• The extent to which power is centralized and personalized in the hands of President Aleksandar Vučić came into clearer focus during 2020. The combination of the COVID-19 pandemic and accompanying state of emergency allowed Vučić to claim the center stage in coordinating the Serbian state’s pandemic response. While other politicians from the ruling and opposition parties became all but invisible, Vučić, together with Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, Minister of Health Zoran Lončar, and the medical members of the COVID-19 Crisis Staff, made regular appearances at press conferences and public addresses.12 Progovernment media and other SNS officials made a point of praising Vučić’s efforts.13
• In early March, Vučić called parliamentary elections for April 26th.14 However, following the imposition of a state of emergency in mid-March, the Republic Electoral Commission (RIK) suspended all election activities.15 Nevertheless, many observers and commentators believed Vučić’s handling of the pandemic was instrumentalized as part of the then suspended election campaign.16 An Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) report on the elections, which were held in June, described Vučić’s activities as “tacit campaigning.”17
• Having won three-quarters of the parliament’s seats, the ruling SNS faced no challenge in forming a government. However, while elections in neighboring Croatia and North Macedonia yielded functioning governments within weeks, a new government was not formed in Serbia for over four months. President Vučić cited various reasons for delaying government formation, including the need to select the right coalition partners, the need to consider ministerial appointments, and his own diplomatic schedule.18 Political observers and politicians expressed the belief that Vučić was drawing out the process to maintain control over it, all while keeping SNS subordinates and potential partners unclear as to the coalition’s final configuration.19
• On October 5th, Vučić nominated Ana Brnabić as prime minister.20 The participation of the SPS and SPAS in the coalition government21 was announced 15 days later. The Brnabić-led government was approved by legislators on October 28th.22
• Following the opposition boycott, the national legislature seems less representative of the electorate’s political preferences than ever since the introduction of multi-party elections. Serbian opposition parties will be forced to operate outside regular democratic institutions and will face a major challenge in finding ways to criticize the government and, ultimately, to remain relevant. At the end of 2020, opposition parties seemed far from agreeing on a common set of demands that would facilitate conditions for fully free and fair elections.

• The June parliamentary elections were marred by a boycott from the opposition over the lack of free and fair electoral conditions.23 Shortly before elections were called, the ruling SNS amended the electoral law, reducing the threshold for entering the parliament from 5 percent of votes cast to 3 percent.24 OSCE election monitors noted that the manner and timing of the legal changes, which Serbian observers considered an attempt to undermine the opposition boycott, were not in line with internationally recognized best practices.25
• In early March, President Vučić called parliamentary elections for April 26th.26 However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent state of emergency, election activities were suspended in mid-March.27 In May, after the state of emergency was lifted, the RIK announced a resumption of election activities, and the polls were rescheduled for June 21st.28 Elections for the Vojvodina Provincial Assembly and 154 local governments were held the same day.
• While President Vučić was not on the ballot, his personal power within the ruling SNS was demonstrated by the decision to name the ruling party’s electoral list “Aleksandar Vučić–For Our Children” for parliamentary, provincial, and local races, without any reference to the SNS itself. While the list’s name again demonstrated the personalization of politics within the ruling party, it did not violate existing legislation.29
• According to the final results, the SNS-led list won 60.7 percent of votes cast and 188 parliamentary seats. The allied SPS won 10.4 percent of votes, securing 32 seats. The only other nonminority list to cross the 3 percent threshold was the SPAS, which won 3.8 percent of the vote and 11 seats. The remaining 19 seats were won by ethnic minority representatives, who faced a lower threshold. Some 20 percent of votes were cast for electoral lists that failed to enter the parliament. Turnout for the parliamentary contest stood at 48.9 percent, the lowest since multiparty elections were introduced in 1990.30
• The OSCE sent a limited mission to observe the elections, though no systematic election-day monitoring was carried out. In its final report, the OSCE noted that the elections “were administered efficiently,” but also noted numerous problems and irregularities, ranging from pro-SNS media bias to pressure and intimidation of voters on election day. OSCE monitors also reported that “the advantage enjoyed by the governing parties, the decision of some opposition parties to boycott the elections and limited policy debate narrowed the choice and information available to voters.”31
• The Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA), an independent domestic election-observation organization, issued a critical assessment of the elections in an October report. CRTA called the elections “the worst of all election processes observed to date, and although on the whole the elections fulfilled minimal democratic standards, they will have negative consequences for the quality of democracy in Serbia.”32 In particular, CRTA concluded that events on election day were “on the edge of regularity,”33 with significant irregularities observed in at least 8 percent of polling stations, two to three times more than in past elections. The CRTA report notably concluded that irregularities did not affect the electoral outcome as much as turnout, which it estimates would have been around 4% lower in their absence.34

