a-5403 (ACC-SOM-5403)
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Situation der Tumal
Laut dem im März 2007 veröffentlichten Jahresbericht des US Department of State (USDOS) zur Menschenrechtslage im Jahr 2006 gehören die Tumal den Minderheitenclans in Somalia an:
“There were 31 members of the minority Bantu or Arab ethnic groups in the 275-seat Transitional Federal Parliament and four in the TFG cabinet. The Somaliland parliament and cabinet had no members of minority groups. […]
NGOs documented patterns of rape of women with impunity, particularly of women displaced from their homes due to civil conflict or who were members of minority clans. Police and militia members raped women, and rape was commonly practiced in inter-clan conflicts. […]
More than 85 percent of the population shared a common ethnic heritage, religion, and nomad-influenced culture. In most areas members of groups other than the predominant clan were excluded from effective participation in governing institutions and were subject to discrimination in employment, judicial proceedings, and access to public services.
Minority groups and low-caste clans included the Bantu (the largest minority group), the Benadiri, Rer Hamar, Brawanese, Swahili, Tumal, Yibir, Yaxar, Madhiban, Hawrarsame, Muse Dheryo, and Faqayaqub. The UNIE estimated that minority groups may constitute a higher percentage of the population than previously thought--perhaps as many as two million persons (around 22 percent of the estimated population). In the absence of any census data for the past 30 years any demographic statement can only be an estimate. Intermarriage between minority groups and mainstream clans was restricted. Minority groups had no armed militias and continued to be disproportionately subject to killings, torture, rapes, kidnappings for ransom, and looting of land and property with impunity by faction militias and majority clan members. Many minority communities continued to live in deep poverty and to suffer from numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion. [...]
It could not be confirmed whether it continued to be the case, as had been reported the previous year, that local clan militias forced members of minority groups to work on banana plantations without compensation or that in Middle and Lower Juba and Lower Shabelle Bantus were used as forced labor.” (USDOS, 6. März 2007, Sektion 3, Sektion 5, Sektion 6.c.)
Das UK Home Office gibt in seiner Operational Guidance Note (Richtlinien für die britischen Asylbehörden) vom 27. Oktober 2006 folgende Einschätzung zur Situation von Angehörigen der Tumal:
„Treatment. The Gaboye/Midgan (usually referred to as the Midgan but also known as the Madhiban), Tumal and Yibir (a group said to have Jewish origins) traditionally lived in the areas of the four main nomadic clan families of Darod, Isaaq, Dir and Hawiye in northern and central Somalia though in the last few decades many of them have migrated to the cities. These groups are now scattered throughout the country. They are mainly found in northern and central regions but the Midgan have been able to settle in Puntland. […] The Midgan, Tumal and Yibir and Galgala have always been placed at the lower end of Somali society and are subject to societal discrimination in urban centres from other clan groups and harassment where no patron clan protection exists, particularly in rural areas.
Sufficiency of protection. These groups traditionally settle in areas where they can obtain protection from the dominant clan and engage in an economic activity. Most have assimilated into the other Somalia clans with whom they live. Some Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir assimilated into the Isaaq in Somaliland, while others have assimilated into the Darod in Puntland and central regions. Other Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir have assimilated with Hawadle, Murasade and Marehan clans in Galgadud region.31 Members of groups other than the Galgala are therefore able to seek and receive adequate protection from their patron clans.
Internal relocation. Those assimilated into major clan families, their clan groups and associated sub clans should be able to safely reside in an area in which their patron clan is present. Freedom of movement is sometimes restricted in some parts of the country due to sporadic clan or sub-clan conflict, especially in southern and central regions. More usually, checkpoints manned by militiamen loyal to one clan or faction inhibit passage by other groups. Nevertheless internal relocation for members of occupational castes other than the Galgala is generally possible. The possibility of internal relocation to Somaliland or Puntland is restricted; in these areas the authorities have made it clear that they would only admit to the territory they control those who are of the same clan or who were previously resident in that particular area.” (UK Home Office, 27. Oktober 2006, Abs. 3.9.2.-3.9.4.)
