This Response adds to information provided in Response to Information Request AFG20612.E of 9 May 1995.

In November 1994 the Taliban gained control of the ancient city of Kandahar, a victory, which, according to some sources, clearly demonstrated the significance of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan (AI Apr. 1995, 1; Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 39). Reports indicate that as the Taliban moved across southern Afghanistan in late 1994 and early 1995 they were greeted as liberators; they promised the nation's war-weary and impoverished people an end to Afghanistan's then two-year old civil war (The Economist 25 Feb.-3 Mar. 1995, 36; The Washington Post 20 Mar. 1995; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 16). By the spring of 1995 the Taliban had failed in their bid to capture Kabul and the movement reportedly began to lose some of its momentum (FEER 18 May 1995, 24).

Background:

With the collapse of President Muhammed Najibullah's Soviet-backed administration in April 1992, a temporary government was sworn in and Burhanuddin Rabbani was named interim president (Current History Jan. 1995, 37).¹ He was re-affirmed as president in January 1993 (Security Dialogue Dec. 1993, 388). President Rabbani leads the Jamiat-e-Islami (Islamic Society) supported by Ahmed Shah Masoud, the group's military strategist (ibid., pp. 386-88). Current History reported in January 1995 that the Jamiat-e-Islami have had a "presence in or dominate[]" the capital city Kabul, Kandahar province and northern and western parts of the country (Current History Jan. 1995 37). In addition, the source maintains that the group gains its support primarily from Sunni Muslim Tajiks, Afghanistan's second-largest ethnic group (ibid.).

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar heads the Hezb-e-Islami (Islamic Party), whose forces come largely from Afghanistan's largest ethnic group, the Sunni Pushtan² (ibid.). In 1994 Hekmatyar had the backing of Abdul Rashid Dostam's National Islamic Movement and Ali Mazari's Shiite-based Hezb-e-Wahdat (Asian Survey Feb. 1995, 148; see also Central Asian Survey Mar. 1995, 20). The Hezb-e-Islami lost ground to the Jamiat-e-Islami in 1993 and 1994, and Current History reported in January 1995 that "its forces [had] regrouped to the south of Kabul and on the road leading to Jalalabad," adding that "it [did] not control one important city" (Current History Jan. 1995 37).

Hekmatyar, along with Abdul Rashid Dostam, an Uzbek who dominates the northern regions and directs Afghanistan's largest army (Central Asian Survey Mar. 1995, 20), launched a new offensive against Rabbani's government on New Year's Day 1994 (Asian Survey Feb. 1995, 148-49). Fighting between the two alliances continued throughout 1994, and while Rabbani and Masoud managed to push back the Dostam-Hekmatyar offensive, control of several districts of Kabul passed from one group to the other (ibid., 149). According to a May 1995 report, "[c]ontrol of Kabul was still divided between various armed political groups and there appeared to be no end in sight to the violence" (AI,May 1995 3).

History of the Taliban:

The precise origins of the Taliban remain largely a matter of conjecture (Asiaweek 3 Mar. 1995, 26; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 16; The Christian Science Monitor 29 Mar. 1995). The Taliban³ has been recognized as a distinct group only since 1993. At that time Maulvi Mohammad Omar, a 43-year old religious scholar, united a group of approximately 30 to 50 religious students in a village near the city of Kandahar, the capital of Kandahar province (Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 38; Newsline Feb. 1995a; U.S. News & World Report 6 Mar. 1995). Reportedly, the first Taliban were Afghan youths from refugee camps and madrassahs (religious schools) located in the two provinces of Pakistan's northern Pushtan belt: North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan (ibid.; Asiaweek 3 Mar. 1995, 26). The Far Eastern Economic Review indicates that "[m]ost of the Taliban soldiers belong to the southern clans of the Pashtun sub-tribe of Durrani" (Far Eastern Economic Review 18 May 1995, 24; see also U.S. News & World Report 6 Mar. 1995; Jane's 1 May 1995, 2).

The original small group was "united in their anger over the lawlessness into which mujahideen⁴ rule had sunk. Particularly galling were the daily abuses at highway checkpoints, where extortion, robbery and rape were the norm" (Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 38; see also Newsline Feb. 1995a). Jane's Intelligence Review contends that the Taliban were "active throughout 1994 attempting to interdict drug supplies from Afghanistan into Pakistan" (Jane's Intelligence Review-Pointer 1 May 1995). In July 1994 a Kandahar military leader allegedly raped and killed three women, inciting outrage in the city (The Christian Science Monitor 29 Mar. 1995; The Economist Feb. 25-3 Mar. 1995, 36). Upon hearing of the incident, Mohammad Omar rounded up his group of religious students—the Taliban—and executed the alleged perpetrator; his men subsequently surrendered their weapons to the Taliban (ibid.; The Christian Science Monitor 29 Mar. 1995). U.S. News & World Report reports that "the Taliban movement was born" with this incident (U.S. News & World Report 6 Mar. 1995). The Christian Science Monitor reports that the Taliban "were soon called on to redress other injustices, which they responded to with similar success" (Christian Science Monitor 29 Mar. 1995).

