30. September 2021

Die Al-Furqan Media Foundation wird als ältester Medienarm der Gruppe Islamischer Staat (IS) beschrieben, der Beginn der Aktivitäten wird mit November 2006 angegeben, zu einer Zeit, als die Organisation im Irak noch unter der Bezeichnung Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) agierte (Kadivar, 22. März 2021; LWJ, 28. Oktober 2007). Das Video, in dem Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi - nur wenige Tage nach Ausrufung des IS-Kalifats - am 4. Juli 2014 während des Freitagsgebets in der Großen Moschee von Mosul zu sehen war (Kadivar, 22. März 2021; NYT, 6. Juli 2014), sei ebenso von Al-Furqan Media veröffentlicht worden (Kadivar, 22. März 2021; ITIC, 21. Februar 2019) wie die Rede des Sprechers Abu Hamza Al-Qurashi am 19. Oktober 2020 (Kadivar, 22. März 2021).

Eine Analyse des in Israel ansässigen Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) aus dem Jahr 2019 beschreibt, dass das Mediennetzwerk des IS 2018 nach dem Zusammenbruch des „Kalifats“ dezentralisierter geworden sei. Es sei nach wie vor global ausgerichtet und vor allem im Cyberspace aktiv. Eine Schwächung des IS-Mediennetzwerks habe 2016 begonnen und habe sich 2017 und im ersten Halbjahr 2018 fortgesetzt, im zweiten Halbjahr 2018 habe ein Erholungsprozess begonnen, der bis Anfang 2019 weiter angehalten habe. 2018 sei die Anzahl der Propagandawerke deutlich gesunken, nachdem der Zusammenbruch des Islamischen Staates zu einem Verlust finanzieller Ressourcen geführt habe und viele der ausgebildeten Medienmitarbeiter·innen entweder getötet worden oder in ihre Heimatländer zurückkehrt seien. Außerdem hätten Länder und Unternehmen wie Facebook und Twitter Maßnahmen gegen das Mediennetzwerk ergriffen. Die alteingesessenen Medienstiftungen des IS wie Al-Furqan, Amaq oder Al-Hayat würden weiter existieren, aber deren Inhalte seien 2018 im Vergleich zu 2017 zurückgegangen (ITIC, 21. Februar 2019).

Das Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy berichtet im Mai 2020, dass die Gruppe Islamischer Staat weiterhin Medienaktivitäten betreibe, wenn auch in vermindertem Ausmaß im Vergleich zu früher. Im Februar 2020 habe es zuletzt aber wieder einen deutlichen Anstieg bei Umfang und Qualität der Beiträge gegeben, die durch Al-Furqan, Amaq und die Wochenzeitung Al-Naba veröffentlicht worden seien. Nach einer Abwesenheit von vier Monaten seien die Mediennetzwerke des IS zurück und würden beliebte Plattformen sozialer Medien nutzen. In den Monaten vor Veröffentlichung des Berichts habe der IS zahlreiche Videos aus dem Irak veröffentlicht, mit Schwerpunkt auf die Regionen Kirkuk, Diyala und Salah al-Din. Der Diskurs lehne sich dabei an die zwischen 2012 und 2014 vom IS verlautbarten Botschaften an, die das Ziel gehabt hätten, Angst unter den schiitischen Gegnern des IS sowie unter Sunnit·innen, Kurd·innen und Turkmen·innen, die sich gegen den IS gestellt hätten, zu schüren (Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 5. Mai 2020). Auch die Forscherin Jamileh Kadivar berichtet im März 2021 von anhaltenden Medienaktivitäten des IS, darunter auch Al-Furqan (Kadivar, 22. März 2021).

Aaron Y. Zelin, Forscher und Betreiber des Blogs jihadology.net, auf dem dschihadistische Primärquellen archiviert und analysiert werden, schreibt in einer E-Mail-Auskunft vom 9. September 2021, dass Al-Furqan Media zuletzt hauptsächlich offizielle Stellungnahmen des Anführers und Sprechers der Gruppe Islamischer Staat veröffentliche. Al-Furqan Media sei nicht notwendigerweise nur im Irak oder einer bestimmten Stadt ansässig, es arbeite nicht wie ein traditionelles Medienunternehmen, da es von einer dschihadistischen Gruppe betrieben werde. Die Inhalte von Al-Furqan würden online über ursprünglich passwortgeschützte Foren und in jüngerer Zeit auch über soziale Medien und verschlüsselte Nachrichtenapplikationen verbreitet (Zelin, 9. September 2021).

