• Armenia is on the path toward a new democracy after the 2018 Velvet Revolution. The governing alliance’s struggle with former authorities continues as the parliament and the government battle with all the means at their disposal to, in their words, “break the resistance” of those actors in the political system who are thought to be loyal to the former regime.12
• In 2019, high-ranking security officials either resigned or were laid off13 as the new government tried to get a stronger foothold in all state apparatuses. The chief of police and the head of the National Security Service left their posts in 2019 after serving for about a year and half. Both had previously worked in law enforcement during the rule of former president (and prime minister) Serzh Sargsyan.
• The current authorities fear losing popularity and are taking a cautious approach to policymaking. The most publicized issues of the year included the operation of a gold mine at Amulsar and ratification of the Istanbul Convention, a Council of Europe treaty on preventing domestic violence and violence against women. In August, Armenia’s Investigative Committee released a commissioned report that raised ecological concerns about the planned gold mine while dismissing other issues.14 Prime Minister Pashinyan gave the project the green light, as it is a critical source of hard currency for the country. In September, he reversed himself amid public outcry,15 conceding that more environmental and legal inspections are needed.16 Earlier, in July, the government announced that it would ratify the Istanbul Convention, which the former government had signed in January 2018.17 However, conservative elements in Armenian society objected to the treaty’s assertion that gender is a social construct.18 Public debate on the treaty turned hostile as various nationalistic and chauvinistic groups spread misinformation about it, and the government quietly dropped the matter.19
• Armenia’s parliamentary body, the National Assembly, consisted of three political forces in 2019: Prime Minister Pashinyan’s My Step Alliance, plus oligarch Gagik Tsarukyan’s opposition Prosperous Armenia Party (PAP), and the opposition party Bright Armenia, led by Edmon Marukyan.20 The most radical opposition, however, remained outside the parliament. Due primarily to Pashinyan’s personal popularity, My Step Alliance received an overwhelming mandate in the December 2018 parliamentary elections, winning 88 seats out of 132.21 It now dominates the parliament and the government. The year 2019 saw some key changes to the cabinet, notably, former Minister of Justice Artak Zeynalyan resigned,22 and Rustam Badasyan, a close Pashinyan ally, was appointed to replace him. Most of the cabinet is from Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party, the largest constituent in the My Step Alliance.23
• Foreign affairs are in the process of being stabilized. The country’s relationship with Russia endured ups and downs in 2019. The EU-Armenia Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA) has not yet been ratified, but Armenian diplomats are committed to seeing it through on their end.
• The year featured a lesser degree of violence along the border with Azerbaijan. For the first time in well over a decade,24 Armenian and Azerbaijani journalists made exchange visits.25 However, Prime Minister Pashinyan’s rhetoric on the feud between the two countries differs only slightly from his predecessors.
• In July, the governing alliance passed a flat tax of 23 percent,26 doing away with the former government’s progressive tax system.27 Armenia’s central bank projected that the economy could expand by 6.9 to 7.1 percent in 2019.28 (The real GDP growth rate in 2019 was 7.6 percent.29) Nevertheless, the government has a more conservative outlook for 2020, projecting 4.9 percent GDP growth.30

• Elections in post-revolutionary Armenia have more credibility in the public’s perception than they did under the former authorities. The results of the 2018 parliamentary elections have not been contested, unlike the previous parliamentary votes in 201231 and 201732 (although, in both cases, the Constitutional Court found the results to be lawful). Armenia did not hold any national elections in 2019.
• Elections did take place, however, in Armenia’s provinces and communities for various posts in local self-government bodies.33 These were deemed mostly free and fair. Each election was monitored by three to six observer groups.
• During the June 9 local elections, observer groups found irregularities in several provinces and communities. Observers from Akanates (“Eye-Witness”), a nongovernmental organization (NGO), singled out the election in Abovyan, where a candidate from Civil Contract competed against an incumbent supported by the PAP for the post of community leader.34 Electoral violations were recorded on both sides during the campaign and the balloting itself. Provincial governor Romanos Petrosyan, a member of Civil Contract appointed by the current authorities, illegally campaigned on election day, giving an interview to Armnews TV in which he remarked that the incumbent community leader was corrupt. Observers labeled this an “abuse of administrative resources that was clearly intended to influence the voters’ choice.” Meanwhile, one PAP proxy—an employee of PAP leader Gagik Tsarukyan’s Student Charitable Fund—was discovered with a list that included names and phone numbers of voters expected to support the incumbent community leader. Ultimately, the incumbent was reelected.
• Another group of observers from the NGO Legal Progress Legal Club reported to the central election committee that there was an unnecessary high concentration of police forces in Abovyan, which created tension around polling sites.35
• Observers recorded irregularities such as counting invalid ballots during the vote in the community of Gorayq. Artyom Grigoryan, who lost his race to become the Gorayq community leader by 16 votes, asked a court to annul the election results.36 The court ultimately ordered a do-over election—which the winner in the first election, Ashot Aghajanyan, and his supporters objected to by blocking roads.37 Nevertheless, Aghajanyan also won the do-over election on June 30.38
• In October, the government approved the Justice Ministry’s 2019–2023 Strategy for Judicial and Legal Reforms.39 Included in the strategy is a call for amendments to Armenia’s electoral legislation that would decentralize power in the parliament and ensure party pluralism by lowering the minimum election threshold. The strategy also calls for other changes, such as adopting a simple proportional system, reforming the procedure for forming coalitions in the parliament, and revising electoral deposit requirements for candidates.

