Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada

1. Security Situation

According to sources, it is ["difficult" (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. F3) or "hard" (US 29 Apr. 2020)] to authenticate crime statistics in Haiti, and crimes are underreported (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. F3; US 29 Apr. 2020).

According to foreign travel advisories in various countries, the security situation is [Canada English version] "unpredictable" (Canada 22 May 2021), [translation] "tense" (France 14 Apr. 2021), or violence is "common" (US 1 June 2021).

Sources report that the deteriorating security situation in 2020 is one cause of the demonstrations against President Jovenel Moïse (ACLED Feb. 2021, 15; UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 17). According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), a non-profit organization that conducts "disaggregated data collection, analysis, and crisis mapping" in various regions of the world, including Latin America (ACLED n.d.), there were more than 400 cases of political violence and protests in 2020, including "almost" 330 deaths, 90 percent of which are attributed to criminal groups (ACLED Feb. 2021, 17).

Media sources indicate that, on 7 July 2021, President Moïse was assassinated, reportedly by mercenaries, in his home in Port-au-Prince (BBC 12 July 2021; Reuters 8 July 2021; The Washington Post 7 July 2021). According to sources, following Moïse's death, there was "a lack of clarity" (The Washington Post 7 July 2021) or "confusion" (The Guardian 8 July 2021; Reuters 10 July 2021) over who has the authority to lead the country (The Guardian 8 July 2021; Reuters 10 July 2021; The Washington Post 7 July 2021). Sources indicate that Jimmy Cherizier [Cerizier, Cherisier], the leader of a criminal group called the Group of 9 (G9) issued a "veiled warning" (AP 11 July 2021) or called for [translation] "revenge" (Radio-Canada 14 July 2021) [in a video posted (Radio-Canada 14 July 2021)] in response to the assassination (AP 11 July 2021; Radio-Canada 14 July 2021). For further information on the political situation in Haiti, see Response to Information Request HTI200654 of July 2021.

Sources report that there are 500,000 illegal weapons in circulation (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]; CARDH 22 July 2020, para. 5) according to Haiti's National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration (Commission nationale de désarmement, démantèlement et réinsertion, CNDDR) (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]). Based on cases reported by the Haitian National Police (Police nationale haïtienne, PNH), a February 2021 UN report on the implementation of the mandate of the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (Bureau intégré des Nations Unies en Haïti, BINUH) notes that 1,380 voluntary homicides were reported in 2020, 75 percent of which occurred in the Ouest department, representing a 20 percent increase compared to 2019 (UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 19). Statistics for other departments could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

Sources note that violence by armed gangs displaced 450 families (UN Mar. 2021, 88) or [HRW English version] "at least" 1,221 residents (HRW 13 Jan. 2021) of Port-au-Prince's Bel-Air neighbourhood in August 2020 (UN Mar. 2021, 88; HRW 13 Jan. 2021). According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), a July 2020 cyclone and gang violence were the cause of [HRW English version] "the majority" of displacements that affected "at least" 12,000 people in 2020 (HRW 13 Jan. 2021).

1.1 Impact of the COVID-19 Health Crisis

According to a report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),

[translation]

The COVID-19 pandemic has complicated the social and security situation [in Haiti] as its emergence has been juxtaposed with an already difficult humanitarian situation that includes food insecurity, malnutrition, health emergencies and population movements caused by community violence. (UN Mar. 2021, 31)

According to the February 2021 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate, [UN English version] "extensive" school closures occurred in 2019 and 2020 due to the pandemic, protests and "insecurity due to gang activities" (UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 47). According to the OCHA, children who do not attend school are more likely to be recruited by criminal groups (UN Mar. 2021, 75, 84).