Das UK Home Office hält abschließend fest:
“Conclusion. Members of the Midgan, Tumal or Yibir groups are usually assimilated into major clan or sub-clan groups where they reside. While they may from time to time encounter discrimination and harassment from other clan groups due to their lowly social status, they may avail themselves of the protection of their patron clan or relocate to another region where their patron clan is represented. It is unlikely that such a claimant would encounter ill treatment amounting to persecution within the terms of the 1951 Convention. The grant of asylum in such cases is therefore not likely to be appropriate.” (UK Home Office, 27. Oktober 2006, Abs. 3.9.6.)
Das United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) bemerkt in seinem “Mogadishu Fact Sheet” vom 11. Dezember 2006 zur Lage von Binnenvertriebenen (IDPs), die oft Minderheitengruppen oder machtlosen Clans angehören:
“IDPs are often from minority or weak/powerless clans, and thus have limited clan protection. They are particularly vulnerable to violence but have had little recourse to either customary law (xeer), or religious law (sharia). Despite their vulnerability, IDPs/urban poor are unlikely to return to their place of origin due to insecurity and lack of livelihood opportunities.” (OCHA, 11. Dezember 2006, S. 2)
Am 6. Dezember 2006 berichtete OCHA im „Protection Fact Sheet“:
“Women and girls, especially within IDP and minority communities, continue to suffer sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). […] While minority groups, according to some estimates, constitute up to one-third of the Somali population, their lack of clan protection leaves them vulnerable to a range of human rights abuses and harassment; often, they find themselves facing discrimination when trying to access limited social services.” (OCHA, 6. Dezember 2006)
Freedom House (FH) schreibt in seinem Jahresbericht vom September 2006:
“Although more than 80 percent of Somalis share a common ethnic heritage, religion, and nomadic-influenced culture, discrimination is widespread. Clans exclude one another from participation in social and political life. Minority clans are harassed, intimidated, and abused by armed gunmen.” (FH, September 2006, Kap. „Political Rights and Civil Liberties“)
Der Refugee Council of Australia beschreibt in seinem Bericht vom Februar 2006 folgende Gruppen in Somalia als besonders schutzbedürftig:
“Those in most need of protection are:
· female headed households
· women at risk, including trafficked girls;
· members of minority ethnic groups such as Bantu, Benadiri and Midgan;
· members of the Tumal and Yibro occupational groups of metal-workers,
leather-workers, hairdressers, herbalists and others and;
· religious minority groups such as the Ashraf and Shikhal Muslims.” (Refugee Council of Australia, Februar 2006, S. 36)
Zur Lage von Binnenvertriebenen in Somaliland, die Minderheitengruppen aus Süd- und Zentralsomalia angehören, finden sich folgende Informationen vom Juni 2006, die in einem Bericht des Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) vom Oktober 2006 veröffentlicht wurden:
· „IDPs from Digil, Mirigle, Bantu and minorities suffer social discrimination in Somaliland negatively affecting their standards of living and access to services
· Minority groups: Bantu, Bravenese, Rerhamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumal, Yibir, Ogadenis, Rahanweyn and Gaboye), represent one third of the Somali population and have been forcibly displaced from valuable agricultural lands
· Most of the IDPs who fled to the north come from minority groups such as Rahaywen sub clan, Bantu, Ajuran, Jarso, Madhiban and Ashraf
· Southern IDPs in the north are considered as ‘criminals’
· IDPs from minority groups lack protection political representation, and are denied basic rights including access to humanitarian assistance
· Minorities are subject to human rights abuses, attacks, discrimination, exploitation, displacement and land dispossession by militias and bandits” (IDMC, 2. Oktober 2006, S. 108)
Amnesty International (AI) schreibt im Mai 2005 zur Lage von Minderheitengruppen in Somaliland:
“Gaboye is the collective name in Somaliland for different occupational minority groups (Musa Dariyo, Tumal, Madiban and Yibir) who number some tens of thousands of people and suffer severe discrimination in this nomadic pastoralist-based society. They are also found in Somalia. They experience exclusion on account of their occupations as hairdressers, metal-workers and blacksmiths, leather-workers and shoemakers, herbalists and ritual specialists – services they traditionally perform for the “noble” Somali pastoralist clans. They are customarily not permitted to inter-marry with the pastoralist clans and thus have no clan protection in the form of vengeance or compensation for murder or other crimes. They equally have little or no protection in the state system of administration of justice, which is controlled by clan members, and in practice have little or no access to education or other economic and social rights. Although attitudes to minorities are improving, with two seats reserved for minorities in parliament, and several Somaliland human rights organizations working with minority associations to defend their rights, the minorities benefit little from the human rights guarantees in the Somaliland Constitution and laws. Cases of arbitrary detention, kidnapping, rape, torture and killing of Gaboye with impunity are still reported in Somaliland as well as Somalia.” (AI, 18. Mai 2005; siehe dazu auch AI, 17. März 2005, S. 21f.)