• Armenian civil society lost some of its prominent members to state apparatuses in 2019, a result of the current authorities’ welcoming stance. In general, the civil sector’s involvement in government discussions and decisions increased compared to previous years. The public image of civil society organizations (CSOs) has slightly improved.40 However, the once largely liberal sector has now been supplemented with nationalistic and chauvinistic civil initiatives as well as politically motivated NGOs.41
• According to the Ministry of Justice, Armenia had 4,222 registered public organizations by the end of 2018. The European Union (EU) estimated that only 15 to 20 percent of these were active.42
• A standardized financial-reporting form for NGOs was introduced by the State Revenue Committee (SRC) in March 2019.43 Financial sustainability remains one of the biggest challenges for many organizations, and only a few have dependable sources of income.
• Amendments introduced by the SRC in March require foundations to disclose the personal information of employees. Transparency International (TI) objected that this requirement could violate employee privacy rights.44 Later, the SRC altered the amendments in line with TI’s suggestions.
• In November, the government introduced an initiative to remove an education course called “Armenian Church History” from school curricula and assimilate it into the “History of the Armenian People” module.45 This controversial plan divided society. Religious freedom is protected by the Armenian constitution, but the “Armenian Church History” class, which sometimes includes prayers and occasional Bible readings, is mandatory in public schools.
• Anti-Pashinyan groups have been lobbying against the Istanbul Convention (see “National Democratic Governance”), which addresses violence against women and domestic violence, while Pashinyan’s supporters have generally been silent on the issue.46 Since the Velvet Revolution, LGBT+ issues have dominated the public discourse and used for political ends. For example, a significant debate took place after the state made an investment in a film production about a transgender person. Prime Minister Pashinyan ultimately adopted a firm stance in defense of the subject of the film, marking the first time he had publicly defended LGBT+ people.47
• In July, Pashinyan strongly criticized right-wing “blackshirts,” with many interpreting his remarks to mean the “Adekvad” initiative, which has continuously targeted him.48 Moreover, he ordered the chief of police to locate its members. Adekvad subsequently announced that it would become a political party.49 “Veto” is another post-revolutionary initiative that spreads nationalistic views via aggressive speeches and provocative actions aimed at authorities sponsoring or defending anything that, in its view, has a connection with the LGBT+ community. One of their long-standing punching bags is the Open Society Foundation in Armenia.50 A third initiative, “Kamq,”51 has been actively disrupting events that the group labels anti-Armenian, anti-Russian, pro-sexual liberty,52 pro-LGBT+, or Satanist, such as heavy metal concerts.53 The funding streams for these groups are unknown, but the groups claim they are powered by donations from supporters.