2. Kidnappings

Sources report an increase in kidnappings in Haiti in 2020 compared to 2019 (ACLED Feb. 2021, 15; UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 19). According to the report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate, between February 2020 and February 2021, [UN English version] "kidnappings followed a concerning trend as they increased by 200 per cent compared with the previous year (a total of 234 cases, including 59 women and 37 minors, were reported in 2020 compared with 78 in 2019)" (UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 19). According to the Centre for Human Rights Analysis and Research (Centre d'analyse et de recherche en droits de l'homme, CARDH), a Port-au-Prince-based nonprofit organization cited by Reuters, there were 796 kidnappings in 2020 (Reuters 26 Apr. 2021) and "at least" 91 abductions in April 2021 (Reuters 19 May 2021). The Haitian NGO Défenseurs plus, quoted in a report by AyiboPost, an online media platform that focuses on explanatory journalism regarding Haiti (AyiboPost n.d.), and Connectas, a media platform that focuses on development issues in the Americas (Connectas n.d.), estimates that [translation] "more than" 1,000 kidnappings were committed in 2020 (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]).

Sources report that criminal groups are demanding [translation] "exorbitant" (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021) or "lucrative" ransoms from victims' families (Reuters 19 May 2021). Sources state that victims may regain their freedom if their families pay the kidnappers (US 29 Apr. 2020; Reuters 19 May 2021), in "most cases" (US 29 Apr. 2020). AyiboPost and Connectas state that kidnappers threaten to kill victims if their families report the kidnapping to the police or the press, or if they try to avoid paying the ransom, and report on the case of an abducted schoolgirl found dead in October 2020 (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]). According to Djems Olivier, a sociologist quoted by AyiboPost and Connectas,

[translation]

the increase in kidnappings is due to how easy it is to collect money. "Until recently, people were assaulted when they were returning from the bank. But these acts have gone down significantly. Criminals think of other strategies, and kidnapping is a quicker way to make money. There are groups that specialize in kidnapping, but there are more and more small armed groups that are also doing it, because it is lucrative." (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021])

2.1 Targeted Individuals

Sources report that the wave of kidnappings has involved victims from different social groups [including doctors, students, merchants and police officers (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021])] [as well as the poor and members of the middle class (Reuters 26 Apr. 2021)] (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]; Reuters 26 Apr. 2021). Other sources highlight cases of kidnappings involving children (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]; UN Mar. 2021, 82; Reuters 26 Apr. 2021). According to some sources, kidnappings ["disproportionately" (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. F3)] affect women and girls (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. F3; UN Mar. 2021, 80).

3. Main Criminal Groups

Sources estimate that there were 76 armed gangs in Haiti in May 2019 (Le Nouvelliste 6 May 2019), "more than" 150 criminal groups in 2020 (US 30 Mar. 2021, 4) and 177 active groups in March 2021 (Olivier 18 Mar. 2021, 85). The names of the main criminal groups could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to the National Human Rights Defense Network (Réseau national de défense des droits humains, RNDDH), a Haitian NGO engaged in human rights education and monitoring of human rights violations (RNDDH n.d.), in May 2020 new criminal group leaders were installed in various Port-au-Prince neighbourhoods that had been [RNDDH English version] "freshly conquered" by Serge Alectis, alias Ti Junior, who controls the Croix-des-Bossales and La Saline neighbourhoods, Micanor Altes (or Monel Felix), alias Roi Mikanó in Wharf Jérémie, and Jimmy Cherizier, alias Barbecue, who controls Delmas 6:

• Garry Lyron (alias Coby), Chancerelles leader
• Ronald Alcide (alias Depòte) in Nan Tokyo
• Daniel (alias Tapajè) in Delmas 2
• Colson Jean in Nan Barozi
• Richardson Louis, leader of the G-8 gang, operating in Upper Delmas 4
• Josué in Lower Delmas 4
• Mackenson Louis, leader of the Peace Village gang
• Ti Jude, leader of the Fort Dimanche gang
• Jean Gardy Alectis (alias Dyòl) in Nan Bwadòm (RNDDH 23 June 2020, para. 77).

