Anfragebeantwortung zum Irak: (Religiöse) Autorität von Ali Sistani und Muqtada al-Sadr (z.B. Erlass von Fatwas); Einstellung von Ali al-Sistani und Muqtada al-Sadr zu LGBT-Personen [a-10715]

6. September 2018

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(Religiöse) Autorität von Ali Sistani und Muqtada al-Sadr (z.B. Erlass von Fatwas)

Im Mai 2018 schreibt der auf den Nahen Osten und US-Außenpolitik spezialisierte Journalist und Autor Thanassis Cambanis in einem Bericht der sich als progressiv und nicht-parteiisch beschreibenden US-Denkfabrik The Century Foundation, dass sich in der fragmentierten Landschaft von Parteichefs, Kriegsherren und Stammesführern im Irak zwei starke charismatische Führungspersönlichkeiten herausgebildet hätten. Beide seien schiitische Kleriker, die in keinem guten Verhältnis zueinander stünden. Der eine, Großayatollah Ali Sistani, habe den größten Einfluss und sei der Führer mit der größten Autorität im Irak. Er sei ein Kleriker von beeindruckendem Intellekt und vertrete eine konservative, nicht radikale, nationalistische Sicht. Sistani werde als moderierende Kraft gesehen, der den Irak schon vor einem Bürgerkrieg bewahrt habe und auch schon geholfen habe, das Ausmaß und den Schaden des konfessionellen Konflikts abzumildern. Der andere sei der viel jüngere Muqtada al-Sadr, der im Zuge der US-Invasion als starker Kontrapunkt zu Sistanis Führungsstil in Erscheinung getreten sei. Sadr habe nicht die Bildungslaufbahn der Ayatollahs vorzuweisen, die als „Mardschaiyya“, als „Quelle der Nachahmung“, gesehen würden, und deren Lehren Millionen weltweit folgen würden. Dennoch habe Sadr Millionen leidenschaftlicher Anhänger von seinem Vater und Onkel geerbt, die beide verehrte Ayatollahs gewesen seien, und er habe auch die Familienfehde gegen Sistani weitergeführt, den die Sadrs als zu zaghaft angesehen hätten. In der Zeit, als der Islamische Staat das Gefühl der Sicherheit im Irak zerschmettert habe, habe Sadr einen Kurswechsel vollzogen. Er habe eine neue moderate und inkludierende Rhetorik angenommen. Er habe seine politische Bewegung und seine Anhänger ermutigt, mit säkularen Reformern und unabhängigen Technokraten gemeinsame Sache zu machen, und seine Anhänger hätten mit ihren sehr öffentlichen Angriffen auf Homosexuelle aufgehört:

„Yet only two indisputably strong, charismatic leaders have distinguished themselves from the fragmentary society of party bosses, warlords, tribal leaders, and the grifters and opportunists who have made deals with the wardens of cash. Those two are both Shia clerics, and no love is lost between them.

The first, and most influential, is Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the single most authoritative leader in Iraq. A cleric of impressive intellect and conservative (rather than radical) nationalist views, Sistani is credited as a moderating force who at times kept Iraq from civil war and at others helped mitigate the scope and damage of sectarian conflict.

The other enduringly powerful figure is the far more junior Sadr, who in the wake of the U.S. invasion emerged as a strong counterpoint to Sistani’s style of leadership and modest ambitions. Sadr lacks the educational pedigree of the ayatollahs who are considered ‘marjaiya,’ or sources of emulation, and whose teachings are followed by millions worldwide. Still, Sadr inherited the millions of passionate followers of his father and uncle, both revered ayatollahs; and he also continued the family feud against Sistani, whom the Sadrs regarded as too timid.