Zur aktuellen Lage von Minderheiten in Somalia hält die Minority Rights Group (MRG) in einem im März 2007 veröffentlichten Bericht fest:
“According to MRG’s People under Threat calculation (Table 1, Reference section, pp. 118–23), Somalia is the most dangerous place in the world for minorities. […]
The position of Somalia at the top of the table for 2006 attests to a highly dangerous combination of factors. In June 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an Islamic coalition seeking to restore law and order to Somalia, took over Mogadishu and subsequently much of the country, curbing the power of Somalia’s warlords. However, in December, Ethiopian armed forces acting in support of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), and supported by the USA, overthrew the UIC, which had received support from Eritrea and a number of Middle Eastern states. The TFG is unlikely to be able to retain control of the country without outside support. While one side has portrayed itself as fighting terrorists linked to al-Qaeda, and the other claims it is fighting Christian invaders, the most immediate fear is now a renewal of atrocities against civilians in the context of Darood–Hawiye interclan rivalry and a threat to minorities both in Somalia and in neighbouring Ethiopia. Although the UIC emphasized the importance of moving away from clan politics and had achieved some success in overcoming ‘clanism’, it was nonetheless particularly associated with the Hawiye clan. It also provided overt support for Oromo and Ogaden selfdetermination movements in Ethiopia. There is now a grave threat of violent repression against these populations, as well as other groups in Somalia in the context of a power vacuum and/or continued intervention by neighbouring states.” (MRG, März 2007, S. 10, 57)
Das UK Home Office hält in seinem jüngsten Länderbericht zu Somalia vom 28. Februar 2007 unter Bezugnahme auf mehrere Quellen in einem Kapitel zur allgemeinen Sicherheitslage von Angehörigen von Minderheitengruppen fest:
“As noted in the JFFMR March 2004, the delegation asked a number of UN and NGO sources whether the security and human rights situation of the minority groups and minor clans in southern and central Somalia had undergone any significant change since the situation described in the JFFMR of December 2000:
“The response from all sources consulted was that no change for the better had taken place, either with regard to their security or human rights situation.” [7c] (p36)
The United Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) does not have any representation in Somalia. The south and central areas of Somalia, including Mogadishu, are covered by dedicated staff in the British High Commission in Nairobi. These staff, together with staff from the British Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, have regular contact with the Somalia Transitional Government, and many international organisations, agencies, journalists, parliamentarians and other members of the Somali civil society. In its advice note dated 29th January 2007, the FCO stated:
“The risk for minority clans is the same as for majority clans. Individuals, regardless of clan are generally safe, unless they are part of a militia. If two militias clash, for example over a business interest, they may fight. But individuals are not targeted simply because of clan affiliation.” [16b] (p4)
The International Crisis Group (IGC) in a report dated 26 January 2007 stated
“The Courts’ defeat signals the return of clan-based politics to southern Somalia. Whereas the Courts drew their support predominantly from the Hawiye clan, the TFG is widely perceived as dominated by Darod clan interests. TFG leaders reinforced this perception by pursuing policies that further alienated the Hawiye, notably an appeal for foreign troops and the government’s relocation to Jowhar and then Baidoa, instead of Mogadishu. Hawiye alienation and TFG inadequacies left a vacuum into which the Courts expanded between June and December 2006, bringing a degree of peace and security unknown to the south for more than fifteen years. Mogadishu was reunited, weapons removed from the streets and the port and airport reopened. By December [2006], the Courts had expanded from their Mogadishu base to control most of the territory between the Kenyan border and the autonomous region of Puntland in the north east, while the TFG was confined to Baidoa, protected by its Ethiopian backers. Communities seemed prepared to tolerate a strict interpretation of Sharia law in return for peace and security.
