Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1985

NICARAGUA
 
 
In January 1985, the Junta of National Reconstruction (which
had run the Nicaraguan Government since the 1979 revolution
that overthrew the Somoza dictatorship) was terminated with
the inauguration of President Daniel Ortega Saavedra and Vice
President Sergio Ramirez and the swearing-in of a 96-member
National Assembly. Real political power nevertheless
continued to be wielded by the National Directorate of the
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), the Front's nine
Marxist leaders who conceive and implement policies through an
interlocking party-government structure. Intimidation and the
restriction of basic human rights were significant factors in
the largely successful consolidation of power by the
Sandinista Front over the preceding five years. Though
elections were held on November 4, 1984, important sectors of
the political opposition declined to participate because of
the Government's failure to establish the conditions necessary
for a fair and free campaign.
 
During 1985, the Sandinistas increased markedly their
intimidation of the Church and the civic opposition and their
control of the society. The basic instruments of internal
control, the police and state security organizations, fall
under the control of the ^Sinistry of the Interior. Using
these agencies, the Sandinistas are able to enforce adherence
to the standards of political conformity imposed by the FSLN
through the power of arbitrary arrest, interrogation, and
imprisonment .
 
The Nicaraguan economy is heavily agricultural. Its small
industrial sector, weakened during the 1978-79 revolution,
continues to deteriorate under Sandinista economic policies.
The Government controls the distribution of foodstuffs, and
even basic staples are subject to rationing.
Politically-motivated expropriations, the increasingly
state-managed economy, heavy military expenditures (accounting
for an estimated 60 percent of the budget), and often
capricious implementation of agrarian reform have
substantially decreased living standards in the country.
 
The civil war continued throughout 1985, with heavy combat in
the northern region causing casualties to civilians and
extensive damage to economic infrastructure. Human rights
organizations charged both sides with serious human rights
abuses. Government security forces reportedly tortured and
executed persons suspected of assisting the guerrillas, while
the Government accused the guerrillas of killing, torturing,
and kidnapping civilians. The Sandinista Army continued
military impressment, conducting sweeps of public facilities
and forcibly removing youths as young as twelve. Although the
Government claims that conscientious objection to military
service is permitted, it is not provided for in the law. On
October 15, the Government reinstated and broadened the 1982
State of Emergency restrictions on civil rights and liberties
originally provided in 1979 by the National Junta of
Reconstruction in "The Statute of Rights and Guarantees of
Nicaraguan Citizens." Under the new decree many rights
concerning arrest, trial, detention, speech, assembly, privacy
and association were abolished. In effect, however, the
latest suspension of civil liberties merely legalized various
government activities that in practice had already been
underway.
 
Beginning in mid-1985, government officials and entities began
to increase and personalize public attacks on business,
church, professional and opposition political leaders.
Intimidating interrogations of such leaders, searches of
houses and the confiscation of offices and publications
occurred in the late fall. The Government continued to use an
array of control techniques: political tribunals established
outside the judicial system to try cases of suspected
subversives, mass organizations controlled by the Sandinistas
to help implement their policies and to instill loyalty and
sanction opponents, and prior censorship of the print and
electronic media to silence opposition.
 
The two domestic human rights organizations in Nicaragua which
are independent of the Government were subject to constant
harassment by the Sandinistas during 1985.
 
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including
Freedom from:
 
a. Political Killing
 
Ample evidence exists of a number of politically-motivated
killings during 1985. The independent Permanent Human Rights
Commission (Spanish acronym CPDH) received thirteen
substantiated cases during the year of political killings
committed by government authorities, and several more
complaints in which government involvement was suspected. In
one of the cases reported to CPDH in 1985, a Sandinista
soldier took a Social Democratic Party member from his house.
As soon as the family reported him as missing to CPDH, the
Ministry of Defense issued a communique stating that a
resistance leader by the same name had been killed in combat
in November. The Social Christian Party called for, but did
not receive, an official explanation for the death of a
17-year-old member whose decomposing corpse was discovered a
few days after he was taken into police custody, apparently
during a Government conscription round-up. In another case
reported to CPDH, a Cuban military advisor indiscriminately
opened fire on a group of Nicaraguans attending a party,
killing three and injuring others. The Cuban was not
prosecuted and Ministry of Interior officials reportedly
attempted to bribe witnesses not to report the incident.
Local newspapers announced that several Sandinista soldiers
had been court-martialed for abuses in the field, but neither
the trials nor the sentencing in such cases are open to public
review. In one case, CPDH states that it has proof that the
person convicted was sent to Bulgaria for study rather than
serving out his term.
 
CPDH further alleges that, out of fear of reprisals, the
majority of government political killings go unreported. In a
May 12, 1984, letter to the Organization of American States
(OAS) Inter-American Human Rights Commission (lAHRC), CPDH
maintained it had evidence of an increase in the number of
unexplained deaths. From 1981 to 1984, CPDH received 97
complaints of deaths attributable to identified civil and
military authorities. In each case, after brief detention,
the prisoners reportedly died "during attempts to escape," "in
combat with army troops," "from heart attack," or under other
circumstances CPDH found suspicious. CPDH brought all 97
cases to the attention of the Nicaraguan Government, but no
investigations are known to have been conducted nor official
explanations offered. In some cases, the families of the
 
victims have themselves received death threats from government
officials for making inquiries. CPDH findings of governmental
involvement in political killings have been confirmed by a
niomber of sources, among them former employees of the
government-sponsored human rights commission and the Ministry
of Interior.
 
One defector, Lt . Alvaro Baldizon, served as Chief
Investigator of the Special Investigations Commission of the
Ministry of Interior, established by the Ministry in early
1983 in response to mounting inquiries from international
human rights organizations concerning reported government
abuses. In 1985, Baldizon revealed that the Sandinista
Government had systematically used state-sanctioned political
assassinations, called "special measures" by Ministry of
Interior authorities, against political opponents during
1983. According to Baldizon 's own investigation, Ministry of
Interior State Security forces summarily executed more than
300 farmers suspected of collaborating with the armed
resistance in the Cua, Pantasma, Waslala and Rio Blanco
areas. Relatives had reported many of these assassinations to
CPDH and lAHRC, which published lists of the names of the
missing persons. Baldizon' s investigations in late 1984
turned up clandestine cemeteries in mountain communities of
Matagalpa and Jinotega Departments where government
investigators themselves believed victims of "special
measures" had been buried. Baldizon charged that, in total,
hundreds of assassinations and subsequent cover-ups were
ordered by ranking Sandinista leaders — Interior Minister Tomas
Borge and Vice Minister Luis Carrion.
 
In his October 1985 address to the United Nations, President
Daniel Ortega claimed that insurgent forces, so-called
"counterrevolutionaries," had killed 11,000 Nicaraguans,
injured 5,000, kidnapped 5,000, and caused the displacement of
250,000 in six years of war between government and insurgent
forces; he did not distinguish between Sandinista Army
combatants and civilian casualties. CPDH and the 1985
independent Smith-Rygg human rights report claim that many
civilian casualties have resulted from government use of heavy
artillery near population centers in newly declared free-fire
zones .
 
The Government has charged the insurgents with torturing and
summarily executing civilians and prisoners of war. Americas
Watch has accused both sides, holding the insurgent forces
more culpable of violating international laws of war
applicable to ordinary war conditions. There is evidence that
many Nicaraguan civilians have been killed in crossfire. Some
have died in insurgent ambushes of government military
vehicles carrying civilian passengers. The Government has
also distributed arms to persons engaged in civilian
activities: in December, for example, it was announced that
over one-half of the 10,000 coffee harvesters had received
military training and would carry rifles in a defense
capacity. The insurgents deny that they target civilians and
in 1985 the newly-formed umbrella resistance group, the United
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), announced that it would hold
itself bound to the Geneva Conventions.
 