[…] By the time the Islamic State shattered Iraq’s sense of security, Sadr was already changing course. With the protest movement, he adopted a newly moderate and inclusive rhetoric. Sadr threw his weight behind the protesters. He encouraged his political movement and followers to make common cause with secular reformers and independent technocrats. His followers ceased their very public attacks on homosexuals. ‘He has undergone a change, an evolution,’ said Raid Jahid Fahmi, the secretary general of the Iraqi Communist Party, who has led the secular embrace of the cleric Sadr. ‘You will find a change in his vocabulary and thinking.’” (The Century Foundation, 1. Mai 2018)

In einem Bericht der US-Denkfabrik Brookings vom August 2017 wird erwähnt, dass Sadr drei Jahre im Exil im Iran gelebt habe und dort seine religiösen Referenzen aufpoliert habe. Er habe noch nicht die religiösen und pädagogischen Nachweise errungen, die es ihm erlauben würden, mit dem führenden Großayatollah Sistani zu konkurrieren, aber vielleicht müsse er das gar nicht, sobald Sistani versterbe. Nach Sistani werde es vielleicht keinen vorherrschenden Träger religiöser Autorität mehr geben. Das politische und klerikale Umfeld sei heute viel zersplitterter als es früher der Fall gewesen sei. Geschwächte Institutionen und mehrere rivalisierende Machtzentren, die in der schiitischen Gemeinschaft im vergangenen Jahrzehnt entstanden seien, könnten weitreichende Auswirkungen auf die Politik der Autorität in Nadschaf (Sitz von Sistani und Zentrum der schiitischen Autorität im Irak, Anmerkung ACCORD) haben. Das könne für Sadr eine Möglichkeit eröffnen, die Lücke zu schließen, die Sistani wahrscheinlich hinterlassen werde:

„Early on, al-Sadr benefitted from Iranian support and he later spent three years in self-imposed exile there, burnishing his religious credentials. […]

Al-Sadr has not yet acquired the religious and scholarly credentials that could allow him to compete with Sistani (the leading Grand Ayatollah) but he may not need to once Sistani passes. Traditionally, succession has taken anything from months to years and is shaped by a collective decisionmaking process that involves the most senior of members within the Najafi clerical establishment, in addition to the input and influence of Sistani’s own network of international representatives and institutions.

However, after Sistani, there may no longer be a predominant and preeminent wielder of religious authority. The political and clerical environment is today far more atomized than it once was. Weakened institutions and the multiple, rival centers of power that have emerged within the Shiite community over the past decade could have a far-reaching impact on the politics of authority in Najaf. For al-Sadr, that could provide an opportunity to fill the gap that Sistani’s passing will likely bring, while also challenging Iran-aligned groups within Najaf and elsewhere to ensure Najaf’s historical resistance to the wilayati-faqih doctrine that underpins Iran’s system of Islamic rule.” (Brookings, 21. August 2017)

In einem Profil von Muqtada al-Sadr des in Doha ansässigen arabischen Nachrichtensenders Al Jazeera vom März 2010 wird erwähnt, dass Sadr trotz seiner Abstammung und Verbindungen nicht über die religiöse Ausbildung verfüge, die nach schiitischer Doktrin für den Titel Mudschtahid erforderlich sei, er habe auch nicht die Autorität, religiöse Erlässe (Fatwas) herauszugeben:

„Muqtada al-Sadr, of Lebanese ancestry, comes from a family of Shia scholars. He is the fourth son of the late Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr, a highly regarded scholar throughout the Shia Muslim world. Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr was murdered, along with two of his sons, allegedly by the government of Saddam Hussein - the former Iraqi president. Al-Sadr is also the son-in-law of Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr. Muqtada's father-in-law was executed by the Iraqi authorities in 1980. Al-Sadr's cousin is Moussa as-Sadr, the Iranian-Lebanese founder of the Amal movement. Despite his lineage and connections, he lacks the religious education and degrees required by Shia doctrine to take the title mujtahid (the equivalent of a senior religious scholar) and he lacks the authority to issue religious edicts (fatwas).” (Al Jazeera, 7. März 2010)

