Document #2035822
Freedom House (Author)
Democracy Percentage | 5.36 / 100 |
Democracy Score | 1.32 / 7 |
By Malika Toqmadi
Despite the resignation of President Nursultan Nazarbayev—the country’s only president since its independence in 1991—Kazakhstan remained a consolidated authoritarian state in 2019. Nazarbayev maintains his grip on power as Leader of the Nation, as well as leader of the ruling Nur Otan party and lifelong chairman of the Security Council, which endows him with continued and sweeping control of the country’s major decision-making processes.
The hopes of many for political liberalization and decentralization of power were dashed as the acting president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in his inaugural speech proposed changing the name of the capital city from Astana to Nur-Sultan and, perhaps more importantly, nominated Nazarbayev’s daughter, Dariga Nazarbayeva, to succeed him as Speaker of the Senate, allowing her to take over presidential responsibilities in case the current president resigns or dies in office.1
The 2019 transfer of power was followed by a wave of political activism not seen in the country since the early 2000s. Although the overall environment of suppression of the opposition, independent media, and civil society continued during the year, the early presidential elections on June 9 were accompanied by unprecedented public debate, countrywide street protests, and a record number of citizen election observers,2 who actively used social media to report widespread irregularities.
Tokayev was inaugurated as president amid mass arbitrary detentions of peaceful protestors3 demanding the cancellation of the election results and an end to the massive internet shutdowns. The OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission concluded that voters had “no genuine choice” and that the elections “showed scant respect for democratic standards.”4
Protests took place throughout the year. Thousands of people were drawn to the streets for a wide range of issues—from socioeconomic grievances, such as a series of “mothers’ protests” and new labor tensions in the city of Zhanaozen, to youth-driven rallies for political reforms and anti-Chinese demonstrations. In 2019, the authorities deployed a new method of disrupting antigovernment gatherings, where so-called titushky—unidentified paid agitators in civilian clothes—attacked protestors and journalists at various demonstrations and press events.5
A range of political movements and parties announced their formation in 2019, including “Oyan, Qazaqstan” (OQ), Respublika, Democratic Party of Kazakhstan (DVK), Nashe Pravo (Our Rights), Haq, and others. However, no new political parties have been officially registered in the country since 2006, and restrictive legislation and administrative pressure make registration impossible for most new parties.6
Under popular pressure, President Tokayev has declared the need for a state that provides a “quick response to the needs of people” and has proposed to “carry out political reforms without ‘running ahead of ourselves.’”7 As one of his first steps as president, he established the National Council of Public Trust, an advisory body meant to “ensure constructive dialogue” between the state and civil society, which nevertheless ended up consisting predominantly of progovernment figures.8 The council met twice in 2019 and became the main platform for Tokayev to articulate his agenda and address some civic demands, such as promising to allow peaceful public rallies, decriminalize libel,9 “create the institution of parliamentary opposition,”10 and speed up law enforcement reforms.11 However, despite Tokayev’s stated intentions to conduct liberal reforms, the results are yet to be seen, as he is limited by his lack of legitimacy and the tight legislative and political boundaries established by the country’s first president.
In 2019, Kazakhstan continued to import and install advanced surveillance and intelligent monitoring systems based on Chinese technologies. The country’s digital communications space is heavily controlled by the state, namely, by the National Security Committee (KNB). In July, the government tried to intercept and monitor users’ encrypted connections by asking all internet users to install so-called national security certificates on their devices. This public request was withdrawn the next month, as the president referred to the action as a successful “test.”12 Websites are routinely shut down by authorities without a court order. There are about 30,000 websites banned permanently,13 and popular social media and online messaging services are regularly blocked, for instance, during public protests or livestreamed addresses by the fugitive oligarch and opposition leader Mukhtar Ablyazov (cofounder of Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan, DVK).
Freedom of expression remains significantly restricted in Kazakhstan. There are criminal penalties for libel and defamation, and journalists are obliged to verify all published information and seek consent from the subjects of their reports. Journalists are threatened, prosecuted, and attacked by both authorities and individuals, often with impunity. Subsequently, media critical of the regime are almost nonexistent, while self-censorship is widely practiced by both media and internet users.
Corruption continues to be one of the major impediments to good governance in Kazakhstan. Although there are regular high-level declarations that the fight against corruption is a top government priority, private interests continue to influence decision-making, while political processes remain opaque and highly centralized.
Kazakhstan is in the beginning steps of an important process to shape new political structures without the cornerstone figure of Nazarbayev. The coming year will determine whether President Tokayev will be able to keep his promises of a socially oriented and “hearing state.” Considering the limited political and legal space for much-needed systemic reforms, as well as a lack of legitimacy in the eyes of both elites and society, Tokayev is in the precarious position of balancing populist measures to satisfy public demands and the pro-status-quo positions favored by elite interests. The country’s new opposition movements currently lack political organization, strategy, or clear ideological grounds. Acting in the narrow space of intimidation and legal prosecution, opposition actors and movements will likely continue to be united on an ad hoc, issue-centered basis.
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. | 1.25 / 7.00 |
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. | 1.25 / 7.00 |
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. | 1.50 / 7.00 |
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. | 1.25 / 7.00 |
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. | 1.50 / 7.00 |
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. | 1.25 / 7.00 |
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. | 1.25 / 7.00 |
Author: Malika Toqmadi is an independent researcher based in Kazakhstan. She holds an MA in Politics and Security in Central Asia from the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and an MA in Global and European Security from the Geneva Center for Security Policy, University of Geneva.
NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0–100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic.