ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (Author)
In einem Länderbericht des Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) der australischen Regierung vom Februar 2018 wird erwähnt, dass es als glaubwürdig erachtet werde, dass Mitglieder von Studentenorganisationen oft eher Parteiaktivisten seien als Studierende, und dass politische Vorfeldorganisationen oft eine Tarnung für kriminelle Aktivitäten seien, darunter Gewalt und Erpressung. In ländlichen Gebieten seien Berichten zufolge Geschäftsleute, die mit der (oppositionellen) Bangladesh National Party (BNP) in Verbindung stehen würden, von Mitgliedern der (Regierungspartei) Awami League (AL) erpresst worden. Ihnen sei Gewalt angedroht worden, falls sie den Geldforderungen nicht nachkommen würden:
„The auxiliary organisations support the political parties through fundraising and election-related activities. They also play a major role in inter- and intra-party violence (see Politically Motivated Violence (PMV)). DFAT assesses as credible allegations that members of student wings are often party activists rather than genuine students, and that auxiliary organisations are often a front for criminal activities, including violence and extortion. The BCL [Bangladesh Chhatra League (the Awami League’s student wing)] has effectively controlled public university campuses since 2009, preventing members of other parties’ student wings from undertaking activities and even from sitting examinations. In rural areas, AL [Awami League] members and activists have reportedly extorted business owners affiliated with the BNP [Bangladesh National Party], threatening them with violence if they do not comply with demands for money.” (DFAT, 2. Februar 2018, S. 20)
In einem Bericht des britischen Innenministeriums UK Home Office vom Jänner 2018 wird ebenfalls erwähnt, dass Gruppen wie die Studenten- und Jugendorganisationen der Awami League häufig außerhalb der Gesetze operieren würden, zunehmend in kriminellen Unternehmungen, die sich auf Erpressung lokaler Geschäftstreibender konzentrieren würden:
„The AL’s [Awami League‘s] student and junior wings are faction-ridden and often use violent means to settle their disputes. Intra-party violence has increased with the decline of the BNP, and is greatest among factions of the students’ and labour wings and centres on competition over resources; factions have increasingly and violently competed over contracts, tenders, and appointments to senior positions within the student and labour wings. Such groups commonly operate above the law, increasingly in criminal enterprises focussing on extortion of local business owners and land grabbing. Criminal activities of leaders and activists associated with AL’s student and youth wings increased during 2016; AL central leaders have not been able to control the rent-seeking and violent behaviour of the members of these associate organisations. Intra-party AL violence accounted for over half of all recorded incidents of political violence in the January 2017 – September 2017 period.” (UK Home Office, Jänner 2018, S. 25-26)
In zwei Artikeln der in Bangladesch erscheinenden Tageszeitung The Daily Star vom Oktober 2017 wird über die Entführung eines Geschäftsmannes durch sieben Polizisten berichtet. Der Entführte, der jüngere Bruder des Bürgermeisters der Gemeinde Teknaf, sei nach der Zahlung von Lösegeld freigelassen worden. Die Polizisten seien suspendiert, sechs von ihnen seien verhaftet worden. Das Opfer habe berichtet, dass die Polizisten ihm gedroht hätten, ihn in einem Kreuzfeuer zu töten, falls das Lösegeld nicht bezahlt werde:
„Authorities have suspended seven detectives for allegedly kidnapping a businessman in Teknaf of Cox’s Bazar early today. Confirming the suspension order, Afjurul Hoque Tutul, additional superintendent of police in the district, told our Cox’s Bazar correspondent that a case will be filed against the seven in this connection. The seven members of Detective Branch (DB) of police were detained and Tk 17 lakh ransom money was recovered from a vehicle in Teknaf, according to law enforcers. A sub-inspector named Moniruzzaman fled the scene during the search at the check post, they said adding the money was recovered from the vehicle. The DB men allegedly abducted Abdul Gafur, who sells blankets, from Teknaf yesterday morning. The kidnappers set him free in Marine Drive area early today after collecting the ransom, according to the lawmen. The alleged kidnappers initially demanded Tk 50 lakh from Gafur’s family for his release, they said. Informed by the family members, the team of the security forces conducted the search and arrested the alleged kidnappers along with the money.” (The Daily Star, 25. Oktober 2017)
„Six members of the Detective Branch of Police were detained yesterday with a ransom of Tk 17 lakh in Cox's Bazar half an hour after the six along with another DB man released a local trader they had abducted on Tuesday. The seven DB men kidnapped blanket trader Abdul Gafur, younger brother of Teknaf municipality mayor Moniruzzaman, from the district town and demanded Tk 50 lakh as ransom, alleged Gafur's family. […]
The authorities suspended the seven detectives. The incident took place only a day after the Anti-Corruption Commission filed a case against former superintendent of police of Faridpur Subhash Chandra Saha and his wife for allegedly amassing Tk 8.36 crore beyond their known sources of income. The DB men were taken to the temporary camp at Sabrang and later handed over to police after the SP and the additional SP of Cox's Bazar went there. The police officials assured that proper administrative measures would be taken against the accused policemen. They also returned Tk 17 lakh to Gafur's family.
