Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1992
CUBA
Cuba is a totalitarian state dominated by President Fidel Castro, who is Chief of
State, Head of Government, First Secretary of the Communist Party, and Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces. President Castro seeks to control all aspects
of Cuban life through a broad network of directorates ultimately answerable to him
through the Communist Party, as well as through the bureaucracy and the state
security apparatus. The party is the only legal political entity and is headed by an
elite group whose membership is ultimately determined by Fidel Castro. All government
positions, rncluddng judicial ofiices, are controlled by the party. Though not a
formal requirement, party membership is a de facto prerequisite for high-level official
positions and professional advancement.
The Ministry of Interior (MININT) is the principal organ of state security and totalitarian
control. It operates border and police forces, orchestrates public demonstrations,
determines whether to recognize nongovernmental associations, investigates
nonconformity, regulates migration, and maintains pervasive vigilance
through a series of mass organizations and informants. It also is charged with the
suppression of dissent and opposition of any kind. The Ministry is under the de
facto control of the Revolutionaiy Armed Forces (FAR). The mass organizations attempt
to extend government and Communist Party control over each citizen's daUy
activities at home, work, and school. Neighborhood Committees for the Defense of
the Revolution (CDR's) mobilize citizens, impose ideological conformity, and report
suspicious behavior.
Tiie economy is highly centralized and managed by President Castro and a group
of close advisors. The Gfovemment controls the means of production and is virtually
the country's sole employer. In 1992 the economy continued to decline dramatically,
reflecting the collapse in Cuba's economic relationship with the former Soviet Union.
An annual $4 billion in Soviet aid in 1989 has been reduced to zero. Total foreign
trade in 1992 was one-third of the 1989 level. The Government has not taken any
economic reforms which could arrest the downward spiral in Cuba's tightly controlled
economy. The Government continues its stringent austerity measures Known
as 'i.he special period in peacetime," which calls for draconian efforts to establish
economic self-sufdciency.
The Government sharply restricts all basic human rights, including freedom of expression,
association, assembly, and movement, as well as the right to privacy, the
ri^t of citizens to change their government, and worker rights. Authorities oft«n
neutralize dissent through a variety of tactics designed to keep activists off balance,
divided, and discredited by labeling them as mentally disturbed social misfits or
hostile agents of foreign countries. It continues widespread use of "acts of repudiation,"
which are attacks by mobs organized by the Government but portrayed as
being spontaneous public rebukes of dissident activity. Crowds of people are
amassed outside homes of activists to harass and ridicule them, yell insults, and
vandalize properly. At times, the tareeted activist is forced throu{^ the crowd by
Eolice and beaten and spat upon. The Government also metes out exceptionally
arsh prison sentences to activists who are considered a threat to its control. Americas
Watch accurately reported that The human ri^ts situation in Cuba, where
civU and politiral n^ts are systematically violated in law and in practice, was
punctuated in 1992 by reprisals against dissidents, particularly human rights monitors
and peaceful prodemocracy activists.*
In February, the JJH. HumooKi^ts Commission (UNHRC) passed a resolution
endorsing the report of the UNHRCTs Special Representative, wnich cited over 150
cases of systematic human ri^ts abuses. The resolution notes with "deep regret"
Cuba's failure to cooperate wim liie UNHRC, and 'profound concera" over "numerous
uncontradicted reports" of human rights violations. The resolution also mandated
estabUshment oi a Special Rapporteur—a step reserved for the world's most
serious human ri^^ts violators—to report on human ri^ts in Cuba. Althou^ Cuba
did not allow the new Special Rapporteur, like his predecessor, to visit, his interim
report to the UJ^. General Assembly (UNGA) in November contained strong and detaued
criticism of Cuba's gross violations of human ri^^ts. It concluded with six
steps Cuba must take to bring its human risiits practices up to minimum international
standards. This report resulted in tne Elecember 4 passage of the first
UNGA resolution ever on human rights in Cuba, which expressed profound concern"
at Cuba's human ri^ts record. Six days later, on U.N. Human Rights Day,
the Government unleashea a massive wave of repression against human rights activists,
arresting, beating, threatening, placing under house arrest, or otherwise
harassing virtually eveiy leading activist. For most of the year, Cuba's human
rights record remained as poor as in 1991. However, the sudden crackdown on December
10 signaled a significant worsening in the Government's human rights
record.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Induing Freedom from
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.
Government agents were responsible
for several extrajudicial killings. On May 10, policemsui Juan Corrales Rego shot
and killed Jose Francisco Gonzalez Campo in Arroyo Naranjo as he was lying defenseless
on the ground, after Gonzalez was picked up for questioning relating to
a bicycle accident. Joive Guillen Linares, 13-year-old son of a numan rights activist,
and Maximo Fagundo Martinez were shot and killed by police late in 1991.
People were dso killed or injured after the Government organized vigilance brifades
to prevent people from stealing food. For example, a 12-year-oia boy was
iUed ana another nine boys wounded by a guard at a plantation in Guira de
Melena while taking bananas, and an 11-year-old boy was seriously wounded by a
guard at the Aranguito plantation also while tiying to steal bananas. Several persons
were shot ana killed while tiying to steal sugar.
