Document #2029663
Freedom House (Author)
Democracy Percentage | 65.48 100 |
Democracy Score | 4.93 7 |
By Anna Wójcik and Miłosz Wiatrowski
The quality of democratic governance in Poland continued to deteriorate in 2019, marking the fourth consecutive year of decline in the country and its lowest score in Nations in Transit. The most negatively affected areas were the judiciary, local democratic governance, and the pluralism of civil society.
The main political event of the year was the October parliamentary election, which decisively strengthened the mandate of the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) government. The PiS-led coalition, United Right (Zjednoczona Prawica), won a majority in the National Assembly’s Sejm (lower house) with an unprecedented eight million votes—though the opposition won a fragile 51 to 49 seat majority in the Senate (upper house) and can slow down the legislative process through debate and deliberation. The election was preceded by a vicious campaign but also unprecedented mobilization, resulting in a 30-year record-high turnout.1 Earlier, in May, the country also recorded high participation in the European Parliament elections.2
See also: PKW, ‘Sprawozdanie z wyborów do Parlamentu Europejskiego przeprowadzonych 26 maja 2019 roku’ [National Election Commission, Report on elections to European Parliament conducted on 26th May 2019], accessible at:
Even though the outcome of the elections reflected the deep political polarization of Polish society, the new parliament represents a broader spectrum of political views than the former. The largest opposition force is the center-right Civic Coalition (Koalicja Obywatelska, KO), while the left made a return with the united list of Lewica (Left), and the extreme right entered too, represented by the Euroskeptic Konfederacja. Consequently, PiS is flanked by critics on both sides, challenged on social policy commitments by Lewica and on cultural and economic issues by Konfederacja.
For much of the year, the PiS-led coalition continued to increase its popularity despite intense domestic and European Union (EU)–level criticisms of its moves to undermine judicial independence, media pluralism, and civil liberties. Significantly, substantive institutional changes remained in force, including modifications to the composition and functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal (CT, described in previous Nations in Transit reports) and the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ)—both of which had been taken over by the ruling PiS through politicized appointments. In December 2019, three new appointments to the CT included two well-known former PiS members of parliament (MPs), one of whom had been a communist-era state prosecutor.
Attempts at subordinating the justice system to political power reached new lows as well. The NCJ started appointing judges to common courts and to certain chambers of the Supreme Court (SC),3 although uncertainty prevailed as to whether those chambers could still be considered independent courts. Following a landmark ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the SC in December ruled that the Disciplinary Chamber could no longer be considered an independent court.
Before and after the ruling, members of the legal profession continued to face significant pressure from the executive and legislative branches, notably through excessive use of disciplinary proceedings. In August, media outlets reported about an online smear campaign against judges, allegedly coordinated from within the Justice Ministry and supported by some NCJ officials. And in December, the governing coalition added fuel to the fire by introducing the so-called muzzle law, which would tighten the disciplinary system and set out harsh punishments for criticizing the government’s overhaul of the judiciary. Domestic and international bodies and experts all agreed that the bill diminished Poland’s judicial independence; they argued that it would put judges in the impossible situation of facing disciplinary actions for decisions required by the European Convention on Human Rights, EU law, and other international instruments, as well as by the Polish constitution.
Polish civil society remained vibrant but highly polarized. The year was marked by hate-motivated attacks, both verbal and physical, on the LGBT+ community, while PiS and the public media initiated lawsuits against critics. In January, Paweł Adamowicz, the longtime mayor of Gdańsk known for his progressive views, was murdered at knifepoint during a large public charity event. Additionally, the government systematically degraded the social and institutional autonomy of the cultural sphere, channeling state funds to select organizations and initiatives, and appointing loyal supporters to helm museums and other cultural institutions.
Media freedoms continued to deteriorate. Having taken over the broadcasting supervisory bodies and the public broadcasters themselves, PiS announced plans to curb the remaining independent media during its second term. The governing party’s electoral program contained a proposal that would set up a professional body endowed with the power to discipline journalists. Meanwhile, the public media remained involved in political campaigning in favor of PiS.
Local governments were put under financial strain as tax cuts announced by the central government reduced their revenues, while the educational reform, a salary increase for teachers, and a host of other factors will significantly increase local expenditures. Liberal mayors in charge of the largest Polish cities were often targeted by government criticism as well as negative propaganda by media outlets associated with the right-wing, populist ruling camp led by PiS.
Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki formed his second government cabinet in November, but PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński—who does not hold any formal position other than being an MP—continued to wield informal power behind the scenes. The government includes PiS coalition partners United Poland (Solidarna Polska, SP) and Alliance (Porozumienie), each controlling 18 seats in the Sejm, which are crucial for maintaining a majority. Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro from SP and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Science and Higher Education Jarosław Gowin from Alliance are powerful figures in the cabinet.
While there were a number of corruption allegations in the ruling camp during the year, they had no substantial impact on PiS’s popularity. The fight against corruption remained one of the key stated objectives of the government, and almost half of all Poles were satisfied with its handling of the issue. A strong economy and an increase in private sector wages, however, led to a rise in food prices. Coupled with chronic underfinancing in the public sector, the increase prompted mass protests among teachers, doctors, and administrative staff. PiS’s model of welfare state, which appeals to many voters, is focused primarily on supporting the family through social transfers and tax cuts, not on supporting the public sector.
At year’s end, the ruling PiS party was engaged in a deep conflict with EU institutions over the rule of law while preparing for the presidential elections in 2020. President Andrzej Duda, actively campaigning for reelection, expressed his support for the judicial disciplinary system and launched attacks on judges and “foreign lawyers” interfering in Polish affairs on state TV and during meetings with voters. With the election and pending EU actions, the upcoming year is set to be pivotal for judicial independence, as well as for Poland’s democratic trajectory.
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. | 4.00 7.00 |
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. | 6.50 7.00 |
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. | 5.50 7.00 |
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. | 5.00 7.00 |
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. | 5.75 7.00 |
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. | 3.50 7.00 |
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. | 4.25 7.00 |
Authors: Anna Wójcik coordinates the Wiktor Osiatyński Archive, a rule-of-law monitoring initiative, and is cofounder of an English-language resource on rule of law in Poland (ruleoflaw.pl).
Miłosz Wiatrowski is a PhD candidate in contemporary Polish history at Yale University and a researcher working at Polityka Insight.
The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0–100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic.
On the quality of legislative procedure and legislation in 2018, see:‘XII Komunikat Obywatelskiego Forum Legislacji o jakości procesu legislacyjnego na podstawie obserwacji prowadzonej w okresie od 16 maja do 15 listopada 2018 roku oraz podsumowujący aktywność legislacyjną rządu i parlamentu w trzecim roku ich działalności’, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, accessible at: .
Source: ‘Premier: stoimy u progu wielkiej szansy budowy państwa dobrobytu’ [Prime Minister: we are at a threshold of having a chance to build a welfare state], Polsatnews.pl, 28.09.2019, accessible at: .
See also: PKW, ‘Sprawozdanie z wyborów do Parlamentu Europejskiego przeprowadzonych 26 maja 2019 roku’ [National Election Commission, Report on elections to European Parliament conducted on 26th May 2019], accessible at:
PKW, ‘Obwieszczenie Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 14 października 2019 r. o wynikach wyborów do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej przeprowadzonych w dniu 13 października 2019 r.’ [National Election Commission Announcement of 14th October 2019 on the results of elections to Senate of the Republic of Poland conducted on 13th October 2019], accessible at:
,
On the importance of the CJEU judgment, see for instance: Pech, L., Platon, S., ‘The beginning of the end for Poland’s so-called “judicial reforms”? Some thoughts on the ECJ ruling in Commission v Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court case)’, EU Law Analysis Blog, 30.06.2019, accessible at: .
See also: Oral justification of the Supreme Court judgment in connection with the CJEU ruling regarding the Disciplinary Chamber and the National Council of the Judiciary, Ruleoflaw.pl, 8.12.2019, accessible at: .
See also EU commission report on cumulative effects of the disciplinary model on judicial independence:
‘Rule of Law: European Commission launches infringement procedure to protect judges in Poland from political control’, European Commission, 3.04.2019, accessible at:
Amnesty International, ‘Free Courts, Free People, Judges Standing for Its Independence’, accessible at: (accessed: 20.09.2019).
