Update on the Situation in the North (Somaliland)

Report on current issues in Somaliland (tension between and within clans, local
authority and importance of elders, disarmament and security, mine clearing),
situation of refugees and events in Hargeisa between September and December
1994 Update on the Situation in the North (Somaliland) http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/en/research/publications/index_e.htm?docid=233&cid=0 SOMALIA: UPDATE
ON THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH (SOMALILAND) - January 1995 Disclaimer This paper
was prepared by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board
on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment. All
sources are cited. This paper is not, and does not purport to be, either
exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed or conclusive as
to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. For further
information on current developments, please contact the Research Directorate.
Table of Contents INTRODUCTION CURRENT ISSUES IN SOMALILAND 2.1 Tension Between
and Within Clans 2.2 Local Authority and the Importance of Elders 2.3
Disarmament and Security 2.4 Mine Clearing and Its Impact THE SITUATION OF
REFUGEES OTHER ISSUES EVENTS IN HARGEISA: SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1994 APPENDIX 1
- MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOMALILAND REFERENCES INTRODUCTION This document
is an update of the paper in the "Question and Answer" Series entitled Somalia:
The North which was published by the DIRB in September 1992. As Somalia: Update
on the Situation in the North (Somaliland) was being prepared for publication
in autumn 1994, fighting broke out in Hargeisa, the capital of the self-
proclaimed Republic of Somaliland. The information within this paper remains
valid as an account of the situation in Somaliland from 1992 until August 1994,
however, a brief chronology of events in Hargeisa from September to December
1994 is included in section 5 of this paper. On 17 May 1991, a few months after
the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre collapsed, the Somali National Movement (SNM),
following a decade of civil war that left tens of thousands of victims,
proclaimed the independence of the provinces that comprised the former British
colony of Somaliland (Politique Africaine June 1993, 9). In October 1992, in an
effort to make up for the government's inability to maintain public order, the
elders negotiated an end to the fighting around the port of Berbera between the
Habar Yunis and Isse Muse sub-clans ( ibid. 16; The Guardian 15 Oct. 1993). The
two sub-clans signed a peace accord in Sheikh on 10 November 1992 (Politique
Africaine June 1993, 16-17). In February 1993, some 300 people representing the
various clans in the region and the elders, customary chiefs, intellectuals,
politicians and military personnel met in Borama to review the prospects for
the future (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 27 Feb. 1993, 3). The delegates were to
decide on plans for a referendum on secession to be held in July 1994, and
select a date for the elections ( ibid.; Al-Hayah 24 Jan. 1994). As of December
1994, sources consulted made no mention of elections or a referendum having
been held. During this large "shir" (council), President Abdirahman Ahmed Ali,
also known as "Tour" [ Alternate spellings include "Tuur" ( AFP 26 Nov. 1994)
and "Tur" ( Reuters 28 Nov. 1994).] (hunchback), was accused of being "soft" on
Somaliland independence and surrounding himself in government with members of
his clan (Habar Gaharjiis) or allied clans and was removed from power
(Documentation-Réfugiés 1528 Feb. 1994, 6). In May 1993, Mohammed Ibrahim Egal,
who had served as Prime Minister of Somalia from 1967 to 1969 prior to the
military coup of October 1969, was chosen as the new president ( ibid., 3; AFP
8 May 1993). Appendix 1 gives a detailed list of Egal's cabinet (clan
affiliation, military or civilian), which was formed in June 1993 and which has
been described as a "government of colonels" (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 12
June 1993). At the Borama conference, which lasted three months, the Guurti or
Council of Elders adopted a national charter which, pursuant to article 5.1,
was to remain in effect for two years ( Republic of Somaliland 25 Apr. 1993).
The Guurti also designated an interim parliament and appointed a supreme court
( Leatherbee, Leah and Bricker Jan. 1994, 29). In December 1993, almost three
years after Northern Somalia (Somaliland) declared its independence, a source
reported that the government "face[d] the same problems as its predecessor:
economic collapse, the destruction of infrastructures, the absence of
administrative structures, high level of armaments, the lack of functioning
social services, international isolation, and the huge problem of land mines"
( African Rights & Mines Advisory Group Dec. 1993, 29). 2. CURRENT ISSUES IN
SOMALILAND Before the outbreak of violence in Hargeisa in autumn 1994 (See
section 5.0), some sources noted that, compared with the rest of Somalia, the
situation in Somaliland has been fairly calm (The Christian Science Monitor 6
Jan. 1994; World Refugee Report July 1993, 44). Following the election of
Mohammed Ibrahim Egal in May 1993, the region appeared to be more stable ( IPS
16 Dec. 1993). However, as a result of the lack of recognition by the
international community, international aid had all but dried up (The Dallas
Morning News 5 Nov. 1993). 2.1 Tension Between and Within Clans The Conference
of Elders, held in October 1992 to promote peace and a peaceful end to the
conflict between rival clans, was a "turning point" in the clan rivalry that
had characterized the first 18 months of Somaliland independence ( Leatherbee,
Leah and Bricker Jan. 1994, 28 ). The rivalry has not disappeared, however. In
January 1994, for example, at least two people were killed in a fight between
militia from the Habar Yunis and the Eidagale [Alternate spellings include
"Idagalle" ( SNU 21 Nov. 1994), "Idagale" ( The Indian Ocean Newsletter 26 Nov.
1994) and "Ida Gale" ( Reuters 28 Nov. 1994). ] clans ( AP 25 Jan. 1994), both
of which are part of the Gahaarji, an Isaaq sub-clan (see appendix). The
dispute was over the collection of taxes on Catha edulis or khat, a narcotic
plant imported from Ethiopia and Kenya that is very popular in Somalia ( ibid.;
The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 1989, 7-8; Marchés tropicaux 26 Mar. 1993,
823). Clan political organizations such as the Somali Democratic Association
(SDA) representing the Gadabursi, the United Somali Party (USP) representing
the Warsengele and Dulbahante, and the United Somali Front (USF) representing
the Issa cannot legally operate until appropriate regulations are introduced
( Leatherbee, Leah and Bricker Jan. 1994, 29; New African May 1994a, 8). The
restriction does not apply, however, to the Isaaq political organization, the
Somali National Movement (SNM), which remains the only legal party ( ibid.;
Horn of Africa Bulletin July-Aug. 1993, 25). The government is still dominated
by the old "maquisards" from the civil war, most of them Isaaq, who control
such key ministries as Defence, Foreign Affairs and the Interior (see
appendix). Some clans, such as the Warsengele, are still without representation
(see appendix); despite the recent trend in the current government to include
minority clans and sub-clans, many remain largely unconvinced that they have
any real power ( Leatherbee, Leah and Bricker Jan. 1994, 29). As noted by
Daniel Compagnon, a researcher who specializes in Somalia, a strong minority of
Dulbahante and Gadabursi are still [translation] "insensitive to separatist
alarms" for a variety of reasons (Politique Africaine June 1993, 14). Another
source quotes a prominent Gadabursi who estimates that 30 per cent of the
population would prefer a union with the South, but the conditions would have
to be different from what they were in 1960 (The Washington Post 20 Oct. 1993).
In Las Khorey, home of the Warsengele, there are [translation] "no traces of
the Independent Republic of Somaliland ... the national flag of Somalia, with
its white five-point star on a light blue field, still flies over the home of
Ismail, Sultan of the Warsengele" (Le Nouvel Afrique Asie Mar. 1994, 12-13).
The head of the clan militia believes the Warsengele will deal with Somaliland
[translation] "when its presumed president, Ibrahim Egal, extends his authority
at least to the airport in the capital, Hargeisa. Now, when he uses that
airport, he has to pay a transit fee to the Isaaq clan - a [sub] clan different
from his own - which controls the runway" (See section 2.3) ( ibid.). 2.2 Local
Authority and the Importance of Elders Because of the "fairly chaotic"
situation created by the lack of a modern government structure, Somaliland
society has had to use tremendous [translation] "political innovation"
(Politique Africaine June 1993, 18). It has actually revived [translation] "
the mechanisms of collective decision-making, representation, and negotiation"
in which decisions are made by a council ("shir") of elders ( ibid.) which is
recognized by the National Charter ( Republic of Somaliland 25 Apr. 1993, 6).