Felipe Timoneda, detained by police in a Havana suburb, died May 17 after an
epileptic seizure, according to pohce. When family members examined the body they
discovered that Timoneda's wrists had b^n handcuffed, his arms and thi^s had
deep bruises, his back was injured, and his face appeared to have been severely
beaten. T^e autopsy stated that he died of unknown causes.
b. Disappearance.
^There were no credible or verifiable reports of politically motivated
disappearance in 1992.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.
The Constitution prohibits abusive treatment of detamees and prisoners. However,
beatings, neglect, isolation, and other abuse by police and prison officials were often
directed at detainees and prisoners convicted of political crimes (including human
rights advocates) or who persist in expressing tiieir views. The UNHRC Special
Rapporteur found prison conditions, especially habitual beatings and the lack of food
ana medical care, to violate Cuban law. The Government claims that prisoners have
guaranteed ri^t^ such as family visitation, adequate nutrition, pay for woric, the
ri^t to request parole, and the ri^^t to petition the prison director. However, according
to human ri^^ts woikers, tnese purported rights are frequently and capriciously
withdrawn, especially from politiosd prisoners. There has been no indication
that authorities investigated reports of abuse or took disciplinary action against security
agents responsible for sum abuse.
Among the many reported cases of brutality by prison guards and police were
those of Mario Lopez R^es, who suffered disfigurement after police sprayed a Macelike
substance in his face during questioning; Humberto Amengual Martinez, a
former prisoner at Combinado delSur penitentiary in Matanzas, who lost vision in
one eye after a beating in April by MININT oflicers; and Sei^o Diaz Alvarez, an
inmate at Aguica prison in Matanzas province, who was severely beaten by prison
guards in Alay after complaining about conditions. The beating resulted in three
Fractured ribs and a hematoma in one eye and the jaw. For weeks, he was refused
medical attention.
Human rights activists and political dissidents are systematically harassed, beaten,
and otherwise abused in public and private as a means of intimidation and control.
Those sufTering such abuse included Juan Betancourt Morejon, former head of
the Pro-Human Ri^ts Party (PPDH); Jorge Amores, also of the PPDH; and activist
and former university professor Rolando Prats, who was attacked May 29 by five
men, who knocked him off his bicycle, beat him, and took documents from him concerning
his human rights work. When nassers-by tried to help Prats, the men told
them to leave because they were dealing with a "counterrevolutionary carrying
enemy propaganda."
Authorities continued to use acts of repudiation to intimidate activists and as a
pretext for their arrest. Activists are roughed up and, in some cases, suffer serious
iqjuiy by government-organized mobs who chant slogans and vandalize their homes
(see Section 2.b.). During such acts, activists are often arrested "for their own protection,"
then later chaiged with counterrevolutionary activity and sentencea to
prison terms.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Article 245 of the Law of Penal Procedures
requires police to file formal charges and either release a detainee or place
him before a prosecutor within 96 hours of arrest. Authorities are also legalfy required
to provide suspects with access to a lawyer within 10 days of arrest. Iliese
grocedures are routinely denied to those detained on state security grounds. The
onstitution states that all legally recognized civil liberties can be denied anyone
actively opposing the "decision of the Ciiban people to build socialism." Authorities
invoke this open-ended article to justify lengthy detentions of activists on the
g-ounds that they constitute "counterrevolutionary elements." The UNHRC Special
apporteur found that the legal system lacks the laws and institutions needed to
protect due process.
The Penal Code contains several articles prohibiting "counterrevolutionary" activity.
Activists are often imprisoned for "enemy propaganda," "illicit association," "contempt
for authoritjr" (usually for criticizing Fidel (Jastro), "clandestine printing" or
the Droad charge of "rebellion." Rebellion has been used against those people advocatingpeaceful
democratic change, as occurred with Yndamiro Restano (see Section
I.e.). Tne Penal Code also includes the concept of "dangerousness," defined as "the
special proclivity of a person to commit crimes, demonstrated by his conduct in
manifest contradiction of socialist norms." There were reliable reports that authorities
intimidate activists by threatening prosecution under this article. If the police
decide that a person exhibits such behavior, the offender may be brought beiore a
court or subjected to "therapy" or "political reeducation" for 1 to 4 years.
Reports of arbitrary arrests of human rights monitors continued unabated. The
Government also preempts dissident activity by arbitrarily prolonging prison sentences
by sentencing detainees on new chai*ges for human rights activities allegedly
committed during imprisonment.
One index of the extent of repression is the high number of arrests for political
crimes in recent years. According to reliable sources, from 1986 to 1990, 4,568 people
were arrested and imprisoned at Department of State Security (DSE) head-
Suarters at ViUa Marista, an average of 95 per month. This grew to 160 a month
uring the April 1990-April 1992 period, a total of 3,989 arrests. Villa Marista handles
only those arrested for illegal depulure from the country and political crimes;
furthermore, it has jurisdiction only over greater Havana. Each provmce has its own
DSE facility, meaning that the number of arrests for political crimes is far higher
than the number cited.