Einstellung von Ali al-Sistani zu LGBT-Personen

Juan Cole, Professor für Geschichte an der Universität Michigan, schreibt im März 2006 in seinem Blog Informed Comment, dass er von Lesern zur Haltung von Großayatollah Ali Sistani zur Homosexualität gefragt worden sei. Er schickt seinen Ausführungen zu dieser Frage voraus, dass die Anschuldigung, die von manchen erhoben worden sei, wonach Sistani zur Tötung von Sunniten aufgerufen habe, komplett falsch sei. Auch die Schlussfolgerung des im Exil lebenden schwulen Irakers Ali Hili von der in London ansässigen Menschenrechtsgruppe OutRage, wonach Sistani zur Tötung von homosexuellen Männern durch Bürgerwehren aufgerufen habe, sei nicht wahr, auch wenn es der Wahrheit entspreche, dass Sistani rate, dass der Staat homosexuelle Aktivitäten zu einem Verbrechen erklären solle, auf das die Todesstrafe stehe. Cole erklärt weiter, dass das Konzept „homosexuell“ im Sinne einer permanenten Identität oder sozialen Rolle im traditionellen Islam nicht bekannt sei. Vielmehr habe es wie im antiken Griechenland die Unterscheidung zwischen Penetrierendem und Penetriertem gegeben. Eine moderne homosexuelle Identität habe sich im Nahen Osten nur langsam entwickelt und sei oft großer Feindseligkeit ausgesetzt. Was Sistani betreffe, so vertrete dieser eine leicht modernisierte Version des mittelalterlichen islamischen Rechts. Die ersten beiden Fatwas von Sistani zu diesem Thema hätten mit erwachsenen Männern zu tun, die Jungen penetrieren. Sistani scheine also “Lawat” mit einem erwachsenen Mann, der minderjährige Jungen penetriert, zu verbinden. Es sei nicht überraschend, dass er das stark ablehne. Diese ersten beiden Fatwas würden davon ausgehen, dass eine homosexuelle Affäre entdeckt und bestraft worden sei. Gleichzeitig werde davon ausgegangen, dass die beiden betroffenen Männer nicht nur in Freiheit seien, sondern, dass ihre Familien auch in einer Beziehung zueinander stünden, in der eine Heirat zwischen Angehörigen beider Familien noch in Frage komme. Eine spätere Fatwa bestehe darauf, dass homosexuelle Beziehungen strengstens bestraft werden sollten und fordere die Todesstrafe. Es sollte beachtet werden, dass Sistani nicht das Recht habe und dieses auch nicht beanspruche, die Todesstrafe über eine Person wegen ihrer Handlungen zu verhängen. Im heutigen Irak sei es Sache des Parlaments, über die Rechtmäßigkeit von Homosexualität zu bestimmen und im Falle, dass sie verboten wäre, müssten zivile Richter darüber urteilen. Sistani agiere hier als Rechtskundiger, der sage, was seiner Meinung nach das islamische Recht verlange:

„Readers have been asking me about the stance of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani regarding homosexuality. […] Let me begin by saying that the charge leveled by some, and mentioned at Pandagon, that Sistani has called for the killing of Sunnis, is completely untrue. The implication given by exiled gay Iraqi, Ali Hili, of the London-based gay human rights group OutRage, that Sistani has called for vigilante killings of gays, is untrue, though it is accurate that Sistani advises that the state make homosexual activity a capital crime; it is also accurate to call this ‘sick.’

In traditional Islam there was no conception of the ‘homosexual’ as a permanent identity or social role. As in ancient Greece, the real distinction in sexuality (as Michel Foucault showed) was between the penetrator and the penetrated. Medieval and early modern Islamdom were like the Greece of Plato. Adult males were the penetrators. In premodern Muslim society, women could be penetrated if they were legally married to the man or if they were his slaves. Likewise, slave-boys (catamites) could be penetrated, although it was typically disapproved of by the Muslim clerics. Exclusive adult male-male sexual relationships are not recorded, and a taste for a slave-boy did not stop a wealthy man from being married or from having liasons with his female slaves, as well. About half the famous love-poems of the medieval Baghdad literary figure, Abu Nuwas, appear to have been addressed to boys.