Although CPDH has received few reports of insurgent
atrocities, some Nicaraguan government-sponsored international
human rights researchers have produced extensive testimonies
from alleged witnesses to political killings. Former
 
Sandinista government employees who served in the area of
human rights have charged that the Government controlled these
groups' access to information. The Smith-Rygg report, based
on interviews with Nicaraguan refugees in Costa Rica and
Honduras and displaced persons inside Nicaragua, on the other
hand, found no evidence of any systematic abuses conducted by
counterrevolutionaries, in the form of intentional killings,
torture, or rape.
 
b. Disappearances
 
Most reported disappearance cases result from what CPDH has
labeled "a deliberate policy" by government security forces to
hold suspected insurgents or political critics incommunicado
indefinitely without notifying family members. The
Government's October 15, 1985, suspension of legal guarantees
for political detainees — habeas corpus, arrest warrants, and
time limit on investigations — legalized this practice.
 
In its May 1984 communique to the lAHRC, CPDH claimed that
from 1981 to 1983, 433 cases of disappearance had been
reported to its offices. As of that date, 142 of those cases
had not been resolved and, in total for all years recorded,
CPDH maintained it had 342 cases of prisoners who had
disappeared. In the first six months of 1985, CPDH received
31 reports of disappearances. Of these, 16 persons had been
located alive, with 14 of them detained in prisons. Three
people had been found dead; 12 cases remained unresolved.
CPDH found the Government implicated in 30 of the 31 reported
disappearance cases.
 
The Government, for its part, has claimed that the insurgents
have routinely kidnapped civilians. Insurgent forces have
admitted to holding civilians captive temporarily in war
zones. On January 26, 1985, Dr. Gustavo Sequeira Pena and a
small medical team were taken captive by insurgents during
battle on Rama Key, in the Bay of Bluefields. On April 29,
the insurgents released the team, two members of which opted
to remain with the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN) . Nine
members of the Sandinista "Fiftieth Anniversary
Brigade" — volunteers who provide basic education in rural
areas — were taken captive in 1984 and 1985. By the end of
1985, one continued to be held prisoner by the FDN, which was
seeking the cooperation of the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) in arranging her release; one was working as
a volunteer with the FDN; and one had returned to Nicaragua.
The FDN reported to the ICRC that it did not have information
concerning the remaining six persons. Seven members of other
Sandinista brigades previously reported as missing were
discovered to have joined the resistance forces. A number of
international workers have been temporarily held by
insurgents; two reported that they had been raped.
 
c. Torture euid Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
 
CPDH holds that the Sandinista Government, particularly in
State Security interrogation centers and clandestine prisons,
has condoned the intentional infliction of severe physical and
psychological suffering for the purpose of extracting
information or confession, of punishing the detainee for an
actual or suspected crime, or of intimidating the detainee and
others. For example, CPDH estimates that almost all the
political prisoners convicted by special Sandinista tribunals
 
(called "TPA's,") were convicted by confessions which were
extracted by torture or abusive treatment that might fall
technically short of torture. CPDH further maintains that
cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment of prisoners in the
national penitentiary system is pervasive and a detainee could
be investigated indefinitely, tortured, or submitted to cruel
treatment without any legal mechanism available to stop the
abuses .
 
Nine known Ministry of Interior security interrogation prisons
and several clandestine prisons function in the country. The
Government has denied repeated requests by international human
rights monitors to inspect these facilities, and it does not
permit the ICRC to provide assistance to prisoners in State
Security prisons. In 1985, both Americas Watch and the
Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights repeated
previous requests to the Government to eliminate the practice
of incommunicado detention and to permit inspection of the
State Security prison facilities from which they had received
persistent reports of cruel treatment of detainees. Concerned
that international human rights organizations had not been
able adequately to address abuses occurring in Nicaraguan
jails, CPDH published a special report, "The Prison
Situation — Nicaragua 1985." The report summarizes testimonies
collected from CPDH's current case files of serious abuses of
prisoners' human rights.
 
In the most notorious of the State Security interrogation
centers, "El Chipote," located in the downtown area of the
capital city of Managua, many detainees are held incommunicado
sometimes for months, in dark subterranean cells in which they
can only stand or sit. Air reaches cells through a tube and
no toilet facilities are provided. ("El Chipote" was also
used during the Somoza dictatorship as an interrogation and
torture center.) State Security interrogators, some of them
reportedly non-Nicaraguan, routinely deprive detainees of
food, water and sleep for lengthy periods of time. CPDH
received several complaints concerning detaineees who were
made to dig their own graves, subjected to mock executions, or
had had empty pistols" triggered at their temples. Others were
beaten by interrogators, sometimes with rubber instruments
that do not leave marks. One mother reported to CPDH that her
son's face had been disfigured by repeated beatings. In the
colder mountainous areas of Esteli, in the La Barranca Prison,
and in the La Perrera Prison of Matagalpa, detainees have been
forced to stand in barrels of cold water for periods of two to
three days or until they made desired declarations or agreed
to become informants .
 
In 1984 and early 1985, several women detainees in "El
Chipote" reported they had been raped repeatedly by their
guards, one woman after she had been drugged for an
interrogation session. Women prisoners, without regard to
age, have been forced to assume humiliating positions naked in
front of male guards who insult and hit or kick them, in some
cases only because their husbands or sons are accused of
crimes against the state.
 
President Daniel Ortega himself, before international
journalists during a televised press conference, admitted to
and justified the detention at "El Chipote" of the president
of a Catholic school parents' association. Commander Lenin
Cerna, head of State Security forces, personally tortured the
victim. The 60-year-old, who was not politically active, was
 
detained because of his religiously-based criticisms of the
government-enforced program of Marxist-Leninist patriotic
education. Cerna and his agents reportedly beat the victim
and Cerna himself put a pistol to the victim's head, saying he
was going to kill him that night and the rest of his family
later. At the behest of a visiting foreign delegation, a high
Nicaraguan official intervened, after which the victim was
released in the middle of the night completely naked, without
his eyeglasses, on a main Managua thoroughfare. State
Security agents had told him he was being driven to a location
to be executed.
 
CPDH also has on file cases in which, during prolonged and
intense interrogations, detainees have been made to listen to
recordings of pleading voices and cries of loved ones. They
were sometimes led to believe that relatives had been
imprisoned and were being mistreated because of the detainees'
recalcitrance to confess or to implicate others. In a number
of cases, particularly those which involved government
officials who had defected to other countries, family members
have been detained and reportedly subjected to cruel treatment
and torture in an effort to force the defector to return or to
intimidate him into refraining from criticizing the Government.
 
Complaints filed with CPDH by the relatives of prisoners and
some released prisoners indicate that the prisons of the
national penitentiary system are characterized by severe
overcrowding, inadequate food and medical treatment, and
unhygienic conditions that are intentionally imposed by prison
authorities. CPDH believes that prison conditions have
deteriorated within the last year and alleges that prisoners'
families fear reprisals if they request reviews of cases or
conditions. CPDH has evidence that prison authorities have
also used exceptionally cruel forms of punishment that include
sealed cells or cars placed in direct sunlight, where the
prisoners are placed \intil they dehydrate. Indiscriminate
beatings and unexplained transfers also occur. CPDH has
provided to the Government the names of abusive prison
officials and the charges against them, but it has no evidence
that investigations have been undertaken.
 