Among the prominent cases of arbitrary arrest and long-term detention were
noted activists Sebastian and Gustavo Arcos and Jesus Yanes Pelletier, detained on
January 15 for alleged links to terrorists. Though Gustavo Arcos and Yanes were
released a few days later, the Government held Sebastian Arcos for 9 months before
charging him; the trial followed days later. Sebastian Arcos was a founder of the
Committee for Human Rights (CCPDH). Government oHicials told CCPDH members
in January that he would be tried for rebellion. Unable to implicate Arcos in the
activities of alleged terrorists captured in December, DSE subsequently tried to link
him with convicted hijacker Arturo Suarez. Suarez was taken from prison to a wellappointed
beach house near Havana, where his wife had been brougnt, and was told
by a DSE major that DSE wanted to help him. When Suarez refused to testify
against Arcos, tie was taken back to prison and warned not to tell anyone what had
happened. Arcos was then accused of enemy propaganda and tried October 5. Dur374
ing the trial, the prosecutor badgered Aroos and defense witnesses, while prosecution
witnesses were instructed on what to say by MININT oSicials in a nearby
chamber. Though no crwiible evidence was presented, Arcos was sentenced to 56
months in prison. In December he was moved to a prison 3 hours from Havana, thus
making it neariy impossible for his family to visit him, given fuel and transport
shortages.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Cuban law and trial practices do not meet international
standards for fair and impartial public trials. Almost all cases are tried in
less than 1 day. Although tiie Constitution provides for independent courts, it explicitly
subordinates them to the National Assembly and the Council of State, which
is headed by Fidel Castro. Judges are elected by the rubber-stamp National Assembly
and its lower level counterparts. The judiciary's independence is also compromised
by the subordination of the courts to the Communist Party. Americas
Watch reported that 'i.rials staged in courts that lack independence ended in convictions
and prison sentences that racJc among the stiffest for thou^t crimes in the
last 10 years." There is no known case in which a court has ruled against the Govermnent
on any political or security matter.
Civil courts exist at municipal, provincial, and Supreme Court levels. All are presided
over by panels composed oi a mix of professionally qualified judges and lay
judges. There are also mHitaiy tribunals which assume jurisdiction for certain
"counterrevolutionaiy" cases. Most trials are public; however, trials are closed when
state security is allegedly involved. Testimony from a CDR member may be introduced
on behalf of a defendant and may contribute to either a shorter or a longer
sentence. The law recognizes tiie ri^t of appeal in municipal courts. In provincial
courts, some cases are appealable, such as tJiose involving maximum prison terms
or a death penalty. TTie law provides that an appeal must be filed within 5 days
of the verdict.
Criteria for presenting evidence, particularly in cases of human rights activists,
are arbitrary and discriminatory. Often, the sole evidence provided, particularly in
cases with political significance, is the defendant's confession. The confession is usually
obtained under duress and without legal advice or the knowledge of the defense
lawyer. In Sebastian Arcos's case (see Section l.d.), the evidence consisted of an unsigned
letter that was lost in a fire in MININT files before the case could be tried.
A videotape of unsworn witnesses testifying against him was presented, and the
prosecutor failed to recuse herself aft«r revealing that she had been a childhood
friend of Arcos' dau^ter and had often been in his home. Defense lawyers often are
not allowed to meet with defendants until the day of the trial. Several activists who
have served prison terms say they were tried and sentenced without defense counsel
and were not allowed to speak on their own behalf.
Cuban law provides an accused the right to an attorney, but the latter's impartiality
and independence are compromised by the absence of a private bar association
and by ideological controls exerted over members of the state-controlled lawyers' collectives,
especially when defending persons accused of state security crimes. Observers
report reluctance among attorneys to defend such persons. Lawyers are discouraged
from tfjcing political cases because of the persecution suffered by those who
have done so.
One noted lawyer, Rene Gomez Manzano, staunchly defended several human
rights advocates in court. As a result, he came under increasing government pressure
to curtail his activities. In Mardi he was the tai^et of an act of repudiation
at the National Assemblv of Law Offices, in which the Assembhr's members, including
Justice Minister Carlos Amat, publicly denounced Gomez. There have been other
cases of lawyers who were removed from the Assembly, in effect disbarring them,
for defending activists too aggressively.
The Government continues to use the judicial system to discredit human rights
advocates by publicly associating them with foreign governments or violent activities
or by portraying them as suDversive and dangerous. Harmony Movement president
Yndamiro Restano, an avowed pacifist, was tried in May on charges of rebellion
although his organization's stated goal is to advocate peaceful, democratic
change. At the trial, diplomats, activists, and journalists were turned away, even
though the law requires trials to be open to the public. Three of the Government's
key witnesses recanted on the stand, saying that they wanted to retract sworn
statements attacking Restano because they had been made under coercion from
MININT officials. The Government was unable to provide any evidence linking
Restano with violent activities; both defense and prosecution witnesses testified to
that effect. The prosecutor noted the "dangerous" effect Restano's group would have
if not stopped, comparing him disparagingly with Mtihatma Gandhi. Despite all this,
Restano was convicted of rebellion and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.