According to a report published by the International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) and the Haitian Observatory for Crimes Against Humanity (Observatoire haïtien des crimes contre l'humanité, OHCCH) [1], those involved in deadly attacks in La Saline in 2018, Bel-Air in 2019, and Cité Soleil in Port-au-Prince in 2020 [see section 3.1 of this Response] include Serge Alectis, Jimmy Cherizier, the Delmas 6 gang, the Nan Bwadòm gang and the Wharf Jérémie gang (IHRC and OHCCH Apr. 2021, 19).

According to sources, further to a mobilization of dissatisfied police officers within the PNH who held demonstrations to demand better working conditions, a new armed group composed of serving or decertified police officers emerged [in 2018 (Insight Crime 26 Mar. 2021) or in February 2020 (UN Mar. 2021, 32)], with the nickname Fantom [Fantôme] 509 (Insight Crime 26 Mar. 2021; UN Mar. 2021, 32). Sources note that members of the group sometimes wear their police uniforms while carrying out crimes (HaïtiLibre 24 Mar. 2021; Insight Crime 26 Mar. 2021).

3.1 Activities

According to the ACLED, activities perpetrated by criminal groups include violent clashes between rival groups (ACLED Feb. 2021, 15). The same source adds that such attacks have also led to an increase in the number of kidnappings for ransom and rapes, which are used by criminal groups as "a weapon of war" to secure the population's "allegiance" (ACLED Feb. 2021, 15). According to a June 2020 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate, the increase in kidnappings in February 2020 [UN English version] "may" be due to the need for new sources of income since the end of the 2019 protests (UN 15 June 2020, para. 11). According to sources, targeted assassinations and kidnappings against public figures have also been part of the arsenal of criminal groups [17 such targeted attacks were recorded by the ACLED in 2020 (ACLED Feb. 2021, 15)], including the assassination of Bâtonnier Monferrier Dorval in 2020 (ACLED Feb. 2021, 15; US 30 Mar. 2021, 3; UN Mar. 2021, 24).

Sources report that gangs carried out attacks from 4 to 6 November 2019 in the Bel-Air neighbourhood, causing three (UN Feb. 2020, 4) or four deaths (FJKL 29 Nov. 2019, 11) and the burning of some 30 residences (UN Feb. 2020, 4; FJKL 29 Nov. 2019, 2, 11). According to the same sources, gangs intervened at the instigation of Jimmy Cherizier in an effort to force demonstrators opposed to the Moïse government to remove their barricades from the street (UN Feb. 2020, 10; FJKL Nov. 29, 2019, 3).

In its 2020 Crime and Safety Report, the US Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) notes that criminal groups set up barricades on highways to extort drivers (US 29 Apr. 2020).

According to sources, the Fantom 509 group [which vandalizes and loots citizens' property, among other activities (FJKL 21 Mar. 2021, 1)] set fire to a police station in Delmas in mid-March 2021, resulting in the release of four imprisoned police colleagues (FJKL 21 Mar. 2021, 1; HaïtiLibre 18 Mar. 2021).

3.2 Targets

The ACLED notes that members of the public are "often" targeted by gangs (ACLED Feb. 2021, 15). Sources note that officials (ACLED Feb. 2021, 15; US 30 Mar. 2021, 3), judges, lawyers and activists may also be targeted (ACLED Feb. 2021, 15).

Sources report an increase in the number of cases involving children in criminal groups' line of fire (HaïtiLibre 15 Apr. 2021; Miami Herald 13 Apr. 2021; UN 15 Apr. 2021). For example, according to sources, on the night of 11 to 12 April 2021, a criminal group composed of more than 15 individuals attacked an orphanage in the Croix-des-Bouquets neighbourhood on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince [from which 400 prisoners had escaped less than two months earlier (Insight Crime 8 Mar. 2021; Miami Herald 13 Apr. 2021)], beat up the managers and raped two children and one woman (HaïtiLibre 15 Apr. 2021; Miami Herald 13 Apr. 2021). According to UNICEF, 73 women and children were victims of gangs between the last quarter of 2020 and mid-April 2021:

"Children and women in Haiti are no longer merely the victims of criminal gangs — they are increasingly becoming their targets," warns Jean Gough, UNICEF's Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean. "Whether kidnappings, rapes or even killings, more and more incidents of gang violence have involved children and women in the past few weeks and months. This recent upsurge is fuelling insecurity in the impoverished country." (UN 15 Apr. 2021)

For information on gender-based and sexual violence in Haiti, including such acts by criminal groups, see Response to Information Request HTI200653 of June 2021.

