "Sri Lanka." World Report 2022: Events of 2021. [Accessed 4 Apr. 2022]

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 30 April 2021. "Sri Lanka: Reject 'Political Victimization' Findings." [Accessed 6 Apr. 2022]

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 25 March 2021. "Sri Lanka: Landmark UN Resolution Promotes Justice." [Accessed 1 Apr. 2021]

Human Rights Watch (HRW). February 2021. Open Wounds and Mounting Dangers: Blocking Accountability for Grave Abuses in Sri Lanka. [Accessed 29 Mar. 2021]

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 13 January 2021. "Sri Lanka." World Report 2021: Events of 2020. [Accessed 15 Mar. 2021]

Human Rights Watch (HRW). 27 March 2020. "Sri Lanka: Justice Undone for Massacre Victims." [Accessed 29 Mar. 2021]

International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). 27 October 2020. "Sri Lanka: Newly Adopted 20th Amendment to the Constitution Is Blow to the Rule of Law." [Accessed 29 Mar. 2021]

International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP). 8 September 2021. Yasmin Sooka and Frances Harrison. Sri Lanka: Torture & Sexual Violence by Security Forces 2020-21. [Accessed 7 Apr. 2022]

International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP). N.d. "About." [Accessed 31 Mar. 2022]

The Island. 18 January 2021. Cyril Wimalasurendre. "New Constitution to Parliament Before End of 2021 – Prof. Peiris." [Accessed 6 Apr. 2021]

Law & Society Trust (LST). N.d. "About Us." [Accessed 1 Apr. 2022]

The Morning. 24 February 2021. Mahendran Thiruvarangan. "The P2P March and Beyond, ReImagining Resistance Amidst Ethnic Polarisation." [Accessed 6 Apr. 2022]

The New York Times. 28 March 2020. Maria Abi-Habib and Dharisha Bastians. "As Pandemic Rages, Sri Lanka's President Pardons a War Criminal." [Accessed 30 Mar. 2021]

Ochab, Ewelina U. 1 April 2021. "A Step Towards Justice for the 26 Year Civil War in Sri Lanka?" Forbes. [Accessed 1 Apr. 2021]

Press Trust of India (PTI). 19 October 2021. "Sri Lanka's Draft of New Constitution Expected to be Ready for Parliament's Nod by Early 2022: Minister." [Accessed 8 Apr. 2022]

Press Trust of India (PTI). 22 October 2020. "Sri Lankan Parliament Passes 20A with Two-Thirds Majority." [Accessed 30 Mar. 2021]

Professor, a university in the US. 18 March 2022. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.

Reuters. 5 April 2022. Uditha Jayasinghe and Devjyot Ghoshal. "Sri Lanka President Revokes Emergency Order, Govt in Disarray as Economic Crisis Deepens." [Accessed 5 Apr. 2022]

Reuters. 2 April 2022. Uditha Jayasinghe. "Sri Lanka Imposes Curfew After President Declares State of Emergency." [Accessed 5 Apr. 2022]

Reuters. 24 March 2021. Alasdair Pal. "What Does UN Human Rights Resolution Mean for Sri Lanka?" [Accessed 1 Apr. 2021]

Sanjeev, Laxmanan. 17 July 2020. "Is Sri Lanka Becoming a De Facto Junta?" Foreign Policy (FP). [Accessed 26 Mar. 2021]

Sri Lanka. 26 February 2020. "Statement by Hon. Dinesh Gunawardena, Minister of Foreign Relations, Skills Development, Employment and Labour Relations of Sri Lanka." Statement made at the 43rd Session of the Human Rights Council (HRC), Geneva, Switzerland, 26 February 2020. [Accessed 29 Mar. 2021]

United Nations (UN). 5 April 2022. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). "Sri Lanka: Concern at Measures in Response to Protests Amid Economic Crisis." [Accessed 5 Apr. 2022]

United Nations (UN). 16 March 2021. Human Rights Council (HRC). Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and Human Rights in Sri Lanka. (A/HRC/46/L.1/Rev.1) [Accessed 1 Apr. 2021]

United Nations (UN). 9 February 2021. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability and Human Rights in Sri Lanka: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (A/HRC/46/20) [Accessed 26 Mar. 2021]

United Nations (UN). 27 March 2020. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). "Press Briefing Note on Sri Lanka." [Accessed 30 Mar. 2021]

United States (US). 30 March 2021. Department of State. "Sri Lanka." Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020. [Accessed 7 Apr. 2022]

Wickramasinghe, Nira. 1 February 2021. "Sri Lanka in 2020: Return to Rajapaksa Regnum." Asian Survey. Vol. 61, No. 1. [Accessed 29 Mar. 2021]

The Wire. 5 April 2022. "Sri Lanka's New Finance Minister Resigns a Day After Appointment." [Accessed 5 Apr. 2022]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Adayaalam Centre for Policy Research; American Institute for Sri Lankan Studies; Amnesty International – representative in Canada; Centre for Policy Alternatives; Council of NGOs – Jaffna District; Front Line Defenders; INFORM Human Rights Documentation Centre; International Truth and Justice Project; Journalists for Democracy in Sri Lanka; lecturer at a Canadian university specializing in conflict prevention who has conducted field work in Sri Lanka; lecturer in conflict and justice at a university in the UK with a research focus on Sri Lanka; National Peace Council of Sri Lanka; People for Equality and Relief in Lanka; professor at a university in the UK with a research focus on peace and conflict studies in South Asia; professor in peace and security studies at an American university with a research focus on South Asia; professor of conflict analysis at an American university with specialization in conflict in Sri Lanka; professor of political science at a Sri Lankan university; researcher of Sri Lankan foreign policy; Sri Lanka – Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka; UN – UNHCR.

Internet sites, including: ABC News; Asylum Research Centre; Belgium – Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides; Brookings Institution; Business Standard; Center for Human Rights and Development; Ceylon Today; Challenges; Colombo Telegraph; Council on Foreign Relations; Daily News; Denmark – Danish Immigration Service; Deutsche Welle; ecoi.net; The Economist; EU – EU Agency for Asylum; Factiva; Fédération internationale pour les droits humains; France – Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides; German Institute for International and Security Affairs; Groundviews; The Indian Express; International Crisis Group; Journalists for Democracy in Sri Lanka; The New Humanitarian; The New Indian Express; News First; Observer Research Foundation; openDemocracy; Organisation suisse d'aide aux réfugiés; Outlook India; People for Equality and Relief in Lanka; Political Handbook of the World 2018–2019; The South Asia Collective; South Asia Monitor; Sri Lanka – Department of Census and Statistics, Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka; Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice; Sri Lanka Guardian; Tamil Guardian; Transparency International Sri Lanka; UK – Home Office; UN – UN News, Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the UN, Refworld; US – Congressional Research Service; University of Colombo – Centre for the Study of Human Rights; Verité Research; Voice of America; The Washington Post; World Bank.

Associated documents