Activist Omar del Pozo of the National Civic Union and two others were tried in
August for revealing state security secrets. A MUSTINT lieutenant had provided them
with names of informants posing as activists. Hector Castaneda. who had worked
as an activist, acknowledged at the trial that he was a MININT collaborator. The
tribunal sentenced the lieutenant to 19 years, del Pozo to 15 years, and the two others
to 13 and 9 years, respectively.
There were also several summaiy trials for "economic crimes," such as hoarding.
In February people were often stopped in the street and, if searches revealed suspicious
items, subjected to a "people s trial," usually in a local hall. Defendants were
not given time to prepare, were not allowed counsel, and in general had no right
to due process. The vast majority were found guilty and fined or sentenced to jail.
In March activist Felix Fleitas, president of the Association for a Constitutiontd
Democracy (APDC), was arrested for traflicking in foreign currency, even though police
could not find any currency after searching his home. His trial is pending. In
the December 10 crackdown, police threatened Fleitas with arrest if he continued
his human rights activities.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
Despite
Articles 56 and 57 of the Constitution dictating the inviolability of one's residence
and correspondence, official intrusion into private and family affairs remain one of
the most repressive and pervasive features of Cuban life. Mass organizations controlled
by the Communist Party permeate society. The State has assumed a virtual
right of interference into the lives of citizens, even those who do not actively oppose
the Government and its practices. These intrusions aim ostensibly at "improving"
the citizenry, but are calculated to encourage ideological conformity.
Authorities possess a wide range of social controls. The educational system teaches
that the State's interests have precedence over all other ties and commitments.
Teachers, selected in part for their ideological commitment, emphasize Communist
doctrine in the classroom and can penalize students whose families question orthodox
opinion. Teachers are required to evaluate student's ideological character, which
is noted in records carried by students throughout their education and which affect
their future prospects.
MININT employs an intricate system of informants and block committees (CDR's)
to monitor and control public opinion. Guardians of social conformity, CDR's are
neighborhood security committees tasked with closely monitoring the daily lives of
individual residents. Participation in the 80,000 CDR's is described as voluntary; in
cities, it is, in fact, obligatory. CDR's report suspicious activity, such as reception
of foreign radio or television broadcasts in the home, conspicuous consumption, unauthorized
meetings, or attitudes toward the Government and the revolution.
Cubans do not have the right to receive publications from abroad and expect that
their international correspondence will be read by state security. Overseas telephone
calls are difficult to make and are monitored; conversations with foreigners are reported.
Activists, foreign diplomats, and journalists report frequent surveillance by
security agents.
Authorities regularly search people's homes without probable cause for the pur-
Soses of intimidation and harassment. MININT oflicials warned Manuel Martinez
lodriguez. Secretary of the National Council for Civil Rights, to stop his human
rights activities. When he persisted, 10 MININT officials returned with a search
warrant and accused Martinez of being a drug trafficker. After searching the house
for hours and finding nothing, they took Martinez in for questioning.
As part of a massive crackdown on human rights activists December 10, police
broke down the doors and searched the offices of the Cuban Committee for Human
Rights and National Reconciliation without a search warrant, confiscating files dealing
with human rights violations in Cuba. The offices, located at the home of activist
EUzardo Sanchez, were surrounded by a rock-throwing mob, and police cordoned
off the street. Police later found Sanchez, who was not home, at a friend's house,
broke down the door, and assaulted him. He suffered cracked ribs, severe bruises,
and a possible broken jaw. Police meanwhile sealed off his home for several days;
his elderly mother and relatives received food throudi the windows of an adjacent
building. His charges have been changed from "pubBc disorder," based on the disturbance
caused when police roped ofFhis street, to "disrespect," which could carry
a longer sentence. He was released December 28 aft«r being fined the equivalent
of almost a year's average salary.
As part 01 the December 10 crad^down, the homes of at least seven leading activists
were cordoned off. No one could enter or leave these homes. At the homes of
Gustavo Arcos and Vladimiro Roca (son of the late Secretary General of the Cuban
Communist Party), gas, electricity, and water were also cut off. Arcos was told that
the cordoning woula last until he stopped his human rights activism. Despite the
threat, the cordoning stopped in late December.
Govenunent interference also extends to deciding what is permissible entertainment.
On May 18, Frank Agrat was with friends in his apartment, where they
played "Ya Viene Ll^ando," a pop song critical of the regime. It is by WiUy Chirino,
a smger of Cuban descent living m the United States, whose songs the Government
has banned. An informant called police, who then broke up the party, confiscated
the cassette, and arrested Agrat. He was fined and released.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
These fi'«edoms do not exist. The Government
does not allow direct criticism of the revolution or its leaders. Laws are enforced
against antigovemment propaganda, grafiitl, and insults against ofiicials. The penalty
is 3 months to 1 year in prison. K Fidel Castro or members of the National
Assembly or Council of State are the object, the sentence is 1 to 3 years. Local
CDR's inhibit fiieedom of speech by momtoring and reporting dissent or criticism
(see Section l.f.).