3.3 Areas of Influence

Sources report that criminal groups control a number of "impoverished" neighbourhoods (ACLED Feb. 2021, 14)] in Port-au-Prince (ACLED Feb. 2021, 14; US 29 Apr. 2020). According to sources, neighbourhoods under the control of criminal groups include Martissant, Bel-Air (US 29 Apr. 2020; UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 18), Cité Soleil (US 29 Apr. 2020) and Village de Dieu (UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 18). According to a September 2020 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate, the areas of influence of some criminal groups correspond to [UN English version] "populous areas that house major public markets and large polling stations" (UN 25 Sept. 2020, para. 15).

Other sources report the presence of criminal groups outside Port-au-Prince [areas include the South-East Department (département du Sud-Est)] (ACLED Feb. 2021, 14)] [or Pétionville and along highways (US 29 Apr. 2020)] (ACLED Feb. 2021, 14; US 29 Apr. 2020). The February 2021 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate notes that, as a result of police operations starting in late 2020, criminal groups have been pushed to the outskirts or outside of Port-au-Prince, including [UN English version] "a few areas of the Artibonite Department, where gangs posed additional security threats" (UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 18). According to the September 2020 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate, clashes between criminal groups increased between June and August 2020 in Cap-Haitien (Nord department) and Petite-Rivière-de-l'Artibonite (Artibonite department) among other areas, affecting thoroughfares (UN 25 Sept. 2020, para. 18).

3.4 Links Between Criminal Groups and the Authorities

Sources report that the use of criminal groups by political actors to repress opponents and demonstrators in rival neighbourhoods is part of the electoral campaign process in Haiti (ACLED Feb. 2021, 14; Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. B3). According to some sources, criminal groups are guaranteed impunity in exchange, along with resources in the form of weapons (ACLED Feb. 2021, 14; RNDDH 23 June 2020, para. 98-99) and funding (ACLED Feb. 2021, 14). The February 2020 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate refers to the November 2019 attacks on the Bel-Air neighbourhood in which, according to [translation] "certain sources," "a representative of the authorities" reportedly asked five criminal organizations to intervene; the latter reportedly refused (UN Feb. 2020, 10). However, the same source adds that an intervention by Jimmy Cherizier a few days later [translation] "suggests a link between the state representative's approach to local organizations and the acts perpetrated by Cherizier and the gangs under his control" (UN Feb. 2020, 10). Sources report links between the Moïse government and criminal groups (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]; RNDDH 23 June 2020, para. 98). According to the RNDDH, armed gangs [RNDDH English version] "benefit [from] the protection of the police institution" (RNDDH 23 June 2020, para. 98).

4. G9

Sources report that nine criminal groups in Port-au-Prince have come together to form a coalition named the G9 (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]; RNDDH 23 June 2020, para. 78-79) or G9 an fanmi e alye (in family and alliance) in June 2020 (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]). According to sources, the leader is former PNH police officer Jimmy Cherizier (ACLED Feb. 2021, 14; AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]; UN 25 Sept. 2020, para. 16). An RNDDH report lists the following constituent groups:

[RNDDH English version]

• Jimmy CHERISIER AKA Barbecue - Delmas 6
• Iscar ANDRICE Cité Soleil - Belekou
• Christ-Roi CHERY aka Chrisla - Nan Tibwa
• Serge Alectis alias Ti junior - La Saline
• Wilson PIERRE aka Sonson St Martin Street - Bel-air
• Micanor ALTES still known as Monel FELIX as King Mikanò - Wharf Jérémie
• Jouma ALBERT alias Zouma - Simon Pelé
• Ezéckiel ALEXANDRE - Pilate Base
• Matias SAINTIL - Nan Boston / Cité Soleil