• The Serbian Business Registers Agency counted 34,450 registered civil society organizations (CSOs) in October, an increase of just over a thousand compared to 2019.35 Although this represents a sizeable number relative to Serbia’s population, it likely includes many organizations with little or no activity.
• However, the Civil Society Sustainability Index for 2019, published in October, noted a deterioration in CSO sustainability in five of seven criteria, primarily due to “the hostile environment in which civil society activists operated.”36
• Meanwhile, the European Commission’s (EC) Serbia report, also published in October, stated that “an enabling environment for the development and financing of civil society still needs to be established,” while noting that CSOs operate in a polarized environment that is “not open to criticism.”37 The EC report also noted the prevalence of negative statements made against CSOs by the authorities, particularly over funding, in the context of “smear campaigns.” Notably, the EC report concluded that “organizations and individuals that criticize the authorities in developments related to the rule of law are under particular pressure.”38
• Environmental protests, which are relatively new phenomena in Serbia, continued during the year. Most visible were the protests against the construction of hydroelectric power plants in the Stara Planina nature park. The “Let’s Defend the Stara Planina Rivers” movement organized protests in the area,39 as well as in Belgrade.40 The movement won a notable victory when plans to construct hydroelectric plants in the park were removed from the planning documents of the local Pirot municipality in April.41 Citizens also protested over a range of other environmental problems; in Bor and Smederevo, protests were organized against air pollution generated by local industrial complexes owned by Chinese companies.42
• In July, an informal group of medics known as United Against COVID-19 issued a public letter—initially signed by more than 350 doctors—in which they criticized the government’s COVID-19 response. United Against COVID-19 called for the dismissal of the government’s COVID-19 Crisis Staff, and stated that “the complete easing of anti-epidemic measures in the pre-election period (rallies, matches, tournaments, celebrations, etc.) led to a loss of control over the epidemiological situation.”43 Subsequently, media outlets reported that several signatories faced pressure and sanctions in state workplaces.44
• Serbia was also swept by a short but intense wave of protests in July. The protests were originally prompted by an apparent announcement of a weekend-long COVID-19-related curfew, attributed to President Vučić.45 Left-wing and right-wing protesters gathered in front of the parliament building with little or no active coordination. During that protest, a group of right-wing demonstrators, apparently led by former Dveri official Srđan Nogo, briefly broke into the parliament building before they were removed.46 Over the next few days, protesters continued to gather in front of the parliament, motivated by issues ranging from government policy on COVID-19 to Kosovo.47 Protests were held in several other cities including Kruševac, Niš, and Novi Sad.48 Police used force against demonstrators, who were often peaceful, in scenes not witnessed since the 1990s.49

