Anfragebeantwortung zu Afghanistan: Region Dande-e Ghori, Dorf Hosseinabad (Provinz Baghlan): Einnahme durch die Taliban 2015; aktuelle Lage; Lage der Hazaras [a-10367]

24. Oktober 2017

Das vorliegende Dokument beruht auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen sowie gegebenenfalls auf Expertenauskünften, und wurde in Übereinstimmung mit den Standards von ACCORD und den Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI) erstellt.

Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar. Alle Übersetzungen stellen Arbeitsübersetzungen dar, für die keine Gewähr übernommen werden kann.

Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien im Original durchzusehen. Originaldokumente, die nicht kostenfrei oder online abrufbar sind, können bei ACCORD eingesehen oder angefordert werden.

 

Anmerkung: Manche der gefundenen Quellen erwähnen einen Bezirk namens „Dand-e Ghori“ (o.ä.) in Baghlan. Karten des Afghanistan Information Management Service (AIMS) von 2005 und von UN OCHA von 2014 zeigen keinen so benannten Bezirk, jedoch einen namens „Dahana-i-Ghori“ (AIMS, 1. Mai 2005; UN OCHA, April 2014). Die unabhängige Forschungsorganisation Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) bezeichnet "Dand-e Ghori“ als Region im Westen der Provinz und südlich des Bezirks Baghlan-e Dschadid gelegenes Gebiet (AAN, 31. Mai 2013), das Teil des Bezirks Dahana-ye Ghuri sei (AAN, 21. Oktober 2015). Die deutsche Wochenzeitung Der Spiegel erwähnt 2011 Dande Ghori als „Rückzugsort der Taliban westlich des Baghlan-Flusses“ (Spiegel, 28. Februar 2011).

Es konnte im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche nicht geklärt werden, ob dies zwei Namen für ein Distrikt sind, oder ob es sich um zwei Distrikte handelt, oder um umgangssprachlich so benannte Regionen.

 

 

Die folgenden Ausschnitte aus ausgewählten Quellen enthalten Informationen zu oben genannter Fragestellung (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 24. Oktober 2017):

 

Einnahme von Dande-e Ghori durch die Taliban Mitte 2015

AAN beschreibt im Mai 2013 die Bedeutung des Gebiets Dand-e Ghori für die Taliban wie folgt:

„Meanwhile, the main goals for the Taleban insurgency in Baghlan are to recapture Dand-e Ghori,(4) an area in the west of the province and south of the stronghold Baghlan-e Jadid, and continue significant influence in Baghlan-e Jadid itself, according to the member of the Taleban’s military commission interviewed by AAN. Controlling these districts would provide the insurgency with easy access to the provincial centre in Pul-e Khumri and to the Baghlan-Mazar-e Sharif highway – the backbone of traffic and trade between Hairatan Port in Balkh and the rest of the country. […]

(4) Not identical with the district of Dahan-e Ghori.” (AAN, 31. Mai 2013)

Das UNO-Flüchtlingshochkommissariat (UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR) schreibt in einem Monatsbericht zu Binnenvertreibung im Juli 2015:

„During the months of June and July, 21 out of 34 Provinces in Afghanistan (60%) have been affected by forced movements of population due to conflict. Provinces that have not been traditionally prone to conflict-induced internal displacement have emerged as new hotspots, particularly in the North East (e.g. Takhar, Badakhshan, Baghlan). The widespread number of provinces simultaneously affected is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the displacement trends in 2015.” (UNHCR, Juli 2015, S. 2)

In dem Bericht schreibt UNHCR weiter, dass es eine Verschlechterung im Distrikt Dahana-e-Ghori in Baghlan gegebene habe. Der Distrikt sei zunächst von Anti-Regierungskräften eingenommen worden. Mitte August hätten die afghanischen Streitkräfte eine Gegenoffensive gestartet (Anm. ACCORD: Der Bericht behandelt den Juli 2015 und enthält kein explizites Veröffentlichungsdatum. Die Datei des Berichts wurde im September 2015 erstellt):

„Since end-July, a deteriorating has been reported in Dahana-e-Ghori district of Baghlan, initially overtaken by AGEs. In mid-August, a counteroffensive ANSF was launched. This determined more sustained displacement trends towards Puli-Khumri.” (UNHCR, Juli 2015, S. 6)

Die Dachorganisation britischer Afghanistan-Hilfsorganisationen BAAG berichtet in einem Monatsbericht über Entwicklungen im September 2015, dass (neben Kundus) auch weitere nördliche und nordöstliche Provinzen von den Taliban bedroht würden. Es werde befürchtet, dass ein Abkommen zwischen RegierungsvertreterInnen und lokalen Ältesten in der Provinz Baghlan zu mehr Landgewinn für die Taliban führe. Dem Abkommen zufolge würden die afghanischen Streitkräfte auf weitere Operationen im Gebiet Dand-e-Ghori verzichten. Im Gegenzug würden die lokalen Ältesten die Taliban daran hindern, von dort aus zu operieren. Laut BeobachterInnen liefere so ein Abkommen die lokale Bevölkerung den Gräueltaten der Taliban aus:

„Other northern and north-eastern provinces also came under threat of the Taliban. A deal signed between officials and local elders in the neighbouring Baghlan province is feared to provide more grounds to the Taliban. According to the deal, Afghan forces will cease further operations in Dand-e-Ghori area. In return, local elders will prevent the Taliban from operating there. Commentators say such a deal will leave local populations exposed to Taliban atrocities.” (BAAG, Oktober 2015, S. 1)

AAN berichtet im Oktober 2015 im Rahmen eines Artikels über den Aufstand im Norden, dass der Krieg in der Provinz Baghlan in den letzten zwei Sommermonaten in einem Gebiet namens Dand-e Ghuri im Distrikt Dahana-ye Ghuri konzentriert gewesen sei. Das Gebiet liege entscheidend an der Straße von (der Provinzhaupstadt) Pul-i Chumri nach Mazar-e Scharif. Die Taliban hätten Anfang September 2015 in dem Gebiet fast alle Checkposten der Afghanischen Lokalen Polizei (ALP) eingenommen. Später hätte die Regierung Gegenangriffe gestartet, die Posten jedoch nicht wieder eingenommen. Mit Stand Mitte Oktober 2015 sei nur mehr ein Posten unter Kontrolle der ALP. Das Gebiet sei zunächst von den Taliban im Rahmen ihrer Frühlingsoffensive eingenommen worden, die sich bis in den frühen Sommer ausdehnte. Im Spätsommer hätten die afghanischen Streitkräfte versucht, das Gebiet wieder einzunehmen. Als dies nicht funktioniert habe, hätten die Streitkräfte begonnen, Positionen der Taliban unter Artilleriebeschuss zu nehmen, von einem Gebiet namens Zementhügel, zwischen Pul-i Chumri und Dand-e Ghuri liegend. Die Taliban hätten daraufhin Raketen aus Dörfern unter ihrer Kontrolle im Gebiet Dand-e Ghuri in Richtung Pul-i Chomri geschossen. Dies habe zu einer hohen Zahl ziviler Opfer geführt:

„In the last two months of the summer, the war in Baghlan was concentrated in an area called Dand-e Ghuri in Dahana-ye Ghuri district which – crucially – lies along the highway connecting Pul-e Khumri with Mazar. The Taleban took over almost all Afghan Local Police (ALP) check posts in the area in early September 2015. Later in the month the government launched counter-attacks, but failed to re-take the posts. As of now (mid-October 2015), just one check post is left under ALP control: QurghanTepa (or Qurghan Hill).

The area was initially captured by the Taleban as part of their spring offensive operation, which extended into early summer. In late summer, the ANSF started their counterattacks to attempt to retake the area. When these did not bear fruit, they started shelling Taleban positions from an area called Cement Hill, which is located between Pul-e Khumri city and Dand-e Ghuri. This is named after the Ghuri Cement Factory, one of the largest industrial enterprises in the country. The Taleban did not respond directly to these attacks, but instead started firing rockets from the villages under their control in Dand-e Ghuri toward the city of Pul-e Khumri. The shelling of the city by the Taleban caused a large number of civilian casualties, included a reported 25 women and children killed and dozens of other civilians injured on the outskirts of the city. Around 250 families were displaced and local schools closed.“ (AAN, 21. Oktober 2015)

AAN beschreibt das oben von BAAG erwähnte Abkommen in Dand-e Ghori genauer und erwähnt dabei auch eine von den Taliban eingehobene Steuer („ushr“). Zudem seien die Taliban weiterhin in dem Gebiet aktiv geblieben, hätten Straßen kontrolliert und durchfahrende Fahrzeuge besteuert. Selbst als die Taliban, nachdem sie Checkposten der Polizei entlang der wichtigsten Straße des Gebiets eingenommen, niedergebrannt hatten, diese wieder verlassen hätten, würden sie in Dand-e Ghori als gestärkt wahrgenommen – fähig, die Posten jederzeit wieder einzunehmen, wenn sie wollten:

„On 3 September 2015, a five-member delegation, consisting of senior government officials headed by Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs Gulab Mangal, travelled to Baghlan to look into the security problems in the area. After two weeks of discussions with local tribal elders, mainly Pashtuns from the Dand-e Ghuri area, the delegation in the third week of September signed what Afghan media called a ‘memorandum of understanding’ (MoU) with the local tribal elders.

In this MoU, the elders promised to prevent any disorder that would disrupt security, including any targeting of Afghan government forces, from the area and to hand over to the government anyone committing crimes in their villages.The government argued that it signed the MoU to restore and maintain security in the area.

The agreement between the government and local elders had been preceded by a similar arrangement in Kohna Masjid-e Payin (also known as Nawabad), a small village in to the north of Pul-e Khumri that is located close to a UNESCO-protected archaeological site at Surkh Kotal hill and is inhabited by Hazaras. Community elders from this area had entered into a ceasefire deal with the Taleban, but long before the signing of the Dand-e Ghuri MoU. The residents of this village have been paying various taxes to the Taleban, providing them with free passage to other villages and giving them food when requested. This kind of collaboration with the Taliban did not take place in other villages in the area. (6)

After the signing of MoU, the displaced residents of the Dand-e Ghuri area returned to their homes and were able to harvest their crops. Schools re-opened and communities were able to spend the Eid days peacefully. That the harvest could be safely gathered was also of importance to the Taleban, who usually collect one tenth of it as a ‘religious tax’ (ushr).

Although local residents in the area endorsed the MoU, it was criticised by local civil society activists and commentators in Kabul. The opponents argued that, with the signing of the MoU, the area had officially been surrendered to the Taleban – even though, in fact, the area had already been under Taleban control. The MoU also remained controversial in the media. A live discussion on the topic between tribal elders, the Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs, Gulab Mangal, and the anchor of ToloNews, escalated into a heated argument. This televised debate was subsequently widely covered and shared by social media activists.

Indeed, after the signing of the MoU, the Taleban remained an active presence in the area. They continued to control the roads passing through Dand-e Ghuri and taxed vehicles passing through the area. After the capture of Kunduz, the Taleban attacked and burnt down the police check posts located along the main highway in the area under their control, local residents recounted. Although these attacks constituted a breach of the MoU, there was no immediate reaction from the government side. When the Taleban left the area where the attacks took place within a few days, the police moved in to retake control of their check posts. Despite the fact that they had abandoned the check posts, the Taleban in Dand-e Ghuri are now perceived stronger than before and are seen as being able to recapture these check posts whenever they want.” (AAN, 21. Oktober 2015)

Die New York Times verzeichnet die Region um die Provinzhauptstadt Baghlans, Pul-i Chumri, in einer Karte vom September 2015 als eine Angriffszone der Taliban. Die Karte basiert auf Daten des US-amerikanischen Institute for the Study of War (ISW), das sich selbst als überparteiliche Forschungsorganisation im Bereich Militärangelegenheiten bezeichnet (New York Times, 29. September 2015).

 

 

Aktuelle Kontrolle von Dande-e Ghori

The National, eine Zeitung der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate, berichtet im März 2016 davon, dass das Waffenstillstandsabkommen in Dand-e-Ghori nach Monaten des fragilen Friedens zusammengebrochen sei. Die darauf folgende Gewalt habe zur Vertreibung tausender ZivilistInnen geführt. Die Regierung bestreite dies. Im Gebiet Dand-e-Ghori, das nahe der Provinzhauptstadt Pul-i Chomri liege, würden ethnische Tadschikinnen, UsbekInnen, und Hazaras leben, der Großteil der Bevölkerung sei jedoch paschtunisch. The National berichtet darüber hinaus über Hintergrundinformationen zu dem Gebiet:

„When a power cut plunged Kabul into darkness for several weeks this winter, the Taliban’s strength in a mountainous region of northern Afghanistan became a national concern.

The blackout occurred after the collapse of a ceasefire agreement between prominent officials and elders mediating on behalf of local insurgents, ending months of fragile peace in the Dand-e-Ghori area of Baghlan province. […]

Power has now been restored but the controversy over the failed truce and the subsequent bloodshed has only intensified. […]

The recent events in Dand-e-Ghori underline the complexity of even low-level deals between the two sides.

Residents told The National the peace agreement restored order in the area and described the Taliban as local people motivated to take up arms because of years of ethnic discrimination and official corruption.

However, the truce collapsed after it was sharply criticised by some Afghan MPs and sections of the Afghan media who claimed it gave the Taliban undue legitimacy and allowed them to carry out attacks elsewhere.

Following its collapse and the subsequent rise in violence, some residents say thousands of civilians have been forced to leave their homes. This is disputed by the government. The displaced include Fazel Rabi Latif, a teacher who fled to his brother’s house in Baghlan’s provincial capital, Pul-e-Khumri, after the high school at which he taught was hit by a mortar.

‘Besides the casualties, [the unrest] has caused other problems and all kinds of damage,’ he said. ‘People have had to stop work, they have left behind their animals, houses and farmland without making any plans.’

The main road connecting Kabul to northern Afghanistan runs through Baghlan and the province is of strategic importance to the country, with any major breach in security having the potential to spread quickly into surrounding areas.

Dand-e-Ghori is home to ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras but much of the population is Pashtun. It is close to Pul-e-Khumri, making it an ideal staging post for attacks on government installations there.

The peace deal in Dand-e-Ghori was struck last September after heavy fighting erupted near the end of Ramadan and the provincial capital came under increasing threat.

A high-ranking delegation from the government including the minister of borders and tribal affairs, Gulab Mangal, and senior figures from the ministries of interior and defence, travelled to Baghlan to talk to local officials.

Among those they met was Alam Jan Mujahid, a Baghlan provincial councillor, who told The National soon afterwards how he lost his temper with them.

‘What have been your achievements?’ he asked the delegation. ‘In each operation you are losing bases and the way you are blindly shooting artillery is not Islamic.’

At his suggestion, the visiting officials decided to meet a group of elders and a truce was signed.

It was agreed that the Taliban would not attack the main road or any government checkpoints in the area. They would also not cut off access to Dand-e-Ghori and would vacate their fighting positions.

In exchange, the government agreed to stop firing artillery into Dand-e-Ghori and to halt the arrests of local men accused of having Taliban links unless there was sufficient evidence they had committed an offence.

The elders who signed the deal included Haji Sardar Khan Mosazoi, who comes from the village of Jina Ahmadzai and is the older brother of a prominent local Taliban commander.

Mr Mosazoi said the problems in Dand-e-Ghori began in 2008 or 2009 when the security forces started to harass students of a local madrasa.

The madrasa had about 200 students and at least 10 teachers. As well as offering the usual lessons such as Islamic law and jurisprudence, it also ran classes for Muslims who wanted to memorise the Quran.

According to Mr Mosazoi, the students were frequently stopped, questioned, searched and arrested for no apparent reason. Ethnic Pashtuns travelling into Pul-e-Khumri were regularly detained by the Afghan intelligence service, he said.

In the end, the people took up arms and assumed control of Dand-e-Ghori. They included Mr Mosazoi’s younger brother, Sayed Ahmad Hanafi, who is popularly known as Mawlawi Mamor.[…] According to Mr Mosazoi, two years after the insurgents took control of Dand-e-Ghori, the government recaptured the area in 2011 and set up militias to maintain security. When the militias continued to harass residents, the Taliban soon seized back control.

The Taliban appear to have widespread support in Dand-e-Ghori. After driving the militias out they moved around the area freely, kept schools open and allowed work on building a medical clinic to continue. They also established their own judicial system.

‘They had courts which were loved by the people,’ said local elder Mohammed Yousef Ahmadzai. ‘People were happy with them – there was no bribery, corruption and nepotism. If there was a dispute between two men it would be solved in a single day.’

Mr Mangal, the minister of tribal and border affairs, has defended the failed truce and said it should act as ‘a lesson’ for the government.

Shams-ul-Haq Barakzai, a provincial councillor, agreed that it had helped local residents.