... These nine (9) armed gang leaders are supported by a group of twenty (20) other gangs members [of lesser] organizational and territorial significance. Their leaders are referred to as bridgeheads or members of the G-20. (RNDDH 23 June 2020, paras. 79 and 80, emphasis in original)

The September 2020 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate states that the G9 claims to have social demands to address poverty in the most precarious neighbourhoods of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and that six other groups have joined the coalition (UN 25 Sept. 2020, paras. 15 and 16). Various sources report that the group is carrying out attacks on the population (UN 25 Sept. 2020, para. 31; The Washington Post 14 Aug. 2020). According to the Washington Post, the group has also hijacked fuel trucks, extorted money from businesses and carried out kidnappings for ransom (The Washington Post 14 Aug. 2020).

4.1 Areas of Influence

According to the RNDDH, the G9's areas of influence are concentrated in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and include the following neighbourhoods: Delmas 6, Belekou, Nan Tibwa, La Saline, Bel-Air, Wharf Jérémie, Simon Pelé, Base Pilate and Nan Boston in Cité Soleil (RNDDH 23 June 2020, para. 79). The September 2020 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate also states that the G9 controls Cité Soleil, La Saline, and Lower Delmas (UN 25 Sept. 2020, para. 15).

4.2 Links Between the G9 and the Authorities

Sources report that the armed wing of President Moïse's administration is the G9 (ACLED Feb. 2021, 16) or Jimmy Cherizier (RNDDH 23 June 2020, para. 81). According to AyiboPost and Connectas,

[translation]

the creation of the G9 was supported by the [CNDDR], created in 2006 and reactivated by Moïse in 2019. Jean Rebel Dorcenat, one of the members of this commission, stated on a radio show that he had suggested that the gangs consolidate. According to him, this made things easier for the CNDDR, which would have only one party to deal with. This new federation of gangs would bring peace after a number of massacres in working-class neighbourhoods, attributed to armed gangs in Port-au-Prince. (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021])

According to sources, the G9 is seeking to consolidate electoral support for the Moïse administration in neighbourhoods considered to support the opposition (ACLED Feb. 2021, 14; The Washington Post 14 Aug. 2020). According to sources, the G9 is involved in political decision-making, including appointments (CARDH 22 July 2020, para. 5) and dismissals (RNDDH 23 June 2020, para. 84). According to the RNDDH,

[RNDDH English version]

Many officers belonging to specialized units of the PNH including the General Security Unit of the National Palace ([l'Unité de Sécurité générale du Palais national,] USGPN), the Departmental Unit for the Maintenance of Order ([Unité départementale pour le Maintien de l'ordre,] UDMO), the [Departmental Operation and Intervention Brigade] ([Brigade d'Opération et d'Intervention départementale,] BOID) and the Intervention Corps for the Maintenance of Order ([Corps d'Intervention pour le Maintien de l'ordre,] CIMO) have sworn allegiance to Jimmy CHERIZIER aka Barbecue. They are paid exorbitant [sums] for services rendered.

... The General Inspection of the PNH, very lax, closes its eyes to the numerous excesses of police officers who protect armed gangs and maintain good relations with Jimmy CHERIZIER alias Barbecue. For example, on April 1, 2020, when the police institution claim[ed] to be looking for Jimmy CHERIZIER alias Barbecue, he [gave] instructions for him to participate in a distribution of food ... (RNDDH 23 June 2020, para. 99 and 100, emphasis in original)

Some sources report that the G9 openly demonstrates in the streets of Port-au-Prince, as in July 2020 (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]) [or in June 2020 (The Washington Post 14 Aug. 2020)] to seek legal recognition from the state (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]). According to a Reuters report, Jimmy Cherizier organized a protest in March 2021 in support of the Moïse administration (Reuters 19 May 2021). Sources report that Jovenel Moïse has stated that he has no ties to gangs (The Washington Post 14 Aug. 2020; Reuters 19 May 2021).