• The number of independent media outlets remained broadly stable, but these outlets remained limited in their ability to reach the wider Serbian population. In late January, the government adopted the Media Strategy to 2025 plan, which was largely well-received by the two main journalists’ associations.50 However, both associations, as well as independent journalists, voiced caution over the ultimate fate of the plan’s envisioned legal changes.51 While a related action plan was originally due for adoption in May, the Brnabić government only pledged to adopt the document during its first 100 days in late October52 and announced the formation of a working group to monitor its execution by December.53
• Independent outlets faced headwinds while reporting on the COVID-19 pandemic and related state of emergency, with Serbian authorities proving themselves unwilling to accept critical coverage. The most drastic example was the case of journalist Ana Lalić, who reported on a lack of protective equipment and on chaotic working conditions at the Vojvodina Clinical Center in an April article published by news site NovaS.rs.54 The day the article was published, police arrested Lalić for “spreading panic and disturbance.”55 Lalić was released a day later, after her arrest stirred public outcry,56 and the charges against her were eventually dropped.57
• At the end of July, Serbian media revealed that the Finance Ministry’s Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering had requested the banking information of 20 journalists, activists and other individuals, as well as 37 organizations—primarily media outlets and CSOs—as part of its investigations into terrorism financing and money laundering.58 Organizations targeted by the ministry included Serbia’s two main journalists’ associations, BIRN, the Center for Investigative Journalism of Serbia, the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network, CRTA, and the European Movement in Serbia.59 Journalists, media outlets, and CSOs reacted angrily, seeing the move as a deliberate attempt to silence and intimidate critics. The EC, the US Embassy in Belgrade, and Amnesty International also voiced concern over the move.60
• The Independent Association of Journalists of Serbia (NUNS) reported a sharp increase in the total number of registered attacks against journalists. NUNS counted 151 such attacks in 2020, up from 119 in 2019—the 2020 figures were the highest since the database was created in 2008.61 NUNS also recorded a notable increase in physical assaults. Particularly worrying were a string of attacks on journalists by riot police—and some protesters—during the July protests in Belgrade.62

• Local elections were held in 154 of Serbia’s 170 local municipalities, taking place concurrently with national elections. Electors in the autonomous province of Vojvodina also cast their votes for the Vojvodina Provincial Assembly. The same parties that boycotted national parliamentary elections largely boycotted the local contests. As a result of the boycott and the weak organization of the opposition groups that did participate, voters benefited from even fewer choices in local races than in the national elections.
• The ruling SNS secured overwhelming majorities in nearly all the municipalities that held local elections. While the political representatives of ethnic minorities prevailed in municipalities with sizeable minority populations such as Novi Pazar, the SNS lost in only seven municipalities outside such areas—Beočin, Čajetina, Novi Beograd, Ražanj, Surdulica, Svilajnac, and Topola.63 Even then, parties such as the SPS, a coalition partner, won power in some of these municipalities.
• Fierce contests took place in the towns of Paraćin and Šabac, which were among the last municipalities with large urban centers under opposition control. Paraćin mayor Saša Paunović defied the Democratic Party’s (DS) decision to boycott the elections, leaving the DS in order to seek a new term.64 Paunović publicly described his choice as that between letting down his party and letting down his supporters in Paraćin.65 Paunović and his electoral list were defeated, with the SNS taking 45.1 percent of the vote to Paunović’s 24.2 percent.66 In a subsequent interview, Paunović argued the elections were neither free nor fair, but that voters were free of intimidation, and accepted the results.67
• The elections in Šabac—where incumbent mayor Nebojša Zelenović and his “Together for Serbia” group faced off with the SNS—were marred by procedural chaos. Following the local elections in June, the SNS proclaimed that it won more than half the votes cast.68 However, the City Election Commission (GIK) decided to annul the voting process on procedural grounds at all 100 polling stations;69 an administrative court later quashed the decision, ordering a rerun at 27 polling stations.70 Amidst an outbreak of COVID-19 infections, the rerun elections were held in early September, but the GIK ordered the vote to be repeated once again at five polling stations.71 The third round of voting took place in early October, after which the GIK annulled the results at one of the five polling stations.72
• In the aftermath of this, 10 GIK members close to Zelenović resigned, while a group of GIK members close to the SNS organized a hunger strike. Eventually, a rump GIK cancelled a fourth round of voting73 and proclaimed the final election results on October 17th—almost four months after the elections were first held—confirming that the SNS had won an absolute majority of seats in the local assembly.74

The government did not adopt a law on funding for Vojvodina, despite a constitutional requirement to do so. While the constitution stipulates that at least 7 percent of the national budget should be devoted to Vojvodina, disagreements over how that commitment is calculated persisted.

• The EC’s October report on Serbia noted a lack of progress on judicial reform during the year,75 concluding that “the current constitutional and legislative framework continues to leave room for undue political influence over the judiciary” and that “pressure on the judiciary remains high.”76 The EC also noted the willingness of government officials to publicly comment on court proceedings, sentences, and investigations, even though existing codes of conduct for government officials prohibit such behavior. Individual judges and prosecutors often found themselves subjected to personal attacks, including by parliamentarians, which were also carried in tabloid newspapers.77 In September, the Judges’ Association of Serbia called on the parliament to establish an ethics committee to investigate code-of-conduct breaches.78
• In January, Justice Ministry official Radomir Ilić issued new proposals that would institute more “external control” over the judiciary, after claiming that it was becoming “an unaccountable branch of government.” Ilić cited the French model when discussing his proposal, highlighting the French president’s apparent power to appoint judges and prosecutors.79 While the proposals caused a storm in judicial and legal circles, they appear to have only amounted to a trial balloon.80 The proposals were put forward despite the Vučić government’s 2018 move to offer constitutional amendments on judicial independence.
• In July, the government adopted a national judicial development strategy for the 2020–25 period; the previous strategy had expired in December 2018.81 The EC report on Serbia warned, however, that no impact assessment had been carried out, nor was a financial analysis of the proposed reforms’ costs conducted.82 A revised action plan for EU negotiating Chapter 23 pertaining to judicial and other fundamental rights was adopted that same month.83
• The EC’s report on Serbia noted a smaller, though still large, number of backlogged cases in 2019 over the previous year. The EC counted 685,456 cases that were at least two years old in 2019, as opposed to 781,137 in 2018. The same report counted just over 250,000 cases that were at least 10 years old in 2019.84
• Judicial authorities increasingly relied on so-called “Skype trials” during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and related state of emergency. Following the imposition of the state of emergency in mid-March, the work of the courts was essentially suspended, with only urgent cases—primarily related to state-of-emergency violations—being processed. Given the social distancing measures in place, some of these urgent trials were held via Skype, the sole legal basis for which was an instruction from the Ministry of Justice.85 One month into the state of emergency, media reported that dozens of trials were conducted via videoconference, noting that seemingly similar offenses were often punished with very different sentences. Thus, while a Niš resident received a three-year prison sentence for breaching a self-isolation order from the Basic Court in Dimitrovgrad, the Basic Court in Zrenjanin issued a €680 ($880) fine for a similar offense one week later.86

• While the SNS took power on a pledge to fight corruption in 2012, the party has lessened its public rhetoric on the issue. Indeed, while outlining the priorities of her new government in late October, Prime Minister Brnabić put a strong focus on fighting organized crime but only mentioned anticorruption efforts in passing. While laying out her government’s program, Brnabić made a reference to implementing an action plan for the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, even though both the strategy and action plan expired at the end of 2018. No new strategic framework has been adopted since.87
• The EC noted only “limited progress” in the fight against corruption in its report on Serbia.88 While the report noted positive steps taken to “strengthen the mandate and to ensure the independence of the Anti-Corruption Agency,” it also stated that the “number of finalized high-level corruption cases has decreased compared with the previous years.”89
• In early February, the parliament adopted a law that effectively allows the government to exempt selected infrastructure projects of “strategic importance” from public procurement rules.90 The new law was criticized by numerous anticorruption campaigners, including the local chapter of Transparency International, which called for the law to be withdrawn because it would undermine the public procurement system.91 The EC’s report on Serbia also criticized the legislation, warning that the new law “raises serious concerns regarding its potential for corruption.”92
• In late February, the parliament adopted the Law on the Origin of Assets, which expands the ability of tax administrators to compare the assets of natural persons to their declared income, with a view to taxing or confiscating assets in case of major discrepancies.93 The law will come into effect in 2021, though many anticorruption experts have reservations over how it will be implemented.94
• In an unusual move, President Vučić told Austrian newspaper Kleine Zeitung that there had been a significant amount of corruption in the Serbian government.95 The statement was carried by some Serbian media outlets, with observers noting that Vučić only made those admissions to foreign—rather than local—media.96
• The Anti-Corruption Council, an independent government body, continued to be understaffed and underresourced: currently, only 7 of the body’s 13 seats are filled. More worryingly, the Council faced sharp attacks from government officials in September. After the Council issued a report on the operation of the state railway, Transport Minister Zorana Mihajlović threatened to initiate procedures to “reexamine the Council’s work” in order to “reform” the body. Members of the Council saw this as a veiled threat to end its work.97

Author: Miloš Damnjanović is a political analyst working and living in Belgrade. He holds a doctorate in Political Science from the University of Oxford, where he worked on post-1989 democratization in Serbia and Croatia.