In September 1994 the Taliban confronted a commander at a Kandahar Road checkpoint who had been charging "exorbitant tariffs" (ibid.). When the commander refused to abandon the post, a reported 100 Taliban attacked and killed many of the commander's men (ibid.). In October the Taliban secured "25 to 30 more checkposts along the Kandahar Road" (ibid.). Asiaweek reports that Quetta and Kandahar merchants supported the Taliban's attempt to cleanse the roads and highways of corrupt warlords (Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 39).

In early November the Taliban, now reportedly a force of 2,500 (FEER 29 Dec. 1994-5 Jan. 1995, 21), freed a hijacked Pakistani truck convoy that was attempting to negotiate a route through Quetta, Kandahar and Herat to Turkmenistan (ibid.; The Christian Science Monitor 29 Mar. 1995; Jane's 1 May 1995). The Taliban then captured a large arms depot at Spin Baldak (Frontier Post 17 Mar. 1995; Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 39), and on 5 November the Taliban took control of Kandahar city (Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 39; The Christian Science Monitor 29 Mar. 1995; FEER 29 Dec. 1994-5 Jan. 1995, 21). Far Eastern Economic Review reports that approximately fifty people were killed during the four days of fighting for control of the city (ibid.).

As the Taliban advanced and gained momentum, thousands of Pakistani and Afghan students and their teachers left the madrassahs in Pakistan in order to "reinforce their comrades" (ibid.; Newsline Feb. 1995a; The Economist 25 Feb.-3 Mar. 1995, 36). In addition, Afghan veterans, including many former communist soldiers and supporters of former King Zahir Shar joined the movement (ibid.; The New York Times 16 Feb. 1995; U.S. News & World Report 6 Mar. 1995). Several sources indicate that by February 1995 the number of Taliban had risen to 25,000 (ibid.; Muslim World Monitor 16 Feb. 1995; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 17) and was "backed by more than 200 captured tanks, other armour, artillery, helicopters and even a dozen MiG-23 jet fighters" (ibid.; The New York Times 16 Feb. 1995).

Many reports indicate that Pakistan is suspected of providing financial and military assistance to the Taliban, especially since a Taliban presence in Afghanistan would secure access for Pakistani convoys travelling to Central Asia (Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 39; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 18; The Christian Science Monitor 29 Mar. 1995). The Christian Science Monitor reports that "the youth army is said to have begun receiving significant financial backing from Pakistani intelligence forces" in late 1994 (ibid.). U.S. News and World Report writes that "Pakistan's relationship to the new group is a matter of intense speculation" and that some "say that Pakistan's Interior Ministry and military intelligence are backing Taliban" (U.S. News & World Report 6 Mar. 1995). The Muslim World Monitor reports that "[t]he Taliban are believed to be financially and militarily supported by Pakistan, especially Pakistan's Interior Minister Nasirullah Babar" (Muslim World Monitor 16 Feb. 1995). Finally, Asiaweek reports that "[b]y the late summer of 1994, arms and money began flowing from Pakistan to the Talibs" (Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 39).

Pakistan has denied being involved with the Taliban (The Economist 25 Feb.-3 Mar. 1995, 36; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 18), and a former Pakistani army chief has accused the United States of establishing the Taliban to counter Iran's influence in the region (Asiaweek 3 Mar. 1995, 27). Two sources hint that the CIA may quietly support the Taliban movement (FEER 29 Dec. 1994-5 Jan. 1995, 21; Frontier Post 24 Feb. 1995). Iran accuses Pakistan and Saudi Arabia of backing the Taliban (The Economist 25 Feb.-3 Mar. 1995, 36; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 18) and has warned both countries to ensure the safety of Afghanistan's Shiite minority (ibid.). Taliban leaders have claimed that they "'do not receive any aid from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia or any third country'" (The News 27 Jan. 1995) and that they receive their backing only from indigenous forces (Newsline Feb. 1995b; see also The Washington Post 2 Mar. 1995; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 18).

