Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa

1. Prevalence of Clerics Inciting Violence Against Shia Muslims

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Executive Director of the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) [1] stated that "the number of recorded incidents of hate speech against the Shia has declined after the crackdown on mosque loudspeakers in the aftermath of the militant attack of [Army Public School Peshawar] on December 16, 2014" (SATP 22 Mar. 2018). However, sources indicate that the incitement of hatred and/or violence against Shia Muslims by Sunni clerics is "spread countrywide" (CASS 19 Mar. 2018) or "widespread" (SATP 22 Mar. 2018).

In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the research department of the Centre for Academic Shi'a Studies (CASS) [2] stated that "terrorism-related incidents have drastically decreased [in Pakistan], but the issue of extremism or incitement of violence against minorities is still there [and], in fact, [it is] rising" (CASS 19 Mar. 2018). In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate, Shehryar Fazli, the Senior Analyst and Regional Editor, South Asia, of International Crisis Group, stated that "in Pakistan, there is a general atmosphere of tolerance for rhetoric spreading sectarian hatred and violence, for example, through the loudspeakers of mosques" (Fazli 28 Mar. 2018). When asked whether there are areas in Pakistan where the incitement of hatred and/or violence against Shia Muslims by Sunni clerics is more prevalent, the Executive Director of the SATP responded that "Karachi, Quetta, Parachinar (Kurram Agency) and the districts of Southern Punjab are the most volatile regions," "[a]lthough sectarian extremism and terrorism affect all parts of the country" (SATP 22 Mar. 2018).

However, the CASS research department added that

not all Sunni clerics engage in spreading hate messages against Shias. In fact, there are many examples of Shia-Sunni cooperation in Pakistan. The Sunni clerics who engage in spreading hate against Shias are those who ideologically believe that Shias are not Muslims and the destruction of Shia Imambargahs or shrines is their religious obligation. (CASS 19 Mar. 2018)

According to Fazli, "[t]he public incitement of hatred and/or violence against Shia Muslims by Deobandi clerics in Pakistan is very prevalent" (Fazli 28 Mar. 2018). According a report by The Middle East Institute [3], the Deobandis are one of two major "Sunni subsects" that emerged as a result of "reform movements within Sunni Islam in British India" in the nineteenth century, the Barelvis being the other one (The Middle East Institute Dec. 2014, 12). According to Fazli,

Deobandi adherents are opposed to fellow Sunni Muslims who espouse the Barelvi School, which is much more syncretic. When one refers to the Sunni and Shia conflict in Pakistan, one means the Deobandi and Shia conflict. Barelvi Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims have a lot more in common than Deobandi Sunni Muslims and Barelvi Sunni Muslims. (Fazli 28 Mar. 2018)

Similarly, the report by The Middle East Institute states that

[i]n both general and more informed discussions in Pakistan and beyond, sectarian violence in Pakistan between Sunni and Shi'i groups is almost without exception referred to simply as Sunni-Shi'i violence. But such a characterization is a misnomer. Two of Pakistan's three major Sunni subsects, the Ahl-e-Hadis, and to a lesser extent, the Barelvis, may have antipathy toward the Shi'a, but rarely express such sentiments through violent activity. Instead, since the 1980s, it is segments of the Sunni Deobandi community and Ithna Ashari Shi'a (or Twelvers) that have been at war with one another and have developed an infrastructure and discourse—aided by governmental forces in Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia—that is designed to combat the other side. Smaller Shi'i sects, such as the Dawoodi Bohras and Imami Ismailis, have been victims of Sunni Deobandi violence, but have no significant involvement in militant activity. (The Middle East Institute Dec. 2014, 9)

2. Affiliation to Militant Groups

According to Fazli, "Deobandi clerics, mosques and madrasasare associated with militant groups and receive financial support from Saudi and United Arab Emirates sources" (Fazli 28 Mar. 2018). According to the Executive Director of the SATP, "the sectarian militant groups who are orchestrating anti-Shia violence in Pakistan are directly connected with or are supported by Sunni seminaries and clerics" (SATP 22 Mar. 2018). According to the the same source,

[a] wide range of Deobandi seminaries and clerics patronize these groups and openly support their objectives through widely publicized hate speeches, which secure a high measure of social acceptance. There is no visible resistance to these militant organizations and sectarian clerics from local communities.