• The media landscape in Armenia is highly polarized between pro- and antigovernment outlets, with very few options in between. Commercial TV outlets, which remain the country’s most popular sources of information, are relatively free from state control but lack editorial independence vis-à-vis their owners, according to IREX54 and Reporters Without Borders (RSF).55
• The media environment was further complicated by several government proposals in 2019. In August, the Ministry of Justice proposed a draft bill that would supplement hate speech legislation by criminalizing public calls or justifications for violence.56 Another proposal made by independent member of parliament (MP) Arman Babajanyan suggests imprisoning people who are “spreading false information, [or] materially motivating another person with the purpose of spreading false information.”57
• The current authorities have been critical towards several media outlets.58 On January 13, Prime Minister Pashinyan posted an article from the critical newspaper Hraparak on his Facebook page, saying, “Judging from their reports, the media is nostalgic for the Republicans’ corrupt government. After all, after many years of working side by side, they have become almost relatives.” Two days later, he complained on Facebook that the media are not appreciative of changes that have taken place in Armenia because “90 percent” of outlets are controlled either by the former regime or those who oppose him.59
• New amendments were introduced by the Justice Ministry that would allow journalists free access to information from the state’s registry of legal entities.60 Previously, the data was sold for $7 per search.61
• The Committee to Protect Freedom of Expression (CPFE), an Armenian NGO, recorded 96 lawsuits involving journalists and media outlets in 2019.62 This number is significantly higher than the previous two years combined. The majority of lawsuits alleged insult or slander. Many of these were brought by former or current politicians. In addition, the CPFE recorded 4 cases of physical violence against journalists as well as 134 cases of pressure against journalists and media outlets. Journalists’ work was disrupted 108 times. These numbers are alarming, and with the exception of physical violence against journalists, represent an increase over 2018. In one incident from October, a nationalistic group of Pashinyan supporters egged a critical media outlet.63
• In 2019, there were significant shifts in media ownership that brought an injection of money and energy into the antigovernment campaign run by Pashinyan opponents. PanARMENIAN, a major media holding reportedly owned by the son-in-law of former president Serzh Sargsyan, was broken up and sold to a number of buyers including former HHK MPs.64 The new owner of the country’s most profitable TV station, Armenia TV, is also linked to the former owner of PanARMENIAN. Earlier, a TV station once owned by the HHK (Ararat TV, renamed 5th Channel) was taken over by an associate of former president Robert Kocharyan.65
• The public broadcaster, Public TV, experienced many staff changes after the Velvet Revolution. In March 2019, two former employees sued Public TV for wrongful termination.66 An observer from the watchdog Media Initiative Center has remarked that “coverage of Pashinyan dominates to an outrageous degree. My hope that Public TV would not become the image maker of Pashinyan and Anna Hakobyan [Pashinyan’s wife] is fading day by day.”67 Notably, the public broadcaster under-covered the claim by Sarhat Petrosyan, former chair of the Cadastre Committee of the Republic of Armenia, that current Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinyan’s office had been involved in corrupt practices.68

• Armenia’s local governments are not decentralized. The structure of governance in Armenia, along with limited local revenues, leave the country’s provinces and communities dependent on budget allocations from the central government. The prime minister paid frequent visits to the regions to check on development. Under the current authorities, local governance is not as politicized as in the past.
• The 2019 local elections, in their conduct and results, were deemed mostly free, fair, and transparent (see “Electoral Process”). Notably, the central government refrained from putting its cronies into elected positions. In terms of campaign content, however, the elections overall remained fairly typical. Voters paid little attention to the programs introduced by candidates, and some candidates did not even have programs to put forward.
• A study of voter behavior by the group Independent Observer showed that the main issues in the regions are “lack of drinking or irrigation water,” “road construction,” and “waste management.”69
• Women’s integration into the workings of local government also remains a problem. Research showed that only about 10 percent of women were informed about the 2019 elections before candidates were registered.70
• Local governments and communities need fiscal autonomy in order to be independent and to set priorities based on their needs rather than wait for central government subventions. Existing legislation creates a hierarchy in which the central government may express concerns to community leaders, but the public cannot. A 2019 report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on fiscal transparency in Armenia noted that “local governments are highly reliant on central government transfers,” which account for 80 percent of their funding.71
• Some steps have been taken towards a more accountable model of local self-governance. Prior to 2019, a proportional system for local elections was adopted in the capital Yerevan and the municipalities of Vanadzor and Gyumri. In August 2019, the Minister of Territorial Administration opined that this system should be implemented in all communities, adding that community leaders have too much authority and, under current law, cannot be removed before their terms expire if constituents are unhappy with their services.72 However, the minister’s position was not followed up with any legislative proposals.