Taliban Structure, Ideology and Aims:

The Shura (Shoora), based in Kandahar, is the Taliban's highest decision-making body (Jane's 1 May 1995). The Shura, or "assembly", is comprised of some 30 people and grows as the Taliban gain control of additional regions and provinces (ibid.; U.S. News & World Report 6 Mar. 1995). The inner-core of the Shura has eight participants, "of which a group of four leaders, all from Kandahar—Maulvis Umar, Mohammad Rabbani, Mohammad Abbas and Borjan—are considered the key players in evolving Taliban strategy" (Jane's 1 May 1995; see also Los Angeles Times 21 Feb. 1995).

While Taliban leaders are reluctant to expound on the group's "political philosophy" (Jane's 1 May 1995), Taliban officials and outside observers have variously stated that the group aims to "take Kabul and sweep away all the mujahideen factions" (Asiaweek 3 Mar. 1995, 27), "cleanse Afghanistan ... of drug traffickers" (Time 27 Feb. 1995, 18), "'cleanse Afghanistan in the name of Islam'" (FEER 29 Dec. 1994-5 Jan. 1995, 21; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 18), "rid the country of the various military factions" (Muslim World Monitor 16 Feb. 1995) and to usher in "a new era of peace and good government" (FEER 29 Dec. 1994-5 Jan. 1995, 21). The London-based publication Al-Majallah reports that the Taliban's political views "represent[] a revolution against the current political situation in the country, in which leaders of the mujahedin factions control the reins of power" (Al-Majallah 5 Mar. 1995). The Al-Majallah article outlines three key elements of the Taliban's political agenda. The Taliban are:

1. Calling for dismantling the traditional political infrastructure in Afghanistan through a position of extreme opposition to the mujahedin factions ... .

2. Disarming all the mujahedin factions ... .

3. Adopting a three-part plan to resolve the Afghan conflict, based on: forming a true Islamic government composed of committed Islamist figures, basing this government on regional representation of the Afghan provinces, not on representation of parties or factions, and calling for the Taliban movement to assume [responsibility for] (sic) the security of the capital, Kabul (ibid.).

Asiaweek reports that

[p]olitically, the Taliban are closely linked to Pakistan's conservative Jamiat Ulema Islami, a Sunni party headed by Maulana Fazlur Rahman, which is influential in Pakistan's Pushtun regions. An analyst notes: 'The Taliban are fundamentalist in the real sense of the term. This is the conservative reactionary Islam of the mullahs as distinct from the politically revolutionary Islam of the intellectuals -- the Rabbanis, Massouds and Hekmatyars' (Asiaweek 3 Mar. 1995, 27).

According to several sources a primary objective of the Taliban is the establishment of an Islamic theocratic state based on Islamic law or Shari'a (The Herald Mar. 1995, 51; Jane's 1 May 1995; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 16; Al-Majallah 5 Mar. 1995). A Taliban spokesman stated during a press conference cited by Xinhua that the "holy quran was their only law and they would implement it throughout Afghanistan" (Xinhua 12 Feb. 1995). Islamic law and courts have reportedly been established throughout Taliban-controlled provinces (AI Apr. 1995, 1; U.S. News and World Report 6 Mar. 1995; The News 27 Jan. 1995). Amnesty International reports that, as of April 1995, Islamic courts established in Taliban-controlled provinces had carried out "dozens" of punishments in accordance with Islamic law, including executions and amputations (AI Apr. 1995, 1). In February 1995 the first amputation of hands and feet reportedly took place in Lashkargah, the capital city of Helmand province (ibid., 3); three alleged thieves had their left feet and right hands amputated (L'Express international 30 Mar. 1995, 42). Two men found guilty of murder by a four-member court in Kandahar were executed in "early 1995" (AI Apr. 1995, 4). In March 1995 The Washington Post reported that in the city of Kandahar "at least four people" had been executed and "unmarried lovers [had] been publicly flogged" (The Washington Post 2 Mar. 1995). According to L'Express international, the Islamic courts established in Kandahar hang murderers and flog hashish smokers and unmarried lovers (L'Express International 30 Mar. 1995, 42).

The Taliban have reportedly banned music, chess, football and volleyball (Time 27 Feb. 1995, 18; The Washington Post 2 Mar. 1995; AP 20 Mar. 1995) The Associated Press (AP) reports that the Taliban consider sports a distraction from prayers (AP ibid.). Taliban officials have stated that elections are "un-Islamic" (U.S. News & World Report 6 Mar. 1995; The News 27 Jan. 1995), and one official argued that "'[m]ost of the Afghans are illiterate and can not choose sincere and honest leaders'" (ibid.).