According to Compagnon, every married adult male in the clan can claim elder
status even though [translation] "his status will depend on his birth
(genealogical link to the founding ancestor of the clan), his personal
integrity and wisdom, his speaking ability and eloquence, and his wealth"
(Politique Africaine June 1993, 18). Some elders have the traditional titles of
sultan, garad or okal, [translation] "although they cannot employ either the
physical or symbolic coercion which a true chief can" ( ibid.) [ For more
information about the role of elders in Somaliland, see Lewis I.M., 1961, A
Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics among the Northern
Somalia of the Horn of Africa, London: Oxford University Press.]. However, the
clan division reduces the overall political power of the elders. Since the
clans are nothing more than "autonomous reproductions of the state on a smaller
scale" and each clan "guards its sovereignty and separateness jealously", the
elders have difficulty forming lasting cross-clan coalitions ( Leatherbee, Leah
and Bricker 1994, 31). Moreover, it appears that public affairs (including the
police and all matters related to security) are administered at the local level
( Good 13 Sept. 1994). A good example of the substitution of state authority by
local authority is the intervention of the elders as mediators in the conflict
between the Habar Yunis and the Habar Jelo (two Isaaq sub-clans) in Burao in
January 1992 (Africa Report MayJune 1993, 46). The two sub-clans had become
embroiled in an intense armed conflict; the elders had to step in at
considerable personal risk to prevent further loss of life and reassure
civilians, who were fleeing in droves ( ibid.). The government of Abdirahman
"Tour", a member of the Habar Yunis clan (a sub-clan of the Habar Gaharjis),
which did nothing to pre-empt or stop the fighting and "refused to support" the
elders' initiative, was "accused of complicity" with one of the two sides
( ibid.). Relations between the government and the elders took a more hostile
turn in March 1992 when fighting broke out between the Habar Yunis and the Isse
Muse militias in Berbera ( ibid.). The elders tried to negotiate an agreement
between the two sides, but the government wanted to let the conflict drag on as
a way of "settling political scores with some of its key opponents" ( ibid.).
The victims of such manipulation were again civilians, who had to flee Berbera,
and, when the fighting spread to that city, to Sheikh ( ibid.). In February
1993, the elders succeeded in negotiating an agreement between the Dulbahante
and the Habar Yunis in Daraweyne; the two clans compete for grazing land
( ibid., 48). The elders' principal achievement in peacefully administering the
region was the afore-mentioned conference of the council of elders (Guurti)
held in Borama "to negotiate a comprehensive peace deal for Somaliland and to
set the political framework for the two-year transition period" ( ibid., 45).
The conference was considered by many "the triumph of [political] discourse
over armed conflict" and generated a degree of optimism ( ibid., 48). In
October 1993, The Guardian reported that a functioning judiciary existed (The
Guardian 15 Oct. 1993). Nevertheless, according to Leatherbee, Leah and
Bricker, despite the appointment of a supreme court, there is no active,
comprehensive judicial system; authority over the courts lies not with the
government, but with the elders, who "resort to a traditional mix of Somali
customary law and Islamic Shari'a" ( Leatherbee, Leah and Bricker Jan. 1994,
29). 2.3 Disarmament and Security In a January 1994 speech in Hargeisa,
President Egal issued a call for sweeping voluntary disarmament. He added that
the government (and not the armed clans) would be taking charge of national
facilities, which were major sources of revenue (Somali News Update 27 Jan.
1994). However, the Somaliland government was unable to control the armed
teenagers who were rampaging through the region: the 50,000 or so veterans of
the civil war - most of them young men - and their weapons were still,
according to one source, inseparable ( AP 25 Jan. 1994). Only 6,000 of the
veterans could be integrated in services like the new national guard and the
police ( ibid.). Six military barracks were supposed to be used as
demobilization centres, but because of financial problems, only the barracks in
Mandera, 60 miles from Hargeisa, could be opened ( ibid.; The Guardian 15 Oct.