The Government admits that it uses forced prison labor to
harvest crops in war zones. Two known hunger strikes were
known to have taken place in Managua prisons in 1985, during
which prisoners protested the use of forced labor and poor
prison conditions. Approximately 100 of the strikers were
transferred to the El Chipote complex for incommunicado
detention and special punishment.
 
According to its own statistics, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) is presently permitted by the
government to provide medical and nutritional assistance to
approximately 3,700, or 50 percent of the known political
prisoners. A special agreement with the Government provides
that the ICRC may not make public reports on conditions within
the prison system. The ICRC also maintains an effective
program of assistance to prisoner's families.
 
The Government human rights commission (CNPPDH) has developed
a limited rehabilitation program within the penitentiary
system for those prisoners who, according to CNPPDH officials,
have come to accept the goals of the Sandinista revolutionary
society. The program's most visible aspect is a system of
open farm prisons. In those facilities, prisoners work during
 
the day and have recreational programs, continuous visits by
family members, and furloughs. While agreeing that such open
prison facilities exist, CPDH and former CNPPDH employees
maintain that they are few in number, and that they are used
by the Government primarily for staged representations to
international human rights monitors and visiting delegations.
CPDH argues that the open farm prisons are populated by
lower-ranking former Somoza National Guardsmen whose sentences
are almost completed and who have agreed to cooperate with the
Government as informants.
 
According to Catholic and Protestant church officials, priests
and ministers are denied visitation rights or access to the
prisoners. It has been reported to international human rights
monitors that prison authorities have confiscated religious
papers and books and broken up meetings of prisoners engaged
in religious activity.
 
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
 
States of Emergency decreed in 1985 suspended various legal
guarantees and civil rights relating to arrest and detention.
As of November, emergency decrees had deprived persons accused
of non-political offenses of the right to have a hearing
within 24 hours of detention, to request a "personal
exhibition" before a judge, to obtain damages for false
imprisonment, and not to be removed from the jurisdiction of a
competent judge. Also, those accused of non-political
offenses no longer enjoyed the guarantee against arrest
without a warrant. Persons accused of subversive political
actitivies were denied all of the above rights and guarantees
as well as the guarantee of habeas corpus. Thus, any
Nicaraguan citizen is subject to arbitrary arrest at any time
and may be detained for an indefinite period "for
investigation" of what are deemed political offenses without
being formally charged or being accorded any other kind of due
process .
 
In practice, arbitrary arrest and prolonged incommunicado
detentions by state security forces and Sandinista police have
been common for years. Numerous international hum.an rights
monitors, including the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission, Americas Watch, Amnesty International and the
Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights have made detailed and
longstanding protests of these abuses. In its April 1985
report, "Nicaragua-Revolutionary Justice," the Lawyers'
Committee stated that during its investigation government
officials openly admitted to incommunicado detentions of up to
30 days, and the Committee found cases in which persons had
been detained incommunicado for substantial periods ranging
from five weeks to two and one-half months. In one case, the
Lawyer's Committee found that an individual had been detained
for 15 months without being charged.
 
Thousands of Nicaraguan citizens — political opposition
leaders, businessmen, religious officials and lay workers,
journalists, and private citizens who were actual or suspected
dissenters from governmental policies — were arbitrarily
arrested in 1985 and subjected to incommunicado detention
generally ranging from six hours to more than ten days in
State Security prisons or police headc[uarters . During the
incommunicado detentions. State Security agents, and in a few
cases policemen, tried during intense interrogation sessions
to extract statements to support accusations of subversive or
 
"counterrevolutionary" activity on the part of detainees.
Generally the detainees would receive orders to appear at a
State Security prison or police headquarters at a certain
time. On several occasions State Security agents arrested
persons at their homes or work places, sometimes in the middle
of the night. CPDH believes peasants in the rural areas are
subject to more frequent arbitrary arrests and more lengthy
periods of incommunicado detention. In its 1984 letter to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, CPDH claimed that
"arbitrary detention, without trial, without legal charges,
without possibility of defense, has been established as a
system for intimidating citizens. After several months of
illegal detention, they are freed without ever having been
through any court and without being given any opportunity to
defend oneself. Some of the prisoners have died in jails.
Others, after several years in prison, are declared innocent,
but their families have been destroyed, their property has
been confiscated, they have lost their jobs."
 
In 1984 and 1985, CPDH received several complaints of mass
arrests of the citizenry of small villages in war zones for
supposed collaboration with resistance forces, or mass
roundups of youths believed to be evading compulsory military
service. In La Trinidad, 39 peasants, who were arrested and
accused of circulating a letter stating that they had not
voted in the 1984 elections, were held incommunicado for five
days in the Esteli State Security prison. La Barranca. There
they were reportedly deprived of food for several days,
isolated in dark cells, and made to stand in barrels of cold
water until they confessed, before being transferred into the
regular penitentiary system in Managua to await trial in the
TPA.
 
Prisoners detained for TPA trials normally face additional
long (usually five to six months, but sometimes longer)
incommunicado confinement pending investigation by the
Interior Ministry. Investigation can be extended indefinitely
and family members and counsel, who are not notified of the
arrest or generally permitted visits, have no evidence upon
which to file allegations of either physical or psychological
abuse. Writs of habeas corpus, available until October 1985,
only served as notice from a government official, who
reportedly had seen the prisoner, that a given detainee was
being held in the State Security prison. El Chipote.
 
The Government does not usually exile dissidents, but in the
spring of 1985 the Government forbade airlines to bring
opposition leader Arturo Cruz into Managua. Also, many
opposition leaders and critics of the Government have fled
after receiving threats from government officials against
their lives and those of their families and/or after their
sources of livelihood had been destroyed by the Government
through property confiscation or deprivation of employment.
 
In early 1985, the Government extended and broadened the terms
of an amnesty, granted previously only to Miskito Indians and
certain other exiles and "counterrevolutionaries," to include
all Nicaraguans . According to government reports, over 2,000
people had received amnesty under that decree by November
1985. There were no known cases of later detentions for acts
committed prior to amnesty.
 
Prohibitions on the use of compulsory or forced labor are
among the rights and guarantees of Nicaraguan citizens. The
 
October 15 suspension of political and civil liberties did not
affect those provisions of the law.
 