Women in Taliban-controlled regions must be veiled, have been forbidden to work outside their homes, and are not allowed to leave their homes unless accompanied by a man (The New York Times 16 Feb. 1995; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 18; The Washington Post 2 Mar. 1995). Girls have been forbidden from attending school and young boys are suppose "to receive a religious education" (ibid.; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 18). The New York Times reported that women in Kandahar protested the Taliban decision to ban women from shopping in the town's bazaars and stores (The New York Time 16 Feb. 1995). The Taliban reportedly reversed their decision and permitted women entry into bazaars providing they remained outside shops run by men (ibid.).

An editorial published in the Asian Wall Street Journal asserts, however, that the Taliban are "simply ordinary Afghans who are sick and tired of corrupt warlords", and that they are not "religious zealots in any threatening way" (Asian Wall Street Journal 22 Feb. 1995). AP states that "the strict controls brought order where there had been chaos" (AP 20 Mar. 1995). According to the Los Angeles Times the Taliban in Kandahar have ended the "looting, rape and bullying" common under mujahedin rule (Los Angeles Time 21 Feb. 1995). Roads have re-opened and highway banditry has all but ended in Taliban-controlled areas, "allow[ing] food and other products to flow freely" (ibid.).

The March to Kabul:

After capturing Kandahar in November 1994, the Taliban "fanned out" north, west and east towards Kabul,⁵ until they had gained control of many of Afghanistan's southern Pushtan provinces (Asiaweek 3 Mar. 1995, 26; Al-Majallah 5 Mar. 1995). Before reaching Kabul, the army rarely had to test its military strength as they reportedly enjoyed the support of ordinary Afghans (ibid.; The Economist 25 Feb.-3 Mar. 1995, 36; Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 39). Asiaweek reports that Uruzgan and Zabol provinces "fell with scarcely a shot fired" (Asiaweek ibid.). The group planned next to move on to Vardak and Ghazni provinces (FEER 29 Dec. 1994-5 Jan. 1995, 22), and in January 1995 the Taliban "routed Hizb commanders at Ghazni and Maidan Shahr, southwest of Kabul" (Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 39). The Taliban scored their biggest success on 14 February 1995 when their forces seized Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's headquarters in Charasiab, variously reported as being 15, 25 or 30 kilometres south of Kabul (Keesing's Feb. 1995, 40446; AFP 16 Feb. 1995; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 17). "[A]fter a two-month, 330-mile march across southern Afghanistan, during which every opposing army gave way before it, Taliban [stood] just 10 miles south of Kabul, the capital, where citizens await[ed] its arrival with a mixture of joy, fear and suspicion" (The Washington Post 2 Mar. 1995).

By early 1995, reports indicated that the Taliban had gained control of several Afghani provinces (AI Apr. 1995, 1; The Economist 25 Feb.-3 Mar. 1995; The Independent 23 Mar. 1995; The Financial Times 18 May 1995; FEER 18 May 1995, 24). Amnesty International reported in April 1995 that the Taliban continued to maintain control of ten provinces, including "Kandahar, Helmand, Nimroz, about half of Farah, Zabul, Ghazni, Wardak, Logar, Pakia, Paktika as well as the city of Khost" (Amnesty International Apr. 1995 2). "Administrative structures", under the direction of religious students, have reportedly been established in these Taliban-controlled provinces (ibid.). The Independent reported in March that the Taliban controlled eight provinces (The Independent 23 Mar. 1995), while the Far Eastern Economic Review and the Financial Times reported in May that the army controlled 12 and 7 provinces respectively (Far Eastern Economic Review 18 May 1995, 24; Financial Times 18 May 1995).⁶

Some articles have reported that during their advance the Taliban generally avoided bloodshed through the use of persuasion; however, when that tactic failed military force was used (Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 39; Time 27 Feb. 1995, 16). According to U.S. News & World Report, the Taliban "sent religious envoys ahead to demand that local commanders disarm and dismantle roadblocks. Most duly did. Some even offered money, vehicles and weapons to help Taliban eliminate their rivals" (U.S. News & World Report 6 Mar. 1995). The Paris-based Al-Watan Al-Arabi reports that the Taliban

... presented the venerable Koran to every military position on which they advanced and appealed to the other fighters to surrender in the name of the Koran ... [and] defenders of those military positions rushed to surrender.... Some reports also say that the Taleban have used the method of financial inducements, which is used widely to overturn alliances in Afghanistan (Al-Watan Al-Arabi 6 Jan. 1995; see also Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 39).