5. State Protection

According to sources, criminal gangs enjoy impunity (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]; HRW 13 Jan. 2021). A report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate notes the arrest of 51 gang members and 53 suspected kidnappers between June and September 2020 (UN 25 Sept. 2020, para. 17). Another report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate notes the arrest of 169 gang members in January and February 2020 and 232 in March and April of the same year (UN 15 June 2020, para. 12). The February 2021 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate states that internal investigations are being conducted into 70 suspected Fantom 509 operatives (UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 27). Information indicating whether charges had been laid against the individuals arrested or under investigation could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

A Reuters article reports that President Jovenel Moïse stated in April 2021 that the fight against insecurity has been "ineffective" (Reuters 26 Apr. 2021). According to AyiboPost and Connectas, while police operations were launched against criminal groups in late 2020, [translation] "the strategy does not seem to be working. On 20 January [2021], some schoolchildren were kidnapped in the town of Carrefour, about 10 km from Port-au-Prince and a few metres from the G9-controlled neighbourhoods of Grand Ravine and Martissant" (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]).

5.1 PNH

Sources note that the PNH lacks resources and personnel (UN 25 Sept. 2020, para. 26; IHRC and OHCCH Apr. 2021, 10; Reuters 19 May 2021). However, a report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate states that, in order to combat gangs, the PNH budget received a [UN English version] "significant" increase in September 2020 for the first time since 2007 (UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 17). Other sources report that the PNH also lacks legitimacy among the Haitian population (ACLED Feb. 2021, 15; UN 25 Sept. 2020, para. 26; Reuters 19 May 2021). However, the US OSAC 2020 Crime and Safety Report states that the public places "a higher level of trust" in the PNH than in other government organizations (US 29 Apr. 2020). According to various sources, the PNH is suspected of collusion with criminal groups (IHRC and OHCCH Apr. 2021, 10; Reuters 19 May 2021; RNDDH 23 June 2020, para. 99-100). The February 2021 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate highlights human rights violations committed by law enforcement officials:

[UN English version]

From 1 September 2020 to 31 January 2021, BINUH documented 81 human rights violations by officers of the [PNH], resulting in 12 people killed (including 1 girl) and 25 injured (including 2 women) ... The General Inspectorate of the Haitian National Police [Inspection générale de la Police nationale d'Haïti, IGPNH)] opened 122 investigations into alleged acts of misconduct by police officers, 22 of which were later closed, leading to the adoption of administrative sanctions in 16 cases, of which 4 were transmitted to judicial authorities. Moreover, the General Inspectorate investigated 68 additional violations related to incidents that occurred prior to the period covered by the present report. In 14 instances, it recommended sanctions. Notably, only two of those cases were transmitted to judicial authorities ... (UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 34)

Given the lack of public trust in the police, the same source reports instances of popular justice, such as lynchings, 20 cases of which were documented between 1 September 2020 and 31 January 2021 and went unpunished (UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 34).

In March 2021, the president amended the state of emergency legislation to ensure national security and empower the government to take [translation] "all measures deemed useful" (Le Nouvelliste 17 Mar. 2021) or [translation] "competent authorities to mobilize any external, necessary support" (AlterPresse 17 Mar. 2021).