As slavery was forbidden in the Ottoman Empire in the course of the mid- to late-nineteenth century, obviously the keeping of slave-boys by wealthy men ceased. As society modernized, notions of sexuality moved away from the penetrator/penetrated model similar to that of the ancient Greeks, and toward a modern male-female binary. Many Muslim societies in the course of the twentieth century also moved away from polygamy toward a model of one man, one woman as the family unit.

Modern homosexual identity has only slowly emerged in the Middle East, and has sometimes faced great hostility. I say sometimes because real-life Muslim societies are not as puritanical as outsiders or local elites imagine. […]

So on to Sistani, who upholds a slightly modernized version of medieval Muslim canon law. The first two fatwas he gave on the subject have to do with adult men penetrating boys. That is, Sistani appears to take as the connotation of lawat that it is an adult man penetrating an under-age boy. Unsurprisingly, he deeply disapproves. The first two fatwas, however, come in response to questions about what this sexual relationship means for later marital relations between the two families. Say a 21-year-old man from Khazraj had relations with a 17-year-old boy from Ruba’i? Then, say the first man’s family wanted to marry him off to a girl from the Ruba’i family. Can they? And to what degree of relatedness? Can he be the husband of his former lover’s sister? The answer is ‘no.’ In contrast, Sistani would allow a man who had an affair with a girl to later on marry her sister. […]

The first two fatwas assume that the gay affair had been discovered and punished, but also assumes that the two men were not only at liberty but that their families were in the sort of social relationship where intermarriage was still a possibility.

A later fatwa insists that homosexual relations should be punished with the utmost severity, and urges the death penalty. Again, his assumption appears to be that the penetrated partner would likely be under-age, which may help explain his severity. His first two fatwas, however, assume that the punishment will actually be much less severe, even when one of the partners was under-age!

It should be noted that Sistani does not have or even claim the right to impose a death penalty on individuals for their activities. In contemporary Iraq, the legality of homosexuality would be determined by statute passed by parliament (or by provincial assemblies), and if it were illegal, sentencing would be carried out by civil judges. Sistani is here acting as a jurisconsult, saying what he thinks Islamic canon law requires. But Iraq is not governed, or not solely governed, by shariah or Islamic canon law.

The Iraqi constitution adopted on October 15 contains a provision that no law be passed directly contradicting the established laws of Islam, but another article says that no law may be passed that is contrary to human rights standards. Given that homosexuality has never been such a big an issue in the Middle East (and for long stretches some sort of homosociality was accepted elite practice) that its prohibition would rise to the level of an ‘established’ Islamic law (thawabit ahkam al-Islam), one wonders if Iraqi law will really take this direction. Certainly, it would not be in accord with the other provision, concerning basic human rights.” (Cole, 19. März 2006)

