27. Juli 2017

Iran: Möglichkeit einer Mitgliedschaft bei den Basidsch für afghanische Staatsbürger

Es konnten kaum Informationen zu afghanischen Mitgliedern der Basidsch gefunden werden. Die folgenden Berichte beziehen sich daher auch auf Fälle von Afghanen, die von den Basidsch rekrutiert wurden, danach jedoch nicht unbedingt bei den Basidsch tätig sind:

 

Das Middle East Institute (MEI), ein Thinktank mit Sitz in Washington, D.C., veröffentlicht im Jänner 2017 einen Beitrag zu den Basidsch, in dem erwähnt wird, dass die Basidsch kürzlich auch Iraner, Afghanen und Pakistanis für den Kampfeinsatz in Syrien rekrutiert hätten. Im November 2016 habe der Generalstabschef der iranischen Streitkräfte, Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, gesagt, dass die Basidsch hunderttausende Kämpfer nach Syrien schicken könnten, wenn der Revolutionsführer dies gestatte. Die iranischen Revolutionsgarden (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, IRGC) würden ebenso beabsichtigen, die Rolle der Basidsch in regionalen Konflikten auszuweiten, so habe der Kommandant der Quds-Force des IRGC, Qassem Suleimani, auch gesagt, dass die Basidsch dazu beigetragen hätten, die iranische Revolution in die Region zu exportieren :

„The Basij is an omnipresent force in Iran. It has active presence in mosques, government offices, industrial sector, schools and universities, cultural institutions, charity organizations, and more. Places of worship and educational institutions are particularly important for its recruitment purposes. The Basij’s official statute states that the ‘clergy of the neighborhoods and trusted citizens and legal associations of the neighborhoods’ supervise the organization’s recruitment efforts.

Earlier this month, the new head of Basij, Brigadier General Gholamhossein Ghaib-Parvar, rejected the criticism that the paramilitary force was entering the political field. But few Iranians would agree with the assertion. The role of the Basij Force in politics increased significantly under the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad government. Basij members reportedly played a decisive role in Ahmadinejad’s reelection in 2009, by establishing campaign offices in major cities, holding rallies in the incumbent’s favor, and intimidating opposition supporters.

[…] Now that the Basij Force is an integral part of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), its security, political and economic role is expected to only grow further. On December 7, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Ghaib-Parvar as the new head of the Basij Force, and tasked him to counter ‘enemy infiltration‘ and ‘soft’ threats against the regime. Previously, the Supreme Leader had warned that ‘enemies’ were trying to change Iranians’ political beliefs and values and that ‘infiltrating into [political] currents is more dangerous than influencing individuals.’

Lately, the Basij has also actively recruited Iranians, Afghans and Pakistanis to fight in Syria. Last November, Major General Mohammad Hossein Bagheri, the Iranian chief of staff of the armed forces, said Basij could dispatch hundreds of thousands of fighters to Syria if supreme leader permitted. The remark showed that the IRGC intends to widen Basij’s role in regional conflicts as well. Last month, IRGC’s elite Quds Force commander, Qassem Suleimani, also said Basij forces had been instrumental in exporting Iranian revolution across the region.” (Middle East Institute, 25. Jänner 2017)

Die US-amerikanische christliche Tageszeitung Christian Science Monitor (CSM) schreibt im Juni 2016, dass die iranischen Basidsch-Milizen im September 2015 die Eröffnung eines neuen „Hauptquartiers“ in Herat in Afghanistan auf ihrer Nachrichtenwebsite verlautbart hätten:

„Remarkably, Iran’s volunteer Basij militia – a force of ideological devotees that operates under the Revolutionary Guard – publicized the opening of a new ‘headquarters’ in Herat on its Basij News website last September. The photographs, since taken down, did not give away the location, perhaps to indicate a degree of caution about their operations in a neighboring country, but they show a ribbon-cutting ceremony and several uniformed Iranian officers with a handful of Afghans, most of them teenagers.” (CSM, 12. Juni 2016)

Die in den USA erscheinende Zeitschrift Foreign Policy (FP), die sich der Außenpolitik der Vereinigten Staaten sowie internationalen Themen widmet, erwähnt in einem Artikel vom Mai 2016, dass es Mitglieder der Basidsch-Milizen gebe, die eine militärische Ausbildung absolvieren in der Hoffnung, an der iranischen Beratungsmission zur Unterstützung Syriens teilzunehmen. Diese habe 2012 begonnen, und im Jahr 2015 habe sich Suleimani, der Kommandant Quds-Force, gezwungen gesehen, die Mission auf Freiwillige aller sechs Teilstreitkräfte der iranischen Revolutionsgarden (IRGC) auszuweiten, darunter auch die Basidsch. Suleimani habe das Kommando über die Mission behalten, aber nun würden Offiziere jeder Teilstreitkraft Einheiten aus Freiwilligen zusammenstellen, die unter seinem Kommando dienen. Es gebe trotz der steigenden iranischen Opferzahlen in Syrien keinen Mangel an Rekruten, so ein Basidsch-Offizier. Es müssten aber viele, die sich freiwillig für die Mission in Syrien melden, zurückgewiesen werden, und es gebe eine strenge Anweisung von Revolutionsführer Khamenei, wonach nur die besttrainierten und erfahrensten Freiwilligen mit speziellen Kenntnissen in die Einheiten für Syrien aufgenommen würden. Wenn diese Anordnung geändert würde, würden laut dem Basidsch-Offizier „Millionen“ Basidsch und andere IRGC-Soldaten nach Syrien gehen. Es würden sich aber nicht alle, die abgewiesen würden, abschrecken lassen. Viele würden sich stattdessen einer Reihe von Freiwilligenmilizen anschließen, die seit Kriegsbeginn entstanden seien. Diese Männer, fromme Schiiten, die vom Versprechen des Märtyrertods gelockt würden, würden sich nach einem Krieg sehnen, den sie als religiöse Pflicht betrachten. Es wird auch das Beispiel eines Basidsch-Soldaten aus Teheran erwähnt, der für die Elite-Beratermission abgelehnt worden sei, aber mit verschiedenen Milizen in Syrien gewesen sei, darunter auch mit der Fatemiyoun-Brigade, einer Einheit, die hauptsächlich aus afghanischen Freiwilligen bestehe. Die Fatemiyoun-Brigade sei bereits 2012 als Kampfeinheit in Syrien entstanden, aber einige ihrer Mitglieder hätten lange bestehende Verbindungen zu den iranischen Revolutionsgarden. Ihr erster Kommandant, Ali Reza Tavassoli, der in Afghanistan geboren und in Daraa in Syrien getötet worden sei, habe an der Seite des IRGC im Iran-Irak-Krieg mit einem Kontingent afghanischer schiitischer Freiwilliger gekämpft:

„Since November, Asghar and Abbas, 24, both members of Iran’s voluntary Basij militia, had been undergoing military training in hopes of joining Tehran’s advisory mission to support Syria. The mission began deploying in 2012 to advise Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces in their fight against the growing insurgency. By the time the Abyari men began training in 2015, Syria’s horrific civil war had stretched into its fifth year, forcing Quds Force commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Suleimani to expand the mission to include volunteers from all six branches of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), including the Basij. Suleimani still maintained command of the mission, but now officers from each branch were assembling units composed of assorted IRGC volunteers to serve under his command.

[…] Yet, despite the mounting Iranian casualties in Syria, IRGC officers face no shortages of eager recruits, according to Abbas’s commander, a 41-year-old Basij officer named Hajj Mehdi. On his most recent deployment near Aleppo, he commanded a unit of 230 men, ranging in age from 21 to 60 years old. When he is on leave in Tehran, he awakens most mornings to find men lined up at the outer gate of his humble home, hoping to enlist. He is regularly bombarded with requests from relatives, friends, and acquaintances for permission to join the war. […]

Hajj Mehdi has no choice but to turn away most of these hopeful volunteers. Under the strict orders of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Hajj Mehdi and his fellow IRGC officers have been ordered to select only the most well-trained, experienced volunteers with specialized skills to join the units in Syria. If the order to limit troop numbers and deploy only the most elite forces were reversed, Hajj Mehdi said, Basij and other IRGC soldiers would ‘go by the millions.’

[…] Not all of those Iranians who are rejected are deterred. Many, instead, have joined an array of volunteer militias that have taken root since the start of the war. These men, devout Shiites lured by the promise of martyrdom, are desperate to fight a war that they regard as their religious duty. Like Abbas, these volunteers believe that non-Sunni communities in Syria face the threat of elimination. Having witnessed the destruction of shrines, mosques and churches in state media and on social media networks, they also reckon that holy sites, particularly the shrine of Sayeda Zeinab, will never be safe in rebel hands. They are ready to sacrifice their lives to protect them and defend the oppressed.