1993). According to one source, "It's difficult to just say no to a teenager
with a rifle, and [. . .] very few dare to try" ( AP 25 Jan. 1994). For
example, armed teenagers from the Eidagale sub-clan are the ones who collect
"taxes" at the airport in the "capital" of Hargeisa ( ibid.; Le Nouvel Afrique
Asie Mar. 1994, 13). The president himself, in theory the supreme authority,
has to pay the taxes because it is not his sub-clan that controls the airport
( ibid.). The situation is the same at the Borama airport and in the port of
Zeyla ( Good 26 May 1994). The president also does not appear to be beyond the
reach of the violence: his home in Hargeisa was the target of attacks by young
former militiamen, although the president tried to downplay the impact of the
attacks ( BBC Summary 22 Feb. 1994). In February 1994, two British members of
parliament and a British citizen working for the non-governmental organization
Action Aid UK were abducted near the village of Mydt, Somaliland, by a band of
kidnappers from the Habar Yunis clan ( Reuters 10 Feb. 1994; AFP 10 Feb. 1994).
Opinion is divided as to the motive behind the abduction: an official of Africa
Rights quoted by Reuters said the incident could have been politically
motivated, but the president of Somaliland felt the kidnappers were simply
after ransom money. The trio were released without ransom following
negotiations with Habar Yunis elders ( ibid.). According to the president, the
same group of kidnappers last year seized an Italian boat and its crew and did
not release them until a huge ransom was paid ( AFP 10 Feb. 1994). 2.4 Mine
Clearing and Its Impact The Chicago Tribune estimates there are 1.5 million
land mines in Somalia (Chicago Tribune 28 Feb. 1993). According to Africa
Rights, however, that figure is only a guess ( Africa Rights & Mines Advisory
Group Dec. 1993, 7); no one knows exactly how many mines are buried throughout
Northern Somalia ( AP 31 Jan. 1994). There are two types of mine in Somalia:
anti-tank devices made in Russia, Italy, Pakistan and Egypt, and anti-personnel
devices from countries like the former USSR, the United States and Pakistan
( Physicians for Human Rights Nov. 1992, 39-40). Physicians for Human Rights
claims that in the north, "most of these mines are anti-personnel devices left
by Siad Barre's forces and, to a lesser extent, by the Somali National Movement
(SNM)" ( ibid., 15). Furthermore, "there are no maps of mine fields"; mines
have been planted throughout the region ( AP 31 Jan. 1994). There are many
mines in Hargeisa, the main city in the north and the capital of the new
"republic". Many areas of the city, in particular the military areas, the area
around the airport, the area around the main prison and the area around the
radio station (Radio Hargeisa) are high-risk areas ( Physicians for Human
Rights Nov. 1992, 39). Moreover, many of the main roads, especially the roads
linking the refugee camps in eastern Ethiopia to the major cities in the north,
are laden with mines ( ibid.). The mines are alleged to have killed and injured
thousands of people in Somalia, especially in the self-proclaimed republic of
Somaliland ( Africa Rights & Mines Advisory Group Dec. 1993, 8). According to
the co-director of Africa Rights, some 10,000 people in Somalia have been
killed by mine explosions ( IPS 16 Dec. 1993). The same source estimates that
between 15,000 and 20,000 people in Somalia, most of them children, have lost
limbs or been otherwise injured ( ibid.). The impact of the mines goes far
beyond the loss of human life or loss of limbs ( Africa Rights & Mines Advisory
Group Dec. 1993, 8). The mines are an obstacle to economic recovery in
Somaliland ( ibid.; IPS 16 Dec. 1993). For example, the area stretching from
Hargeisa to Borama, the main farming region in the north, is one of the most
heavily mined regions in Somaliland ( Africa Rights & Mines Advisory Group Dec.
1993, 37). The planting of mines on roads such as the road from Borama to Zeyla
has had an adverse effect on trade, on the movement of goods, and on prices
( ibid., 40-41). The mines are also an obstacle to the return of refugees
( ibid., 43-44). Many of the refugees who returned to Somalia after the fall of
the Siad Barre regime have gone back to the camps, primarily because of the
mines or the lack of water ( ibid.). As one German physician observed, "There
are so many victims. Three times at the airport, I saw people blown up near the
runway" ( ibid., 43). Experts from a British company, Rimfire International,
along with some 440 local employees, undertook the difficult task of locating,
defusing and destroying all the mines buried in Somaliland ( AP 31 Jan. 1994).
In two years, almost 78,000 mines were unearthed; moreover, the number of
civilians injured by mines dropped from 416 in 1991 to 54 in 1993 ( ibid.).