Ein Bericht der Menschenrechtsorganisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) zu einer Mordkampagne an Homosexuellen im Jahr 2009 erwähnt, dass sporadische Berichte über gezielte Tötungen von Männern, die als „verweiblicht“ betrachtet würden oder die homosexueller Aktivitäten verdächtigt würden, seit 2005 die westliche Presse erreichen würden. Einige westliche Reporter hätten seit 2005 die hauptsächliche oder ausschließliche Verantwortung für Tötungen von homosexuellen Männern im Irak Großayatollah Ali al-Sistani zugeschrieben, der angeblich mithilfe der Badr-Organisation operiere. Human Rights Watch habe hingegen keine klaren Beweise gefunden, die Spekulationen stützen würden, wonach die Badr-Organisation gezielt Männer verfolgt habe, die homosexueller Aktivitäten verdächtigt worden seien, oder dass Mörder von „schwulen“ Männern direkt von Ayatollah Sistani angetrieben worden seien. Sistani sei ein unabhängiger religiöser Gelehrter, der weithin als einer der höchstrangigen Kleriker in der schiitischen Welt gelte. Er habe eine eigene Webseite, die, wie viele Webseiten schiitischer Imame, Alltagsfragen zu Themen behandle, die von seinen Anhängern eingebracht würden, diese Themen könnten sehr bedeutend oder sehr trivial sein. Ziemlich sicher würden die meisten Antworten von auszubildenden Klerikern verfasst. Im Jahr 2005 habe die Seite eine Frage nach dem „Urteil zu Sodomie“ mit „verboten“ und „mit der schlimmsten Todesart zu bestrafen“ beantwortet. Die Antwort gelte als Fatwa, wie jede Antwort eines qualifizierten religiösen Gelehrten zu Fragen des islamischen Rechts. Anders als Fatwas von Sistani zu Themen von klarer öffentlicher Bedeutung im Irak sei diese nur auf einem unbedeutenden Teil der Webseite sichtbar gewesen, seine Organisation habe sie nie publik gemacht. In Europa lebende Aktivisten hätten ihn aufgerufen, sie zurückzuziehen, und Anfang 2006 sei sie von der Seite verschwunden. Die Fatwa habe kaum oder keine Aufmerksamkeit in der irakischen Presse erregt:

„Sporadic reports of targeted killings of men seen as ‘effeminate,’ or suspected of homosexual conduct, have reached the Western press from Iraq since 2005. Although everyone we spoke to called the latest campaign of murders vastly more organized and extensive than those earlier assaults, testimonies demonstrate that fears about morality corrupted and masculinity undermined are of long standing, and transgress sectarian lines.

Several Western reports since 2005 have pinned main or exclusive responsibility for killings of gay men in Iraq on Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, supposedly operating through the Badr Organization, a shadowy militia affiliated with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (formerly known as the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq or SCIRI), and based, during most of the Saddam era, in Iran. The Badr Organization has engaged in death-squad killings and other egregious human rights abuses since 2004. However, Human Rights Watch found no clear evidence to support speculation that they have targeted men suspected of homosexual conduct, or that killers of ‘gay’ men took a direct impetus from Ayatollah Sistani. While those claims cannot be definitely disproved, only one Iraqi we interviewed suggested that the Badr Organization might be a key force in the killings, or that it acted on an initiative from Sistani. He knew of no gay men who had actually been killed by Badr Organization members. Grand Ayatollah Sistani is an independent religious scholar widely regarded as one of the highest-ranking clerics in the Shi’a world. While he has supported attempts to unify Iraqi Shi’ites into a cohesive political movement, he has avoided direct identification with particular Shi’ite factions, including SCIRI. He has his own website, www.sistani.org; like the cybersites of many Shi’ite imams, the forum fields questions and furnishes religiously predicated answers about everyday life, taking up whatever issues its followers submit, on subjects alternately momentous and trivial. (Most of the answers are almost certainly drafted and posted by apprentice clerics.) In late 2005, the site responded to a question about ‘What is the judgment for sodomy?’ by calling it ‘forbidden’ and punishable by ‘the worst kind of death.’ The call to violence was extralegal and reprehensible. It clashed with the norms of rule of law that Sistani himself had endorsed. The statement was a fatwa, as is any answer from a qualified religious scholar on a question of Islamic law. Unlike Sistani fatwas on issues of clear public concern in Iraq, such as the form of the post-occupation government, this one stayed confined to an obscure part of his website; his organization never publicized it. Activists based in Europe called on him to retract it, and it disappeared from the site in early 2006. It received little or no notice in the Iraqi press. One man told us that ‘I only heard about Sistani’s fatwa on US websites on the Internet.’ Its domestic impact cannot be gauged, but as a Western journalist experienced in Iraq reminded us, ‘The militias don’t need a fatwa to kill people they don’t like.’