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
 
The state of emergency decreed in 1985 suspended various legal
guarantees and civil rights relating to judicial processes.
As of November, emergency decrees had deprived persons accused
of non-political offenses of the following rights: to be
informed of charges, to have a public trial before a competent
judge, to participate personally in all proceedings from the
start, and to challenge evidence. Such persons no longer
enjoyed the following legal guarantees: against imprisonment
without all requirements of law having been fulfilled, against
double jeopardy, and against conviction for an act which was
not a crime when committed. Persons accused of subversive
political activities were denied the above rights and
guarantees, as well as the right of appeal within the judicial
branch. Within the severe restrictions imposed by the
foregoing suspensions of rights and guarantees, the criminal
courts showed some independence from political manipulation.
Two kinds of special tribunals outside the judicial branch,
however, had nearly discretionary powers to try economic,
political, and security crimes — the Peoples Anti-Somocista
Tribunals (TPA's) and the Sandinista police courts. The TPA's
are entities within the executive branch (Interior Ministry).
The TPA process theoretically functions as follows: once a
complaint is filed, the detainee has two days in which to file
a response. This initial period is followed by an
investigative period of at least eight days, but the
investigation may be extended indefinitely. Following the
conclusion of the investigation the TPA has 3 days (or 10 if
the defendant is not incarcerated), to pronounce sentence.
There is a right of appeal only to the TPA Court of Appeals,
composed of judges drawn from the same pool of people who
staff the TPA. Sentences range from 3 to 30 years. Thus, the
tribunals operate outside the conventional judicial system,
and the defendant has no right to appeal to the regular
judiciary. The members of the tribunals are selected on the
basis of their leadership roles in Sandinista organizations
and only one member of the three-judge panel is required to be
a lawyer. Persons tried in these tribunals technically have
the right to counsel and to introduce evidence, but highly
expedited procedures and the use of flexible evidentiary
standards severely diminish the exercise of these rights. The
proceedings of the TPA's are in theory open to the public, but
in most cases attendance is restricted. Trials have
reportedly been scheduled with little or no advance notice,
limiting opportunities for the accused to prepare his
defense. Legal counsel to TPA defendants are frequently not
advised of their clients' appearances before the court.
Prisoners often spend further months "under investigation,"
even though they may have confessed, before being brought
suddenly to trial. Since all special tribunal cases are tried
in one court in Managua, it is often impossible for witnesses
who live in other areas of the country to attend trials on
time.
 
The TPA's became increasingly active in 1985 and according to
government figures, as of October 31, 995 defendants had been
processed through the tribunals since the TPA's were incepted
on June 6, 1983. CPDH maintains that the number of TPA cases
is much higher, with hundreds of cases remaining in pending
status. The conviction rate of the TPA's is 90 percent, and
 
these tribunals are known for arbitrary actions. In one case
a prisoner was sentenced to seven years, and upon appealing to
another tribunal, was sentenced to an additional eight years,
reportedly for having made recourse to the services of CPDH.
Although the TPA's were established to try subversives and
counterrevolutionaries, one case sent to the TPA in 1985
involved two young Social Democratic Party members, Luis Mora
Sanchez and Mauricio Membreno Gaitan, who were arrested
because they participated in welcoming activities for the
return to Nicaragua of newly-invested Cardinal Obando y
Bravo. Arrested on June 15, the two were investigated during
detention (which was incommunicado for Membreno) for over a
month before being tried in late July. As of early December,
they remained incarcerated, but had not been sentenced.
According to the 1985 Lawyers' Committee for International
Human Rights study of Nicaragua's judicial system, "both the
formal structure and mode of the operation of these tribunals
undermine the basic due process rights of Nicaraguan citizens.'
 
The Sandinista police courts also fall under the jurisdiction
of the Ministry of Interior, and so work within the confines
of a military, not judicial, bureaucracy. Court procedures,
which are not always adhered to, provide that police courts
have seven days following arrest in which to conclude their
proceedings. Within 24 hours of arrest, the police must make
a probable cause determination, upon which the defendant will
be set free or provisionally detained pending investigation.
Investigation should not take more than five days. At the end
of the investigation, the police have 24 hours either to remit
the detainee to the civilian courts or to impose sentence for
an offense that falls within "police tribunal jurisdiction,"
which can include "insulting authority," "cultivation,
possession or distribution of marijuana," and undefined
"economic crimes," such as violations of price controls, and
black marketeering. The judges (Sandinista police officers)
enjoy wide latitude: at the end of their investigations they
may, at their discretion, remit detainees to the civilian
courts or sentence them to up to two years in jail. Thus, a
person who is brought before a police tribunal may, within a
few days, be sentenced to two years without right to appeal.
The Lawyers' Committee for International Human Rights
condemjied the 1900 Law of Judicial Functions of the Sandinista
police as "a particularly disturbing assault on the right to
be tried by an independent tribunal." CPDH maintains that
police courts have condemned several opposition leaders on
trumped-up charges for purely political reasons.
 
The Government claims it has no political prisoners, though it
admits to holding about 5,000 prisoners, including some 2,000
former National Guardsmen, plus other people convicted of
counterrevolutionary subversive activities. CPDH
conservatively estimates that the political prisoner total,
including National Guardsmen who were convicted without due
process, is between 7,500 and 10,000, with approximately 700
to 1,000 of that number being held at any one time for
investigation in State Security prisons. The ICRC estimate of
numbers of political prisoners falls within this range of
7,500-10,000.
 
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
 
On October 15, the Government suspended Article 18 of the
Statute of Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguahs, which states
 
that "no person will be subject to arbitrary or illegal
interference affecting his private life, his family, his home,
his correspondence or his communications." Thus, with no
legal requirement for a search warrant, police and state
security officials regularly enter and search private
residences, particularly those belonging to political
opposition figures. The Government opens private mail and
intercepts both incoming and outgoing international mail, taps
telephone lines, and inspects the baggage and personal effects
of both arriving and departing international travelers to
confiscate items of literature including newspapers, films or
tape recordings alleged to be subversive, as well as some
religious materials that originate abroad.
 
The Government has developed an elaborate and effective
security and intelligence network, employing both the security
forces and Sandinista party organizations, particularly the
"Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS's)," to ferret out
dissidents and suspected subversives. The CDS's, based on
Cuban model block committees, are organized in most
neighborhoods throughout the country. The CDS central office
serves as headcjuarters for a network of informers and as an
instrument of pervasive political control and
 
intimidation — they are self-described as the "eyes and ears of
the revolution." Participation in the CDS is supposed to be
voluntary, but they employ many methods to entice or pressure
individuals into joining, including committee control over the
distribution of ration cards for the purchase of basic
products such as rice, beans, and soap. In 1985, access to
public health care, public records, and the right to
employment often depended upon a letter of recommendation from
a local CDS. While many people who do not participate in
Sandinista party activities suffer no ill effects, others are
disdained as politically suspect or are denounced by
Sandinista activists as subversives — for example, if they
refuse to perform CDS neighborhood night guard duty known as
"revolutionary vigilance." People who criticize the
"revolutionary process" or its leadership may be subjected to
pressure ranging from public ridicule and defacement of their
homes to loss of employment and even detention.
 
CPDH has credible reports that under-age Nicaraguan males have
been impressed into military service, including boys as young
as twelve years old. A riot broke out in the small town of
Nagarote in January 1985 as the citizenry resisted mass
round-ups of youths by government troops, who forced their way
into homes and public places.
 
Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:
 
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
 
The Government intensified its policy of prior censorship and
practice of harassment against the private and electronic
media in 1985. Since 1982, the only independent newspaper. La
Prensa, has suffered widespread censorship of new materials
and editorials. The two other newspapers, both supported by
the Government, at times publish the same items that have been
censored from La Prensa. -The distribution of newsprint to all
three newspapers is controlled by the Government, which limits
the number of pages per week they may publish. Many small
publications not aligned directly with the Government were
forced to c^ase publication because of their inability to
obtain newsprint. Though a July 19, 1984, decree proclaimed
 
that censorship would affect only matters of national
security, censorship in fact continued on internal political
matters, economic problems. Church affairs, human rights and
many other non-security issues. Censorship of La Prensa
continued to be capricious and increased sharply by the end of
the year. La Prensa editors estimated that in 1985, before
the October 15 decree, 40 percent of the news coverage was
censored; after the decree, the share regularly censored
increased to approximately 80 percent. The paper had failed
to publish eight times as of December 5, 1985. The Government
also banned private and internal publications not for sale to
the general public of organizations which had not first
received permission to publish nor agreed to submit to prior
censorship.
 