[…] Gafur told this newspaper that the detectives picked him up from Hotel Al Gani in the district town around 1:00pm on Tuesday after he had lunch with his friends. When two of my friends protested, the DB men said a case was filed against me and they would release me after grilling. ‘The DB team confined me to a room in Maheskhalia Para area and demanded Tk 50 lakh for my release. They threatened to kill me in crossfire if I didn't oblige.’ The 26-year-old trader said the DB men then contacted his family members through his cell phone and finally settled the ransom for Tk 17 lakh.” (The Daily Star, 26. Oktober 2017)
In einem Artikel der Tageszeitung Dhaka Tribune vom April 2018 wird berichtet, dass zwei Informanten der Polizei im August 2017 gefasst worden seien, als sie versucht hätten, Geld von einem Geschäftsmann zu erpressen, indem sie damit gedroht hätten, die Droge Yaba in seiner Tasche zu platzieren. Es gebe bereits Anschuldigungen ernsthafter Verbrechen wie Mord, Erpressung, Entführung von Personen und Fahrzeugen gegen die Polizei. Yaba sei zu einer neuen Methode der Erpressung und Belästigung geworden:
„In a similar incident in Jatrabari in Dhaka on August 12, 2017, two police sources were caught while trying to extort money from a businessman by threatening to put yaba in his pocket. Other police officers came to their sources’ rescue and took them to the station. The country’s top police officials are reported to be ’concerned and embarrassed‘ over the activities of corrupt police members. Such incidents have raised questions as to the professionalism of the police, and caused the public to lose faith in the integrity of the service. There are already allegations of serious crimes such as murder, extortion, abduction and hijacking against the police. Yaba has become a new tool of extortion and harassment.” (Dhaka Tribune, 27. April 2018a)
Am selben Tag berichtet die Zeitung Dhaka Tribune über einen Fall im März 2018, in dem ein Mann von der Polizei festgenommen worden sei, nachdem er und seine Frau sich geweigert hätten, einen Geldbetrag zu bezahlen. In Folge hätten sie mehrmals bezahlen müssen, bis der Mann schließlich freigelassen worden sei. Der Mann und seine Frau seien bedroht worden, in einem Drogenfall beschuldigt zu werden, und lokale Polizeibeamte hätten sie danach immer wieder belästigt:
„Sanjida Yasmin, a resident of Chattogram city’s Noyabazar area, has been living in constant paranoia for nearly two months. Every day, she fears that police will knock on her door and harass her and her family with unwanted queries. Sanjida claims her fear stems from having faced persistent police harassment ever since her husband was picked up by law enforcement on March 2. Although he was subsequently released, this came at a great financial cost to the family. ‘On that morning, my husband Sheikh Jasim Ahmed went out to get breakfast for us,’ Sanjida told the Dhaka Tribune. ‘While he was doing this, some people in plain-clothes led by Pahartoli police station Sub-Inspector Shahadat Hossain stopped him.’ Sanjida said the undercover officers claimed to have found incriminating evidence against him. ‘My husband said he wasn’t a criminal and asked the police why they were behaving in this way with him,’ she said. ‘I rushed to the spot to support my husband when I heard news of the incident from locals, but the police had already taken Tk12,500 which was in his pocket.’ Sanjida and Jasmin both argued with the police officers over the extortion, at which point the law enforcers detained Jasim and took him to Pahartoli police station.