Instead, most people maintained to us that the Mahdi Army had always been the main actor in the violence, turning its attention at irregular intervals since 2004 to what it saw as sexual immorality in Iraq. Intermittent violence by Sunni militias, particularly al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, accompanied this in Baghdad and elsewhere. ‘Killings of gays in Baghdad started in 2004, and that campaign lasted for about a year,’ Munir remembered. ’And then the militias became distracted with other issues, Shi’a and Sunni.’” (HRW, August 2009, S. 47-48)

Scott Long, LGBT-Aktivist und ehemaliger Direktor des LGBT-Programms bei Human Rights Watch (HRW), sowie Autor des oben zitierten Berichts von HRW, erläutert in einem Beitrag für seinen Blog „A Paper Bird“ im Jänner 2015, dass Ali Hili, ein Exil-Iraker in London, nach der Invasion als wichtige Quelle für Gewalt gegen LGBT-Personen im Irak gedient habe. Er habe Sistani und den Badr-Brigaden die volle Schuld für die Gewalttaten zugeschrieben, und seine Version sei von Aktivisten Peter Tatchell und dem Reporter Doug Ireland übernommen worden. Der Wahrheitsgehalt dieser Vorwürfe sei aber gering gewesen. Bei eigenen Recherchen im Irak im Jahr 2009 habe Long keine Beweise dafür gefunden, dass die Badr-Brigaden für ausgedehnte Angriffe auf LGBT-Personen verantwortlich gewesen wären. Andere schiitische Milizen hätten hierbei die Führung übernommen:

„Sporadic reports of LGBT people targeted for violence started emerging not long after the invasion. Ali Hili, an Iraqi exile in London, was a key source. Hili had a wide network inside Iraq; he was also corrupt and unreliable. He placed full blame for the killings on Grand Ayatollah al-Sayyid ‘Ali al-Husayni al-Sistani, the spiritual leader of many Iraqi Shi’ites — and on the Badr Brigade, a militia affiliated with Sistani. Peter Tatchell and reporter Doug Ireland both promoted Hili’s checkered career and adopted his version. The ‘campaign of terror is sanctioned, some say orchestrated, by Iraq’s leading Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani,’ Tatchell wrote. ‘The Badr Corps,’ Ireland intoned, ‘is committed to the ‘sexual cleansing’ of Iraq.’

There was little truth to these particular charges. When I researched inside Iraq for Human Rights Watch in 2009, I found no evidence that the Badr Brigade had been responsible for extensive attacks on LGBT people; other Shi’ite militias had taken the lead. (Sistani’s website, probably largely written by junior clerics, had once carried a fatwa calling for the death penalty for ‘sodomy,’ but when it attracted attention he quickly took it down.) Politics, tinged with old grudges, propelled the claims. Hili was a former Ba’athist, who shared the party’s loathing of Sistani. Moreover, the Badr Brigade was also a longtime enemy to the cultlike Iranian Mujahedin e-Khalq guerrillas stationed in Iraq — and the Mujahedin had fed (false but headline-grabbing) stories to both Tatchell and Ireland in the past.

But Sistani was also the one Shi’ite cleric whom the US saw as potentially a force for ‘stability.’ True or not, narratives that blamed him for the killings were unlikely to get much traction with a Western media that still took the coalition military forces as their main sources for Iraq events. Stories of ‘gay murders’ stayed confined to the ghettos of the gay press.” (A Paper Bird, 27. Jänner 2015)