The Constitution states that electronic and print media are state property and
"cannot become, in any case, private property. The media are controlled by the
Communist Party and operate under party guidelines. They faithfully reflect government
views and are used to indoctrinate tne public. No ouier public forum exists
for airing views. Artistic, literary, and academic freedoms are also circumscribed by
the Government. Education is the exclusive prerogative of the State. The school system
follows Mandst-Leninist precepts as interpreted by the Government.
The Government continued to assert control over foreign media representatives in
Cuba, refusing visas to reporters fi:t)m several U.S. newspapers. Moreover, several
foreign joumausts were harassed or expelled because of articles they wrote. Spanish
reporter Joaquin Ibarz, of Barcelona's La Vanguardia, had his visa canceled without
explanation in October 1991. Spanish Journalist Santiago Aroca was expelled in January
after writing an article on one of the men arrested in an attempted infiltration
the month before. Le llifonde correspondent Bertrand La Grange was attacked by
two men May 23 in fivnt of the home of activist Vladimiro Roca. Eco, the Mexican
TV information service, announced May 30 that it would close its Havana office because
there was '^ot enoudi fireedom to carry out our journalistic assignment."
Beyond the Governments ti^t control over the media, other forms of expression
are ri^dly monitored. The Government frequently arrests and imprisons people for
the crimes of "enemy propaganda" and "clandestine printing." Marco Antonio Abad
and Jorge Antonio Crespo were arrested in late 1991 and charged with "enemy
propaganda" and "contempt" after making a film, smuggled out of Cuba and shown
in Costa Rica, called "Un Dia Cualquier ("A Day Like Any Other"). The Government
indictment asserts that the film "attacks the integrity of our Chief of State,"
even thou^ the film has never been shown in Cuba. Tne prosecution asked for 8
years' imprisonment for both. Sentencing is pending.
Academic publications and research may not conflict with government or Communist
Party policy. Thirteen professors at the "ISPJAE" Polytechnic Institute, including
Nestor Castellanos, Rafael Gonzalez, and Pedro Rubio, signed a "Declaration
of Principles" in December 1991, calling for a "genuine political space" in which intellectuals
could contribute fireely to society, respect for human rights as established
in the Universal Declaration on Human nights, amnesty for all prisoners of conscience,
and the "democratization of political life." All were subsequently fired from
the university because of their "association with a subversive and
counterrevolutionary group." More than 25 professors and stafT have so far been dismissed;
most remain unemployed.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The Constitution does not provide
for freedom of assembly or association. Those freedoms are not permitted. Any
assembly of more than three persons, even in a private home, is punishable by up
to 3 months in prison and a fine. Though not universally enforced, it is often used
as a legal pretext to harass and imprison human rights advocates. The UNHRC
Special Rapporteur found that even thou{^ activists act "perfectly peacefully" and
respectfully towairds authority, they are "continuously the object of harassment and
persecution." According to the Penal Code's Article 240, organizers of "illicit or unrecognized
groups" may be sentenced to up to 9 months. There is no known instance
of authorities approving a public meeting of a human rights group.
The Penal Code's Article 208 forbids "iU^l or unrecognized groups." The Ministi^
of Justice, in consultation with MININT, decides whether to recognize organizations.
Apart from "recognized" churches and one or two carefully monitored
groups sucn as the Masonic Order, small human rights groups represent the only
associations outside the State and party. Authorities continued to ignore numerous
applications for legal recognition by various human rights groups. Because the Government
has not recognized these groups, activists are ofton jailed for "illicit asso377
riation." In addition, members of such groups and even their Sjpouses are often flred
from their jobs (see also Section 2.a.). Miguel Brito Capote, lor example, was dismissed
in April from his position as a mechanic with the armed forces because he
was "unreUable." The Government cited his membership in the CCPDH and concluded
that his way of thinking was "not in accordance with revolutionary principles."
Mayra Gonzalez, girlfriend of Sebastian Arcos (see Section l.d.), was fired
April 23 from her job at the Sugar Cane Institute for "unreliability" for having
"close relations with a citizen who is hostile to socialism and who heralds capitalist
ideas about human rights in Cuba."
Another measure used to harass activists are acts of repudiation, officially sponsored
mob gatherings staged outside the homes of suspected
"counterrevolutionaries." Though the Government contends that such "acts" are
spontaneous demonstrations oithe people's will, they are, in reality, well-orchestrated
events whose sole objective is to intimidate dissident elements and the general
public. Mobs, often in the hundreds and largelv comprised of MININT officials
and members of local CDR's and "Rapid Reaction Brigades," are often bussed in by
the Government to shout insults, throw rocks, and paint condemnatory slogans. The
acts can last hours or even da^s.