“Politically, Somalia has now been returned roughly to where it was when the TFG was formed in October 2004. The government is weak, unpopular and faction ridden, and the power vacuum in southern Somalia is rapidly being filled by the same faction leaders and warlords the Courts overthrew less than a year ago. Many Mogadishu residents resent the Courts’ defeat, feel threatened by the TFG and are dismayed by the presence of Ethiopian troops in the capital. Mogadishu is awash with weapons, and there have already been hit-and-run attacks on TFG and Ethiopian troops. The potential for serious violence is just below the surface.
“Ethiopia’s military victory has dismantled only the most visible part of the Courts: the regional administrative authority in south central Somalia (including Mogadishu), which served essentially as a political platform for Hawiye clan interests. Other elements, including the militant Shabaab leadership, remain largely intact and have dispersed throughout the country, threatening to wage a long war. A U.S. air strike on 8 January 2007 apparently wounded Aden Hashi ‘Ayro, a prominent Shabaab commander, and killed some of his guards but failed to destroy any top targets. A second U.S. airstrike was launched on 23 January [2007], but information on the targets and impact was not immediately available. The grassroots network of mosques, schools and private enterprises that has underpinned the spread of Salafist teachings and their extremist variants remains in place and continues to expand thanks to generous contributions from Islamic charities and the private sector.”
As the FCO have noted in their advice, emergency laws had been enacted by the TFG. The IGC report reflected the rapidly developing situation, and these factors that may have an indirect effect on the security of minority groups. (IGC 26 January 2007) [31a] The Power and Interest News Report (PINR), in its article dated 2 February 2007, also gave an overview of recent security developments. (PINR 2 February 2007) [14b]” (UK Home Office, 28. Februar 2007, Abs. 20.11-20.14)
Das Danish Immigration Service (DIS) berichtet in einem älteren Bericht über eine Erkundungsreise im Jänner 2004, veröffentlicht im März 2004:
“Discrimination against minorities
Though presented as a homogeneous society, Somalia features a number of low-status and minority groups which are frequently subject to abuse and exploitation. The Somali Bantu population is now the best known of these minorities; representing about 5% of the total population, the Bantu are prone to theft of their land, rape, forced labour, and a range of discriminatory behaviour. Minority and low status groups such as the Bantu are afforded little protection under customary clan law and have virtually no recourse to a system of justice when victimized. Those who do bring complaints to clan, legal, or religious authorities place themselves at great risk of intimidation and assault.38 A report on human rights abuses by the Mogadishu-based Isma’il Jumale Human Rights Centre in 2003 concludes that most of the victims were from minority groups “who have no clan affiliations as protection. […] (DIS, März 2004, S. 17)
Hinsichtlich des Zugangs zum Justizsystem für Minderheitengruppen bezieht sich das DIS auf Dr. Osman Kamula Mofi, einen Menschenrechtsanwalt und Begründer der Somali International Organisation for Human Rights:
“Dr. Mofi stated that members of minority groups in Somalia have no access to a judicial system, whether it is Sharia courts or traditional customary law (Diya compensation system). Firstly, there are no conventional courts or Sharia courts, and secondly the minority groups have no legal rights, as they are not part of the Diya system. Dr. Mofi explained that if a member of a minority group kills a member of one of the major clans the murderer will loose his property and he may also be killed. The proverb loma ooye (meaning “no one cries for him”) reflects the lack of justice in such a situation.