5.2 National Intelligence Agency (Agence nationale d'intelligence, ANI)

Sources report that President Moïse created the ANI by presidential decree in November 2020; it was tasked with countering terrorism (CEPR 14 Dec. 2020; Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. F2). According to the same sources, another decree expanded the definition of act of "terrorism" (CEPR 14 Dec. 2020; Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, sect. F2) to include extortion and the blocking of roads with barricades, a common practice for protesters (CEPR 14 Dec. 2020). AyiboPost and Connectas indicate that ANI members [translation] "answer only to the president" (AyiboPost and Connectas [Feb. 2021]). Freedom House reports that, according to human rights groups, the decrees

threate[n] residents' civil rights and the rule of law. Further, the decrees authorize the ANI to have total secrecy and to conduct surveillance at any time, even if there is no relevant ongoing investigation. ANI staff will be recruited from the [PNH] and from the military and will not be subject to legal proceedings without prior authorization from the president. (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. F2)

5.3 Judiciary

According to sources, the Haitian judicial system is susceptible to pressure from the executive and legislative branches (US 30 Mar. 2021, 8-9; Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. F1). Sources report that police arrested 18 (FJKL 8 Feb. 2021, 2-3) or 23 (Le Nouvelliste 9 Feb. 2021) individuals on 7 February 2021, including a Supreme Court (or Court of Cassation) judge (FJKL 8 Feb. 2021, 2-3; Le Nouvelliste 9 Feb. 2021), while three other Supreme Court judges were forced into retirement by the Moïse administration the next day (Le Nouvelliste 9 Feb. 2021).

Sources state that the judicial system also lacks oversight (US 30 Mar. 2021, 8-9; Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. F1) and that "most" corrupt officials are not held accountable (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. F1). According to the February 2021 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate, the judicial system is experiencing intermittent strikes, along with delays in court proceedings and the implementation of projects, including [UN English version] "the opening of 11 decentralized legal aid offices ... providing free legal assistance to the most vulnerable segments of the population" (UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 28-29, 36).

5.4 Detention Centres

According to Freedom House, the pretrial detention rate in 2020 represented 78 percent of the total incarcerated population (Freedom House 3 Mar. 2021, Sec. F2). The February 2021 report on the implementation of the BINUH's mandate notes that Haitian prisons have an occupancy rate of 315 percent (UN 11 Feb. 2021, para. 24). According to the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2020, inmates are malnourished and have 8.6 square feet of space in some prisons and sleep in shifts in "many" prisons, due to lack of space (US 30 Mar. 2021, 4-5).

5.4.1 Croix-des-Bouquets Jailbreak

According to sources, a February 2021 jailbreak in the Port-au-Prince suburb of Croix-des-Bouquets led to the deaths of 25 people and the escape of 400 inmates (AFP 10 Mar. 2021; InsightCrime 8 Mar. 2021). According to sources, observers believe that the escape was planned with help from the authorities (AFP 10 Mar. 2021; Insight Crime 8 Mar. 2021) and that its purpose was to free criminal group leader Arnel Joseph, who was killed by police the day after the escape (Insight Crime 8 Mar. 2021). The same sources state that 59 or 87 of the inmates who escaped were recaptured by law enforcement (AFP 10 Mar. 2021), or that half were recaptured (Insight Crime 8 Mar. 2021).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Note

[1] The International Human Rights Clinic (IHRC) at Harvard Law School [translation] "seeks to protect and promote human rights and international humanitarian law," and the Observatoire haïtien des crimes contre l'humanité (OHCCH) is a "consortium of Haitian civil society organizations and prominent leaders ... with a mission of monitoring human rights violations in Haiti" (IHRC and OHCCH Apr. 2021, 2).

References

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Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED). February 2021 "Haiti: High Risk of Increased Gang Violence Amid Rising Authoritarianism." Ten Conflicts to Worry About in 2021. By Sandra Pellegrini. [Accessed 21 May 2021]

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Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources: Assistant professor of social work at a university in the US who has lived and taught in Haiti; Défenseurs plus; full professor at a university in Canada whose research focuses on security, conflict, and the institutions of fragile states, including Haiti; Plateforme des organisations haïtiennes des droits humains; Security Governance Group.

Internet sites, including: ACAPS; Amnesty International; Center for Strategic and International Studies; Défenseurs plus; Haiti – ministère de la Justice et de la Sécurité publique, Police nationale d'Haïti; The Haitian Times; Médecins sans frontières; UN – Refworld; Reporters sans frontières; Transparency International.