There are close linkages between sectarian formations like [the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)], [the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ)], and various terrorist groups including the Taliban, al Qaeda, Jundallah, Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen and Jaish-e-Mohammad [4]. (SATP 22 Mar. 2018)

2.1 The ASWJ

Sources describe the ASWJ as a banned "extremist group" (US 15 Aug. 2017, 15) or a "Sunni supremacist group" (The Guardian7 June 2016). According to an article in The Diplomat, an "international current-affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region" (The Diplomatn.d.), the ASWJ is

a proscribed sectarian organization that has spread anti-Shia hatred for decades. During the 1990s, the group was actively involved in a number of high profile attacks on Shia scholars, mosques, and gatherings. Previously, the organization was registered under the name of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). However, after the banning of SSP by General Pervaiz Musharaf in 2002, the organization reemerged under the name of ASWJ. (The Diplomat20 Sept. 2016)

Other sources similarly indicate that the ASWJ was previously referred to as SSP (Fazli 28 Mar. 2018; CASS 19 Mar. 2018; US 15 Aug. 2017, 20).

The Diplomatexplains that despite the ban, the ASWJ's

activities have continued without any significant pressure from the government. In fact, besides remaining actively involved in sectarian killings, [the] ASWJ remains openly engaged in politics: the organization’s open campaigns to woo the military and major political parties through rallies, gatherings and addresses at universities and colleges have become a common practice. These rallies often run under the guarantee of state security, with law enforcement agencies standing guard for their protection. (The Diplomat20 Sept. 2016)

According to The Express Tribune, a daily Pakistani newspaper, the Sindh government "provides security to the Karachi head of [the ASWJ] Aurangzeb Farooqi during public rallies in which he is often found instigating his followers against the Shia community in Pakistan" (The Express Tribune30 Jan. 2017). According to the CASS research department, "[t]he leaders of [the SSP] including … Aurangzeb Farooqi … continue staging rallies and delivering anti-Shia sermons across Pakistan" and they "continue to operate with impunity despite steep rise in attacks on Shia Muslims" (CASS 19 Mar. 2018).

According to the Executive Director of the SATP, the imam of the Jamia Masjid [mosque] in Qayyumabad "asked worshippers to donate funds and charity to members of [the] ASWJ" on 17 June 2016 (SATP 22 Mar. 2018). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to the US 2016 Report on International Religious Freedom, in December 2016, a cleric ''unofficially affiliated'' with the AWSJ obtained a seat in the Punjab Assembly (US 15 Aug. 2017, 15). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

According to the CASS research department, the "SSP and other anti-Shia groups can identify Shias by their surnames, i.e., Rizvi, Alvi, etc." and are able to "target Shia doctors, lawyers, professors and other professionals in drive-by shootings" (CASS 19 Mar. 2018). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

2.2 The LeJ

According to sources, the LeJ is a "splinter group" of the SSP (CASS 19 Mar. 2018) or "militant offshoot" of the SSP (The Middle East Institute Dec. 2014, 20). According to the CASS research department, the LeJ and SSP "share anti-Shia ideology with the common goal of eradicating Shias from Pakistan and, therefore, their followers are the same. [The LeJ] is more actively engaged in militancy while SSP leads on the ideological front along with militancy" (CASS 19 Mar. 2018). According to Fazli, "[a]lthough the core membership of [the LeJ] is small, its reach spreads across the country, including informants, sympathizers, as well as members. They rely on hired gunmen and ideologically motivated members" (Fazli 28 Mar. 2018). According to the same source, "[c]lerics at mosques and madrassas often identify potential members for the LeJ" (Fazli 28 Mar. 2018).