Hossein, a 30-year-old Basij soldier from Tehran, is one such volunteer. He was rejected by the elite advisory mission, despite his military training, but has served tours in Syria with a variety of militias, including the Fatemiyoun Brigade, a force of mostly Afghan volunteers, and the Zeinabiyoun, a group of mostly Pakistani volunteer soldiers. The Fatemiyoun Brigade emerged as a fighting force in Syria as early as 2012, but some of its top members have long-established links with the IRGC. Its first commander, Ali Reza Tavassoli — born in Afghanistan in 1962 and killed in Daraa, Syria, in February 2015 — fought alongside the IRGC in the Iran-Iraq War with a contingent of Afghan Shiite volunteers.” (FP, 12. Mai 2016)

BBC Monitoring berichtet im Juni 2017 über einen Artikel der iranischen Nachrichtenagentur Fars News, die den Revolutionsgarden nahestehe. Der Artikel habe vom Begräbnis eines vom Iran unterstützten afghanischen Kämpfers in der Provinz Teheran berichtet. Der Mann sei vor kurzem beim Kampf gegen die Gruppe Islamischer Staat (IS) in Syrien getötet worden. Es sei auch erwähnt worden, dass das Begräbnis von den iranischen Revolutionsgarden (IRGC) und der mit ihnen verbundenen Basidsch-Miliz organisiert worden sei. Dies erhöhe die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass der Mann ein Mitglied der Fatemiyun-Brigade des IRGC gewesen sei, die hauptsächlich aus schiitischen afghanischen Migranten im Iran zusammengesetzt sei:

„An Iran-backed Afghan fighter, recently killed in Syria, has been buried in the northern county of Pakdasht, in Tehran Province, hardline Fars news agency reported on 9 June. Ali Asqar Baluch is the 50th fighter from Pakdasht to have been killed in Syria ‘while fighting Daesh [Islamic State]’, added the report, which was published on the agency's separate ‘Provinces’ webpage. Fars is close to the Islamic Revolution Guards Force (IRGC). The report added that the funeral ceremony had been arranged by the IRGC and its affiliated volunteer militia, Basij. This raises the likelihood that he was a member of the IRGC's Fatemiyun Brigade - which is mainly made up of Shia Afghan migrants to Iran.” (BBC Monitoring, 9. Juni 2017)

Die US-Tageszeitung New York Times (NYT) berichtet im Juni 2017 über die Fatemiyoun-Division (früher Brigade), eine Miliz aus schiitischen afghanischen Flüchtlingen, die etwa Anfang 2014 gegründet worden sei und von der Hisbollah und den iranischen Revolutionsgarden ausgebildet werde. Die Stärke sei auf 8.000 bis 14.000 Mann geschätzt worden. Die ursprünglichen Mitglieder der Fatemiyoun-Division seien schiitische afghanische Hazara, die sich nach der sowjetischen Besetzung, nach dem Bürgerkrieg und während der Taliban-Herrschaft in Afghanistan im Iran niedergelassen hätten. In den letzten Jahren sei die Rekrutierung auf in jüngerer Zeit eingewanderte undokumentierte Afghanen ausgeweitet worden. Die Iraner würden dabei die ökonomische Lage, den prekären Aufenthaltsstatus und den schiitischen Glauben der afghanischen Flüchtlinge ausnützen, um sie für den Kampf für das Assad-Regime in Syrien zu rekrutieren. Die afghanischen Rekruten würden von den Iranern und den Assad-Kräften als erste Schockwelle im Kampf eingesetzt, mehrere hundert Afghanen seien im Kampf gefallen:

„A few months after Iran asked Hezbollah to join the fighting in Syria alongside Mr. Assad’s forces, it began raising other Shiite militias. The Fatemiyoun Division (formerly Brigade), a militia of Shiite Afghan refugees, was formed around early 2014 and trained by both the Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah veterans. Its strength has been estimated at 8,000 to and 14,000 men. The Iranian authorities maintain the fighters are volunteers.

The initial recruits to the Fatemiyoun Division were initially Shiite Hazara Afghans, who settled in Iran after the Soviet occupation, after the civil war in the early 1990s and the subsequent Taliban rule. Their recruitment had echoes of how Pakistan — the other major host of the Afghan refugee population — recruited the Sunni Pashtun Afghan refugees and their children to form the Taliban in the mid-1990s.

In the past few years, Iranians have expanded recruitment to undocumented Afghans, like Mr. Amin, recently arrived from Afghanistan in search of economic opportunity. Apart from the refugees’ economic anxiety and precarious legal status, the Iranians exploit the Shia faith of Afghan refugees to recruit them to fight for the Assad regime in Syria.

Iranian propaganda framed the Syrian war to these refugees as a Shiite struggle for the defense and protection of the faith and its holy sites. ‘The fighters have little or no knowledge of the political-security context into which they are marching,’ said Ahmad Shuja, a former researcher with Human Rights Watch. ‘They do not speak Arabic, most of them have never been beyond Afghanistan or Iran, many are barely literate, most are devout Shiites.’ […]

Iranians and Mr. Assad’s forces used the Afghan recruits as the first-wave shock troops. ‘We would be the first in any operation,’ Mr. Amin recalled. Several short memoirs by current and former Afghan fighters in Syria published on the Telegram app, which Mr. Shuja studied, recount the Afghans being sent to fight the most difficult battles, and speak about heavy casualties among Afghan fighters and the eventual victory after multiple assaults.