Haltungen von Muqtada al-Sadr zu LGBT-Personen

Im Bericht von Human Rights Watch (HRW) zu einer Mordkampagne an Homosexuellen im Jahr 2009 wird erwähnt, dass die meisten Interviewpartner davon ausgegangen seien, dass die von Muqtada al-Sadr geführte Mahdi-Armee die Hauptverantwortung für die Morde Anfang 2009 trage. Ende Mai 2009 habe ein Sprecher der Sadr-Bewegung in einem Interview gesagt, dass die Milizen Versammlungen abhalten würden, um „die Verdorbenheit zu bekämpfen“ und die Gemeinschaft aufrufen würden, homosexuelles Verhalten zurückzuweisen, dass Sadr aber Gewalt ablehne und dass jeder, der Gewalt gegen Homosexuelle ausübe, nicht als „einer von uns“ betrachtet werde. Gleichzeitig habe aber ein anderer Anführer Homosexualität als „Katastrophe für die Gemeinschaft“ bezeichnet und zur „Korrektur der Moral der Nation“ aufgerufen:

„However, most people Human Rights Watch interviewed believed that the Mahdi Army, the militia led by Moqtada al-Sadr, bears primary responsibility, and launched the killing in early 2009. […] If the killings were a bid for popularity, they may have backfired. The grieving families found even among the Mahdi Army’s core communities in Sadr City lent no burnish to its image. In late May 2009, a Sadrist spokesman gave an interview pointing to ongoing public meetings the militia was holding to ‘fight the depravity and urge the community to reject’ homosexual conduct; but he added that ‘al-Sadr rejects’ violence, and that ‘anyone who commits violence against gays will not be considered as being one of us.’ At the same time, however, another Sadrist leader proclaimed homosexuality ‘a disaster that has come to the community,’ saying ‘We must correct the morals of the nation.’ Human Rights Watch has received testimonies suggesting that in some areas Sunni militias were also joining, possibly competitively, in the campaign of threats and violence.” (HRW, August 2009, S. 4)

In seinem oben erwähnten Blogbeitrag vom Jänner 2015 schreibt Scott Long, LGBT-Aktivist und ehemaliger Direktor des LGBT-Programms bei Human Rights Watch (HRW), über die Hintergründe der Morde von 2009 sowie über die sogenannten „Emo“-Tötungen im Jahr 2012, für die weitgehend die Mahdi-Armee und die schiitische Miliz Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq verantwortlich gemacht worden seien, obwohl Muqtada al-Sadr sich von den Morden distanziert habe:

In early 2009, killings of LGBT people accelerated massively. What had once looked unsystematic became an organized campaign. I went to Iraq; it was obvious, there, that the forces of popular Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr bore main responsibility. Sadr City, the great Baghdad slum dominated by Moqtada’s movement, was the fulcrum of the violence; preachers there openly incited murder, and survivors blamed his Mahdi Army (Jaish al-Mahdi) for most of the carnage. Al-Sadr’s militia had gone underground at the beginning of the US-led counterinsurgency ‘surge’ in 2007, and Moqtada himself fled to Iran. The killings seemed to be a bid to reassert his relevance and moral indispensability. One ‘executioner’ claimed he was tackling ‘a serious illness in the community that has been spreading rapidly among the youth after it was brought in from the outside by American soldiers. These are not the habits of Iraq or our community and we must eliminate them.’

[…] The ’emo‘ killings in 2012 also swirled around Shi’ite-dominated eastern Baghdad, and the Mahdi Army was widely held responsible, along with a breakaway Shi’ite militia, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous) - though Moqtada al-Sadr distanced himself from the campaign, saying emos should be dealt with only ‘in accordance with the law.’ But this time, the Ministry of Interior, which had called for ‘eliminating’ emos, was also involved up to the hilt.” (A Paper Bird, 27. Jänner 2015)

Ein Bericht von Human Rights Watch (HRW) vom August 2016 geht ebenfalls auf die „Emo“-Morde von 2012 ein. Sadr habe damals die Betroffenen online als “Verrückte” und als “Geschwür auf der muslimischen Gemeinschaft” bezeichnet, habe aber auch gesagt, dass man „im Rahmen der Gesetze“ mit ihnen verfahren solle. Im Juli 2016 habe Sadr seine Ansicht ausgedrückt, dass gleichgeschlechtliche Beziehungen und Cross-Dressing nicht akzeptabel seien, dass aber Menschen, die sich nicht an Gender-Normen halten, dennoch das Recht zu leben hätten. Man müsse sich von ihnen fernhalten, aber sie nicht angreifen, man müsse sie mit akzeptablen und rationalen Mitteln anleiten, so Sadr:

„State and non-state actors in Iraq should heed the prominent Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s July 2016 statement banning violence against those who do not conform to gender norms.