Lex Super Omnia Prosecutors’ Association, ‘Królowie Życia. W prokuraturze >’ [“Kings of Life in the Prosecutor’s Office at Times of >”], accessible at:
https://oko.press/cysterny-eko-wstydu-stoimy-z-taka-cysterna-kolo-szkol…;,
Democracy Percentage | 65.48 100 |
Democracy Score | 4.93 7 |
By Anna Wójcik and Miłosz Wiatrowski
The quality of democratic governance in Poland continued to deteriorate in 2019, marking the fourth consecutive year of decline in the country and its lowest score in Nations in Transit. The most negatively affected areas were the judiciary, local democratic governance, and the pluralism of civil society.
The main political event of the year was the October parliamentary election, which decisively strengthened the mandate of the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) government. The PiS-led coalition, United Right (Zjednoczona Prawica), won a majority in the National Assembly’s Sejm (lower house) with an unprecedented eight million votes—though the opposition won a fragile 51 to 49 seat majority in the Senate (upper house) and can slow down the legislative process through debate and deliberation. The election was preceded by a vicious campaign but also unprecedented mobilization, resulting in a 30-year record-high turnout.1 Earlier, in May, the country also recorded high participation in the European Parliament elections.2
See also: PKW, ‘Sprawozdanie z wyborów do Parlamentu Europejskiego przeprowadzonych 26 maja 2019 roku’ [National Election Commission, Report on elections to European Parliament conducted on 26th May 2019], accessible at:
Even though the outcome of the elections reflected the deep political polarization of Polish society, the new parliament represents a broader spectrum of political views than the former. The largest opposition force is the center-right Civic Coalition (Koalicja Obywatelska, KO), while the left made a return with the united list of Lewica (Left), and the extreme right entered too, represented by the Euroskeptic Konfederacja. Consequently, PiS is flanked by critics on both sides, challenged on social policy commitments by Lewica and on cultural and economic issues by Konfederacja.
For much of the year, the PiS-led coalition continued to increase its popularity despite intense domestic and European Union (EU)–level criticisms of its moves to undermine judicial independence, media pluralism, and civil liberties. Significantly, substantive institutional changes remained in force, including modifications to the composition and functioning of the Constitutional Tribunal (CT, described in previous Nations in Transit reports) and the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ)—both of which had been taken over by the ruling PiS through politicized appointments. In December 2019, three new appointments to the CT included two well-known former PiS members of parliament (MPs), one of whom had been a communist-era state prosecutor.
Attempts at subordinating the justice system to political power reached new lows as well. The NCJ started appointing judges to common courts and to certain chambers of the Supreme Court (SC),3 although uncertainty prevailed as to whether those chambers could still be considered independent courts. Following a landmark ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the SC in December ruled that the Disciplinary Chamber could no longer be considered an independent court.
Before and after the ruling, members of the legal profession continued to face significant pressure from the executive and legislative branches, notably through excessive use of disciplinary proceedings. In August, media outlets reported about an online smear campaign against judges, allegedly coordinated from within the Justice Ministry and supported by some NCJ officials. And in December, the governing coalition added fuel to the fire by introducing the so-called muzzle law, which would tighten the disciplinary system and set out harsh punishments for criticizing the government’s overhaul of the judiciary. Domestic and international bodies and experts all agreed that the bill diminished Poland’s judicial independence; they argued that it would put judges in the impossible situation of facing disciplinary actions for decisions required by the European Convention on Human Rights, EU law, and other international instruments, as well as by the Polish constitution.
Polish civil society remained vibrant but highly polarized. The year was marked by hate-motivated attacks, both verbal and physical, on the LGBT+ community, while PiS and the public media initiated lawsuits against critics. In January, Paweł Adamowicz, the longtime mayor of Gdańsk known for his progressive views, was murdered at knifepoint during a large public charity event. Additionally, the government systematically degraded the social and institutional autonomy of the cultural sphere, channeling state funds to select organizations and initiatives, and appointing loyal supporters to helm museums and other cultural institutions.
Media freedoms continued to deteriorate. Having taken over the broadcasting supervisory bodies and the public broadcasters themselves, PiS announced plans to curb the remaining independent media during its second term. The governing party’s electoral program contained a proposal that would set up a professional body endowed with the power to discipline journalists. Meanwhile, the public media remained involved in political campaigning in favor of PiS.
Local governments were put under financial strain as tax cuts announced by the central government reduced their revenues, while the educational reform, a salary increase for teachers, and a host of other factors will significantly increase local expenditures. Liberal mayors in charge of the largest Polish cities were often targeted by government criticism as well as negative propaganda by media outlets associated with the right-wing, populist ruling camp led by PiS.
Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki formed his second government cabinet in November, but PiS chairman Jarosław Kaczyński—who does not hold any formal position other than being an MP—continued to wield informal power behind the scenes. The government includes PiS coalition partners United Poland (Solidarna Polska, SP) and Alliance (Porozumienie), each controlling 18 seats in the Sejm, which are crucial for maintaining a majority. Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro from SP and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Science and Higher Education Jarosław Gowin from Alliance are powerful figures in the cabinet.
While there were a number of corruption allegations in the ruling camp during the year, they had no substantial impact on PiS’s popularity. The fight against corruption remained one of the key stated objectives of the government, and almost half of all Poles were satisfied with its handling of the issue. A strong economy and an increase in private sector wages, however, led to a rise in food prices. Coupled with chronic underfinancing in the public sector, the increase prompted mass protests among teachers, doctors, and administrative staff. PiS’s model of welfare state, which appeals to many voters, is focused primarily on supporting the family through social transfers and tax cuts, not on supporting the public sector.
At year’s end, the ruling PiS party was engaged in a deep conflict with EU institutions over the rule of law while preparing for the presidential elections in 2020. President Andrzej Duda, actively campaigning for reelection, expressed his support for the judicial disciplinary system and launched attacks on judges and “foreign lawyers” interfering in Polish affairs on state TV and during meetings with voters. With the election and pending EU actions, the upcoming year is set to be pivotal for judicial independence, as well as for Poland’s democratic trajectory.
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. | 4.00 7.00 |
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. | 6.50 7.00 |
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. | 5.50 7.00 |
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. | 5.00 7.00 |
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. | 5.75 7.00 |
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. | 3.50 7.00 |
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. | 4.25 7.00 |
Authors: Anna Wójcik coordinates the Wiktor Osiatyński Archive, a rule-of-law monitoring initiative, and is cofounder of an English-language resource on rule of law in Poland (ruleoflaw.pl).
Miłosz Wiatrowski is a PhD candidate in contemporary Polish history at Yale University and a researcher working at Polityka Insight.
The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0–100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic.
On the quality of legislative procedure and legislation in 2018, see:‘XII Komunikat Obywatelskiego Forum Legislacji o jakości procesu legislacyjnego na podstawie obserwacji prowadzonej w okresie od 16 maja do 15 listopada 2018 roku oraz podsumowujący aktywność legislacyjną rządu i parlamentu w trzecim roku ich działalności’, Fundacja im. Stefana Batorego, accessible at: .
Source: ‘Premier: stoimy u progu wielkiej szansy budowy państwa dobrobytu’ [Prime Minister: we are at a threshold of having a chance to build a welfare state], Polsatnews.pl, 28.09.2019, accessible at: .
See also: PKW, ‘Sprawozdanie z wyborów do Parlamentu Europejskiego przeprowadzonych 26 maja 2019 roku’ [National Election Commission, Report on elections to European Parliament conducted on 26th May 2019], accessible at:
PKW, ‘Obwieszczenie Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej z dnia 14 października 2019 r. o wynikach wyborów do Senatu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej przeprowadzonych w dniu 13 października 2019 r.’ [National Election Commission Announcement of 14th October 2019 on the results of elections to Senate of the Republic of Poland conducted on 13th October 2019], accessible at:
,
On the importance of the CJEU judgment, see for instance: Pech, L., Platon, S., ‘The beginning of the end for Poland’s so-called “judicial reforms”? Some thoughts on the ECJ ruling in Commission v Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court case)’, EU Law Analysis Blog, 30.06.2019, accessible at: .
See also: Oral justification of the Supreme Court judgment in connection with the CJEU ruling regarding the Disciplinary Chamber and the National Council of the Judiciary, Ruleoflaw.pl, 8.12.2019, accessible at: .
See also EU commission report on cumulative effects of the disciplinary model on judicial independence:
‘Rule of Law: European Commission launches infringement procedure to protect judges in Poland from political control’, European Commission, 3.04.2019, accessible at:
Amnesty International, ‘Free Courts, Free People, Judges Standing for Its Independence’, accessible at: (accessed: 20.09.2019).
Lex Super Omnia Prosecutors’ Association, ‘Królowie Życia. W prokuraturze >’ [“Kings of Life in the Prosecutor’s Office at Times of >”], accessible at:
https://oko.press/cysterny-eko-wstydu-stoimy-z-taka-cysterna-kolo-szkol…;,