Several major acts of repudiation were staged against activists. From January 12-
15 alone, there were at least five separate acts against activists. One of the more
serious was against Elizardo Sanchez, head of the Commission for Human Rights
and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN), in which over 400 people shouted slogans
and insults and vandalized Sanchez's house, pouring paint on the walls and breaking
windows. The incident lasted past midni^t. On UN. Human Rights Day, December
10, prominent activist Gustavo Arcos was the object of another act, during
which 75-year-old CCPDH activist Jesus Yanes Pelletier briefly lost consciousness
after being hit an was then kicked by crowd members, and activist Aida Valdez was
pushed and insulted. Arcos, formerly Chiba's ambassador to Belgium, was wounded
at Castro's side while fighting at Moncada in 1953, while Yanes, a former policeman,
saved Castro's life by disobeying an order to poison him in prison in 1953.
On March 4, Elizardo Sanchez and Jose Luis Pujol were sutjected to a violent
act when at least 200 people convei^ed on Pujol's home. DSE oflicials thoroughly
searched the house before arresting w)th men. Sanchez and Pujol were then slowly
taken through the crowd, which beat them and yelled insults. One of Sanchez' eyes
was severely bruised. During interrogation, the men were told they had "exceeded
the limits." Though Sanchez was released 2 days later, Pujol remained in custody
until he was sentenced to 2 years for "contempt" in September.
c. Freedom of Religion
The (xovemment made a series of legal changes which
it claimed would enhance freedom of religion, following the October 1991 approval
by the Fourth Party Congress of the admission of religious adherents to the Communist
Party. In July the National Assembly amendea the Constitution to prohibit
discrimination based on religion. It also removed references to "scientific materialism,"
i.e., atheism, as the basis for the Cuban State, and deleted a section making
it "illegal and punishable" for a religious belief to oppose the revolution. This action
was praised by the Ecumenical Council, but the Catholic Clhurch stated its concern
over the gap between the Government's rhetoric and actions.
Despite tnese changes, religious persecution continues. The Government uses the
Penal Code to persecute Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists systematically
and overtly. Witnesses are ofi;en convicted of "clandestine printing if a
search of their home reveals religious materials or "illicit association" Tor havmg religious
meetings. They have also been found guilty of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor (Article 316), for "not complying with the duties related to respect
and love of country," and for "abuse of the freedom of religion" (Article 206) because,
out of religious conviction, they refiise to honor symbols of the Cuban State.
In addition, there have been several verified reports that Seventh Day Adventists
have begun to experience similar discrimination for their beliefs. For example, Williams
Elias of Santiago was the subject of an act of repudiation at the hospital
where he works because he is an Adventist. The hospital administration had forbidden
other workers from changing shifts with him, making it impossible for him to
attend church on Saturdays. It then made him see a psychiatrist for what it determined
was "schizophrenic paranoia."
Members of these religions are watched by the CDR's and often harassed. The
CDR's are instructed to maintain surveillance over 18 different categories of people,
ranging from "counterrevolutionary ex-convict" and "common criminal" to "active religious
enemies of the revolution and "spiritualists (santeros) who give consultations."
The Government and the Communist Party continue to maintain restrictions and
controls on church activities. (Churches and other religious groups must register
with the Government and be ofiicially "recognized." Authorized religious organizations
may hold activities only at designated places of worship. Manpr churches have
closed. Suioe 1961, when religious houdays were eliminated and political indoctrination
classes introduced on Sundays, the Government has prohibited religious processions
and only rarely allowed diurches access to mass meoia.
In July a groiu) of women, including Paula Valiente and Hilda Cabrera, marched
along Havana's Malecon carrying a statue of the Vii;gin of Regla. Stopped by police
and arrested, the statue was destroyed. Valiente was hit, dragged to a patrol car,
and taken in for questioning. The women were released after several hours. Valiente
and a larger group of women made another religious procession August 8. They
were again stopped and asked for their permit. When they noted recent constitutional
changes allowing relinous fiieedom, the police arrested them. After 5 hours,
the women were warned and released. In September the Catholic Churdi issued a
pastoral letter decrying arrests made by plainclothes police inside diurches during
services. Churchgoers who shouted "liberty" were hustled away by agents. On December
13, a mob of some 30 people pelted a Havana church with eggs, and then
assaulted and frisked a group of motners of political prisoners called "Mothers of
Dignity-Leonor Peres" as they left the diurch.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
There are no legal restrictions on domestic travel. The Government now
allows persons over 20 to apply for permission to travel abroad, but approval is by
no means automatic.
The Government permitted a few thousand people, including hundreds of ex-political
prisoners, to emigrate. Nevertheless, it. continues to delay or deny, without explanation,
exit permits to many persons or their relatives who have been accepted
by immigration or refugee programs. These often include professionals who once
tried to leave Cuba and who have since been banned from working in their occupational
field.
Others are refused permission because the Government considers their cases sensitive.
The wives and children of Orestes Lorenzo and Joaquin Movrino Perez were
denied exit visas because their husbands were air force pilots who defected. Orestes
Lorenzo made a dramatic rescue of his wife and children from a Cuban hi^way
in a small plane on December 19. Several prominent human rights activists were
also denied exit visas, such as Mario Chanes de Armas, a former Castro comrade.
At the time of his release from 30 years in prison in 1991, he was the longest-servingpolitical
prisoner in the Western Hemispnere.