According to the CASS research department, Pakistan has launched a "crackdown on the [LeJ]" (CASS 19 Mar. 2018). However, according to Fazli, the LeJ "has sympathizers among state authorities, like judges and local police officers. While in the Punjab province, the state has been antagonistic against the [LeJ, it] has received state support in other provinces, like Balochistan" (Fazli 28 Mar. 2018). For further information on the LeJ, see Response to Information Request PAK105672 of January 2017.

3. State Response to the Incitement of Violence by Clerics

Information on the state's ability to respond to the incitement of violence by clerics against Shia Muslims in Pakistan was scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3.1 Legislation

According to the BBC, "[i]nciting religious hatred is against the law in Pakistan" and "[a]ny act or speech which incites sectarian hatred - wilfully or inadvertently - carries a potential prison sentence of up to seven years" (BBC 20 May 2015). According to the Executive Director of the SATP, despite legislation to regulate and control the "abuse" of freedom of expression, "implementation is not effective" and, in addition, "blasphemy laws are often used against all minorities" (SATP 22 Mar. 2018).

3.2 Police Response

According to the US 2016 Report on International Religious Freedom, NGOs and the media report that police intervention has on some occasions helped to prevent religion-based violence (US 15 Aug. 2017, 9). The CASS research department explained that the "[p]olice provide protection to Shia Muslims for religious gatherings and processions that are public and whose licenses and permits have been held by Shias for many years" (CASS 19 Mar. 2018). Similarly, according to Dr. Matthew Nelson, a Reader in Politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) at the University of London [5], in 2017, there was a "greater police presence to protect certain [Shia] processions" than in previous years and the "level of sectarian violence during Muharram was down partly because the police were more on the front foot in trying to prevent some of that violence" (Nelson Feb. 2018, 24-25).

However, according to the BBC, the incitement of religious hatred is "rarely reported or punished" (BBC 20 May 2015). The Executive Director of the SATP indicated that Shia Muslims in Pakistan have a lack of trust in state institutions (SATP 22 Mar. 2018). According to the CASS research department, "in general, people and Shia community do not rely on the law enforcement agencies" although "[t]o an extent it also depends on the situation and the area" (CASS 19 Mar. 2018). According to the Executive Director of the SATP,

[o]ver the years, the police and public have become inured of extremist sectarian incitement through wall posters, public speeches, addresses in mosques and, increasingly, social media. These are seldom acknowledged or acted against. Among the legitimate problems in this regard is the low capacity of the police and unwillingness to take on additional ''cases,'' particularly those that go against the broad political environment sympathetic to Sunni majoritarianism. (SATP 22 Mar. 2018)

According to the US 2016 Report on International Religious Freedom, in 2016, "[c]ivil society groups expressed concern that authorities often failed to intervene in instances of societal violence against religious minorities, and police failed to arrest perpetrators of such abuses" (US 15 Aug. 2017, 9). According to Fazli,

[p]olice protection against sectarian hatred and violence is weak, as resources are limited, and the conviction rate in terms of tackling sectarian violence is close to zero. It is possible that police authorities themselves fear for their lives, especially in dealing with militant groups. While police authorities are expected to go after members of certain militant groups, like the LeJ, they let members of other militant groups, like the Jaish-e-Mohammed, "off the hook," despite that both groups recruit from the same madrasas and networks and despite [the fact] that their financial resources and weapons originate from the same sources. In addition to police authorities, prosecutors and judges too fear for their lives and have often been targeted. (Fazli 28 Mar. 2018)

According to the Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC), a Hong Kong-based human rights organization that focuses on justice institutions in Asia (ALRC n.d.), "[s]tate bias and prejudice is apparent in the judicial and administrative attitude" towards religious minorities, including "Hazara Shias" (ALRC 26 Feb. 2018). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