‘When I asked SI [Sub-Inspector] Shahadat why they had picked up my husband without a reason, he told me that I was responsible for it,’ Sanjida said with tears in her eyes. ‘He said if the two of us had not protested over the Tk12,500, then they would have left us.’ She further said the SI later demanded Tk500,000 for Pahartoli police station OC [Officer in charge] Rafikul Islam in order to secure her husband’s release. ‘The SI also warned me that they would show my husband as the accused in a drug or arms case if I created problems over the matter. Hearing this, I went to the OC, who told me he would look into the matter after speaking to his subordinates.’ Sanjida said when she returned to the OC a few hours after the first meeting, the police official scolded her and said he had no time for such matters as 200 cases were appealed before him daily. He instructed her to speak to the officer who was handling the matter. She later went to SI Shahadat at the police station and managed to convince him to free her husband for Tk100,000 after much pleading. ‘When I gave him the money, he took three signatures from me on white paper and went away,’ she said. However, when SI Shahadat did not return to the police station by 10pm, Sanjida tried repeatedly to contact him by mobile phone. At one stage, the SI picked up the phone and scolded her, saying that not only would he not free her husband, but he would also show both Sanjida and Jasim as the accused in a drug case.
Subsequently, Sanjida said she went to Panchlaish Zone Assistant Commissioner Pankaj Barua and informed him of the entire incident. ‘When the assistant commissioner asked the policemen about the matter, they could not provide him with any satisfactory answers,’ she said. ‘The AC [Assistant Commissioner] them told me that my husband would be released the following morning.’
The extortion attempts did not end there, however. Sanjida said SI Sunoyon Barua of the police station asked for another Tk30,000 to give to the OC to ensure Jasim’s release. ‘After failing to see any other option, I gave the Tk30,000 to SI Sunoyon,’ she said. ‘I have video footage of the handover. Later, the police again took my signature on some white papers and freed my husband.’ Sanjida’s hopes that the traumatic experience would end with her husband’s release were soon proved unfounded, as local policeman began harassing her with unnecessary queries on a frequent basis.” (Dhaka Tribune, 27. April 2018b)
Die in Bangladesch ansässige Menschenrechtsorganisation Odhikar berichtet in ihrem Jahresbericht vom Jänner 2018, dass es aufgrund der Kampagne gegen Verschwindenlassen in Bangladesch seit August 2017 einen neuen Trend gebe. Menschen seien plötzlich nicht mehr auffindbar. Seit August seien Menschen, darunter ein Universitätslehrer, ein Politiker, ein ehemaliger Botschafter, ein Geschäftsmann, ein Journalist und Studenten auf mysteriöse Weise „abgängig“. Die meisten seien wieder zurückgekehrt und manche seien als verhaftet gezeigt worden. Die Zeugenaussagen einiger der Opfer würden alle ähnlich klingen. Es sei auch von Entführungsopfern berichtet worden, dass die Entführer gut organisiert gewesen seien und die Infrastruktur zur Verfügung gehabt hätten, um Menschen verschwinden zu lassen. Einige Mitglieder der Strafverfolgungsbehörden seien angeblich in diese Zwischenfälle involviert:
„28. Due to the huge campaign against enforced disappearance in Bangladesh, a new trend has emerged since August 2017, where people are suddenly becoming traceless. During this period, people, including a university teacher, a politician, a former ambassador, a businessman, a journalist and students mysteriously went ‘missing’. Most of them have returned and some of them were showed as arrested. Some victims, after their return, gave statements to the media. Their accounts all sound very similar. Even their detention experience was almost the same. During this period, persons who returned after abduction have also commented that their abductors were well-organised and they have the infrastructural facility to disappear people. Some members of law enforcement agencies are allegedly involved in these incidents.” (Odhikar, 12. Jänner 2018, S. 36)
Das UK Home Office zitiert in einem Bericht zu einer im Mai 2017 durchgeführten Erkundungsmission vom September 2017 Antworten aus einem Gespräch mit Medienmitarbeitern, die gesagt hätten, dass die Polizei in vielen, vielleicht in den meisten Fällen von Erpressung involviert sei:
„Do the police engage in extortion?
Yes, in many cases. It maybe happens in most cases.” (UK Home Office, September 2017, S. 72)
Im selben Gespräch sei auch erwähnt worden, dass es den verschiedenen Parteigruppierungen um die Vorherrschaft in einem bestimmten Gebiet gehe. Die Studentengruppen der Regierungspartei seien in die Erpressung von Geschäftstreibenden involviert:
„Are there ideological differences between different party factions?