There is no ri^t of repatriation. Exit permits for unoflicial, temporary travel
specify that the person must return to Cuba within 30 days, although extensions
are available. Cuban emigrants must apply for permission to return for visits. Those
who left prior to 1959 usually receive such permission. However, there is a yearly
limit of 10,000 visitor's visas for emigrants who left between 1959 and 1980. Those
leaving after 1980 are generally not permitted to return to visit.
The National Council for Civil Ri^ts, formerly the Council of Cuban Rafters, estimates
that, in the first 9 months of 1992, some 7,000-8,000 people were detained
on charges of illegal departure for trying to leave the country. Despite such difficulties,
over 2,000 Cubans made it to the United States in small boats and rafts in
1992. Government forces sometimes use lethal force to prevent them. In May the
Border Guard intercepted a group several miles off Matanzas, ordered their boat to
stop, and then began shooting. Orlando Fernandez was killed and Humberto Colon
seriously wounded. In April a filter aircraft shot down a small plane heading toward
the U.S., killing all seven passengers and the pilot, a decorated war veteran.
Cuba enlai^ed and modernized its minefield surrounding the U.S. Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay. On January 12, a 15-year-old boy lost a leg while crossing the
minefield with his family. On July 5, two Cubans were killed by the mines.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government
Cuban citizens have no legal right to change their government or to advocate a
change. Tlie Constitution's Article 5 states that the only political organization allowed
is the Communist Party. A small group of leaders select members of its highest
governing bodies—the Pohtburo and Central Committee.
When change is made, it is tightly controlled. The Government refused to hold
a plebiscite in 1992 when the National Assembly approved changes to nearly half
the Constitution in only 3 days, despite the fact that Article 137 mandates a plebiscite.
Article 131 was amended to permit direct elections to provincial and national legislatures
for the first time since those bodies were created in 1976. However, before
nomination, every candidate must be prescreened by a "candidacy commission" com379
posed of representatives of party-controlled "mass organizations." Up to half of the
candidates will be nominated by the party behind closed doors. Only one candidate
per seat will be cdlowed. Furthermore, no more than half of all seats in the provincial
and national legislatures may be occupied by delegates to the city councils,
whose election, while carefully manipulated by the party and the "mass organizations"
at the grassroots level, at least includes an element of competition. These new
procedures are designed to ensure that only those persons who follow the government
line will be placed on the ballot. The formation of political parties is outlawed;
campaigning is forbidden. The elections are set for February 24, 1993.
resident Castro repeatedly ignored calls for democratic reform and labeled activists
who proposed them "worms and traitors working to undermine the revolution.
Any change judged not within the revolution is rejected, as are proposals by Cubans
who seek nonviolent political change or open debate about the political svstem. The
Government has retaliated against those who have sought to change the Government
or its policies. For example, the massive December 10 crackdown brought
about the arrest, beating, harassment, or house arrest of at least 20 human rights
activists.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations ofHuman Rights
No domestic or international human rights groups are recognized by the Government
or permitted to function legally. As noted previously, domestic human rights
monitors are subject to intense intimidation and repression. The Government refuses
to consider, in violation of its own statutes, applications for legal recognition
submitted by several human rights groups. The four principal domestic human
rights monitoring groups are the Cuban Human Rights Committee (CCPDH), the
Cuban IVo-Human Rights Party (PPDH), the Council for Civil Rights, and the
Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN). In
addition, there is the Cuban Democratic Convergence, an umbrella organization
which includes a number of smaller human rights groups.
The Government also rejects international numan rights criticism. In July 1991,
when, in response to a resolution adopted by the UNHRC, the Secretary General
named Rafael Rivas Posada as Special Representative, Cuba's U.N. representative
stated that Cuba did not recognize the UNHRC mandate on Cuba and would not
cooperate with the Special Representative, even though Cuba is a UNHRC member.
Cuba ignored repeated requests by the Special Representative to visit Cuba to meet
ofdcials and citizens.
After the UNHRC passed a further resolution in March 1992, mandating that the
position of Special Representative for Cuba be upgraded to Special Rapporteur, the
Government reiterated that it would not comply with "a single comma of the resolution.
Moreover, in a February 25 speech to the UNHRC, Vice Foreign Minister
Raul Roa stated that "we could not and cannot allow ourselves to have the appointment
of a Special Representative imposed on us." He then criticized human rights
activists as "frustrated, mediocre, and socially uprooted individuals." The new Special
Rapporteur, Carl-Johan Groth, has also not been allowed to visit Cuba.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status
Cuba is a multiracial society with a majority of people of black and mixed racial
ancestnr. The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin,
although evidence suggests that racial and sexual discrimination occurs.
The Family Code of 1975 states that women and men have equal rights and responsibilities
regarding marriage, divorce, raising children, maintaining the home,
and pursuing a career. The Maternity Law of 1974 provides 18 weeks of maternity
leave and grants working women preferential access to ^oods and services. Some 39
J)ercent of all women work. They are well represented in the professions, although
iew are in positions with policy responsibility.
Cuban law establishes strict penalties, including the death penalty, for rape.
