Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
1. Overview
The Irish Times, a newspaper in Ireland, indicates that Los Zetas has "fragmented" (The Irish Times 9 Apr. 2020). According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an "independent" and "nonpartisan" US-based think tank and publisher on international affairs (CFR n.d.), Los Zetas "has lost power in recent years and fractured into rival wings" (CFR 26 Feb. 2021). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a research professor at the Centre for Research and Higher Studies in Social Anthropology (Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social, CIESAS) in Mexico City, whose research focuses on Mexico's drug trafficking organizations, indicated that "nowadays," Los Zetas has fragmented and weakened, and therefore, can no longer be considered a single organization (Research Professor 9 Mar. 2022). Diario de Yucatán, a newspaper based in Yucatán, reports that according to [translation] "drug trafficking researchers consulted in Mexico City by Central 9, the Investigative Journalism Unit of Grupo Megamedia," Los Zetas "no longer exist as [a] national organizatio[n]"; rather, "they have been fragmented into many groups, often in conflict with each other" (Diario de Yucatán 12 Oct. 2020). The US Congressional Research Service (CRS) states that according to analysts, the structures of the Gulf Cartel (Cártel del Golfo) and Los Zetas "have been decimated by federal action and combat between each other, and both groups now operate largely as fragmented cells" that "often take on new names" (US 28 July 2020, 22). In an interview with the Research Directorate, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Montreal who focuses on organized crime in Mexico noted that although Los Zetas has fragmented and regrouped into smaller gangs, "it is difficult to say that they do not exist anymore," given that the same individuals continue to take part in the fragmented cells (Postdoctoral researcher 10 Mar. 2022). In an interview with the Research Directorate, a Mexico-based independent researcher who focuses on security and organized crime in Mexico noted that while Los Zetas is no longer "traditionally structured, there are a lot of copycats or imitators that present themselves as Los Zetas and are involved in illicit activities," including Unidad Zetas, Comando Zetas, Grupo Delta Zetas, Grupo Operativo Zetas, Grupo Dragones, Fuerzas Especiales Zetas, Sangre Zeta, El Circulo, El Extranjero, and Grupo Nectar Lima (Independent researcher 16 Mar. 2022).
Sources report that the fragmentation of Los Zetas has resulted in the formation of the Northeast Cartel (Cártel del Noreste) (Milenio 23 June 2021; Diario de Yucatán 12 Oct. 2020; US 28 July 2020, 23) and Los Zetas Vieja Escuela (ZVE) (Milenio 23 June 2021; US 28 July 2020, 23). According to sources, the Northeast Cartel is the "most prominent faction" of Los Zetas (US Mar. 2021, 67) or is "more powerful" than ZVE (Associate Professor 11 Mar. 2022).
2. Areas of Operation and Influence
According to the CRS, "many observers dispute the scope of the territory now held by major Los Zetas factions and how fragmentation influenced the formerly cohesive group's prospects"; however, "most concur that the organization is no longer as powerful as it was during the peak of its dominance in 2011 and 2012" (US 28 July 2020, 23).
Sources indicated that Los Zetas are active in Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Nuevo Léon, San Luis Potosí, Veracruz (Postdoctoral researcher 10 Mar. 2022; Independent consultant 15 Mar. 2022), Tabasco, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Zacatecas, State of Mexico, Hidalgo, Tlaxcala, and Puebla (Independent consultant 15 Mar. 2022). The independent researcher stated that fragmented cells can be found in Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Tabasco, Campeche, Quintana Roo, Baja California, Chihuahua. and Yucatán, but noted that Campeche and Mérida are less violent compared to Veracruz and Tamaulipas (Independent Researcher 16 Mar. 2022).
According to a report by Lantia Intelligence, a digital data platform on violence, organized crime, and social conflict in Mexico (Lantia Intelligence n.d.) whose research is based on open-source intelligence verified through information from newspapers, periodicals, social media, and academic studies, the Northeast Cartel [translation] "and its armed wing," the Troop from Hell (Tropa del Infierno), "are responsible for generating violence in Coahuila, Nuevo León, San Luis Potosí, Tamaulipas and Veracruz" (Lantia Intelligence 20 Jan. 2021, 3, 8). The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) notes that "members" of Los Zetas and the Northeast Cartel "smuggle" drugs in Coahuila, Nuevo León, and "parts of Tamaulipas" (US Mar. 2021, 67). In an interview with the Research Directorate, an associate professor at Sam Houston State University in Texas who researches drug violence, drug trafficking organizations, and border security in Mexico indicated that the Northeast Cartel has a presence in Coahuila, Nuevo León, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí, Quintana Roo, Campeche, and Nuevo Laredo (Associate Professor 11 Mar. 2022). According to the Research Professor, "there are still some remnants" of Los Zetas "in some regions" of Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Veracruz, although "they do not seem to be as cohesive as they were in the past" (Research Professor 9 Mar. 2022).