‘The reason for all these problems is that the central government and the local government didn’t pay enough attention to the people of this area,’ he said.” (The National, 1. März 2016)

Auch AAN berichten über Entwicklungen im Gebiet Dand-e Ghori in einem Artikel vom August 2016 (siehe auch LWJ, 15. August 2016; Al Jazeera, 15. August 2016). Nach der Einnahme im September 2015 hätten die Taliban das Gebiet monatelang kontrolliert. Im Jänner 2016 habe die Regierung mit einer groß angelegten Operation zur Rückeroberung des Gebiets begonnen. Im März 2016 habe die Regierung die Kontrolle wieder übernehmen können. Die Taliban hätten das Gebiet binnen eines Tages wieder eingenommen:

„Dand-e Ghori is a Pashtun-dominated area of around 60 to 70 villages to the northwest of Pul-e Khumri, where the ANSF have always struggled to retain control. After the Taleban announced their so-called spring offensive in 2015, they began attacking the ANSF in Baghlan with Dand-e Ghori as their initial target. Local support for the insurgency in some of the villages and limited ANSF manpower put the government forces at a disadvantage. The insurgents, on the other hand, were able to move around the area freely.

In September 2015, Dand-e Ghori fell to the Taleban and remained under their control for five months (see report here). In January 2016, the ANSF conducted a large-scale operation to clear the area. On 6 March 2016, they managed to repel the Taleban and retake control. However, a day after the ANSF left Dand-e Ghori, handing over responsibility to local forces – an Afghan Local Police (ALP) unit led by Mullah Alam, a former commander of Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan, from the Ahmadzai tribe of Dand-e Ghori – the Taleban conducted a counter-offensive. They re-took Dand-e Ghori within a day. […]

The ANSF operation in Dand-e Ghori, termed Khurshid 20, while having no lasting impact on the security situation in Baghlan, had significant, negative repercussions on the lives of the local civilian population caught up in the fighting. According to Afghan media reports, more than 1,500 families had to leave Dand-e Ghori and neighbouring Dahna-ye Ghori district as a result of the operations (see here and here). The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Kabul reported that the number of officially registered IDPs for these two locations still exceeded 5,000 families as of mid-June 2016 – indicating that the displacement was not restricted to the period of the operations. UNAMA also highlighted this displacement in its civilian casualty report, citing ‘new patterns of displacement in Baghlan province,’ with ‘more than 32,500 individuals displaced by the fighting in Dand-e-Ghori and Dand-e-Shahabuddin by the beginning of 2016.’ […]

According to video evidence made available to AAN, many ALP fighters surrendered to the Taleban when they counter-attacked the day after the ANSF left Dand-e Ghori. Some laid down their weapons and returned home, while others joined the Taleban outright. […]

Government officials, however, portrayed the collapse of Dand-e Ghori as a result of not having enough ANSF personnel to maintain permanent bases there. […]

However, the police chief also admitted that the security forces, even when in the area, could not effectively fight the Taleban due to shortages of equipment and weak morale after sustaining heavy losses in the area. […]

The latest quarterly report of the Special Inspector of the [US] Government for Afghan Reconstruction (better known for his acronym SIGAR) cites Baghlan as one of the Taleban’s current focal areas.

Beyond the security trends specific to the area, there have been other disquieting developments in Baghlan province as a whole, which seem to indicate a strategic shift in dynamics between the insurgency and the ANSF, with the Taleban ensuring they maintain control, rather than just making territorial gains along the Baghlan-Balkh highway. They achieve this by persistently disrupting security along this vital transport route. Then they connect the areas they occupy (from Dahna-ye Ghori through Dand-e Ghori and Dand-e Shahabuddin to Baghlan-e Jadid towards Chahrdara district of Kunduz province), thereby creating a larger, cross-provincial area of control. This enables them to deploy reinforcements between the east and west of Baghlan, and likewise to and from Kunduz.

The negative effects of the ANSF’s inconsequential clearance operations and their failure to establish a presence in the area has undermined locals’ trust in both the government and the ANSF. This could pose a serious challenge if at some point they need the local population’s support to oust the Taleban. Their trust will be particularly necessary if the government continues to rely on the ALP and other groups to form the backbone of its local security strategy. Prospects for improved security in Baghlan in the second half of 2016 remain as bleak as they were during the first half, especially after the fall of Dahna-ye Ghori on 14 August 2016, the first district to fall into Taleban hands in Baghlan province since 2001. Worsening security would mostly affect the local civilian population, but also threatens the many seeking to travel or transport goods to and from the northwest. One of the country’s main communication routes remains at risk.“ (AAN, 15. August 2016)