These statutes appear to be enforced. Information Trom human rights groups and
other sources indicates that domestic violence and sexual assaults occur, but no statistics
are available. Violent crime is rarely reported in the press. Due to cultural
traditions, victims of mistreatment are reluctant to press charges.
Information about cases of rficial discrimination is not available. Blacks tend to
occupy low-status jobs; few are in senior government and military circles. Leadership
positions in Castro's Government have been dominated by whites from the
start. Nonwhites make up only 4 of the 25 Politburo members; only 15 percent of
the over 200 members of the Party Central Committee; only 1 of Cuba's 12 vicepresidencies;
and only 6 of the 29 seats on the Council of State. Also, many black
activists report being singled out for harassment. MININT officials have told them
during interrogations that they are 'hingratefiir for not appreciating what the revolution
has done for them. Other black activists have been insulted with racial epithets
by MININT ofiBcials.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Ri^ht of AssocicUion.—The Constitution pves priority to state or collective
needs over individual choices regarding free association or provision of employment.
Decisions and choices of workers are subordinate to the "demands of the economy
and society." The law does not pNermit strikes, nor are an^ known to have occurred
in 1992. Established labor organizations are not trade unions in any real sense and
do not act as a voice for worker rights, including the right to strike. Labor is oisanized
under the control of the State and Party through one umbrella group, tne
Confederation of Cuban Workers (CTC).
The CTC is affiliated with the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade
Unions and plays a leading role in its re^onal organization, the Permanent Congress
of Trade Union Unity of Latin America. The CTC serves primarily as a state
instrument to enforce political and labor discipline, to encourage productivity and
extended hours of "voluntaiV' labor, to hold down labor costs, and to conserve raw
materials. However, some (J£C labor organizations have served as debating forums
for a limited range of labor issues, such as safety or working conditions.
Independent unions are explicitly prohibited. In June International Labor Organization
(ILO) concluded that mdependent unions "do not appear to exist" and ruled
that Cuba violated ILO norms on freedom of association and the right to organize.
Those who attempt to engage in union eictivities face government persecution and
harassment. On tlanuary 11, Rafael Gutierrez Santos, president of a fledgling alternative
trade union movement, was seized by a mob of government supporters and
later arrested by police. He was interrogated and warned to stop his independent
union activities before being released without diarges 2 days later. The International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTLf) issued a statement expressing
its concern over a "widespread crackdown on union and human rights activists."
In September ei^t members of another fledgling independent organization, the
Confederation of Democratic Workers (CTD), were seriously beaten after they appeared
at the CTCs offices to protest its failure to defend worker interests.
The ILO Governing Body in November adopted interim conclusions in response
to an ICFTU oomplamt, reminding Cuba that arresting trade unionists without a
warrant or when no grounds for conviction exist is a violation of trade union rights.
It also asked Cuba to explain the attack against Gutierrez, his detention, and the
Justice Ministiys failure to reply to his group's request for registration and recognition.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Collective bai^gaining does not
exist. The State Committee for Work and Social Security sets wages and salaries
for the state sector. Because the CTC is a government instrument, antiunion discrimination
is only relevant as it applies to government repression of attempts to
form independent unions. There are no known export processing zones in Cuba.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Neither the Constitution nor the
Labor Code prohibito forced labor. The Government maintains "correctional centers"
where youth are sent for such crimes as illegal departure. They are forced to woik
in farming or on building sites, usually with no pay and little food. Internees who
do not cooperate are usually imprisoned.
Special groups of woricers, known as "microbrigcdes," on loan from other jobs, are
employed on special building projects. They have increased importance in the Government's
eflbrts to complete tourist and otner facilities that have priority attention.
Workers who refuse to volunteer for these often become victims of discrimination
or risk losing their jobs. Microbrigade workers, however, are reportedly rewarded
with priority listing for apartments, a strong incentive for such work.
For years, various ILO bodies have concluded that governmental restrictions on
the freedom to choose or change employment are incompatible with ILO conventions
prohibiting forced labor.
d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The legal minimum working age
is 17. The Labor Code exempts 15- and 16-year-olds to allow them to obtain training
or to fill labor shortages. However, all students above age 11 are expected to devote
30 to 45 days of their summer holidays to farm work up to a maximum 8 hours
per day. "Voluntory labor" by Student Work Brigades continues to be used extensively
m the farming sector.
e. Acceptable Cortditions c/* Work.—The minimum wage is supplemented by social
security consisting of free medical care and education and subsidized housing and
food. Efven with these subsidies, however, a worker must earn much more than minimum
wage to support a family. This condition has worsened dramatically during
the "special period in peacetime," which the Government declared in 1990 in the
face 01 deepening economic difficulties.
Tlie standard workweek is 44 hours, with shorter woikdays in hazardous occupations
as mining. The Government has discontinued most routine work on alternate
Saturdays and has reduced workdays to 5 hours in many institutions in order to
save energy. Worker safety and pollution control provisions ap(>ear to be inadequate.
Effective control and enforcement mechanisms to ensure worker safety are lacking.
Industrial accidents apparently are frequent.