Auf dem vom Forscher Aaron Y. Zelin betriebenen Blog jihadology.net finden sich mehrere von Al-Furqan veröffentlichte Audio-Botschaften des IS-Anführers Abu Hamza Al-Qurashi, zuletzt vom Mai (Jihadology.net, 28. Mai 2020) und Oktober 2020 (Jihadology.net, 18. Oktober 2020; ECCI, 27. Oktober 2020) und vom 22. Juni 2021 (Jihadology.net, 22. Juni 2021).

Es konnten keine aktuellen Informationen zum Vorgehen von Behörden und Milizen gegen das Medien-Netzwerk des IS gefunden werden.

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 30. September 2021)

·      ECCI - European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies - Germany and Netherlands: Official ISIS Propaganda Spread Via Numerous Websites, 27. Oktober 2020
https://en.europarabct.com/?p=47838

·      ITIC – The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center: ISIS’s media network: Developments in 2018 and future courses of action, 21. Februar 2019
https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/isiss-media-network-developments-2018-future-courses-action/

·      Jihadology.net: New audio message from The Islamic State’s Shaykh Abu Hamzah al-Qurashi: “And The Disbelievers Will Know For Whom Is The Final Home”, 28. Mai 2020
https://jihadology.net/2020/05/28/new-audio-message-from-the-islamic-states-shaykh-abu-%e1%b8%a5amzah-al-qurashi-and-the-disbelievers-will-know-for-whom-is-the-final-home/

·      Jihadology.net: New audio message from The Islamic State’s Shaykh Abu Hamzah al-Qurashi: “So Relate the Stories That Perhaps They Will Give Thought“, 18. Oktober 2020
https://jihadology.net/2020/10/18/new-audio-message-from-the-islamic-states-shaykh-abu-%e1%b8%a5amzah-al-qurashi-so-relate-the-stories-that-perhaps-they-will-give-thought/

·      Jihadology.net: New audio message from The Islamic State’s Shaykh Abu Hamzah al-Qurashi: “And You Will Be Superior If You Are [True] Believers“, 22. Juni 2021
https://jihadology.net/2021/06/22/new-audio-message-from-the-islamic-states-shaykh-abu-%e1%b8%a5amzah-al-qurashi-and-you-will-be-superior-if-you-are-true-believers/

·      Kadivar, Jamileh: Daesh and the Power of Media and Message, in: Arab Media & Society, Issue 30, 22. März 2021
https://www.arabmediasociety.com/daesh-and-the-power-of-media-and-message/

·      LWJ – Long War Journal: US targets al Qaeda’s al Furqan media wing in Iraq (Autor: Bill Roggio), 28. Oktober 2007
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/us_targets_al_qaedas.php

·      Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy: ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5. Mai 2020
https://newlinesinstitute.org/isis/isis-in-iraq-from-abandoned-villages-to-the-cities/

·      NYT - New York Times: Militant Leader in Rare Appearance in Iraq, 6. Juli 2014
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/world/asia/iraq-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-sermon-video.html

·      Zelin, Aaron Y.: E-Mail-Auskunft, 9. September 2021

 

Anhang: Quellenbeschreibungen und Informationen aus ausgewählten Quellen

Das in Deutschland und den Niederlanden ansässige European Center for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies (Europäisches Zentrum für Terrorismusbekämpfung und Intelligence Studies) befasst sich mit Anti-Terror-Strategien von Regierungen und NGOs in Europa.

·      ECCI - European Centre for Counterterrorism and Intelligence Studies - Germany and Netherlands: Official ISIS Propaganda Spread Via Numerous Websites, 27. Oktober 2020
https://en.europarabct.com/?p=47838

„On October 18, ISIS’s spokesperson Abu Hamza al-Qurashi released a statement via the group’s Al Furqan Media Center on multiple websites titled “So Relate the Stories That Perhaps They Will Give Them Thought.” In the address, al-Qurashi called for increased acts of terrorism, especially attacks in Saudi Arabia against American and European interests, and criticized the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain for establishing formal ties with Israel. Al-Qurashi addressed ISIS supporters in Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Nigeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, Congo, Kenya, and Chad, calling for them to continue fighting. He additionally specifically called for attacks on prison facilities to free ISIS members held there and congratulated ISIS fighters in Afghanistan for attacking a prison in Jalalabad. Al-Qurashi also praised ISIS operations in Mozambique.” (ECCI, 27. Oktober 2020)

Das in Israel ansässige Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center ist Teil des Israel Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center (IICC), sein Ziel ist das Sammeln, Analysieren und Verbreiten von Informationen zum Thema Terrorismus.