Despite these results, Rimfire International was forced to leave Somaliland in
February 1994, initially because of a wage dispute between the company and its
local employees and then because local authorities and United Nations
representatives were not satisfied with Rimfire's work (The Indian Ocean
Newsletter 26 Feb. 1994, 4). 3. THE SITUATION OF REFUGEES According to
Documentations-Réfugiés, Somaliland leaders and representatives of French
authorities met late last year to discuss the French program to repatriate
Somali refugees in Djibouti (Documentations-Réfugiés No 235 114 Feb. 1994, 2).
The voluntary return program overseen by France was to involve 20,000 refugees
(Marchés tropicaux 12 Nov. 1993, 2756). However, the Somaliland delegation, in
addition to requesting financial aid, [translation] "expressed concern about
the return of the refugees, most of them Isaa, to a region dominated by the
Isaaq of the primarily Isaaq Somali National Movement (SNM)" (ibid.;
Documentations-Réfugiés, No 235 114 Feb. 1994, 2). This concern over the return
of refugees can be attributed to the clan-based division of the territory: none
of the clans will tolerate refugees from other clans on their lands ( Good 26
May 1994). According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR), more than a million Somalis left the country during the last few years
because of the civil war (Calgary Herald 16 Oct. 1993). Some 200,000, most of
whom returned to Somaliland, subsequently left the camps in Ethiopia ( ibid.).
However, the voluntary repatriation programs that began in 1991 ran into
difficulty, principally because of problems with the mines and water ( Africa
Rights & Mines Advisory Group Dec. 1993, 43-44). Further, despite the fact that
Somaliland has been fairly stable compared to the rest of Somalia, there is
still some insecurity which has prevented some international and non-
governmental organizations from launching reintegration programs (World Refugee
Report July 1993, 23, 44). The bomb attack on the United Nations office in
Hargeisa (Horn of Africa Bulletin Mar.-Apr. 1993, 26) and an incident near
Hargeisa in which bandits fired at an airplane transporting tents for the UNHCR
( AFP 29 Mar. 1994) provide examples of this state of affairs. As noted in
section 5, as a result of violence in Hargeisa in October and November 1994 and
a migration of people fleeing the violence, the UNHCR postponed its voluntary
repatriation programme ( Reuters 22 Nov. 1994; ibid. 28 Nov. 1994). 4. OTHER
ISSUES Vigorously opposed to secession by the north, the various Somali
factions made statements at the conferences in Addis Ababa, Cairo and, most
recently, Nairobi affirming the sanctity of Somali unity (Results n.d.; New
African May 1994b, 8;The Christian Science Monitor 6 Jan. 1994). Political
organizations such as the Somali Democratic Association (SDA) and the United
Somali Party (USP), which represent the interests of the Gadabursi and the
Darood (Warsengele and Dulbahante) respectively, are on record as being opposed
to secession ( Leatherbee, Leah and Bricker Jan. 1994, 29). Further, in April
1994, the first head of state of the self-proclaimed republic, Abdirahman Ahmed
Ali, currently president of the Somali National Movement, declared his
opposition to secession during a press conference in the Ethiopian capital of
Addis Ababa ( Reuters 30 Apr. 1994). He added that "the path followed by the
Somali people in the north and south of the country to resolve the Somali
crisis has not achieved the desired results" ( AP 29 Apr. 1994). The current
president of Somaliland, Mohammed Egal, described Ahmed Ali as a traitor ( AFP
29 Apr. 1994); he had said that the people of the north did not want to
[translation] "put their fate in the hands of a central power in Mogadishu"
(Marchés tropicaux 28 Jan. 1994, 163). According to Reuters, "The north-west is
still threatened by clan war between ethnic militias who want to keep their
independence and others which want to rejoin the rest of Somalia" ( Reuters 10
Feb. 1994). 5. EVENTS IN HARGEISA: SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1994 As outlined
briefly below, efforts of the government to regain control of the Eidagale-held
Hargeisa airport (see section 2.3) resulted in violence in the capital in
October through December 1994 and the flight of thousands of people from the
city. While the outcome and long-term ramifications of the violence remain
unclear, the following brief chronology may assist the reader in considering
the effects of these events on the future of Somaliland. September Fighting
between supporters of former Somaliland president Abdirahman Ahmed Ali and
government troops closes the airport in Hargeisa ( AP 26 Nov. 1994) 9 October
According to Radio Hargeisa, a report is presented to a joint session of
parliament and the senate announcing agreement between clan elders and
government troops on control of the road between Berbera and Hargeisa. The
issue of control over the Hargeisa airport remains unresolved ( BBC Summary 25
Oct. 1994). 16 October President Egal declares that government forces have
taken control of the Hargeisa airport, reportedly in response to attacks by
militia on government troops on the Hargeisa-Berbera road ( Reuters 16 Oct.