Afghans have fought in Damascus, Hama, Lattakia, Deir al-Zor, Homs, Palmyra and Aleppo. In November and December, Mr. Amin was stationed in Aleppo, where the Fatemiyoun Division had the job of helping the Syrian Army retake the eastern part of the city from rebel groups. He and hundreds of other young Afghans fought under the orders of the Revolutionary Guard.

The foreign Shiite militias played a crucial role in supporting Mr. Assad’s regime and provided the key ground forces in the decisive battle of Aleppo. The victory in Aleppo turned the tide for Mr. Assad and for Iran, bringing it closer to, as Syria scholar Joshua Landis put it, ‘the consolidation of this Iranian security arc, stretching from Lebanon to Iran.’

Several hundred Afghans have died fighting Mr. Assad’s and Iran’s war in Syria. The bodies of slain Afghan fighters were paraded around the streets of Tehran and in Qom, in northern Iran, in elaborate ceremonies before their burials. The Iranian Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and General Suleimani have visited the families of Afghan militiamen killed in Syria and expressed gratitude for the sacrifices their sons made in defending the holy shrines and Islam.” (NYT, 30. Juni 2017)

Die US-Tageszeitung Wall Street Journal (WSJ) berichtete bereits im Mai 2014 über die Rekrutierung von afghanischen Flüchtlingen und Migranten durch die iranischen Revolutionsgarden. Den Rekruten würden umgerechnet 500 US-Dollar monatlich und ein iranischer Aufenthaltstitel angeboten. Laut einem westlichen Beamten im Iran sei die Rekrutierung von Afghanen Teil einer Strategie, arme Fußsoldaten aus einer Community mit wenig Einfluss an die Front zu schicken, um die Opfer unter Mitgliedern der Hisbollah und den Revolutionsgarden zu minimieren:

„Iran has been recruiting thousands of Afghan refugees to fight in Syria, offering $500 a month and Iranian residency to help the Assad regime beat back rebel forces, according to Afghans and a Western official. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, or IRGC, recruits and trains Shiite militias to fight in Syria. Details of their recruitment efforts were posted this week on a blog focused on Afghan refugees in Iran and confirmed by the office of Grand Ayatollah Mohaghegh Kabuli, an Afghan religious leader in the Iranian holy city of Qom. A member of the IRGC also confirmed the details. […] The Revolutionary Guards organize and command the Shiite militias sent to Syria. […] Both Iran and Hezbollah have openly taken credit for their efforts in Syria. Gen. Hossein Hamedani, a senior Guards commander involved in planning war strategy in Syria, said last week that with God's help, Iran had trained an extra 130,000 soldiers ready for dispatch. […] The 130,000 was an apparent reference to all the Shiite militias including Iranians, Hezbollah, Afghans and other foreign fighters.

[…] Syria's civil war shows no sign of subsiding and both Iran and Hezbollah are wary of losing their trained men on the ground and the risk of public backlash with dead bodies returning home every week. A Western official in Iran said recruiting Afghans was part of a shifting strategy to send poor foot soldiers to the front lines from a community with little clout to minimize casualties among Hezbollah and Guards members and political fallout.

The Afghan recruits, like Hezbollah and most Iranians, are all Shiites and support the Syrian regime dominated by minority Alawites, an offshoot of Shiite Islam. […] The Guards are convincing Afghans to join the war in Syria by playing off Shiite-Sunni sectarian rivalries.

[…] Afghan refugees are among the most vulnerable and poor in Iran. There are about one million registered Afghan refugees in Iran, according to the U.N. refugee agency. But additionally, there are as many as 2 million unregistered migrants, according to Human Rights Watch. Up to 800 Afghans try to cross illegally into Iran every day, according to Afghanistan's refugee ministry. They are not allowed to officially work, attend school or register marriages or births. Most Afghans work as day laborers in construction for meager salaries.” (WSJ, 22. Mai 2014)