Lantia Intelligence indicates that the ZVE operates in Hidalgo, Quintana Roo, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, and Veracruz (Lantia Intelligence 20 Jan. 2021, 8). According to the Associate Professor, the ZVE operates "primarily" in the Gulf Coast, which includes Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Zacatecas, Veracruz, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, and Tabasco (Associate Professor 11 Mar. 2022). Milenio, a national newspaper in Mexico, reports that the ZVE [translation] "maintains a presence in most of Tamaulipas, in municipalities such as San Fernando, El Mante, Ocampo, Méndez, San Carlos, [and] Ciudad Tula, as well as in 15 other municipalities" (Milenio 23 June 2021). According to the Associated Press (AP), "[t]urf battles have become common in Tamaulipas, where remnants of the Gulf [C]artel and the old Zetas gang have been fighting for more than 10 years" (AP 27 July 2021).
Another AP article indicates that "remnants" of Los Zetas are "jockeying for turf" in Zacatecas, with the Sinaloa Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel (Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, CJNG), Gulf Cartel and Northeast Cartel (AP 25 June 2021).
Diario de Yucatán reports that Los Zetas is one of [translation] "at least" 3 of the 19 "high-impact criminal organizations" identified by the Financial Intelligence Unit of Mexico's Ministry of Finance operating in Yucatán (Diario de Yucatán 12 Oct. 2020). Corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.
For further information on the CJNG and the Sinaloa Cartel, see Responses to Information Requests MEX200732 and MEX200733 of September 2021.
3. Activities of Los Zetas Cartel
Sources stated that Los Zetas cells are involved in drug trafficking, human trafficking (Postdoctoral researcher 10 Mar. 2022; Associate Professor 11 Mar. 2022; independent consultant 15 Mar. 2022), arms trafficking, oil theft (Postdoctoral researcher 10 Mar. 2022; Associate Professor 11 Mar. 2022), "large-scale ambushes," extorsion, information exchange, control of checkpoints and prisons, and corruption (Associate Professor 11 Mar. 2022). According to Milenio, federal government reports indicate that the ZVE, Northeast Cartel and four splinter cells of the Gulf Cartel are [translation] "engaged in a fight to the death" over trafficking of drugs, weapons, and migrants in Tamaulipas (Milenio 23 June 2021). The CRS report indicates that fragmented cells of the Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas "have expanded into other criminal operations," including "fuel theft, kidnapping, and widespread extortion" (US 28 July 2020, 23). However, the Research Professor noted that since Los Zetas have become "weaker," they have been less involved in transnational drug trafficking and are "mostly" focused on extortion of local businesses and oil theft (Research Professor 9 Mar. 2022).
4. Ability and Motivation of Los Zetas to Track and Retaliate Against Individuals
According to the postdoctoral researcher, if an individual leaves the states where Los Zetas cells have influence, it would be difficult for the organization to track them due to a lack of resources and connections within the government and police (Postdoctoral researcher 10 Mar. 2022). However, in correspondence with the Research Directorate, an independent consultant who focuses on security, crime prevention, and information systems in Mexico stated that Los Zetas is "capable of tracking down enemies, defectors, and people of specific interest, including people fleeing to other states and cities" using "different methods ranging from direct tracking to information provided by corrupt authorities" (Independent consultant 15 Mar. 2022). Similarly, the Research Professor indicated that although Los Zetas has "fragmented," "it may not be too hard for a specific violent actor to retaliate against a person, no matter where in the country the latter may be relocated" due to the "current situation of impunity and weakness of the rule of law" in Mexico (Research Professor 9 Mar. 2022). The Associate Professor also noted that "anyone can be found anywhere" through family, friends, social media, as well as information from telephone companies, and government and law enforcement databases (Associate Professor 11 Mar. 2022). According to the independent researcher, Los Zetas uses satellites, antennas, communication networks, and GPS, as well as taxi drivers as informal informants (Independent researcher 16 Mar. 2022).
The Associate Professor stated that some of the motivators or factors that influence Los Zetas' desire to track or retaliate against certain individuals include drugs, money, economic status, perceived rivals, "defectors," and filing a police report against Los Zetas (Associate Professor 11 Mar. 2022). According to the postdoctoral researcher, personal feuds, money, and love affairs are "common motivators or factors" (Postdoctoral researcher 10 Mar. 2022). The Research Professor indicated that "the more personal the feud, the higher the possibility of retaliation" (Research Professor 9 Mar. 2022).
For further information on the ability and motivations of organized crime groups to track and retaliate against individuals who move to Mérida, Campeche, Mexico City, and Cabo San Lucas, see Response to Information Request MEX200732 of September 2021.
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.