1994; BBC Summary 24 Oct. 1994) As reported by Radio Hargeisa, "the president
stressed that no clan had been defeated in the operation, adding that the
military confrontation had been between the nation and an anti-nation group"
( ibid.). 14-30 November Clan militiamen (also referred to as rebels) and
government forces engage in fighting in the town of Hargeisa ( AFP 18 Nov.
1994; Reuters 22 Nov. 1994; The Indian Ocean Newsletter 26 Nov. 1994; SNU 21
Nov. 1994; Reuters 10 Dec. 1994). According to President Egal, over 30 people
are killed and 100 wounded during the conflict ( Reuters 24 Nov. 1994) The
militiamen are referred to variously as supporters or allies of Abdirahman
Ahmed Ali or as members of the Eidagale [ Alternate spellings include
"Idagalle" ( SNU 21 Nov. 1994), "Idagale" (The Indian Ocean Newsletter 26 Nov.
1994) and "Ida Gale" ( Reuters 28 Nov. 1994).] clan, an Isaaq subclan ( AFP 26
Nov. 1994; The Indian Ocean Newsletter 26 Nov. 1994; Reuters 28 Nov. 1994; SNU
21 Nov. 1994). Egal reportedly calls them "young boys." ( AFP 18 Nov. 1994)
Thousands of people leave Hargeisa, some crossing the borders into Ethiopia
( Reuters 22 Nov. 1994; AFP 26 Nov. 1994; Deutsche Presse Agentur 26 Nov.
1994). The UNHCR postpones its voluntary repatriation programme for Somali
refugees in Ethiopia ( Reuters 22 Nov. 1994; ibid. 28 Nov. 1994) 1 December
According to a Reuters report, President Egal claims to have repelled an attack
on Hargeisa by rebel forces (Reuters 10 Dec. 1994). The report also notes that
"aid agencies in Ethiopia and Djibouti say up to 60 percent of the population
has fled Hargeisa since the fighting... [began]" (ibid.). APPENDIX 1 - MEMBERS
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SOMALILAND Clan Title Name Status Issaq President Mohamed
Ibrahim Ega1 Civ. Gadabursi Vice-president Abdirahman Aw Ali Mil. Dolbahante
Speaker of the parliament Ahmed Abdi Habsadey Mil. Issaq Defence Dahir Warsame
Mil. Rehabilitation and reconstruction Yusuf Jama Burale Civ. Animal husbandry
and forests Ali Caddé Civ. Arap Mail and telecommunications Osman Adel Dool
(Qualé) Civ. Trade and industry Mohamed Ahmed Ibrahim Dahib Gurey Mil. Eidagale
Religion Cabdirahman Cagib Civ. Finance Ibrahim Abdi Musa Civ. Habar Jelo
Planning Abdillahi Mohamed Dualé Civ. Foreign affairs Osman Abdillahi Jama Civ.
Education Suleiman Mohamoud Aden ("Gaal") Civ. Saad Musa Interior Musa Bihi
Abdi Mil. Agriculture Haibé Omar Magan Civ. Darood* Mineral and water resources
Mohamed Ali Attayé Civ. Dolbahante Health and labour Yacin Houssein Civ. Social
affairs (minister of state) Deqa Ouljog Civ. Gadabursi Information Yusuf
Ibrahim Sheikh Civ. Public works Abdi Mohamoud Gaagalé Civ. Issa Justice
Abdillahi Gireh Robleh Civ. (Horn of Africa Bulletin July-August 1993, 25; Good
26 May 1994; Hersi 24 May 1994). The Warsengele (a Darood sub-clan) are not
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