·      ITIC – The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center: ISIS’s media network: Developments in 2018 and future courses of action, 21. Februar 2019
https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/isiss-media-network-developments-2018-future-courses-action/

„The year 2018 was a significant year for ISIS’s media network. During this year, the organization’s media network became more decentralized, following the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Syria and Iraq remained ISIS’s core countries, but the importance of the semi-autonomous provinces outside Iraq and Syria gradually increased. ISIS’s media network continues to be of a global nature, conducted mainly in cyberspace. This network survived the collapse of the Islamic Caliphate, and in 2018 it displayed resilience and recoverability despite the considerable pressure exerted on ISIS in Syria. This was due, to a great degree, to the transition to a more decentralized network in which the organization’s supporters, who are not directly subordinate to the organization’s main media apparatus, began to fill the vacuum that was created.

An examination of ISIS’s media network in 2018 compared to previous years shows that the weakening of the media network that began in 2016 also continued in 2017 and in the first half of 2018. However, in the second half of 2018, the network began a process of recovery, which is still ongoing (early 2019).

[…] During 2018, there was a significant drop in the volume of propaganda items distributed by ISIS’s official media network, although there was somewhat of a recovery in the second half of the year. The drop stemmed mainly from the collapse of the Islamic State, which led to the loss of financial resources, damage to the human infrastructure of skilled media professionals (who were either killed or returned to their home countries), in addition to actions taken by countries and companies (Facebook and Twitter) against ISIS’s media network. The quantitative impact was felt mainly in the core countries, while the volume of media products of the provinces outside Syria and Iraq rose sharply. […]

ISIS’s veteran media foundations (Al-Furqan, Amaq, Al-Hayat) or those affiliated with it (Mu’ta) continue to exist, but the volume of content that they produce is small compared to 2017. ISIS’s main websites (including Akhbar al-Muslimeen, Haqq and Sawarim) have ceased to operate. This year (2018) they were replaced by a central website called Al-Ghurabaa (literally: the foreigners), but it also ceased operating shortly before the end of the year. The Al-Abd al-Faqir Foundation, which specializes in producing videos and posters threatening Western countries, is a new media platform that began operating in the second half of 2018. […]

ISIS continues to operate dozens of platforms and sometimes also produce media materials. Some of them are long-standing recognized foundations. The leading foundations are Al-Furqan, Al-Hayat, Amaq and Al-Mu’ta. In addition to the old foundations, there are also new media foundations, which rise and fall from time to time. Some of the platforms are operated by ISIS’s Central Media Office and some are operated as personal initiatives by ISIS supporters outside the core countries.

The Al-Furqan Media Foundation

The Al-Furqan Media Foundation, or to use its full name, The Al-Furqan Foundation for Media Production, is ISIS’s long-standing media arm, which produces media materials, mainly videos. This media platform is of great importance to ISIS in light of its responsibility for disseminating speeches and statements by ISIS’s leadership. It was established in 2006 by the Islamic State in Iraq (even before the establishment of ISIS) and was later adopted by ISIS. It was the Al-Furqan Media Foundation that released the video in which ISIS’s leader declared the establishment of the Caliphate.

During the course of 2018, the Al-Furqan Media Foundation produced the organization’s main media content, the most prominent of which was the audiotape by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, released on August 22, 2018. This year, the Al-Furqan Media Foundation also produced an audiotape of the organization’s spokesman Abu Hassan al-Muhajir, which was released on April 23, 2018. In the audiotape, Al-Muhajir calls on the organization’s operatives to continue to follow the path of jihad, stressing that as far as the organization is concerned, there is no difference between the fighting against the Arab regimes and fighting against other elements (i.e., the West) and both must be fought against simultaneously.” (ITIC, 21. Februar 2019)

Jamileh Kadivar ist eine Autorin und Forscherin mit einem Doktorat in Media and Communications der Universität Westminster.