In early October, the Government told the Church that its
planned newspaper. La Iglesia, would have to be registe.red
with the Ministry of Interior's Directorate of Media
Communications. The Church feared the request was a prelude
to prior censorship, which the Church has consistently
resisted. On October 12, the first issue of La Iglesia was
printed. A delivery truck carrying copies to various churches
was stopped by police and the driver forced to retrace his
route, picking up already distributed copies of the
newspaper. Later, armed men went to the Church's office and
confiscated the remaining copies and printing equipment. When
the Church attempted to register La Iglesia, the request to
publish was denied.
 
On October 22, the Ministry of Interior issued a notice that
all communications media and printing facilities must register
with the Ministry of Interior. A literary magazine was
confiscated prior to that date, and an opposition political
party was told the party could no longer print and distribute
its monthly newsletter without prior censorship. Several La
Prensa journalists and most of the people involved with the
publication of the Catholic paper were detained in El Chipote
for interrogation, during which they were charged with
involvement in "subversive" activities: one of La Iglesia 's
staff members, a foreign-born resident, was deported.
Government security agents also harassed La Prensa
distributors in areas outside of Managua, forcing a number to
cease operations. In September, a small private publishing
house was occupied by State Security forces and its owner
jailed, reportedly for agreeing to print a private sector
pamphlet. In November, the Ministry of Interior informed the
independent human rights commission, CPDH, that all its
publications, communiques and letters would be subject to
prior censorship.
 
The Government owns two-thirds of the radio stations in the
country. Production and broadcast of news programs are
tightly controlled. Since 1982, 21 independent radio news
programs have gone off the air because of excessive
censorship. All radio programming, including commentary,
names of music selections, and sponsors, must be submitted to
the censors in advance. In the case of the two independent
religious radio stations, one Protestant and one Catholic, the
censors have, for example, found verses from the Bible and
messages from the Pope and other rel-igious leaders
objectionable. Live transmissions on radio or television of
Masses are prohibited, and the Government repeatedly
threatened to close the "Radio Catolica" station and to
confiscate its offices and equipment if the station failed to
 
follow censorship orders. In 1982, the Ministry of Interior
closed the station for 15 days for failure to abide by its
censorship orders. In 1985, the Ministry of Interior twice
raided the station to terminate transmission of Cardinal
Obando ' s Masses, on one occasion despite previous assurances
from Minister of Interior Tomas Borge that the Mass could be
broadcast. On October 30, the station was closed for 48 hours
as punishment for the broadcast of an unapproved homily by the
Cardinal. On January 1, 1986 the Government announced that
the station had been closed down by the Ministry of Interior
because it had failed to join a national radio network in
broadcasting President Daniel Ortega's end-of-year message.
Both public statements by Government officials and the wording
of the official announcement, which referred to the closure
rather than suspension of Radio Catolica suggest that the
shut-down may be permanent .
 
Both existing television channels are state-owned and managed
by the "Sandinista System" (SSTV) . Their daily news programs,
"Sandinista News," are identical, and the content of the
programming is indisputably partisan.
 
The Government also has stymied individual freedom of
expression through selective persecution — the case of the
torture of the Catholic Parents Association president for
criticizing the state-enforced Sandinista patriotic education
curriculum in religious schools is only one example.
Non-programmed, critical questions or comments at government
town meetings may subject the speaker to imprisonment or
worse, according to cases on file with CPDH. There were
detentions in retaliation for verbal expressions of private
views or participation in public events and for the purpose of
interrogation and intimidation on political
subjects — political party and church links, contacts with
foreign embassies, views expressed by priests, employment by
foreign missions, support from foreign labor political groups,
and so forth.
 
While there is no censorship of domestic or imported books,
few books from the West are on sale in Nicaraguan book
stores. Most books are subsidized and book stores are stocked
largely with publications from Communist countries. The
Government's imposition of "curriculum rationalization and
coordination" on the two Nicaraguan universities has limited
their autonomy in developing their curricula and has further
circumscribed academic freedom. The Ministry of Education has
imposed curricula with a strong ideological content on primary
and secondary schools as well. Also, the Sandinista Youth
organization is a pervasive influence in the public education
system; it has reportedly paid for some members' tuition in
private schools in order to have the organization represented
there. Sandinista Youth members allegedly have denounced
teachers for not supporting the Government.
 
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
 
On October 15, 1985, an official decree suspended many legal
rights and guarantees including the right to "associate
oneself freely with others for legal purposes;" the right to
"found and promote regular, commercial, rural, etc.,
organizations and labor or professional organizations;" the
right of unions to form federations and national
confederations; and the right of these to form international
union organizations or to affiliate with them. The right to
 
 
Strike was suspended simultaneously.
 
Before the October 15 decree, rights to associate and to
establish organizations existed in theory but were limited in
two ways: by a government requirement that all organizations
have approved legal status (personeria juridica), and by
government refusal to grant such status to organizations which
it disdained. At least one professional organization, one
political party, and a Protestant ministers' association
applied for such status, but were refused. The application of
an independent labor union has been pending for several
years. These organizations therefore remain technically
illegal, as do all their activities.
 
Prior to the October 15 decree, the right to assemble
physically in one place existed in theory and was often
respected. The Government sometimes made it impossible to
assemble in desired locations, however, by refusing to rent
space for private sector gatherings and to religious groups;
by refusing permits for peaceful marches, reportedly by asking
private theater owners not to rent to certain groups for
specific meetings; and by ordering bus companies not to
transport attendees. On May 1, police forcibly halted
Confederation of Labor Unification members who planned to walk
from a church where they had attended Mass to the site of Luis
Medrano's assassination by the National Guard. Government
officials publicly interpreted the October 15 suspension of
the right to associate physically as a ban only on outdoor
gatherings for which permits had not been granted. In one
case, a dozen members of a committee which organized the
celebration of Mass by the Cardinal in Chinandega in November
were arrested because an unauthorized outdoor procession
occurred there prior to the Mass. In September, the
organizers of a private celebration were summoned and warned
to cancel the festivities, and were held under house arrest on
the day of the event. In December, five hundred persons
invited to attend a graduation of private development trainees
were also turned away by the police. Large outdoor assemblies
by government-sponsored or favored groups, however, are
routine during national holidays, Sandinista and Communist
party anniversaries, and so forth.
 
Seven major labor confederations operate in Nicaragua. The
two largest are linked directly to the FSLN: the Sandinista
Workers Central (CST) and the Rural Workers Association
(ATC) . Three others are Marxist organizations with ties to
Nicaragua's various Communist parties (the Independent General
Confederation of Workers, with approximately 1600 members; the
Confederation of Labor Action and Unity, with approximately
2600 members; and the Workers' Front, a marginal organization
the membership of which is unknown.) Of the remaining two
independent confederations, one is affiliated with the
Christian Social Party (the Nicaraguan Workers' Central with
approximately 3200 members) and the other,
 
democratically-oriented, has no party affiliation. The CST is
the FSLN's umbrella confederation for mostly non-agricultural
workers, and with over 45,000 members is the country's largest
labor confederation. The ATC is a farm labor confederation
with over 35,000 members. According to ATC officials,
however, the figure does not include more than 100,000
seasonal workers.
 