Since early 2009, Human Rights Watch has documented kidnappings, executions, and torture by militia groups, including al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, of gay men and men perceived to be gay. The killings have continued unabated.

‘Finally, the head of one of the groups whose members have carried out serious abuses against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people in Iraq is condemning these heinous attacks,’ said Joe Stork, deputy Middle East director. ‘We hope this will change behavior in successors to the Mahdi Army and other ranks, and spur the government to hold accountable those who commit these crimes.’

A Human Rights Watch report found that in early 2009, Iraqi militia members began a wide-reaching campaign of extrajudicial executions, kidnappings, and torture of men suspected of homosexual conduct, or of not conforming to masculine gender norms, and that Iraq authorities did nothing to stop the killings. The killings began in the Baghdad neighborhood of Sadr City, a Mahdi Army stronghold, and were then replicated by members of militia groups in many cities across Iraq. Mahdi Army spokesmen promoted fear about the ‘third sex’ and the ‘feminization’ of Iraqi men, as well as suggesting that militia action was the remedy.

In 2012, militia members opened a second wave of attacks on people categorized as part of the ‘emo’ subculture, styles that critics associated with heavy metal music, and rap. In early February 2012, signs and fliers appeared in the Baghdad neighborhoods of Sadr City, Hayy al-Habibiyya, and Hayy al-‘Amil that threatened people by name with ‘the wrath of god’ unless they cut their hair short, concealed their tattoos, maintained ‘complete manhood,’ and stopped wearing so-called ‘satanic clothing.’ Similar posters appeared in other neighborhoods, also listing names.

In the following weeks, Human Rights Watch received reports of several dozen youths killed as part of the campaign. While it was unclear who was behind the campaign, at the time al-Sadr called the targets of the campaign ‘crazy fools’ and a ‘lesion on the Muslim community’ in an online statement, but also maintained that they should be dealt with ‘within the law.’

[…] Al-Sadr’s July 7 2016, statement expresses his view that same-sex relationships and cross-dressing are not acceptable, but that gender non-conforming people – whom al-Sadr claims are suffering from ‘psychological problems’ – nevertheless deserve the right to live. ‘[You] must disassociate from them [but] not attack them, as it increases their aversion and you must guide them using acceptable and rational means,’ the statement read.” (HRW, 18. August 2016)

Iraqueer, eine in der Region Kurdistan im Irak registrierte LGBT-Advocacy-Organisation, schreibt in ihrem Bericht vom Juni 2018, dass trotz der positiven Stellungnahme von Muqtada al-Sadr, der die Tötung von Personen, darunter auch LGBT-Personen, verurteilt habe, Gewalt gegen Homosexuelle im Irak fortbestehe:

Despite the relatively positive statement by the prominent Iraqi religious leader and politician, Muqtada Al Sadr who condemned the killing of any individual including LGBT+ people, violence against queer people persists in Iraq. Armed groups like the Islamic State and Asa’eb Ahl Al-Haq have been two of the main groups threatening the LGBT+ community.” (Iraqueer, Juni 2018)

Die Antwort von Muqtada al-Sadr findet sich auf Arabisch auf seiner Webseite unter folgendem Link:

·      Private Office of Muqtada Al-Sadr: [Seine Eminenz Sayyed Muqtada al-Sadr beantwortet die Frage nach dem zunehmenden Phänomen der übermäßigen Verschönerung junger Männer und der Ähnlichkeit mit Frauen und den verdächtigen Beziehungen zwischen ihnen] 7. Juli 2016
http://jawabna.com/index.php/permalink/9343.html

 

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