·      Kadivar, Jamileh: Daesh and the Power of Media and Message, in: Arab Media & Society, Issue 30, 22. März 2021
https://www.arabmediasociety.com/daesh-and-the-power-of-media-and-message/

„The Al-Furqan Media Foundation, the oldest media branch of Daesh, started its activities in November 2006. Initially, it was responsible for media production for the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) releasing official statements, various videos, CDs, DVDs, posters, pamphlets, and web-related propaganda products (KhilafaTimes 2015). Since 2006, Al-Furqan has released different official statements and audio messages of Daesh and its predecessors’ leaders. Video of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s Khutbah (sermon) during Friday prayers at the Grand Mosque, Mosul, July 4, 2014, was released by Al-Furqan Media. Al-Furqan released the latest recorded speech of Daesh’s spokesman Abu Hamza Al Qurashi's on October 19, 2020.” (Kadivar, 22. März 2021)

„After losing most of its territories in Iraq and Syria, the number of Daesh’s content decreased considerably, and Daesh's own survival overshadowed different proceedings, including its media activities. However, Amaq and Nashir news agencies, several official (such as Al-Naba, Al-Furqan, Wilayat media, and Al-Himmah) and unofficial media remain active (as of the publication date of this study) and produce content, which indicates that Daesh still seeks to portray a powerful self-image to the outside world by its media in spite of the defeats it suffered on the battlefield.” (Kadivar, 22. März 2021)

Das Long War Journal (LWJ) ist eine auf das Thema Terrorismusbekämpfung spezialisierte US-amerikanische Nachrichtenwebseite und wird von der Denkfabrik Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) betrieben.

·      LWJ – Long War Journal: US targets al Qaeda’s al Furqan media wing in Iraq (Autor: Bill Roggio), 28. Oktober 2007
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/us_targets_al_qaedas.php

„Coalition and Iraqi special operations forces continue to target al Qaeda’s propaganda capabilities. Over the summer, US forces scored a major victory with the capture of Khalid Abdul Fatah Da’ud Mahmud al Mashadani, also known as Abu Shahed. Mashadani was al Qaeda’s minister of information and served as the go between for al Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al Masri and Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri. The capture of Mashadani has shed light on al Qaeda’s media operations, and has allowed Multinational Forces Iraq to roll up al Qaeda’s media cells throughout Iraq.

‘Since the surge began, we’ve uncovered eight separate al Qaeda media offices and cells, have captured or killed 24 al Qaeda propaganda cell members and have discovered 23 terabytes of information,’ said Rear Admiral Gregory Smith, the chief Public Affairs Officer for Multinational Forces Iraq in a press briefing. Most recently, four members of al Qaeda’s al Furqan media cell in Mosul were captured, ‘including the media emir of Mosul, the former head of Mosul’s media cell who had established the al Qaeda communications hub in Baghdad, a foreign terrorist from Saudi Arabia who is proficient in video editing and special effects, and a computer graphics specialist,’ the Armed Forces Press Service reported. Cells have also been broken up in Baghdad, Diyala, Tarmiyah, Samarra, and Karma.

[…] The video editor and graphics technician are the lowest ranking and most easily replaceable members of the media cells, according to Nick Grace, the host of Global Crisis Watch and an expert on al Qaeda’s media operations, in an interview with The Long War Journal. ‘The cell members are entry-level positions in al Qaeda’s media wing, and start off in the field with al Furqan or al Fajr,’ said Grace. ‘If they show skills they may then graduate to work for As Sahab, al Qaeda’s parent media organization, and work in Pakistan.’ Grace also noted the effort al Qaeda put into its propaganda programs and likened the city cells to local television news stations subordinate to US television networks.

The al Furqan Institute for Media Production, along with the al Fajr Media Center, is one of two al Qaeda media organizations that operate inside Iraq. A recent Radio Free Liberty/Radio Europe study on insurgent media described al Furqan as ‘the primary media production center for ISI [Islamic State of Iraq]/Al Qaeda. It produces virtually all ISI/al Qaeda films, audio and videotaped addresses, and the ISI/al Qaeda-affiliated periodical Biographies Of Notable Martyrs. An al Qaeda-affiliated center, al Furqan distributes its products to websites through the al Fajr Media Center.’