No. It is about supremacy in the locality. The ruling party’s student groups are engaged in extortion from business. Groups have different names. There is the Bangladesh Chhatra League, who are the student body of the Awami League, but there are also local leaders and different names for different local groups.” (UK Home Office, September 2017, S. 73)
In einem Gespräch mit einer Menschenrechtsorganisation sei der Delegation mitgeteilt worden, dass die Polizeieinheit RAB (Rapid Action Battalion) im Wettbewerb mit der Anti-Terror-Polizei stehe, wenn es um Ressourcen und Erpressung gehe:
„You say that people are scared of RAB [Rapid Action Battalion], although we heard from other sources that RAB commands public support, because they are seen to ‘kill the bad guys’. Is this not your impression?
What you are saying is the old version. Up to 2005-06 RAB might have been seen in this way. The counter-terrorism unit of the police target extremist operations along with RAB, but now they have a new counter-terrorism challenge and are in competition with counter-terrorism police in respect of resources and extortion. The system is collapsing.” (UK Home Office, September 2017, S. 95)
Im selben Gespräch sei auch erwähnt worden, dass Banditen, Parteiaktivisten, Landräuber und Erpresser in politische Gewalt involviert seien:
„Are students involved in political violence?
Actual students participate less. It is more thugs or party activists, the land grabbers, extortionists.” (UK Home Office, September 2017, S. 97)
In einem Treffen mit einem westlichen Beamten habe dieser dem UK Home Office die Menschenrechtssituation in Bangladesch beschrieben. Es bestehe der Eindruck, dass Strafverfolgungsbehörden, insbesondere die RAB, für Übergriffe verantwortlich seien, darunter auch außergesetzliche Tötungen und Entführungen. Berichte zu Erpressung durch die Polizei seien weit verbreitet. Das Justizsystem werde als korrupt betrachtet:
„Law enforcement agencies, particularly the Rabid Action Battalion (RAB), were seen as committing abuses, including extra-judicial killings (EJKs) and abductions. Reports of police extortion were widespread. The judicial system was seen as corrupt – there were reports of judges being bribed – and a huge backlog of cases prevented the delivery of justice in a reasonable time frame.” (UK Home Office, September 2017, S. 133)
In einem Alternativbericht der World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT) an das UNO-Menschenrechtskomitee vom Februar 2017 wird der Fall von Imam Hassan, genannt Badal, erwähnt, der am 5. März 2012 in Dhaka entführt worden sei. Am nächsten Tag hätten Mitglieder der RAB Badals Vater informiert, dass sie Badal von Entführern „gerettet“ hätten. Als der Vater seinen Sohn abholen wollte, habe man einen Geldbetrag von ihm verlangt. Der Vater habe einen geringeren Betrag bezahlt, dennoch sei der Sohn nie übergeben worden:
„Mr. Imam Hassan, alias Badal, was abducted on 5 March 2012 in Dhaka. The next day members of RAB-2 informed Badal’s father that they had ‘rescued’ Badal from kidnappers. When he arrived at the RAB-2 office to pick up his son, the duty officer of RAB-2, SI Raju, demanded 100,000 Taka from him for having rescued his son. Badal’s father gave SI Raju 40,000 Taka. However, Badal was never returned to his family, this despite a letter by Advocate Nurul Islam Suzon, Member of Parliament and Former Member of the Standing Committee of the Ministry of Home Affairs urging the RAB-2 to take necessary steps to release Badal. On 30 April 2012, Badal’s father then submitted an application to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) which however replied that the Anti-Corruption Commission had investigated the matter and found no evidence of SI Raju taking a bribe. Badal’s father then filed a Habeas Corpus application in the High Court Division19, which on 13 November 2012, issued a Rule Nisi calling upon the RAB-2 officials to produce Badal before the court. However, the case remains unresolved.“ (OMCT, 24. Februar 2017, S. 9)
Im Bericht zur internationalen Religionsfreiheit des US-Außenministeriums (US Department of State, USDOS) vom Mai 2018 (Berichtszeitraum: 2017) wird der Fall eines Priesters erwähnt, der am 2. Oktober 2017 entführt worden sei, um Lösegeld zu erpressen. Es sei ihm gelungen zu fliehen, und Bewohner hätten den Entführer festgehalten und ihn der Polizei übergeben:
„The Bangladesh Christian Association also reported, on October 2, assailants abducted Shishir Natale Gregory, a priest at Saint Mary Cathedral in Dhaka, and demanded a ransom for his release. Gregory was able to escape, and local residents in Tongi detained one of his abductors and turned him over to police.” (USDOS, 29. Mai 2018)
Im Menschenrechtsbericht des USDOS vom April 2018 (Berichtszeitraum: 2017) wird erwähnt, dass Menschenrechtsgruppen und Medien berichtet hätten, dass es weiterhin Fälle von Verschwindenlassen und Entführungen gebe, manche davon würden von Sicherheitskräften verübt. Die Regierung habe begrenzte Anstrengungen unternommen, um solche Taten zu verhindern oder zu untersuchen. Laut einer Menschenrechtsorganisation habe es im Jahr 2017 60 Fälle von Verschwindenlassen gegeben:
„Human rights groups and media reported that disappearances and kidnappings continued, some committed by security services. The government made limited efforts to prevent or investigate such acts. Following alleged disappearances, security forces released some individuals without charge, arrested some, some were found dead, and others were never found. ASK [human rights organization Ain o Salish Kendra] stated there were 60 enforced disappearances during the year.