In addition to the large labor confederations, the Sandinistas
also control most of the smaller labor unions representing
 
 
various worker groups, such as teachers, health workers,
journalists, and government employees. As is the case with
the confederations, however, these labor organizations
represent the interests of the Government, rather than those
of the workers. Union officials thus act to ensure compliance
with various Government decrees and regulations, encouraging
strict labor discipline, inhibiting the normal demands for
wage and benefit improvements, and discouraging strikes.
 
Despite these efforts, the worsening economic situation in
1985 led to increasing labor dissatisfaction among both the
FSLN-af filiated and independent labor organizations. This
unrest most often was expressed in short-lived wildcat
strikes, which in every instance were put down through the use
of the police and generally brief arrests of activists and
leaders. While prior to the October 15 decree the right to
strike existed in theory, in practice strikes were not
tolerated. In June of 1985, for example, workers in the
Ernesto Chamorro Soap Factory in Granada called a wildcat
strike when the Government suspended payment in kind (the
augmentation of workers' salaries by providing them with goods
produced). The Government's reaction to the strike was first
to ask the workers to return to their jobs, because it was the
duty of all workers to support the revolution, especially
while the country was at war. When the workers refused to
comply, police were used to break up the strike and force the
workers back to the job. Several workers were detained
briefly.
 
Some arrests, however, involved much longer detention.
Alejandro Solorzano, International Affairs Secretary of the
Independent General Confederation of Workers, was arrested on
October 15 and remains imprisoned. Solorzano has been
charged, according to Interior Minister Tomas Borge, with
"actions contrary to the methods used in a revolutionary
country." Other actions against the independent union
organizations included an armed raid of Independent
Confederation of Workers of Nicaragua headquarters, in which
State Security agents confiscated all union papers and
documents and arrested Board members August in Rodriguez,
Sergio Roa, and Eugenio Membreno. The three men were released
following six hours of interrogation.
 
There have been no reported strikes since the State of
Emergency was decreed in October .
 
c. Freedom of Religion
 
An estimated 80 percent of the Nicaraguan population is
Catholic, and Catholicism and other religions are legal.
Throughout most of the year, church services were not
interfered with, but Catholic Radio and Radio Waves of Light
(an evangelical station) were required to tape and transcribe
Masses, sermons and religious services to be broadcast and to
submit them for prior censorship.
 
Relations between the Government and the Catholic hierarchy
and some Protestant churches have been strained for the past
several years, but a new deterioration in relations between
the Catholic Church and the Government began in the early
summer of 1985 with the elevation of Archbishop Obando y Bravo
to Cardinal . Hundreds of thousands of Nicaraguans poured into
the streets to welcome the Cardinal in June when he returned
from Rome. Two events marred the ceremonies. Police applied
a water cannon to a group of faithful trying to enter the
 
airport grounds to greet the Cardinal as he stepped off the
airplane. Because of their participation in the welcoming
ceremonies, eight young men were subsequently detained. Six
were released after a few days, including one young man who
admitted that he had shouted "Nine Get Out," a reference to
the Sandinista National Directorate of nine comandantes; two
were still detained as of December and were tried by the TPA
for crimes against the state. Tensions diminished slightly
between June and August, but in September the Government
stepped up pressure on the Church. On September 12 and 25,
Interior Ministry agents raided the Catholic Radio station,
terminating transmissions of the Cardinal's homilies. The
Ministry of Interior's response to the Church's protests of
the incidents was to reiterate the necessity for submitting
taped and transcribed homilies for prior censorship. The
Government's position was underscored on October 30, when
Catholic Radio was closed by official order for 48 hours for
broadcast of an unapproved homily. On January 1, 1986, the
Ministry of Interior closed the station again.
 
The Government also violated an informal agreement with the
Church exempting seminarians from military service; during the
month of September six seminarians from Granada and five from
the Chontales area had been conscripted. Church efforts to
secure their release have not been successful. Fifteen
foreign priests working in the Rivas-Granada area involved in
protesting the conscriptions were called before immigration
authorities on October 1 and warned that if they did not
desist from "political activities" they would be deported.
The Church protested those threats, but again there was no
response from the Government.
 
On October 15, security officials forced their way into the
Church's Social Services offices, threatening, photographing,
and eventually expelling the workers from the premises. State
Security agents declared the office "officially occupied" and
denied entry to all Church officials, including the Cardinal.
 
In November, the Ministry of Interior notified Cardinal Obando
y Bravo that he must obtain the permission of the Government
before traveling outside Managua to celebrate mass. The
Cardinal's popular outdoor masses have been banned, and
worshippers were prevented from entering some towns where he
was holding services.
 
Government pressure on evangelicals was also stepped up during
1985. In early May, Oklahoma-based evangelist Larry Jones
accepted an invitation to come to Managua, participate in a
crusade, and distribute food through his "Feed the Children"
campaign. Although Jones obtained personal assurances from
President Daniel Ortega that he could hold his crusade and
distribute six truck-loads of food through participating
churches, the Government confiscated the food during the
customs process. After lengthy negotiations, the Government
returned four of the six loads, keeping two for its own use.
The Government told Jones the confiscated food would be used
to feed persons relocated under the government's resettlement
plan, but it provided no evidence that the food was actually
used for that purpose. On September 29, activities sponsored
by a number of evangelical churches were disrupted by
Sandinista mobs (turbas divinas). On October 30, State
Security began rounding up leaders and youth activists from
such groups as Campus Crusade for Christ, the First
Evangelical Church of Central America, the National Council of
 
Nicaraguan Evangelical Pastors, the Alliance for Children, and
the Nicaraguan Bible Society. These men and women were
subjected to abusive treatment. Some were forced to strip and
wait for long periods in dark, cold cells, before
interrogation. All were released from detention after periods
ranging from one to ten days. One of the evangelicals, the
Rev. Boanerges Mendoza, was rearrested and held for ten days
because he discussed his first detention. Another
evangelical. Dr. Jimmy Hassan, chose to leave Nicaragua for
exile because of the threats made against him and his family.
 
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
Travel, Emigration and Repatriation
 
The October 15, 1985 state of emergency decree suspended
freedom of travel throughout the country. The new restriction
has, so far, been used against several thousand Catholic
worshipers, who were prevented from attending two special
masses given by the Nicaraguan Cardinal and against some
opponents of the regime. It has not greatly affected routine
travel, although security checkpoints are now numerous in all
regions except the Pacific. The Government requires exit
visas for departure from Nicaragua for both Nicaraguan
citizens and resident foreigners. Opposition leaders still
experience difficulty in obtaining exit visas. In August of
1985, the Government responded to the flight of medical
doctors by requiring them to obtain permission from Ministry
of Health regional directors before applying for exit visas.
Other Nicaraguans with specialized skills, such as some
refinery workers, must also obtain prior permission.
Draft-age males cannot obtain exit visas without proof that
they have registered for military service. Foreign travel
remains difficult for most Nicaraguans because the Government
controls access to hard currency and limits to US$1,000 the
amount that may be taken out. Nicaraguans wishing to drive
their cars out of the country also must post bonds which equal
half the current value of the cars. The Government continues
to confiscate the property of Nicaraguans who remain out of
the country for periods of six months or more.
 
During 1985, thousands more Nicaraguans left the country. The
Governments of Honduras and Costa Rica estimate the number of
Nicaraguans in those countries at around 200,000, with another
200,000-250,000 in the United States, Mexico, and other Latin
American countries, although the number granted refugee status
is considerably smaller. Continued fighting and conscription,
military induction of men up to age 40 for reserve units, and
deteriorating economic and political conditions generate large
outflows to neighboring countries. Nicaraguans who have fled
the country and then choose to return appear not to face
penalties. The UN reports that 750 people have been
repatriated since January of 1985; the Government claims over
1,500.
 