Kavkaz Center, a website run by Chechen al Qaeda, noted the Islamic State of Iraq formed al Furqan in November 2006, when al Qaeda was at its zenith in Iraq. ‘This Institute is a milestone on the path of Jihad; a distinguished media that takes the great care in the management of the conflict with the Crusaders and their tails and to expose the lies in the Crusaders’ media,’ the ISI press release noted.

The scope of al Furqan’s operations was highlighted during a raid on one of its offices in Samarra in June 2007. The cell ‘produced CDs, DVDs, posters, pamphlets, and web-related propaganda products and contained documents clearly identifying al Qaeda in Iraq’s intent to use media as a weapon,’ said Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, a spokesman for Multinational Forces Iraq during a briefing in July.” (LWJ, 28. Oktober 2007)

Das Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy ist ein in Washington D.C. ansässiger Think Tank der Fairfax University of America mit dem Ziel, die US-Außenpolitik durch Verständnis der Geopolitik und Wertesysteme verschiedener Weltregionen zu erweitern.

·      Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy: ISIS in Iraq: From Abandoned Villages to the Cities, 5. Mai 2020
https://newlinesinstitute.org/isis/isis-in-iraq-from-abandoned-villages-to-the-cities/

„In terms of propaganda, ISIS’s media operation remains active (albeit at a reduced rate) across different platforms such as Twitter and YouTube, although Telegram remains their main platform. ISIS has faced serious obstacles on this front, including measures by platforms to delete extremist content and close sites and pages associated with extremist groups; reduced funding to support media operations; and the loss of many members with professional media skills through desertion, direct targeting, and military defeat.

In April 2020, however, it became clear that ISIS’s media arm could continue to draw on a wealth of technology resources, speeches, statements, and materials on recruitment, funding, training, disguise, combat tactics, and bomb making. Additionally in February 2020, there was a significant increase in the quantity and quality of the media discourse presented by Furqan and Amaq multimedia outlets and the weekly newspaper Al-Naba. In addition, after an absence of four months, ISIS media networks returned to exploiting popular social media platforms.

ISIS has again begun using media tools such as videography and producing new video clips that are short and easy to download. Its main target audience appears to be displaced populations in Syria and Iraq, but its messaging still has a universal appeal consistent with its goals and ideology while reflecting its transformation from a declared state to an underground terrorist group. In the past few months, ISIS published numerous video clips in its so-called Wilayat Iraq, focusing on the operational divisions of Kirkuk, Diyala, and Salah al-Din. The messaging sought to undermine the PMF, TMF, local forces, state security forces, and the peshmerga stationed in rural areas, and to intimidate civilians and mukhtars who cooperate with Iraqi forces against ISIS remnants. Videos depict raids and assassinations targeting Sunni tribes accused of collaborating in ISIS’s defeats and expulsion from those areas. This media discourse echoes ISIS’s messaging between 2012 and 2014, which had intended to scare ISIS’s Shiite rivals as well as Sunnis, Kurds, and Sunni Turkmen who resisted ISIS.“ (Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, 5. Mai 2020)

·      NYT - New York Times: Militant Leader in Rare Appearance in Iraq, 6. Juli 2014
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/world/asia/iraq-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-sermon-video.html

„Until then, there had been very few photographs on the Internet of the insurgent known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. But on Friday he delivered a public sermon in a city once under American control with an audacity that even Osama bin Laden never tried. ISIS released a 21-minute video of the sermon on Saturday.

[…] But on Friday at the pulpit of Mosul's Great Mosque, Mr. Baghdadi appeared confident, calm and measured as he urged the faithful to fast during Ramadan and undertake jihad. He also asserted his position as caliph, or spiritual leader, of the Muslim faithful, calling himself ''Khalifa Ibrahim,'' or caliph Abraham, a reference to the prophet Abraham, who appears in the Quran. Mr. Baghdadi's militant group declared its territory in Iraq and Syria a caliphate, or Islamic state, on June 29.

Daniel Benjamin, a senior counterterrorism official in the State Department from 2009 to 2012, said that if the video was authentic, Mr. Baghdadi's appearance would be ‚remarkable event.‘“ (NYT, 6. Juli 2014)