3.3 National Action Plan (NAP) Against Terrorism

Sources indicate that the NAP Against Terrorism was developed following the Army Public School Peshawar attack in 2014 (The Express Tribune30 Jan. 2017; Stratfor 12 Apr. 2017) and that NAP "was introduced in 2015" (Stratfor 12 Apr. 2017). According to Agence France-Presse (AFP), NAP involves the "outlawing of militant groups, registration of seminaries and crackdown on hate speech" (AFP 20 May 2015). In an article describing the achievements of NAP, The Express Tribunereports in 2017 that, according to the Pakistani Ministry of Information, "over 1,500 books and other hate material ha[ve] been confiscated and 71 such shops sealed" (The Express Tribune30 Jan. 2017). According to the same source, "[a]t least 1,961 suspects have been arrested and 1,893 cases filed against clerics. Of these, 271 have been convicted while 826 cases are still pending before special courts" (The Express Tribune30 Jan. 2017). According to GeoTV, a Pakistani television channel, security forces have arrested "19,530 persons across the country" in a "crackdown against hate material and speech" (Geo TV 6 Jan. 2018). A December 2016 article published in DAWN, a daily Pakistani newspaper, cites officials as stating that "commissioners and deputy commissioners of divisions and districts were meeting religious personalities on a regular basis to discourage hate speech in Sindh" (DAWN28 Dec. 2016).

When asked what some outcomes of NAP are, the Executive Director of the SATP provided the following information:

[m]ore than 14,869 cases have been filed against hate preachers, clerics, religious teachers, prayer leaders and dozens of religious scholars. The counterterrorism forces arrested 11,169 clerics/hate mongers who were later sent to courts to face terrorism charges in 10,648 cases in Punjab—under NAP. The Police and Counter Terrorism Department (CTD) has arrested 2,845 clerics in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and over 2,693 cases were filed against accused religious leaders who are now facing multiple charges in the Province, which has also seen a dramatic decline in cases of terrorism. Terrorism linked fatalities declined from 1206 in 2011, to 213 in 2016 and 123 in 2017 (partial data compiled by [the] SATP).

The Sindh Police has managed to file 1,133 cases against 775 persons accused of spreading hate and extremism through their speeches in mosques and madrassahs during this period. Balochistan has, however, seen just 108 cases registered against 100 clerics arrested by the law enforcement agencies in the province.

The Islamabad Capital Territory police arrested 32 clerics since NAP started. 119 cases have been registered against these accused in the federal capital.

The Government of Gilgit-Baltistan filed 33 cases against 40 clerics/religious teachers who were violating loud speaker laws in the area. Law enforcement agencies also filed 126 cases against 200 religious school teachers and prayer leaders in Azad Jammu and Kashmir [AJK].

Official data further indicated that around 6,000 cases have been registered against shopkeepers who were selling either hate materials or anti state materials. Over 3,200 cases were registered against owners of [shops] in KP, 1,085 in Punjab, 13 in Gilgit Baltistan and 66 cases in AJK. Over 1,200 books and hundreds of other instruments linkage to extremism were confiscated by the police in Balochistan. (SATP 22 Mar. 2018)

Media cite officials as stating that arrests of prayer leaders on hate speech charges have been made under the NAP Against Terrorism (BBC 20 May 2015; AFP 20 May 2015). Sources report that in 2015, a court in Pakistan jailed an imam for five years for inciting religious hatred against Shia Muslims in the Kasur District (BBC 20 May 2015; AFP 20 May 2015). The BBC cites officials as stating that "[a]t least six other clerics have been jailed for similar offences" in Lahore in the first half of 2015 (BBC 20 May 2015).

Sources report that in 2016, an imam was arrested in Hujra Shah Muqeem under NAP for inciting violence, after a teenager cut off his own hand when the imam called him a blasphemer (Al Jazeera 17 Jan. 2016; Reuters 17 Jan. 2016). According to sources, the police filed terrorism charges against the imam (Al Jazeera 17 Jan. 2016; Reuters 17 Jan. 2016).

According to the US 2016 Report on International Religious Freedom, the Islamabad Capital Territory Administration (ICTA) banned 11 clerics on September 2016 "from delivering sermons and addressing the public in Islamabad out of fears of inciting sectarian violence" (US 15 Aug. 2017, 13). According to the same source, ICTA "forbade 16 clerics branded as 'sectarian agitators' from entering the capital for a period of two months, covering the Islamic month of Muharram" (US 15 Aug. 2017, 13). Further and corroborating information could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.