[…] In February the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report claiming at least 40 disappearances. The government did not respond to a request from the UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances to visit the country.
High-ranking government officials repeatedly denied the incidents of enforced disappearance and claimed victims were hiding of their own accord. A July 4 judicial inquiry concluded that enforced disappearances occurred and ordered the Police Bureau of Investigation to take action regarding a disappeared person. In April Swedish Radio reported a secretly recorded interview with a senior RAB officer admitting that his unit routinely picked up individuals, killed them, and disposed of the bodies.” (USDOS, 20. April 2018, Section 1b)
Detaillierte Informationen zum Thema Verschwindenlassen finden Sie in folgenden Berichten:
· HRW - Human Rights Watch: We Don't Have Him - Secret Detentions and Enforced Disappearances in Bangladesh, Juli 2017
· HRC – UN Human Rights Council: Summary of Stakeholders' submissions on Bangladesh; Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/WG.6/30/BGD/3], 13. März 2018
Die International Crisis Group (ICG) schreibt in einem Bericht vom Februar 2018, dass eine Kultur der Straflosigkeit die Professionalität der Sicherheitskräfte aushöhle und in manchen Fällen zu anderen Formen von Verbrechen ermutigt habe. Manche Mitglieder seien in Auftragsmorde und Entführungen zur Erpressung von Lösegeld verwickelt:
„The culture of impunity it breeds also erodes professionalism in the security forces and in some cases appears to have encouraged other forms of criminality. Some members are involved in contract killings and kidnappings for ransom; in 2014, a spate of murders in Narayanganj involved top Rapid Action Battalion officials including a former army lieutenant colonel.” (ICG, 28. Februar 2018, S. 16)
Die Menschenrechtsorganisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) schreibt in ihrem Jahresbericht vom Jänner 2018, dass die Behörden dabei versagen würden, die Sicherheitskräfte für ernsthafte Menschenrechtsverletzungen, darunter geheimes Festhalten, Verschwindenlassen, Folter und außergesetzliche Tötungen, verantwortlich zu machen. Es gebe eine lange Geschichte der Straflosigkeit für Sicherheitskräfte, vor allem die Detektivabteilung der Polizei, die Grenzwache, das Inspektorat der Kräfte des Generaldirektorats und die RAB, für ernsthafte Verletzungen wie willkürliche Festnahmen, Folter, Verschwindenlassen und außergesetzliche Tötungen. Dieses Muster habe sich auch 2017 nicht verringert:
„Authorities failed to hold security forces responsible for serious human rights violations including secret detentions, enforced disappearances, torture, and extrajudicial killings. […]
Bangladesh security forces—particularly the Detective Branch of the police, Bangladesh Border Guards (BGB), the Directorate General Forces Inspectorate (DGFI), and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB)—have a long history of enjoying impunity for serious violations including arbitrary arrests, torture, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings, a pattern that did not abate in 2017.