References
Associated Press (AP). 27 July 2021. "'Long Live Peace:' Mexican Drug Cartel Factions Announce Truce." [Accessed 8 Mar. 2022]
Associated Press (AP). 25 June 2021. "18 Dead in Gunbattle Between Drug Cartels in Northern Mexico." [Accessed 15 Mar. 2022]
Associate Professor, Sam Houston State University, Texas. 11 March 2022. Interview with the Research Directorate.
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). 26 February 2021. "Mexico's Long War: Drugs, Crime, and the Cartels." [Accessed 8 Mar. 2022]
Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). N.d. "About CFR." [Accessed 8 Mar. 2022]
Diario de Yucatán. 12 October 2020. Juan Carlos Góngora Solís. "'Conviven' tres cárteles del narcotráfico en Yucatán." [Accessed 8 Mar. 2022]
Independent consultant, United States (US). 15 March 2022. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.
Independent researcher, Mexico. 16 March 2022. Interview with the Research Directorate.
The Irish Times. 9 April 2020. Eoin Wilson. "'Worse than Any Horror Film': Inside a Los Zetas Cartel 'Kitchen'." [Accessed 8 Mar. 2022]
Lantia Intelligence. 20 January 2021. Mapa Criminal: México. 2019-2020. [Accessed 9 Mar. 2022]
Lantia Intelligence. N.d. "Nosotros." [Accessed 9 Mar. 2022]
Milenio. 23 June 2021. José Antonio Belmont and Amílcar Salazar Méndez. "Tamaulipas, bajo disputa de seis grupos del crimen organizado." [Accessed 8 Mar. 2022]
Postdoctoral researcher, Université de Montréal. 10 March 2022. Interview with the Research Directorate.
Research Professor, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS), Mexico City. 9 March 2022. Correspondence with the Research Directorate.
United States (US). March 2021. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 2020 National Drug Threat Assessment. [Accessed 9 Mar. 2022]
United States (US). 28 July 2020. Congressional Research Service (CRS). Mexico: Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking Organizations. By June S. Beittel. [Accessed 9 Mar. 2022]
Additional Sources Consulted
Oral sources: Assistant professor at an American university who researches gangs at the US-Mexico border; associate professor at an American university who researches gangs, transnationalism, and police issues; associate professor at an American university who researches Mexico-US relations, organized crime, border security, and human trafficking; Belgium – Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides, Cedoca; Brookings Institution; Democracia, Derechos Humanos y Seguridad; fellow at a university in the UK that researches organized violence in Latin America; InSight Crime; Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad; International Crisis Group; Mexico – Subprocuraduría Especializada en Investigación de Delincuencia Organizada; professor at a Mexican think tank that focuses on drug policy, criminal organizations, armed groups, and political violence; professor at a Mexican university who researches organized crime networks in Mexico; professor at a Mexican university who specializes in transnational organized crime, violence, and anti-money laundering; professor at an American university who researches criminal justice policy, gangs, and violence in Mexico; professor at an American university who specializes in Mexican public security issues, including organized crime; researcher at a Mexican university who focuses on organized crime, public security, gangs, mafias, and crime in Mexico; research fellow at a university in the UK who focuses on urban violence and insecurity in Mexico; Washington Office on Latin America; Wilson Center.
Internet sites, including: Action on Armed Violence; Al Jazeera; Alliance to Counter Crime Online; American Broadcasting Company; Amnesty International; Animal Político; Australia – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; Australian Institute of International Affairs; BBC; Belgium – Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons; Bertelsmann Stiftung; Brookings Institution; Business Insider; Campeche HOY; Center for Strategic and International Studies; Christian Solidarity Worldwide; CNN; Committee to Protect Journalists; The Conversation; Deutsche Welle; ecoi.net; Eje Central; El Expreso de Campeche; El Heraldo de México; El Informador; El País; El Universal; EU – EU Agency for Asylum; Fédération internationale pour les droits humains; France – Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides; Freedom House; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime; The Guardian; Human Rights Watch; The Independent; Infobae; InSight Crime; Institute for War and Peace Reporting; Instituto para la Economía y la Paz; International Crisis Group; INTERPOL; La Jornada; La Jornada Hidalgo; Mexico News Daily; National Broadcasting Company; The National Post; Netherlands – Ministry of Foreign Affairs; The New Humanitarian; Norway – Landinfo; Noticias Telemundo; Notimex; Organisation suisse d’aide aux réfugiés; Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project; Proceso; Puerto Vallarta Daily News; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Reporters sans frontières; Reuters; Semáforo; SinEmbargo; Transparency International; Tribuna Campeche; UK – Home Office; UN – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Refworld, UNDP, WHO; Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona; University of California San Diego – Mexico Violence Resource Project; University of San Diego – Justice in Mexico; US – Department of State, Library of Congress, Office of Special Counsel; Voice of America; The Wall Street Journal; War on the Rocks; Washington Office on Latin America; The Washington Post; Wilson Center; World Bank; Yucatán a la Mano; The Yucatan Times.