Das ISW verzeichnet in der aktuellsten von ISW veröffentlichten Übersicht zur Gebietskontrolle (November 2016) die Distrikthauptstadt von Dahana-e Ghori als von den Taliban kontrolliert, die Provinzhauptstadt Pul-i Chomri als von den Taliban bedroht und die umliegenden Gebiete als teils von den Taliban kontrollierte Zonen, teils als Unterstzützungszonen („High Confidence Taliban Support Zone“):

[Bild entfernt]

(ISW, 22. November 2016)

 

Im März 2017 berichten die Taliban auf ihrer Webseite Voice of Jihad, „Dahna Gori“ gänzlich und Pul-i Chomri zu 70% zu kontrollieren:

„9 – BAGHLAN

Dahna Ghori and Tala wa Barfak are completely liberated

70% of capital Puli Khumri and Markazi Baghlan are under Mujahideen control, enemy controls centers and 20% areas.

Mujahideen control 30% of Burka and Doshi, 70% under enemy control.

Khinjan, Puli Hisar, Deh Bala, Banu, Jalga, Khost, Fareng and Guzar Gah are under completely enemy control, Mujahideen only carry out guerilla attacks in some districts.” (Voice of Jihad, 26. März 2017)

Im April berichtet das Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR), der Schattengouverneur der Taliban der Provinz Baghlan sei im April 2017 bei einer nächtlichen Aktion der Regierungskräfte in Dand-e Ghori getötet worden (siehe auch Voice of Jihad, 23. April 2017):

„In one high-profile night raid in late April, the Taleban's shadow governor for Baghlan province, Mawlawi Lal, was killed along with a number of other insurgents in the Dand-e-Ghori area of Pul-e-Khumre city.” (IWPR, 15. Mai 2017)

Im Mai 2017 berichten die Taliban auf Voice of Jihad:

„In the province’s Pol-e-Khomri district, Mujahideen killed a dozen of the enemy including a commander and destroyed 7 vehicles during the violent fighting that was going on through much of Monday.

Two of the enemy major bases were said to have come under Mujahideen attacks.

Separately, 3 puppets were killed in a clash with Mujahideen in Dand-e-Ghori district of the province on the same day.” (Voice of Jihad, 16. Mai 2017)

UN OCHA berichtet im Mai 2017 von intensivierten Kämpfen zwischen Regierungstruppen („ANSF“) und nicht-staatlichen bewaffneten Gruppen („NSAG“) in der Woche vom 21. bis 27. Mai in Kunduz und Baghlan und erwähnt dabei Dand-e-Ghori:

„ANSF and NSAG clashes in Baghlan also reportedly displaced 11,907 from Dand-e-Ghuri and Baladori areas to Pul-e-Khumri district.” (UN OCHA, 27. Mai 2017)

Das Long War Journal (LWJ), eine US-amerikanische Nachrichtenwebsite, die nach eigenen Angaben über den „globalen Krieg gegen den Terrorismus“ berichtet, verzeichnet in einer Karte zur Gebietskontrolle der Taliban vom September 2017 das Distrikt Dahana-i Ghuri als von den Taliban kontrolliert. Der angrenzende Distrikt der Provinzhauptstadt Pul-i Chomri wird als umstritten verzeichnet. Insgesamt berichtet LWJ 45% der afghanischen Distrikte als von den Taliban kontrolliert oder umstritten. (LWJ, 26. September 2017)

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) bezeichnet in einem Artikel vom Oktober 2017 Dand-e Ghori als Taliban-Hochburg der letzten vier Jahre:

„Police spokesman Zabihullah Shuja said one other police officer was wounded by the attack in the Dand-e Ghori district, an area that has been a Taliban stronghold in northern Afghanistan for the past four years.” (RFE/RL, 8. Oktober 2017)

Dorf Hosseinabad, ethnische Gruppen

In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine Informationen zu einem Dorf namens Hosseinabad (o.ä.) in der Provinz Baghlan gefunden werden. Dies bedeutet nicht notwendigerweise, dass dieser Ort nicht existiert.

