In einem Bericht des norwegischen Herkunftsländerinformationszentrums Landinfo vom September 2011 geht der Afghanistan-Experte Antonio Giustozzi auf die Konfliktlage in der Zentralregion ein. Dabei wird erwähnt, dass in der Provinz Logar nur die starke Präsenz internationaler Truppen die Aufständischen davon abhalte, die vollständige Kontrolle zu erlangen. Die Unterstützung für die Regierung sei in Logar besonders schwach (Landinfo, 9. September 2011, S. 17).

 

Die International Crisis Group (ICG) bemerkt in einem Bericht vom Juni 2011 eine Intensivierung aufständischer Aktivitäten in den Provinzen Logar, Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Wardak, Laghman and Ghazni. Die Taliban würden große Gebiete zwischen den Provinzen Logar und Laghman kontrollieren. In diesen zentralen und östlichen Provinzen erfolge die Rekrutierung von Anhängern vor allem über religiöse Führer und Einrichtungen. In dieser Zentralregion um Kabul gebe es landesweit die höchste Zahl von Madrassas und zahlreiche Moscheen, wodurch die Region laut ICG zu einen fruchtbaren Nährboden für die Verbreitung des radikalen Islam werde. Weiters schreibt ICG, dass laut dem Ergebnis einer unabhängigen Analyse sicherheitsrelevanter Vorfälle ein Fünftel aller Anschläge aufständischer Gruppen, die 2010 in der Zentralregion stattgefunden hatten, in der Provinz Logar verübt worden seien. Die Taliban und das Haqqani-Netzwerk unterhielten eine starke Präsenz in den Distrikten Kharwar, Baraki Barak, Charkh und Azrah:

“Insurgent activity in Kabul, Kapisa, Parwan, Logar, Wardak, Laghman and Ghazni provinces has greatly intensified as the nexus between insurgent groups, political elites and criminal networks solidifies in and around the capital.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 1)

“The Taliban control large swathes of territory stretching from Logar to Laghman; as of May 2011, shadow governors appointed by the Taliban’s Quetta Shura operate in 35 out of 62 districts in the seven provinces examined for this report. These mini-shadow states operate as parallel governments, administering taxes, settling disputes and distributing power through the appointment of local military commanders.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 8)

“Notwithstanding the mix of motivations, religious leaders and institutions remain the focal point for recruitment. The central region around Kabul has one of the highest numbers of madrasas in Afghanistan, making it fertile ground for the spread of militant Islam. Deobandi scholars and mullahs have extended their influence in the traditionally conservative provinces bordering the capital such as Logar, Parwan and Wardak, making these areas pivotal in terms of recruitment and operational support for the Taliban and other insurgent groups. This well-tended network of mosques, mullahs and madrasas in and around Kabul also provides the insurgency with a vital source of intelligence.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 11)

“A wide network of official and unofficial mosques in the central heartland, many headed by militant mullahs and imams, is as vital to the insurgency as the madrasas. While the number of mosques registered with the government stood at 2,634 in March 2011, Afghan officials estimate that unregistered mosques number in the tens of thousands. About one fifth or 554 of the country’s registered mosques are located in the central-eastern provinces of Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Logar, Wardak, Ghazni and Laghman. The government’s Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs has in recent years tried to exert tighter control over mosques and mullahs, including through weekly distribution of recommended sermon topics to registered mosques and an examination process that tests mullahs on their level of competence in religious practices. More recently, the NDS has made an attempt to monitor mosque activities and mullahs’ sermons. Afghan officials, while concerned that the militant message is resonating more and more with the population, acknowledge that the government lacks the capacity to provide any meaningful oversight.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 12)

“An independent analysis of security incidents indicates that Logar province accounted for one fifth of attacks by insurgents in the central region in 2010. The Taliban and the Haqqani network maintain a strong presence in the districts of Kharwar, Baraki Barak, Charkh and most recently Azrah. Because a number of Taliban shadow government officials have been killed or captured since the surge began in 2009, it is difficult to identify current provincial leaders and ascertain the current state of the leadership.” (ICG, 27. Juni 2011, S. 17)