On 6 March 1995 government troops loyal to Rabbani attacked positions in south-west Kabul held by the Hezb-e-Wahdat and succeeded in trapping the group between forces loyal to Rabbani and the Taliban (The Economist 18-24 Mar. 1995, 38; Keesing's Mar. 1995, 40453). Ali Mazari, leader of the Hezb-e-Wahdat, reportedly surrendered willingly the group's weapons and positions to the Taliban (ibid.). Renewed battles ensued between the Taliban and government forces, and on 12 March the Taliban were pushed back to Charasiab in their "first major ... defeat" (ibid.; The Economist 18-24 Mar. 1995, 38). On 19 March government troops forced the Taliban out of Charasiab (Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 37).

While retreating, the Taliban "reportedly launched rocket attacks on Kabul ... killing several civilians" (Keesing's Mar. 1995, 40453). The Economist reported that as a result of these Taliban "terror tactics", "[t]he toll of civilian casualties rose to levels not seen since the battles between Islamic rivals in January 1994. Hospitals in Kabul said that over 1,000 people had required treatment" (The Economist 18-24 Mar. 1995, 38). The Washington Post reported that hundreds were killed in the attack (The Washington Post 20 Mar. 1995). The Taliban consequently lost a great deal of the respect and admiration they had enjoyed, and many in Kabul reportedly now believe that the Taliban "are just another power-hungry faction rather than the white knights they claim to be" (The Economist 18-24 Mar. 1995, 38). The Washington Post quotes a Kabul resident as saying "'People used to embrace them. Now we consider them just another group of warriors'" (The Washington Post 20 Mar. 1995).

Ali Mazari and others were killed in March while in Taliban custody (AI Apr. 1995, 4-5; Keesing's Mar. 1995, 40453). Taliban officials reported that Mazari was killed in a helicopter crash (ibid.; The Economist 18-24 Mar. 1995, 38), while Amnesty International reported that "[t]he circumstances surrounding the death of Abdul Ali Mazari and other Hezb-e-Wahdat leaders while in captivity, raise serious concern that the prisoners may have been killed deliberately" (AI Apr. 1995, 5).

The Taliban suffered a series of further setbacks and defeats after March 1995. In April the students suffered major losses when they were repulsed while attempting to reach an air base south of Herat in Farah province (Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 21 Apr. 1995; FEER 18 May 1995, 24). In late April Ahmed Shah Masoud's troops forced the Taliban nearly 100 kilometres south-east towards Kandahar (ibid).

Recent Developments:

According to Asiaweek, in April 1995 the Taliban were still in control of a united south and were "anything but beaten" (Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 38). The same source reported that this situation has led to "a dramatic realignment along a dangerous ethnic divide ..." (ibid.). The Taliban, who are Pushtan of the Durrani sub-tribe, have a strong presence in the south; President Rabbani's forces, who are primarily Tajik, occupy most of Kabul (ibid.); Uzbek Rashid Dostam retains power in the north and west, and Hekmatyar supporters, who are Pushtans of the Ghilzai sub-tribe, have re-grouped in the eastern city of Jalalabad (FEER 18 May 1995, 24). The Economist has warned that such an alignment could lead to "an Afghanistan partitioned into Pathan, Tajik and Uzbek states" (The Economist 25 Feb.-3 Mar. 1995, 36).

Further clashes were reported in May between the Taliban and government forces in Farah province (Xinhua 13 May 1995), in Nimruz province around Zaranj, (IRNA 15 May 1995) in Helmand and in the region of Delaram, which borders Farah, Nimruz and Helmand provinces (ibid.). In May, fighting was reported near the town of Maidan Shahr, west of Kabul (Reuters 8 May 1995). An Iranian source reported on 6 June that Afghani government forces had taken control of Farah and Nimruz provinces and "pushed them [the Taliban] back to Helmand Province in the south of Afghanistan" (IRNA 6 June 1995). According to a 17 June report by the same source, the Taliban were battling forces loyal to General Ismail Khan, governor of Herat, in the Dalbadin district of Balouchistan (ibid. 17 June 1995). The Taliban allegedly attacked the governor's forces at an army camp at Chotu, and the report indicates that Chotu "is said to be now manned by Taleban" (ibid.).

In early June the Taliban and the Hezb-e-Islami reportedly jointly attacked government-held positions around Kabul from Maidan Shahr (Xinhua 3 June 1995; IRNA 3 June 1995). In an interview cited by Xinhua, Hezb-e-Islami leader Hekmatyar stated that "'we have no objections towards an alliance with the Taliban'" (ibid.). Other sources report that Hekmatyar has "confirmed his willingness to join an alliance with the Taleban" (Al-Hayah 3 June 1995) and that he "has committed at least 2000 men" to the Taliban (IRNA 3 June 1995). Radio Afghanistan has indicated that the Taliban have joined forces with Rashid Dostam (Radio Afghanistan 2 June 1995; ibid., 5 June, 1995). The DIRB is currently unable to corroborate the information provided by this source.