 

Folgende Karten zeigen die Verteilung ethnischer Gruppen in Afghanistan (Anm.: bzgl. der von Hazara besiedelten Gebiete in Baghlan unterscheiden sich diese Karten teilweise):

 

·      Izady, Dr. M: Ethnic Groups of Afghanistan (detailed), ohne Datum (veröffentlicht von Gulf/2000)
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Afghanistan_Ethnic_lg.png

·      ISW – Institute for the Study of War: Afghanistan’s Ethno-Linguistic Groups, 19. Mai 2009
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Afghanistan%20Page%20Size%20Ethno%20Linguistic_0.jpg

·      iMMAP: Map 9 – Polling Centres 2010 – 2010 Polling centres with broad ethnic groups, 13. August 2010
http://www.immap.org/maps/files/maps/93.jpg

·      United States. Central Intelligence Agency: Afghanistan ethnic groups, 2005 (veröffentlicht von US Library of Congress, verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/4232_1408002565_afg-ethnic-groups-py.jpg

 

Weitere Karten zur ethnischen Verteilung siehe:
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html#afthematic.html

 

 

image003.gif 

 

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 24. Oktober 2017)

·      AAN – Afghanistan Analysts Network: Baghlan on the Brink: ANSF weaknesses and Taleban resilience, 31. Mai 2013 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/250242/373965_de.html

·      AAN – Afghanistan Analysts Network: The 2015 insurgency in the North (4): Surrounding the cities in Baghlan, 21. Oktober 2015
https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/insurgency-in-the-north-4-baghlan/

·      AAN – Afghanistan Analysts Network: Taleban in the North: Gaining ground along the Ring Road in Baghlan, 15. August 2016 (veröffentlicht von AAN) (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/local_link/329273/470223_de.html

·      AIMS - Afghanistan Information Management Service: Dahana-I-Ghori District, 1. Mai 2005
http://www.aims.org.af/maps/district/baghlan/dahana_i_ghori.pdf

·      Al Jazeera: Taliban overruns district in Afghanistan's Baghlan, 15. August 2016
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/taliban-overruns-district-afghanistan-baghlan-160815073521937.html

·      BAAG - British & Irish Agencies Afghanistan Group: Afghanistan in September 2015, Oktober 2015 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1444373218_afghanistan-in-september-2015-0.pdf

·      ISW – Institute for the Study of War: Afghanistan Partial Threat Assessment as of November 22, 2016, 22. November 2016
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20November%20Afghanistan%20Partial%20Threat%20Assessment_1_0.pdf

·      IWPR - Institute for War and Peace Reporting: Traumatic Night Raids Haunt Afghan Women, 15. Mai 2017 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/341755/472381_en.html

·      LWJ – Long War Journal: Taliban presses offensive in multiple provinces, 15. August 2016
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/taliban-presses-offensive-in-multiple-provinces.php

·      LWJ – Long War Journal: LWJ Map Assessment: Taliban controls or contests 45% of Afghan districts, 26. September 2017
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/09/lwj-map-assessment-taliban-controls-or-contests-45-of-afghan-districts.php

·      New York Times: Taliban Presence in Afghanistan, 29. September 2015
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/09/29/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-maps.html

·      RFE/RL – Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Afghan Officials Say Seven Taliban, Two Police Killed In Attacks, 8. Oktober 2017 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/347540/479121_en.html

·      Salam Watandar: Taliban Mount Civilians’ Persecution in Dahana-I Ghori, 25. Oktober 2016
http://salamwatandar.com/english/Article.aspx?a=27457

·      Spiegel: Der Feind in meinem Camp, 28. Februar 2011
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-77222626.html

·      The National: Behind Kabul’s blackout, a failed attempt at peace, 1. März 2016
https://www.thenational.ae/world/behind-kabul-s-blackout-a-failed-attempt-at-peace-1.155381

·      UN OCHA - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Afghanistan; North Eastern Region; District Atlas, April 2014 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1415353203_afghanistan-north-eastern-region-district-atlas.pdf

·      UN OCHA - UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs: Afghanistan Weekly Field Report | 21 to 27 May 2017, 27. Mai 2017 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1497356414_2afgh.pdf

·      UNHCR - UN High Commissioner for Refugees: Afghanistan; Conflict-Induced Internal Displacement Monthly Update; July 2015, Juli 2015 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1441799292_55efe7294.pdf

·      Voice of Jihad: Percent of Country under the control of Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate, 26. März 2017
https://alemarah-english.com/?p=12443

·      Voice of Jihad: 10 killed, 17 hurt in Baghlan; 5 villages cleared, 16. Mai 2017
http://alemarah-english.com/?p=14683

·      Voice of Jihad: Statement of Islamic Emirate regarding the martyrdom of Baghlan province’s governor – Maulawi Lal Muhammad Muhammadi, 23. April 2017
http://alemarah-english.com/?p=13537