The CASS research department stated that, despite the introduction of NAP "to curb religious extremism, there has been little change in the situation" in Pakistan (CASS 19 Mar. 2018). According to the same source, "[t]here is consensus that NAP has been a failure mainly for its execution" (CASS 19 Mar. 2018). Zahid Shabab Ahmed [6] indicates that critique of NAP includes "its deficiency," for example on "action against material promoting hatred, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance, as well as its non-existent timeline" (Ahmed 16 Feb. 2017). According to Fazli,

[t]he implementation of [NAP] is falling behind. Measures to address the incitement of violence by Deobandi clerics against Shia Muslims are not working, as the focus of NAP's implementation has been on using force against militant groups, rather than on gathering intelligence and carrying out investigations. Moreover, funds are still flowing to centres and forums that are emitting radical rhetoric. In addition, recruitment by militant groups continues to occur. Although the state has focused its attention on the [LeJ], albeit mostly on its leadership, it has not addressed hatred emanating from madrasas and grassroots mosque networks, for example in the rural areas in southern Punjab, the tribal areas of FATA and Balochistan, as well as Karachi and Peshawar. (Fazli 28 Mar. 2018)

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

Notes

[1] The SATP is a project of the New Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), which is a "non-profit society" "committed to the continous evaluation and resolution of problems of internal security in South Asia," including in Pakistan (SATP n.d.).

[2] The CASS, affiliated with the Al-Khoei Foundation, is a London-based organization that "was established in 2009 with the aim of promoting original contemporary, and impartial scholarship on Shi'a Islam and Muslims" (CASS n.d.a). The Al-Khoei Foundation "operates a number of pioneering educational, social, and religious programmes in the United Kingdom, as well as in New York, Montreal, Paris, Bangkok, Islamabad and several other worldwide locations" (CASS n.d.b).

[3] The Middle East Institute is a "Washington-based institution dedicated solely to the study of the Middle East" (The Middle East Institute n.d.).

[4] According to the US National Counterterrorism Center, Jaish-e-Mohammed is an "extremist group based in Pakistan," which was banned in Pakistan in 2002 (US Sept. 2013). Jaish-e-Mohammed is "also known as the Army of Mohammed, Khudamul Islam, and Tehrik ul-Furqaan among other names" and their "aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan and to expel foreign troops from Afghanistan" (US Sept. 2013).

[5] Dr. Nelson, whose research focuses on politics and Islam in South Asia, was speaking on sectarian politics in Pakistan during a European Asylum Support Office (EASO) Country of Information meeting on Pakistan in October 2017 (Nelson Feb. 2018, 24).

[6] Zahid Shabab Ahmed is "Peace Direct's Pakistan Local Peacebuilding Expert and a Postdoctoral Fellow at Deakin University in Australia," who received his PhD from the University of New England in Australia (Peace Direct n.d.a). Peace Direct is a London-based "international organization dedicated to support local people to stop war and build lasting peace" (Peace Direct n.d.b). Zahid Shabab Ahmed "has worked with local and international development agencies in South Asia on various peacebuilding and development projects" and has "published and presented papers on a wide range of issues, including Islam, human rights, peace & conflict, regionalism, and regional security" (Peace Direct n.d.a).

References

Agence France-Presse (AFP). 20 May 2015. "Pakistan Imam Jailed for Five Years for Anti-Shia Sermons ." [Accessed 22 Mar. 2018]

Ahmed, Zahid Shabab. 16 February 2017. "Counter-Extremism in Pakistan: Success or Falling Short ." [Accessed 24 Mar. 2018]

Al Jazeera. 17 January 2016. "Imam Arrested After 'Blasphemer' Teen Cuts Off Hand ." [Accessed 12 Mar. 2018]

Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC). 26 February 2018. "Pakistan: Government Facilitates Curbing Freedom of Religion ." [Accessed 12 Mar. 2018]

Asian Legal Resource Centre (ALRC). N.d. "About ALRC ." [Accessed 23 Mar. 2018]

British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). 20 May 2015. "Pakistan Court Jails Hate Cleric for Five Years ." [Accessed 22 Mar. 2018]

Centre for Academic Shi'a Studies (CASS), Al-Khoei Foundation. 19 March 2018. Correspondence from the research department to the Research Directorate.