On 9 or 10 June 1995 Taliban and government officials, meeting in Lowgar province, announced a 10-day cease-fire, "which was followed by a partial exchange of prisoners before planned face-to-face talks to end hostilities" (Reuters 14 June 1995; Radio Afghanistan 9 June 1995; IRNA 13 June 1995; see also BBC Summary 13 June 1995). The government reportedly breached the cease-fire on 13 June in Delaram, Farah Province (Radio Message of Freedom 14 June 1995; Reuters 14 June 1995), but, according to Reuters, Taliban officials said that it "would not divert [them] from planned peace talks with President Burhanuddin Rabbani" (ibid.). Agence France Presse (AFP) reported on 20 June that the cease-fire was "expected to hold", despite the fact that Taliban and government officials had yet to engage in face-to-face talksAFP 20 June 1995 . According to the same AFP report, a government official stated that there has been "an understanding to maintain it [the cease-fire] for an indefinite period" (ibid.).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the DIRB within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.

References

Agence France Presse (AFP). 20 June 1995. "Minister Predicts Extension of Cease-Fire." (FBIS-NES-95-119 21 June 1995, p. 62)

_____. 15 May 1995. "Afghan Government Forces Attack Talibans." (NEXIS)

_____. 16 February 1995. "Taleban Force Reportedly 9 Miles from Kabul." (FBIS-NES-95-033 17 Feb. 1995, p. 54)

Al-Hayah [London, in Arabic]. 3 June 1995. "Hekmatyar Rejects International Solution to Crisis." (FBIS-NES-95-107 5 June 1995, p. 50)

Al-Majallah [London, in Arabic]. 5 March 1995. "Taleban Goal Said Aimed at Freeing Afghanistan." (FBIS-NES-95-098 22 May 1995, pp. 49-51)

Al-Watan Al-Arabi [Paris, in Arabic]. 6 January 1995. "'New' Brand of Mojahedin Rising." (FBIS-NES-95-036 23 Feb. 1995, pp. 63-65)

Amnesty International (AI). May 1995. Women in Afghanistan: A Human Rights Catastrophe. (AI Index: 11/03/95). London: Amnesty International.

_____. April 1995. Afghanistan: Executions, Amputations, and Possible Deliberate and Arbitrary Killings. (AI Index: ASA 11/05/95). London: Amnesty International.

Asian Survey [Berkeley, Calif.]. February 1995. Vol. 35, No. 2. Zalmay Khalilzad. "Afghanistan in 1994: Civil War and Disintegration."

Asian Wall Street Journal [Hong Kong]. 22 February 1995. Nancy DeWolf Smith. "These Rebels Aren't So Scary." (Afghanistan Forum [East Hampton, NY]. Mar.-May 1995. Vol. 23, No. 2-3, p. 30)

Asiaweek [Hong Kong]. April 28 1995. Vol. 21, No. 17. Anthony Davis. "Showdown in Kabul."

_____. 3 March 1995. Vol. 21, No. 9. "The Rise of the Taliban: A Mysterious Student Army Sweeps All Before It."

Associated Press (AP). 20 March 1995. AM Cycle. Kathy Gannon. "After Dramatic Rise, Taliban Militia Crumbles." (NEXIS)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 13 June 1995. "Internal Affairs: Taleban POWs Released in 'Goodwill Gesture'." (NEXIS)

Central Asian Survey [Abingdon, Oxfordshire]. March 1995. Vol. 14, No. 1. Anders Fänge. "Afghanistan After April 1992: A Struggle for State and Ethnicity."

The Christian Science Monitor [Boston]. 29 March 1995. Peter de Neufville. "Religious Zeal Drives Afghani Youth to Swift, Dubious Win." (NEXIS)

Current History [Philidelphia]. January 1995. Vol. 94, No. 588. Gilles Dorronsoro. "Afghanistan's Civil War."

The Economist [London]. 18-24 March 1995. "Taliban Defeated."

_____. 25 February-3 March 1995. "Revenge of the Pathans."

L'Express international [Paris]. 30 March 1995. No. 2281. Vincent Hugeux. "Afghanistan: La guerre des puritains."

Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) [Hong Kong]. 18 May 1995. Vol. 158, No. 20. Ahmed Rashid. "Grinding Halt: Taliban Student Army Suffers Serious Setbacks."