Die Sonderbeauftragte des UNO-Generalsekretärs für Kinder und Bewaffneten Konflikt hält in einem Bericht zu einer Afghanistan-Mission im Februar 2010 fest, es habe aus allen Landesteilen Afghanistans, unter anderem auch aus den östlichen Regionen, wo auch die Provinz Logar liegt, Berichte über Rekrutierungen von Kindern gegeben. Binnenvertriebene (IDPs) und isoliert lebende Gemeinden seien besonders dem Risiko der Rekrutierung durch nichtstaatliche bewaffnete Gruppen wie den Taliban, dem Haqqani-Netzwerk, der Hezb-i-Islami und der Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia ausgesetzt. Es seien Fälle dokumentiert, in denen Taliban auch Kinder als Selbstmordattentäter eingesetzt hätten. Die betroffenen Kinder seien zwischen 13 und 16 Jahre alt gewesen, und sie seien Berichten zufolge unter anderem durch Täuschung, Geldangebote oder Zwang dazu gebracht worden, Selbstmordattentäter zu werden:

“Reports of recruitment and use of children have been received from all regions, and particularly from the south, south-east and eastern regions, but the security environment and the lack of human resources dedicated to monitoring and verifying cases has limited reporting on these trends of abuse. Internally Displaced People (IDP) and isolated populations in conflict-affected areas in particular are at risk of child recruitment into non-state armed groups, including the Taliban, Haqqani network, Hezb-i-Islami and Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia. […]

Documented cases show that children are also used as suicide bombers by the Taliban. Children involved range from 13-16 years of age and, according to testimonies of failed bombers, have been tricked, promised money or otherwise forced to become suicide bombers. However, some children who have attempted suicide attacks have been heavily indoctrinated, many times in foreign countries, and efforts must be undertaken to combat this practice. That said, some reports suggest that, in the latest incidents of children used in bombings, they may not have been aware of what they were carrying, and explosives were set off remotely without their knowledge.” (Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, Februar 2010, S. 5)

Human Rights Watch (HRW) berichtet, dass Anfang Mai 2011 fünf Kinder, allesamt unter 13 Jahre alt, die aus den Provinzen Logar und Ghazni stammten und angeblich zu Selbstmordattentätern ausgebildet worden seien, vom afghanischen Inlandsgeheimdienst National Directorate of Security (NDS) verhaftet worden seien:

„Recent incidents of suicide bombing involving children include: […]

In early May, five children, all under age 13, from Logar and Ghazni provinces who had allegedly been trained as suicide bombers were arrested by the National Directorate of Security.“ (HRW, 31. August 2011)

Reuters berichtet in einer Meldung vom Mai 2011 über vier Jungen, die alle unter 13 Jahre alt seien und nach eigenen Angaben in Pakistan, wo sie gelebt hätten, von Aufständischen gezwungen worden seien, zu Selbstmordattentätern zu werden. Sie hätten dann Anweisung erhalten, einen Anschlag in der Provinz Logar zu verüben:

“Afghan authorities paraded four young Afghan boys on Saturday who they said had been recruited as suicide bombers from homes in neighboring Pakistan and detained as they came back across the border on a mission to attack foreign troops. The four boys, all under 13, giggled and smiled shyly at one another as they were led on to a stage before television cameras to tell how they were coerced by insurgent leaders into becoming unwitting suicide attackers. ‘We were told to go and carry out a suicide attack in Logar province. I was told to press the detonating button and they said the (infidels) will be killed and you will live,’ said 13-year-old Fazil Rahman, who was dressed in bright green Afghan shalwar kameez clothing.” (Reuters, 7. Mai 2011)

Die Nachrichtenagentur Pajhwok Afghan News (PAN) berichtet im August 2011, Präsident Karsai habe angeordnet, Kinder, die man wegen Vorwurfs versuchter Selbstmordattentate inhaftiert habe, freizulassen. Die betreffenden Kinder stammten laut PAN aus den Provinzen Logar, Khost, Kandahar, Ghazni, Samangan, Kunduz, Jawzjan, Kabul, Parwan und Nangarhar:

“President Hamid Karzai on Wednesday ordered the release of children who had been detained on the charge of attempting to carry out suicide attacks. Speaking to a group of detained would-be suicide attackers at the Presidential Palace, Karzai denounced the use of children for such assaults as an un-Islamic act. The children belonged to Logar, Khost, Kandahar, Ghazni, Samangan, Kunduz, Jawzjan, Kabul, Parwan and Nangarhar provinces.” (PAN, 24. August 2011)