In late 1981 and early 1982, the Government forcibly relocated
about 10,000 Miskito Indians from their homelands to distant
resettlement camps. In 1983, group political executions of
East Coast Miskito Indians by the Sandinista military and
security forces were condemned by the International League for
Human Rights, and in reports made to the U.S. Congress, the
OAS and the Indian Law Resource Center by Miskito Indian
expert, Berkeley Professor Bernard Nietschman. The New York
Times has estimated that approximately 800 Indian civilians
were killed by the Sandinista Government. In an effort to
 
mend relations with the Miskito Indians and to appease
outraged international human rights organizations, the
Sandinista government in 1985 publicly acknowledged its "past
errors" and is now attempting to return Miskitos, earlier
forcibly moved to relocation camps, to their homelands near
the Rio Coco. A government program to resettle Miskitos who
had fled to Honduras has brought back another 5,000 persons to
the Rio Coco area.
 
On March 10, 1985, President Daniel Ortega announced that the
Government would begin new forced evacuation of thousands of
peasants from the northern countryside. He then stated that
7,000 families would be affected. The head of the government
social service agency later estimated that 50,000 people would
be moved in 1985, as part of a program that could affect
200,000-250,000 people. According to Sandinista officials,
the purpose of the program was twofold: to deprive resistance
forces of local support by removing from war zones relatives
and neighbors sympathetic to them, and to create "free-fire
zones," where the Sandinista People's Army could operate
freely. CPDH believes another objective of the forced
relocations is to create new dependence on the Government —
resettlement camps in which the inhabitants must accept
government indoctrination and policies in order to survive.
The Government describes those relocated as "displaced peasant
families" who mobilized themselves in response to resistance
forces attacks, seeking Sandinista government protection.
Many peasants, nonetheless, report that Sandinista troops
arrived in their towns and ordered the inhabitants to leave
within 24 hours or less. In the northern town of Limay,
evacuees and relief officers reported that homes of peasants
were burned and animals killed to prevent people from
returning. One evacuation official claimed that some people
had been evacuated only because they had relatives with the
resistance forces and that others had been ordered to leave
because the Government had told them that they wanted to bomb
their area.
 
Nicaragua has received more than 20,000 displaced persons
since 1979, most of them from El Salvador. This figure also
includes Colombians, Uruguayans, Chileans and Argentines. The
UNHCR gave material assistance to displaced persons in
Nicaragua, most of whom are Salvadorans. The Nicaraguan
Government works closely with the UNHCR to integrate these
people into society, and many no longer receive assistance.
Of the 1,532 persons aided by the UNHCR in 1985, about 500 had
been integrated, and assistance to them ceased by year's end.
As of September 1985, 14 Argentines, 430 Salvadorans, 18
Chileans, 10 Colombians, and 52 Uruguayans had been
repatriated. No displaced persons have been forcibly
repatriated, although a number of Iranians attempting to enter
Nicaragua from Costa Rica were deported back to their point of
departure in Europe.
 
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
 
A fundamental ideological conflict exists between the right of
Nicaraguans generally to effect political change and the
Sandinista Front's asserted right to rule, derived from its
self-defined Marxist-Leninist role as the "vanguard party" of
the people. From 1979 to 1984, the Front's National
Directorate ruled through a junta of government, a council of
state, and cabinet ministries. The Sandinistas always had a
 
monopoly of force, and with that they increasingly dominated
both executive and legislative functions. The November 1984
election of president, vice president, and National Assembly
did not diminish their domination. It merely permitted a
small minority composed of other parties to have formal, if
ineffectual, roles in the legislative process. The Sandinista
Directorate controls the Assembly through its majority of
seats and its president, who is a member of the Front's
National Directorate.
 
The Sandinistas have been even more jealous of power in the
executive branch. All major appointments are of Sandinistas
or their collaborators, and all policy decisions are made by
Sandinistas. The statutes adopted by the National Assembly in
April 1985 recognize that major decision-making authority lies
with the executive. The National Assembly, which serves as a
legislative body and the constitutional drafting institution,
has no authority to involve itself in foreign policy,
international agreements, or the budget. Moreover, during a
state of emergency, the statutes provide that all legislative
functions accrue to the President. That provision, however,
has never been implemented.
 
Thirteen political parties exist in Nicaragua. There are a
few small ones which do not normally criticize the
Sandinistas. Government treatment of the others in 1985
reflected the Sandinistas' Marxist-Leninist assertion of the
right to rule and extreme sensitivity to those who dispute
it. In 1985 there were detentions of opposition activists of
the Independent Liberal, Social Democratic, Liberal
Constitutionalist, Social Christian, and Conservative (PCN)
Parties; a complete prohibition on opposition demonstrations
and parades; censorship of mass media to prevent even the
mention of certain opposition parties; newly-imposed prior
censorship of all written material distributed by all parties;
interference with some parties' attempts to rent meeting
halls; and personal intimidation of some party leaders at
homes and offices.
 
The foregoing forms of repression, along with uncertainties
created by a general suspension of civil and political rights
in October, were clearly designed to dampen the desires of
opponents to maintain viable independent parties. The
suspension of rights left no citizen with legal freedom to
travel in the country, communicate in writing, organize
groups, assemble peacefully, or be free from disruptions to
home, family, correspondence and other communications. Though
prevented from striking back publicly in any effective way,
all opposition parties issued statements condemning the
suspension of rights. Even those parties in the National
Assembly, other than the FSLN, voted against or walked out on
the Sandinistas' proposal for ratification of the decree
abolishing rights.
 
In addition to acquiring political party and governmental
power, the Sandinistas have attempted to displace or frustrate
independent civic and political pressure groups in order to
achieve a monopoly of those also. Virtually every independent
labor, professional, civic, commercial, and agricultural
pressure group has its Sandinista-created counterpart, which
is reportedly government-funded and always promoted publicly
by the pro-Sandinista mass media. Formation of Sandinista
parallel organizations for traditional groups appears to be
the other side of a strategy of limiting the influence of
 
independent groups by restricting their rights. Creation of
competing organizations indirectly reduces the power of
citizens to effect changes in government policies. In
addition, the creation of Sandinista Defense Committees in
urban areas at the neighborhood and block levels has tended to
preempt or discourage the formation of community-based
pressure groups. Would-be organizers of such groups are
accused of anti-revolutionary sentiments and ostracized for
trying to bypass the Sandinista Defense Committees, the ruling
party's chosen instrument for grass-roots social change.
 
The small number of elected officials in Nicaragua also limits
citizens' access to those who might be responsive to pressures
for change in Government or government policies. There are no
elected municipal, departmental, or regional officials. There
are less than 100 elected officials in the Government.
Municipal elections have been discussed publicly by government
officials, but none was scheduled as of late 1985.
 
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
 
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
 
The Government has not been forthcoming on investigations of
alleged violations of human rights which were to be carried
out independently of the Government. The independent human
rights organization, the Permanent Commission on Human Rights
(CPDH), an organization founded in 1977 to focus the world's
attention on human rights violations by the Somoza regime, has
been consistently frustrated in its efforts to do its job. In
the most serious attempt to bring CPDH activities under state
control, in November the Ministry of Interior ordered that all
documents prepared by the organization be submitted to the
Ministry for prior censorship.
 