_____. 29 December 1994-5 January 1995. Vol. 158, No. 1. Ahmed Rashid. "Sword of Islam: New Force Challenges Afghan Warlords."

Financial Times [London]. 18 May 1995. Farhan Bokhari. "World Ignores Suffering of War-Worn Afghanistan." (NEXIS)

Frontier Post [Peshawar]. 17 March 1995. Karrar Ali Agha. "Writing on the Wall." (Afghanistan Forum [East Hampton, NY]. Mar.-May 1995. Vol. 23, No. 2-3, pp. 16-17)

_____. 24 February 1995. Mohammed Zahid. "The Peace Brigade." (Afghanistan Forum [East Hampton, New York]. Mar.-May 1995. Vol. 23, No. 2-3, pp. 10-11)

The Herald [Karachi]. March 1995. Vol. 26, No. 3. Hasan Iqbal Jafri. "Picking up the Pieces."

The Independent [London]. 23 March 1995. Tim McGirk. "Taliban Lose Invincible Reputation." (NEXIS)

Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) [Tehran, in English]. 17 June 1995. "Fighting Reporedly Spills Over Into Pakistan." (FBIS-NES-95-117 19 June 1995, p. 47)

_____. 13 June 1995. "Government, Taleban Exchange Captives Before Talks." (FBIS-NES-95-114 14 June 1995, p. 55)

_____. 7 June 1995. "Taleban Starts 'Operations,' Seeks Dostam Alliance." (FBIS-NES-95-110 8 June 1995, p. 49)

_____. 6 June 1995. "Taleban, Government Said Preparing for 'Encounter'." (FBIS-NES-95-109 7 June 1995, p. 53)

_____. 3 June 1995. "'Grand Alliance' Forming Against Rabbani Government." (FBIS-NES-95-107 5 June 1995, p. 50)

_____. 15 May 1995. "'Severe Setback' for Taleban." (FBIS-NES-95-093 15 May 1995, p. 39)

Jane's Intelligence Review-Pointer [London]. 1 May 1995. Vol. 2, No. 5. "The Taliban's Invincibility is Shattered." (NEXIS)

Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge]. March 1995. Vol. 41, No. 3. "Afghanistan: Retreat of Talibaan."

_____. February 1995. Vol. 41, No. 2. "Afghanistan: Defeat of Hekmatyar."

Los Angeles Times. 21 February 1995. Home Edition. John-Thor Dahlburg. "Mysterious Afghan Militia on a Mission." (NEXIS)

Le Monde diplomatique [Paris]. April 1995. Ahmed Rashid. "Un tournant dans une guerre oubliée? L'Afghanistan à l'heure des « taliban »."

Muslim World Monitor [n.p.]. 16 February 1995. "Taleban Take Over Hekmetyar's Headquarters and May Aim for Kabul."(Afghanistan Forum [East Hampton, NY]. Mar.-May 1995. Vol. 23, No. 2-3, pp. 12-13)

The News [Islamabad]. 27 January 1995. Haroon Rashid. "Taliban Vow to Establish Islamic Rule in Afghanistan." (Afghanistan Forum [East Hampton, NY]. Mar.-May 1995. Vol. 23, No. 2-3, p. 7)

Newsline [n.p.]. February 1995a. Rahimullah Yusufzai. "Here Come the Taliban." (Afghanistan Forum [East Hampton, NY]. Mar.-May 1995. Vol. 23, No. 2-3, pp. 8-9)

_____. February 1995b. Shahzada Zulfiqar. "Brewing Revolution." (Afghanistan Forum [East Hampton, NY]. Mar.-May 1995. Vol. 23, No. 2-3, p. 9)

The New York Times. 16 February 1995. John F. Burns. "New Afghan Force Takes Hold, Turning to Peace." (Afghanistan Forum [East Hampton, NY]. Mar.-May 1995. Vol. 23, No. 2-3, p. 24)

Radio Afghanistan Network [Kabul, in Pashto]. 9 June 1995. "Kabul, Taleban Agree on Cease-Fire, POW Release." (FBIS-NES-95-112 12 June 1995, p. 56)

_____. 5 June 1995. "Radio Says Taleban Secretly Led by Khalq Faction." (FBIS-NES-95-108 6 June 1995, p. 53)

_____. 2 June 1995. "Dostam, Taleban Attack Repulsed." (FBIS-NES-95-107 5 June 1995, p. 52)

Radio Message of Freedom [Clandestine, in Pashto]. 14 June 1995. "Taleban Leadership Differs Over Gvoernment Truce." (FBIS-NES-95-115 15 June 1995, p. 52)

Reuters. 14 June 1995. BC Cycle. "Taleban Ignores Afghan Government Truce Violation." (NEXIS)

_____. 8 May 1995. BC Cycle. Peter Greste. "Afghan Forces Attack Taleban Positions Near Kabul." (NEXIS)

Security Dialogue [London]. December 1993. Vol. 24, No. 4. William Maley. "The Future of Islamic Afghanistan."