Das Washington Institute for Near East Policy, ein US-amerikanischer Thinktank zur Entwicklung von US-Strategien für und Engagement im Nahen Osten, beschreibt die Basidsch in einem Beitrag vom Dezember 2016. Ursprünglich seien die Basidsch eine Vision von Ayatollah Khomeini gewesen, der die unterdrückten Massen in eine 20 Millionen Mann starke Armee mobilisieren wollte. Später hätten sie sich in ein internationales Corps gläubiger schiitischer Jugendlicher entwickelt, mit dem Ziel eine „neue islamische Zivilisation“ aufzubauen. Erst seit kurzem habe Teheran begonnen, das Basidsch-Modell im Ausland, beginnend mit Irak und Syrien, im großen Maßstab zu implementieren. Nachdem die iranischen Revolutionsgarden ihre Aktivitäten in Syrien ausgeweitet hätten, hätten sie auch die Rolle der Basidsch dort verstärkt. Die Revolutionsgarden würden derzeit zwei Missionen in Syrien betreiben, die erste sei ein Programm der Quds-Force mit professionellen Revolutionsgardisten und einigen Armeeangehörigen, die andere seien kleine Kampfeinheiten, die der gemeinsamen Aufsicht des Imam-Hossein-Hauptquartiers der Basidsch und der Quds-Force unterstehen würden. Die jungen iranischen Freiwilligen der Basidsch würden gemeinsam mit der aus Afghanen bestehenden Fatemiyoun-Brigade unter dem Kommando der Quds-Force operieren:

„The Basij were originally the brainchild of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who envisioned mobilizing the oppressed Iranian masses into a twenty-million-strong army. When this vision did not exactly materialize, it gradually transformed into an international corps of devout Shiite youths recruited through an elaborate network of seminaries and universities, with the aim of creating a ‘new Islamic civilization’ (similar to the Sunni jihadist concept of restoring the caliphate, though with less of a territorial emphasis). Yet it was not until fairly recently that Tehran began implementing the Basij model abroad on a major scale, beginning in Iraq and Syria. For example, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) currently operating in Iraq include several militias formed by the IRGC-Qods Force for the purpose of fighting alongside Iran's allies in Syria (i.e., Bashar al-Assad's army, Hezbollah, and various Afghan and Pakistani brigades).

General Naghdi’s background was well suited to propagating Basij tactics in these countries. As an IRGC intelligence officer in the 1980s, he helped found the Irregular Warfare HQ, which waged guerrilla campaigns in northeastern Iraq and later morphed into the Qods Force. He also commanded Iraqi dissidents and former prisoners of war within the Badr Brigades (now the Badr Organization), and helped General Hamedani organize Syria's version of Basij paramilitary forces (in October 2015, Hamedani was killed in a road accident in Aleppo while overseeing the formation of these forces).

[…] As the IRGC expands its activities in Syria, it is also increasing the Basij's role there -- perhaps to relieve overstretched IRGC elements or meet increasing demand from devout Iranian youths eager to join the fight. The IRGC currently operates two distinct missions in Syria: the first is an advise-and-assist program run by the Qods Force, manned by professional IRGC and some national army (Artesh) personnel in close association with Hezbollah; the second involves small combat units jointly supervised by the Basij's Imam Hossein HQ and the Qods Force.

Since last year, the Basij have been more actively recruiting young Iranian volunteers to fight in Syria as part of the ‘Defenders of the Haram’ initiative, which claims to be largely funded by private contributions. Organized into so-called Fatehin (Conqueror) Battalions, these volunteers undergo training before being placed on a waiting list for deployment to Syria in military aircraft or commercial flights. Upon arrival in Syria, they operate alongside the Afghan Fatemiyoun Brigade and the Pakistani Zainabiyoun Brigade, both under Qods Force control. According to Fatehin commander Mehdi Hadavandi, these volunteers suffered their heaviest casualties in Khan Tuman on May 6, 2016, when one of their units was ambushed and lost twelve men.” (The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 20. Dezember 2016)

In einem Interview mit der Basler Zeitung vom Dezember 2015 erwähnt der Politik- und Wirtschaftswissenschaftler und Politiker Albert A. Stahel, dass einige der schiitischen Afghanen, die in die Schweiz gekommen seien und zuvor im Iran gelebt hätten, sogar Mitglieder bei den Basidsch gewesen seien, und dass einige von ihnen in Syrien gekämpft hätten:

„Sind die Afghanen, die in die Schweiz kommen Sunniten oder Schiiten?

Es gibt beides. Einerseits kommen schiitische Hazara, bei denen viele nicht aus Afghanistan kommen, sondern die seit ihrer Jugend in Iran lebten. Sie kommen also aus einem sicheren Herkunftsland. Einige waren sogar Mitglieder der paramilitärischen Organisation der Basij. Einige unter diesen haben auf der Pro-Assad-Seite bei der Hizbollah in Syrien gekämpft. Die Eltern dieser Schiiten sind im Afghanistankrieg 1979–89 gegen die Sowjetunion nach Iran geflüchtet.“ (Basler Zeitung, 19. Dezember 2015)

Iran: Möglichkeit einer Mitgliedschaft bei den Basidsch für Sunniten

Der staatlich finanzierte iranische Satelliten-Nachrichtenkanal Press TV schreibt im Februar 2015, dass am 1. Jänner ein iranischer sunnitischer Freiwilliger der Basidsch bei einem Terrorangriff in der iranischen Stadt Sarbaz getötet worden sei:

„On January 1, an Iranian Sunni Basiji volunteer and a Shia teacher were killed in a terrorist attack in the provincial city of Sarbaz.” (Press TV, 14. Februar 2015)

Auch Iran Daily berichtet von demselben Fall, der sich in der südöstlichen iranischen Provinz Sistan-Balutschistan ereignet habe:

„An Iranian Sunni Basiji volunteer and a Shia teacher were killed in a terrorist attack in the southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan, police said.” (Iran Daily, 2. Jänner 2015)

Die iranische Nachrichtenagentur Taghrib News Agency, die dem Forum for Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought nahesteht, berichtet im Jänner 2013 von einer Rede des Leiters des Forums, Ayatollah Araki, die er vor sunnitischen Basidsch-Studenten in Qom gehalten habe, bei der er die Wichtigkeit der Einheit und Annäherung zwischen Muslimen verschiedener Denkschulen und Konfessionen betont habe:

„Speaking among some Sunni Basiji students in Qom, Ayatollah Araki underlined the importance of unity and rapprochement among Muslims from different Islamic Schools of Thoughts and denominations.” (Taghrib News Agency, 2. Jänner 2013)

Im oben erwähnten Artikel der US-amerikanische Tageszeitung Christian Science Monitor (CSM) vom Juni 2016 wird auch ein afghanischer sunnitischer Paschtune erwähnt, der laut Angaben seines Cousins westlich von Teheran als Bauarbeiter tätig gewesen sei, als er vom Iran rekrutiert worden sei, um in Syrien zu kämpfen. Es gebe offene Rekrutierungen von schiitischen Afghanen im Iran, und es sei viel ungewöhnlicher, einen sunnitischen Paschtunen zu finden, der bereit sei zu kämpfen. Es gebe vereinzelt paschtunische Arbeiter, die wegen des Geldes am Krieg teilnähmen. Der interviewte Freund, der sich geweigert habe, nach Syrien zu gehen und jetzt im afghanischen Herat versteckt lebe, habe Herat auch als „ein großes Rekrutierungszentrum“ für Irans Krieg in Syrien bezeichnet:

„Another surprise Afghan fighter was Yousef, a rare Sunni and ethnic Pashtun recruited by Iran to fight from his job site west of Tehran, according to his cousin Hassan, who wears a bushy beard and embroidered skull cap. Hassan and Yousef worked often in Iran, and last year their group of Afghan construction workers was often visited by an Iranian recruiter. Once the Iranian had a private conversation with Yousef, who then told his cousin he wanted to work ‘far away’ and would be gone for two months – without mentioning the Syrian war. There is open recruiting in Iran for Shiite Afghans, the Hazaras, and Iranian government benefits were for them, says Hassan. But finding Sunni Pashtuns willing to fight is far less common. ‘Pashtuns don’t participate, but they go one-by-one like my cousin, for the money,’ says Hassan. ‘Most who leave Afghanistan are workers, so if the pay is higher in the war, they do it.’ Word filtered through from Hazara friends at the Syrian front that Yousef was with them, and was killed. ‘He did not tell us he wanted to go to Syria,’ says Hassan. ‘He never came back.’ That does not surprise the spike-haired, name-branded Afghan who made it to Tehran, refused to go to Syria, and now hides his identity in Herat, which he calls a ‘big recruiting center’ for Iran’s war in Syria.” (CSM, 12. Juni 2016)

Afghanistan: Behandlung von ehemaligen Basidsch (Iran) bei Rückkehr

Es konnten keine Informationen zur Behandlung von afghanischen ehemaligen Basidsch-Mitgliedern bei einer Rückkehr nach Afghanistan gefunden werden. Die folgenden Quellen enthalten Informationen im Zusammenhang mit Afghanen, die für den Iran in Syrien gekämpft haben und nach Afghanistan zurückgekehrt sind.

 

Der US-Thinktank Middle East Institute (MEI) erwähnt in einem Beitrag vom Jänner 2017, dass man bereits die Konsequenzen des Engagements von afghanischen Schiiten bei der Verteidigung des syrischen Assad-Regimes spüren könne. Die Gruppe Islamischer Staat und Gruppen aus dem Punjab hätten sich zu Terroranschlägen gegen Schiiten in Afghanistan und Pakistan bekannt und die Beteiligung von Schiiten am Syrien-Konflikt als Grund genannt. 2016 habe der IS hunderte schiitische Hazara in Kabul getötet und mit weiteren Angriffen gegen Schiiten gedroht, solange Schiiten nach Syrien gingen und „Sklaven des Iran“ seien:

„The increasing role of Afghan and Pakistani Shiites in defending the Assad regime comes at a time when their fellow Sunni countrymen are fighting on the opposing side in Syria – sparking fears that they will fuel sectarian tension in their respective countries once they return. ‘It is likely that Sunni and Shiite Afghans fighting in Syria and Yemen return someday and their sectarian grudges get them to fight each other at home,’ warned Hasht-e Sobh. The consequences are already felt in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The so-called Islamic State and Punjabi sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e Jhangvi have claimed credit for terrorist attacks against the Shiite communities in both countries and blamed Shiites’ participation in the Syrian conflict. Last year, the Islamic State’s South Asia branch killed and injured hundreds of Shiite Hazars in Kabul, and threatened to carry out more attacks against Shiites ‘unless they stop going to Syria and stop being slaves of Iran.’” (MEI, 18. Jänner 2017)

Die britische Tageszeitung Guardian berichtet im Juni 2016 über einen afghanischen Polizisten, der als „Reiseveranstalter“ Afghanen an die iranischen Revolutionsgarden vermittle. Der Mann sei in Syrien gewesen, weil 12 der von ihm vermittelten Afghanen vom IS entführt worden seien. Nach seiner Rückkehr sei er vom afghanischen Geheimdienst festgenommen worden, und es sei ihm gesagt worden, er solle „seine Brüder nicht an einer anderes Land verkaufen“. Trotz des Widerstands der Familie, des Geheimdienstes und von Politikern würden Afghanen wahrscheinlich weiterhin nach Syrien gehen, solange sie keine Zukunftsaussichten in Afghanistan hätten:

„Central in this recruitment are men such as Jawad. A police officer by day and self-declared ‘travel agent’ when off-duty, Jawad said he acted for a year as middleman for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) when in 2014 it formed an Afghan Shia militia, the Fatemiyoun Division, to fight alongside Syrian government forces. From his ‘travel agency’ on the second floor of a non-descript office building, Jawad connected combat willing men with Iran’s embassy in Kabul. The embassy assisted with visas and travel, and paid Jawad a commission for his troubles. In return for fighting, Afghans are offered a residence permit in Iran and about $500 monthly salary. ‘Most go to Syria for the money,’ said Jawad, wearing stonewashed jeans and replica Ray-Bans. ‘Others go to defend the shrine.’ […]

The first time the Guardian met Jawad, he was preparing to travel to Syria himself. Isis had abducted 12 Afghan fighters in a suburb of Damascus. It was Jawad who had recruited them, and their families now demanded that he help secure their release, he said. When he returned from Syria a month later, he was clearly shaken. Showing photos from Damascus, he said he had negotiated the hostages’ freedom, but also seen first hand how ‘the Iranians use Afghans as human shields’. He said he would stop working as go-between for the Iranians. ‘I’m ashamed because I sent these people,’ he said. There might be another reason for Jawad’s change of heart. Upon his return, the Afghan intelligence agency, NDS, arrested Jawad for 48 hours. ‘They told me, ‘don’t sell your brothers to another country’,’ he said. […]

Some Afghan politicians have tried to intervene. Nazir Ahmadzai, an MP who has tracked recruitment of Afghan combatants, said Iran was stoking ethnic tension between Sunnis and Shias, in order to assert control in Afghanistan. ‘Iran’s policy is to bring division between Muslims. They want Afghanistan to become like Syria,’ he said, adding that he had seen a list of at least 1,800 Afghans recruited in Kabul alone. Analysts, though, like Alfoneh, rejected that estimate as too high. In addition to agents like Jawad, the IRGC has also allegedly used mosques in Afghan cities as recruitment grounds. One such mosque is in Dast-e Barchi, a predominantly Shia neighbourhood in Kabul, according to Ahmadzai who declined to name the mosque. He said after he dispatched a team of investigators, the mosque ceased recruitment. Although the Iranian embassy in Kabul denied involvement, a Syrian opposition leader fighting the Fatemiyoun recently urged the Afghan government to stop the flow of fighters traveling to Syria. Haitham Maleh, a member of the Syrian National Coalition, put the number of Afghans fighting in pro-Assad forces at 8,000. The Afghan intelligence service has clamped down on some recruitment, but it treads carefully, said Ali Mohammad Ali, a security analyst. […]

Despite opposition from family, intelligence and politicians, young Afghans will likely continue to drift toward Syria, as long as hopes of a safe, prosperous future at home remain dim. ‘People who go leave nothing behind, they have lost all hope,’ said Younis, an unemployed university graduate in Kabul who knows 20 people that went to Syria from Iran, including two cousins and an uncle who were killed. All were addicts or had deep family problems, he said. Facing discrimination, drug abuse, and the stigma that comes with it, some see war as the only way to do something out of their own volition. Going to Syria is the ultimate act of desperation, Younis said.” (Guardian, 30. Juni 2016)