Der Fernsehsender National Afghanistan TV berichtet im November 2011 über die Verhaftung eines 15-jährigen Jugendlichen in der Provinz Paktia, der von den Taliban darauf vorbereitet worden sei, einen Selbstmordanschlag zu verüben. Er sei ein Bewohner des Distrikts Baraki Barak der Provinz Logar:

“A 15-year-old child who was prepared by the Taleban to carry out a suicide attack has been arrested by Ministry of Interior intelligence officials. Our colleague reports: [Correspondent] Sayed Zubair, son of Sayed Imam, a resident of Baraki Barak District of Logar Province, recently travelled to Paktia Province under direct instructions from Qari Ihsanollah, a local Taleban commander. He intended to go to a Taleban training facility in Miramshah of Pakistan when he was arrested by detectives in Paktia Province.” (National Afghanistan TV, 14. November 2011)

Noor TV berichtet, der National Directorate of Security (NDS) habe zwei Selbstmordattentäter in Kabul festgenommen. Einer von ihnen stamme aus der Provinz Logar:

“Afghan National Directorate of Security [NDS] says they have detained two suicide bombers in the 5th precinct of Kabul city. NDS spokesman Lotfollah Mashal says their investigation show that a resident of eastern Logar Province wanted to commit a suicide attack in Kabul city. […]

The National Directorate of Security has detained two suicide bombers, one of them is an 18-year-old boy who wanted to commit a suicide attack in the 5th precinct of Kabul city. While speaking about the arrest of the two suicide bombers in Kabul on Thursday [23 June], NDS spokesman said that the detained terrorists pleaded guilty during preliminary investigation.” (Noor TV, 23. Juni 2011)

Zur Rekrutierung von Kindern in Afghanistan allgemein schreibt das US Department of State (USDOS) in seinem Länderbericht zur Menschenrechtslage vom April 2011 (Berichtsjahr 2010), es gebe Anhaltspunkte dafür, dass die Rekrutierung von Kindersoldaten durch aufständische Gruppen im Ansteigen begriffen sei. Zahlreichen Berichten zufolge rekrutieren die Taliban und andere Gruppen Kinder bzw. Jugendliche unter 18 Jahren als Selbstmordattentäter, „menschliche Schilde“ oder als Helfer. Nichtregierungsorganisationen und UN-Behörden hätten berichtet, Taliban hätten Kinder durch Betrug, Geldangebote, oder Zwang dazu gebracht, Selbstmordattentäter zu werden:

“The UN secretary-general's April report also noted that children were recruited and used for military purposes by several antigovernment and insurgent groups, including the Haqqani network, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), the Taliban, the Tora Bora Front, and the Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia.

Anecdotal evidence suggested that insurgent recruitment of underage soldiers was on the rise. There were numerous credible reports that the Taliban and other insurgent forces recruited children younger than age 18, in some cases as suicide bombers and human shields and in other cases to assist with their work. NGOs and UN agencies reported that the Taliban tricked children, promised them money, or forced them to become suicide bombers.” (USDOS, 8. April 2011, Section 1g)

 

 

·      HRW - Human Rights Watch: Afghanistan: Taliban Should Stop Using Children as Suicide Bombers, 31. August 2011

·      ICG - International Crisis Group: The Insurgency in Afghanistan’s Heartland, 27. Juni 2011 (verfügbar auf Refworld)

·      Landinfo - Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre: Afghanistan: Human Rights and Security Situation, 9. September 2011 (Autor: Antonio Giustozzi) (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

·      Office of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict: Visit of the Special Representative for Children & Armed Conflict to Afghanistan, Februar 2010 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

·      PAN - Pajhwok Afghan News: Karzai orders release of would-be child bombers, 24. August 2011

·      National Afghanistan TV: Arrested teen says Taleban encouraged him to become suicide bomber, 14. November 2011 (zitiert nach BBC Monitoring)

·      Noor TV: Afghan security agency arrests two suicide bombers in Kabul, 23. Juni 2011 (zitiert nach BBC Monitoring)

·      Reuters: Boy suicide bomber recruits paraded by Afghan authorities, 7. Mai 2011

·      UNAMA – UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Midyear Report 2011; Protection of civilians in Armed Conflict, Juli 2011 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)

·      USDOS - US Department of State: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010 - Afghanistan, 8. April 2011 (verfügbar auf ecoi.net)