• Reforming the judiciary has topped the government agenda in post-revolutionary Armenia, although the composition of the judiciary did not substantially change after the upheaval of the Velvet Revolution. Reportedly, some judges remain loyal to the former authorities. The level of public trust in court decisions and judges remains low.73
• The courts have been tested on many occasions during 2019. Notably, the reopened case against former president Robert Kocharyan and several other high-ranking officials in connection with the violent breakup of the 2008 protests strained the judicial system. The government and the parliament have taken an overwhelming interest in Kocharyan’s case. On May 18, Kocharyan was released from detention, where he had been held since July 2018. Prime Minister Pashinyan subsequently urged his supporters to physically block the courts.74 Kocharyan was later rearrested and put on trial, despite a September ruling by the Constitutional Court that his initial arrest had been unconstitutional.75
• Pashinyan also suggested vetting judges in order to remove politically biased and corrupt members of the judiciary. After the Venice Commission labeled Pashinyan’s suggestion objectionable,76 Armenia refrained from this and other radical changes to the judiciary, and overall the government’s draft judicial reform package has received generally favorable feedback.
• In October, the government approved the Justice Ministry’s 2019–2023 Strategy for Judicial and Legal Reforms.77 In the first quarter of 2020, the government plans to set up a professional commission to submit a draft of constitutional amendments. New international criteria for screening candidates will apply to not only for judges but also state prosecutors and investigators. The government has planned to create a commission for transitional justice, which will be an autonomous body to investigate cases of mass human rights violations in Armenia from 1991 to 2018. The prison system will see some changes as well, including improved nutrition. The government also plans to launch a fight against organized crime.
• Changing the composition of the Constitutional Court remained a controversial priority for the current authorities. The court chairman, Hrayr Tovmasyan, was charged with “usurping power” in December. That same month, a new law came into effect giving Constitutional Court judges a financial incentive to retire early.78
• The National Security Service and national police answer to the prime minister. As an opposition figure, Pashinyan had argued that this arrangement gives too much power to one individual. In September, the opposition party Bright Armenia proposed that the criteria for occupying those posts should be the same as for MPs.79 Pashinyan’s My Step Alliance rejected the proposal.80

• Corruption was one of the critical issues that fomented the Velvet Revolution. Armenia’s current authorities have been fighting corruption on a case-by-case basis, using all of the investigative bodies at their disposal. Yet Prime Minister Pashinyan’s administration has been criticized for not implementing institutional changes in the fight against corruption.
• In November 2019, a new Commission on Prevention of Corruption was set up, replacing a highly ineffective ethics committee.81 The decision to create the commission was made in 2017, but its implementation was delayed by the revolution. Its members were proposed by the government, the National Assembly, and the Supreme Judicial Council. Haykuhi Harutyunyan, nominated by Bright Armenia, was elected chairwoman of the commission. It will examine the financial declarations of high-ranking officials and determine conflicts of interest, but it is not be empowered to prosecute. An anticorruption body with prosecutorial authority will be set up in 2021, along with a separate corruption court.82
• The Justice Ministry also has an anticorruption strategic plan for 2019–2022. Its main objectives are corruption investigation and prevention, and anticorruption education and public awareness.83
• The State Supervision Service, affiliated with the prime minister’s office, is meant to oversee corruption in state institutions. In April, a criminal charge was brought against its head, Davit Sanasaryan, a long-time Pashinyan ally, for failing to carry out his official duties and abusing power to promote the interests of a business tied to one of his employees.84 A verdict was not reached in 2019, but Sanasaryan was suspended.85
• Grand corruption such as abuse of office still occurs in post-revolutionary Armenia, but according to experts,86 corruption primarily takes place at lower levels of government. The 2019 annual report by the prosecutor’s office87 recorded a 4.7 percent increase from 2018 in corruption-related cases. There were a total of 2,083 cases, of which 1,399 became criminal investigations. Only 52 cases ended in a guilty verdict.
• In May, a website for reporting corruption was created by the General Prosecutor’s Office.88
• Major corruption cases linked to the former regime have been revealed in connection to various sectors, ranging from the Ministry of Defense89 to universities.90 In November, officials released a statement asserting that “over the past 1.5 years, the State Prosecutor’s Office has revealed 60.7 billion drams in damage and 3.2 billion was restored.”91

Author: Ani Mejlumyan is an investigative journalist and correspondent for OCCRP and Eurasianet.

NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0–100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic.

* Correction, May 6: Because of an editing error, an earlier version of the report incorrectly stated that Grigoryan was appointed by the My Step Alliance. He was nominated by the president and elected by the parliament.