Im oben erwähnten Artikel des Christian Science Monitor (CSM) vom Juni 2016 wird ein junger Mann aus Herat erwähnt, der in Afghanistan für den Kampf in Syrien rekrutiert werden sollte und dies vereitelt habe. Nach seiner Rückkehr nach Afghanistan aus dem Iran fürchte er Vergeltung und habe Angst erkannt zu werden. Er habe angegeben, dass ein anderer Afghane in Herat, der ihm bei seiner Reise nach Teheran geholfen habe, ein „Agent des Iran“ sei, dessen Job es sei, junge Menschen für den Krieg in Syrien „einzusammeln“:

„The young man from Herat says he was not threatened. But he asked not to be named, and exudes fear as he recounts the failed recruitment by Iranians that he says believed in their cause, and were clearly tasked with the job. ‘I thought, ‘If I do not accept, they will kidnap me and kill me.’ It was very dangerous,’ recalls the would-be recruit. ‘In front of them I accepted everything, I said, ‘I am ready to leave for Syria and take part in the war.’ But I thought to myself, ‘What should I do? How to escape?’ Shaking with anxiety and sweating at first, he tells how his plan to leave Afghanistan was diverted by Iranian recruiters; about how he felt compelled to agree to join the war; about how he lied to flee Iran to escape that commitment; and about why – now months later, and back in Afghanistan – he fears retribution and covers his face in public to avoid being recognized. While in Tehran, he came up with an excuse of visiting an aunt in northern Iran before his deployment to Syria – and never came back. He claims that a fellow Afghan in Herat with official ties, who helped the young man make the trip to Tehran, was an ‘agent of Iran’ whose job is to ‘collect young people’ for the war in Syria.” (CSM, 12. Juni 2016)

Es konnten keine weiteren Informationen zu diesem Thema gefunden werden.

 

 

Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 27. Juli 2017)

·      Basler Zeitung: "Man kann nicht einfach davonrennen" Afghanistan-Experte Albert A. Stahel kennt Hintergründe von Hazara und Paschtunen, die einreisen, 19. Dezember 2015
http://www.genios.de/presse-archiv/artikel/BAZ/20151219/-man-kann-nicht-einfach-davonrennen/201512194255920854.html

·      BBC Monitoring: Afghan fighter killed in Syria, buried in Iran (Quelle: Fars News), 9 Juni 2017

·      CSM - The Christian Science Monitor: Iran steps up recruitment of Shiite mercenaries for Syrian war, 12. Juni 2016
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2016/0612/Iran-steps-up-recruitment-of-Shiite-mercenaries-for-Syrian-war

·      FP – Foreign Policy: Iran Has More Volunteers for the Syrian War Than It Knows What to Do With, 12. Mai 2016
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/12/iran-suleimani-basij-irgc-assad-syria/

·      Guardian: Iran covertly recruits Afghan Shias to fight in Syria, 30. Juni 2016
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/30/iran-covertly-recruits-afghan-soldiers-to-fight-in-syria

·      Iran Daily: Sunni Basiji, Shia teacher killed in Iran terror attack, 2. Jänner 2015
http://www.iran-daily.com/News/58722.html

·      MEI - Middle East Institute: Iran Recruits and Trains Large Numbers of Afghan and Pakistani Shiites, 18. Jänner 2017
http://www.mei.edu/content/article/io/iran-s-recruitment-afghan-pakistani-shiites-further-destabilizes-south-asia

·      MEI - Middle East Institute: Basij Force Urged to Influence Places of Worship to Counter “Cultural Invasion” (Ahmad Majidyar), 25. Jänner 2017
http://www.mideasti.org/content/is/basij-force-urged-influence-places-worship-counter-cultural-invasion

·      NYT - New York Times: How Iran Recruited Afghan Refugees to Fight Assad’s War, 30. Juni 2017
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/30/opinion/sunday/iran-afghanistan-refugees-assad-syria.html

·      Press TV: Iran smashes terrorist cell in southeastern region, 14. Februar 2015
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/02/14/397576/Iran-disbands-terror-cell-in-southeast

·      Taghrib News Agency: Muslims unity is an Islamic and Quranic Ideology: Ayatollah Araki, 2. Jänner 2013
http://www.taghribnews.com/vdcfy1dycw6dyva.r7iw.html

·      The Washington Institute for Near East Policy: Iran’s Basij Mull a Wider Domestic and Regional Role, 20. Dezember 2016
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-basij-mull-a-wider-domestic-and-regional-role

·      WSJ – Wall Street Journal: Iran Pays Afghans to Fight for Assad, 22. Mai 2014
https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-recruiting-afghan-refugees-to-fight-for-regime-in-syria-1400197482?tesla=y