Time [Toronto]. 27 February 1995. Vol. 145, No. 8. Jefferson Penberthy. "Mystery Army."

U.S. News & World Report [Washington, DC]. 6 March 1995. Emily MacFarquhar. "The Rise of Taliban." (NEXIS)

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran First Program [Tehran, in Persian]. 21 April 1995. "Taleban Suffers Heavy Defeat in Farah Province." (FBIS-NES-95-078 24 Apr. 1995, p. 44)

The Washington Post. 20 March 1995. Molly Moore. "Afghan Militia Taliban, After Raising Hopes, Is Driven Off." (Afghanistan Forum [East Hampton, NY]. Mar.-May 1995. Vol. 23, No. 2-3, pp. 26-27)

_____. 2 March 1995. John Ward Anderson. "Afghan Fundamentalists Impose Order on City." (Afghanistan Forum [East Hampton, NY]. Mar.-May 1995. Vol. 23, No. 2-3, p. 28).

World Directories of Minorities. 1990. Edited by the Minority Rights Group. Harlow, Essex: Longman.

Xinhua News Agency. 3 June 1995. "Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami Clash with Afghan Govt Troops." (NEXIS)

_____. 13 May 1995. "Afghan Government Forces Recapture Farah." (NEXIS)

_____. 12 February 1995. Pan Yi and Gong Min. "Taliban, New Actor in Afghan Bloody Drama." (NEXIS)

Attachments

Al-Majallah [London, in Arabic]. 5 March 1995. "Taleban Goal Said Aimed at Freeing Afghanistan." (FBIS-NES-95-098 22 May 1995, pp. 49-51)

Al-Watan Al-Arabi [Paris, in Arabic]. 6 January 1995. "'New' Brand of Mojahedin Rising." (FBIS-NES-95-036 23 Feb. 1995, pp. 63-65)

Asiaweek [Hong Kong]. April 28 1995. Vol. 21, No. 17. Anthony Davis. "Showdown in Kabul," pp. 37-40.

_____. 3 March 1995. Vol. 21, No. 9. "The Rise of the Taliban: A Mysterious Student Army Sweeps All Before It," pp. 26-27.

Central Asian Survey [Abingdon, Oxfordshire]. March 1995. Vol. 14, No. 1. Anders Fange. "Afghanistan After April 1992: A Struggle for State and Ethnicity," pp. 17-24.

Current History [Philidelphia]. January 1995. Vol. 94, No. 588. Gilles Dorronsoro. "Afghanistan's Civil War," pp. 37-40.

L'Express international [Paris]. 30 March 1995. No. 2281. Vincent Hugeux. "Afghanistan: La guerre des puritains," pp. 40-45.

Le Monde diplomatique [Paris]. April 1995. Ahmed Rashid. "Un tournant dans une guerre oubliée? L'Afghanistan à l'heure des « taliban »," p. 24.

Security Dialogue [London]. December 1993. Vol. 24, No. 4. William Maley. "The Future of Islamic Afghanistan," pp. 383-96.

World Directories of Minorities. 1990. Edited by the Minority Rights Group. Harlow, Essex: Longman, pp. 310-12.

NOTES:

¹ For a brief overview of the political situation in Afghanistan before 1994 please consult the attachments from Central Asian Survey and Security Dialogue.

² According to the World Directory of Minorities "Pashtuns, Pashtouns, Pakhtuns and Afghans" are alternative names for the ethnic group Pathans (World Directory of Minorities 1990, p. 310). For further informati on the Pathans or Pushtan please consult the attachment from the World Directory of Minorities.

³ The word Taliban in Farsi means "seekers of the truth" (Time 27 Feb. 1995, 16; The New York Times 16 Feb. 1995) and in both Farsi and Pushto commonly refers to religious students studying at madrassahs or religious schools (ibid.; Asiaweek 28 Apr. 1995, 37; Frontier Post 24 Feb. 1995; ibid., 17 Mar. 1995).

⁴ For further information on the Afghan mujahideen please see the Central Asian Survey, Current History and Al-Watan Al-Arabi attachments.

⁵ For a map of the Taliban "conquest route" see the 3 March 1995 Asiaweek attachment.

⁶ For a map of Taliban-controlled provinces and regions please consult the attached article from Le Monde diplomatique.??