Law enforcement authorities continued to arrest opposition activists and militant suspects, holding them in secret detention for long periods before producing some in court. Several others, according to security forces, were killed in ‘gunfights,’ leading to concerns over extrajudicial killings. At time of writing, scores remained victims of enforced disappearances.” (HRW, 18. Jänner 2018)
Freedom House, eine in den USA ansässige NGO, die zu den Themen Demokratie, politische Freiheit und Menschenrechte forscht und sich für diese einsetzt, schreibt in ihrem Bericht Freedom in the World vom Jänner 2018, dass die regierende Awami League ihre politische Macht konsolidiert habe, indem sie die Opposition, kritische Medien und Personen aus der Zivilgesellschaft anhaltend schikaniert habe. Sicherheitskräfte würden eine Reihe von Menschenrechtsverletzungen fast straflos begehen. Mitglieder der oppositionellen Parteien Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) und der islamistischen Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) seien schikaniert worden. Endemische Korruption und Kriminalität, ein schwacher Rechtsstaat, begrenzte Transparenz bei Behörden und politische Polarisierung hätten die Verantwortlichkeit der Regierung seit langem untergraben. Kriminalfälle gegen Aktivisten der Regierungspartei würden regelmäßig wegen „politischer Bedenken“ fallengelassen, was die Verfahren unterminiere und eine Kultur der Straflosigkeit vertiefe:
„The ruling Awami League (AL) has consolidated political power through sustained harassment of the opposition and those perceived to be allied with it, as well as of critical media and civil society voices. Security forces carry out a range of human right abuses with near impunity, while Islamist extremist groups threaten and attack those with dissident views. […]
The dominance of the ruling Awami League (AL) party remained unchallenged. The opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) was hampered by arrests and harassment of key party officials and activists, as was the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) party. […]
Endemic corruption and criminality, weak rule of law, limited bureaucratic transparency, and political polarization have long undermined government accountability. […]
Individuals’ ability to access justice is compromised by endemic corruption within the court system as well as severe backlogs, with several million pending cases. Pretrial detention is often lengthy, and many defendants lack counsel. Suspects are routinely subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, demands for bribes, and physical abuse by police. Meanwhile, criminal cases against ruling party activists are regularly withdrawn on the grounds of ’political consideration,’ undermining the judicial process and entrenching a culture of impunity. […]
However, a range of human rights abuses by law enforcement agencies—including enforced disappearances, custodial deaths, arbitrary arrests, and torture—continue unabated. A July 2017 Human Rights Watch report documented the use of detention and enforced disappearance against political opponents, despite the government’s promise to reform the practice, with more than 300 cases reported since 2009. […] Odhikar reported a total of 154 extrajudicial killings perpetrated by law enforcement agencies in 2017, in addition to 86 enforced disappearances.” (Freedom House, Jänner 2018)
· DFAT – Australian Government - Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: DFAT Country Information Report Bangladesh, 2. Februar 2018
· Dhaka Tribune: Police use yaba for extorting cash, 27. April 2018a
· Dhaka Tribune: Extortion victims face unrelenting police harassment in Chattogram, 27. April 2018b
· Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2018 - Bangladesh, Jänner 2018
· HRW - Human Rights Watch: We Don't Have Him - Secret Detentions and Enforced Disappearances in Bangladesh, July 2017
· HRW – Human Rights Watch: World Report 2018 - Bangladesh, 18. Jänner 2018
· HRC – UN Human Rights Council: Summary of Stakeholders' submissions on Bangladesh; Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights [A/HRC/WG.6/30/BGD/3], 13. März 2018
· ICG – International Crisis Group: Countering Jihadist Militancy in Bangladesh, 28. Februar 2018
· Odhikar: Annual Human Rights Report 2017, 12. Jänner 2018
· OMCT – World Organisation Against Torture: Joint NGO Alternative Report on Bangladesh to the United Nations Human Rights Committee 119th Session to be held 6-29 March 2017, 24. Februar 2017
· The Daily Star: 7 DB men suspended over ‘kidnapping’ businessman in Teknaf, 25. Oktober 2017
· The Daily Star: 'Kidnap' of Cox's Bazar Trader: Six DB men detained, 26. Oktober 2017
· UK Home Office: Report of a Home Office Fact-Finding Mission Bangladesh, Conducted 14‑26 May 2017, September 2017
· UK Home Office: Country Policy and Information Note Bangladesh: Opposition to the government, Jänner 2018
· USDOS – US Department of State: Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2017 - Bangladesh, 20. April 2018
· USDOS – US Department of State: 2017 Report on International Religious Freedom - Bangladesh, 29. Mai 2018