Centre for Academic Shi'a Studies (CASS), Al-Khoei Foundation. N.d.a. "Our Goal ." [Accessed 22 Mar. 2018]

Centre for Academic Shi'a Studies (CASS). N.d.b. "Yousif Al-Khoei ." [Accessed 26 Apr. 2018]

DAWN. 28 December 2016. Hasan Mansoor. "More Words Than Action in Sindh's Campaign Against Hate Speech ." [Accessed 12 Mar. 2018]

The Diplomat.20 September 2016. Umair Jamal. "How Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat Uses Politics to Support Its Campaign of Anti-Shia Terror in Pakistan ." [Accessed 13 Apr. 2018]

The Diplomat. N.d. "About the Diplomat ." [Accessed 13 Apr. 2018]

The Express Tribune. 30 January 2017. Saad Ahmed Dogar. "What Has NAP Achieved So Far? " [Accessed 12 Mar. 2018]

Fazli, Shehryar, Senior Analyst and Regional Editor, South Asia, International Crisis Group. 28 March 2018. Telephone interview with the Research Directorate.

Geo TV. 6 January 2018. Zahid Gishkori. "Terror Attacks in Pakistan Down 58%: NACTA ." [Accessed 12 Mar. 2018]

The Guardian. 7 June 2016. Jon Boone. "Followers of Murdered Pakistani Activist Say They Will Not Be Silenced ." [Accessed 13 Apr. 2018]

The Middle East Institute. December 2014. Arif Rafiq. Sunni Deobandi-Shi'i Sectarian Violence in Pakistan. Explaining the Resurgence Since 2007 . [Accessed 13 Apr. 2018]

The Middle East Institute. N.d. "Our Mission ." [Accessed 13 Apr. 2018]

Nelson, Matthew. February 2018. "2. Sectarian Politics ." EASO COI Meeting Report. Pakistan. International conference by the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Rome, 16-17 October 2017. pp. 24-34. [Accessed 23 Mar. 2018]

Peace Direct. N.d.a "Zahid Shabab Ahmed ." [Accessed 23 Mar. 2018]

Peace Direct. N.d.b. "About Us." [Accessed 23 Mar. 2018]

Reuters. 17 January 2016. "Pakistan Arrests Imam After Boy Cuts Hand Off in Blasphemy Error ." [Accessed 12 Mar. 2018]

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). 22 March 2018. Correspondence from the Executive Director to the Research Directorate.

South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). N.d. "Disclaimer." [Accessed 22 Mar. 2018]

Stratfor. 12 April 2017. "Tackling Terrorism in Pakistan's Heartland ." [Accessed 30 Apr. 2018]

United States (US). 15 August 2017. Department of State. "Pakistan." 2016 Report on International Religious Freedom .[Accessed 12 Mar. 2018]

United States (US). September 2013. National Counterterrorism Center. "Jaish-E-Mohammed (JEM) ." [Accessed 13 Apr. 2018]

Additional Sources Consulted

Oral sources:Academic specializing in political violence in Pakistan; The Asia Foundation; Centre for Research and Security Studies; Centre for Social Justice; Global Human Rights Defence; Human Rights Commission of Pakistan; Human Rights Focus Pakistan; Jinnah Institute; The Middle East Institute; Minority Rights Group International; National Commission for Justice and Peace; Pak Institute for Peace Studies; Pakistan – Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Law and Justice, National Peace Council for Interfaith Harmony, National Police Foundation; Peace & Education Foundation; UN – Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief; Women in Struggle for Empowerment.

Internet sites, including:ecoi.net; Fox News; Global Human Rights Defence; The Jamestown Foundation; The Mackenzie Institute; Mapping Militants Project; The New York Times; Pak Institute for Peace Studies; The Straits Times; Pakistan – Ministry of Information Broadcasting, National History and Literary Heritage, Ministry of Interior, National Counter Terrorism Authority; UN – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.