Although a few non-governmental organizations have been
allowed to enter the country to observe human rights
conditions, these visits have been closely structured by the
Government to expose the groups only to information and
situations beneficial to the Government. This strategy of
deception has been detailed by Alvaro Baldizon, who related
that the efforts made to disinform include the careful
preparation of places intended for visits. Such preparation
includes the seclusion and even arrest of persons whose views
toward the Government are known or suspected to be negative,
and the placement of others — usually members of the Ministry
of Interior — to act as "local residents" for the benefit of
the visitors. According to Baldizon, security agents
pretending to be journalists, photographers, or relatives of
actual local residents frequently join the visiting group and
act to steer the groups to particular places or persons, and
to assist in the development of an itinerary. Such agents
constitute what the Ministry terms "casual encounter" teams.
Not only does the control of access to the public ensure the
promotion of a positive image of the Government's policies and
actions, it also provides a channel through which false
information can be disseminated concerning alleged brutalities
by the armed resistance.
 
The offices of Peace and Justice, the newly-formed human
rights investigatory arm of the Catholic Church, have been
occupied by security forces.
 
The umbrella group for the armed resistance, the United
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO), has formed its own human rights
 
organization which is charged with the education of troops on
their obligations under the Geneva Conventions, the American
Human Rights Convention, and UNO's own Code of Conduct; the
maintenance of records on abuses by its own forces and those
of the Sandinistas; and the prosecution of UNO troops accused
of abuses. According to UNO records, 21 individuals were so
prosecuted between May and November, of whom 19 were found
guilty and sentenced, and two were acquitted. The offenses
involved theft, espionage, drug use, rape, and murder.
 
Amnesty International Report 1985, which covers events in
 
1984, expressed concern over detention of prisoners of
conscience, primarily trade union and political party
activists; unfair trials of political prisoners; and
incommunicado detention before political prisoners were
brought before the courts. Freedom House rates Nicaragua
"partly free. "
 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL SITUATION
 
Nicaragua had a population growth rate of about 3.0 percent in
 
1985. The present population of the country is 3.23 million
people. Per capita gross income dropped sharply in 1984 and
1985, as a result of inflation and a fall in the value of the
cordoba.
 
The Nicaraguan economy experienced negative growth in 1984 and
indications are that 1985 was worse. Inflation rose to an
annual rate of over 200 percent. Private investment in the
economy has virtually ceased, and government investment has
been restricted to projects related to the war effort. Export
values dropped in 1984 to US$393 million and to US$300 million
or less for 1985. Import values were maintained at high
levels as the Government continued to rely heavily on imported
raw materials. Trade sanctions imposed by the U.S. in May
1985 have had an impact on the economy, but have affected
private industry more than the government-controlled sectors;
the Government had already begun a shift away from the United
States to other, more friendly markets for its exports. Hard
currency shortages have restricted imports, and the Government
has begun to rely on donations of insecticides, fertilizers,
and other vital inputs. Since May 1985, that trend has
accelerated.
 
Serious economic mismanagement, trade difficulties, and armed
opposition activity all contributed to Nicaragua's economic
woes in 1985. Although the private sector accounts for
roughly 60 percent of gross domestic product, it is closely
controlled by government regulation of all sales,
distribution, prices, bank credits, and foreign trade. The
Government has responded to economic problems by increasing,
rather than decreasing, its degree of control over production
and marketing processes — a solution that has further stifled
private investment and initiative, and perpetuated
bureaucratic inefficiencies. Despite the Government's
proclaimed intention to foster a mixed economy, it has
proceeded with confiscations of private property. In many
cases, the lands and facilities seized have been taken for
blatantly political reasons. One of the most productive
coffee farms in Central America was expropriated for
"inefficiency" in April 1985. The owner is actively involved
in the civic opposition. Seven leading cotton growers lost
their lands and production facilities when the Government
declared them to be "too big" and asserted the right of
 
workers to farm corn and beans on land of their own. The
properties given to peasant families and cooperatives come
mainly from confiscations. Some are given titles legalizing
possession of land (usually in the mountains) already held and
farmed by a family, sometimes for generations. Land titles
distributed under the Agarian Reform Program grant the holder
the rights outlined in the 1981 Agrarian Reform Act. The law
specifically grants right to use only; holders of title cannot
sell the land or divide it into parcels. Their children may
inherit it, but only as an indivisible unit. In many cases,
possession is contingent upon participation in a cooperative,
or upon cultivation of a particular crop.
 
In a June meeting with the country's doctors and health
professionals. President Daniel Ortega conceded that the
people of the country were not receiving the kind of medical
attention they should expect, and he acknowledged that the
national health care situation was truly critical. Most
public hospitals, though free, are poorly maintained, staffed,
and lack equipment. Foreign exchange shortages and war effort
priorities in the budget have caused extreme shortages in
medicines. East bloc countries have provided and staffed
several new health centers and hospitals. The infant
mortality rate in 1985 was 69.0 deaths per 1,000 live births.
According to government figures, about 91 percent of the urban
population and 10 percent of the rural population have access
to safe water, but severe water shortages experienced in
1984-85 may have decreased these percentages. The Government
reported that 10 percent of the population was on social
security rolls in 1984 and the literacy rate had reached 88
percent. Unemployment stayed at about 20 percent, although
the character of the work force changed somewhat. Skilled
laborers, technicians, and professionals continued to leave
Nicaragua, and in many cases there was no one to replace
them. Fifty percent of those unemployed in 1984 were
agricultural workers, many of whom have left the land to seek
greater income in the capital. At the same time, the
agricultural sector experienced a serious labor shortage in
1984. Students, office workers, and international volunteers
were mobilized to pick coffee and cotton, both vital export
crops .
 
Children under the age of 14 are not permitted to work
legally. Ministry of Labor officials, however, admit that the
prohibition on child labor is often disregarded in the
countryside, where entire families often labor for wages,
particularly at harvest time. Under the National
Organizational System for Work and Salaries (SNOTS), minimum
and maximum salaries have been established for all of
Nicaragua's salaried employees working in the public and
private sectors. Agricultural workers have not been
incorporated into SNOTS, and most are paid on the basis of
productivity (e.g., the amount of coffee or cotton picked).
For those who labor in the fields daily, however, a minimum
wage of 138 cordobas per task (a task is defined as a three to
four hour period) plus a daily food allowance of 40 cordobas
have been established. Farm laborers may elect to perform two
tasks daily, thereby raising their daily wage to 278
cordobas. Workers paid under the SNOTS system also receive an
extra month's vacation per annum. Workers may elect, however,
to take all or part of their vacation days as salary. As the
SNOTS system established maximum as well as minimum wages,
collective bargaining was eliminated. However, employers or
workers can apply to the Ministry of Labor for permission to
 
pay or receive either a one-time or annual bonus.
Women are not subject to any special restrictive measures by
the Government, and are active at all levels of society and
government, other than the highest policy-making bodies.
Women serve as officials in both the Sandinista and
independent political parties, and a woman serves as the
president of one of the Conservative Democratic Party
factions. A large number of seats on the Council of States
are also filled by women. Participation of women in the
military is voluntary.
 
Conditions for the Miskitos remain poor. Whole villages,
infrastructure and crops, previously razed by Sandinistas,
have not been restored. Food shortages and malnutrition
reportedly continue to exist, and a number of restrictions or
movement and ownership have been established. Weather,
military activity, and economic restraints have reportedly
hampered the government's current project to return the
Miskitos to their ancestral homelands, according to local
press accounts .