It was stated that even during the Siad Barre’s regime, members of minority groups were judicially discriminated against, but that presently the situation was considerably worse. Dr. Mofi emphasised that the right to property, and the right to defend oneself against killings, physical abuse and other human rights abuses, does not exist in Somalia for members of minority groups.
Dr. Mofi strongly emphasised that it is only members of the majority clans that have access to judicial assistance. The minority groups are not part of the traditional Diya-system and they do not receive any compensation. The only way they can hope to achieve some degree of protection is to try to establish an alliance with a dominant clan in their area. This can occur through intermarriage between a member of a minority group and a member of a major clan or when a minority group submits to be dominated by a ‘noble’ clan. Dr. Mofi did not believe that there is any possibility that a court in Somalia would secure a fair trial for a member of a minority group. As an example of this, Dr. Mofi explained that in 2002 the chairman of the Sharia court in Merka judged in favour of a Bantu in a trial against a Habr Gedir. The chairman himself was affiliated to the minority clan Bimaal (a Dir clan), and as a consequence of his judgement was dismissed on the order of a Habr Gedir warlord in Merka.
Wilback emphasised that those members of minority groups and even clans that are in a minority in a particular area have no right to justice. As an example, Wilback referred to the Harti clans in Kismayo. The Harti are Darod clans from North Eastern Somalia and they constitute a minority clan community in Kismayo. In legal disputes with other clans the Harti are dependent on the Diya support they may get from their fellow clan members in the North East.” (DIS, März 2004, S. 29f.; weitere Informationen zur Lage von Minderheitengruppen entnehmen Sie bitte direkt dem Bericht)
In einer älteren Studie von United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) zu Minderheiten in Somalia vom 1. August 2002 heißt es in Bezug auf Minderheitengruppen in Somalia, darunter den Tumal:
“One of the things that were deliberately downplayed was the existence of minority groups. Although the population of minority groups living in Somalia has not as yet been established, estimates indicate that they constitute one third of the total Somalia population; approximately 2,000,000 people. The minority groups include Bantu, Bravenese, Rerhamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumal, Yibir and Gaboye. These groups continue to live in conditions of great poverty and suffer numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion. […]
Social segregation of minority groups in Somalia dates back to periods before the armed conflict of 1991. Siyad Barre's regime gave minority issues some prominent and positioned some minorities, mainly from the Gaboye (Midgan), Tumal and Yibir in high military and government posts. However, the regime did not carry out any tangible programmes to empower minority groups. On the contrary, it seriously violated the basic human rights and right to development of these groups. […]
The Gaboye, Tumal, Yibir and Galgala are ethnically associated with the Samale, which forms a dominant clan in Somalia. However, cultural stigma and traditions have excluded them as outcastes from the Samale clan. They engage in the activities of blacksmithing and shoemaking, as well as being hunters/gatherers. They live mainly in central and northern Somalia.
Most of the minority groups have assimilated into other Somalia clans with whom they live. […]Some Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir assimilated into the Isak in Somaliland, while others yet have assimilated into the Darod in Puntland and central regions. There are also other Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir who assimilated with Hawadle, Murasade and Marehan clans in Galgadud region.
With the exception of the Bantu, Rerhamar, Bravanese, Bajuni and Eyle who have distinct "non-Somali" physical appearance, all other minorities have physical appearances similar to that of the dominant clans, as well as having ethnic and cultural similarities. What distinguish the assimilated minorities are their distinct economic livelihoods. […]
Economic dominance is one of the most serious socio-economic problems facing the minority communities. Since independence, the major clans at the expense of minority groups have dominated social and political affairs of Somalia. This trend has continued more than ten years after the collapse of the Somali state.
In Kismaiyo, all economic sources such as the seaport, airport and commercial activities are all controlled by the Habregedir and Marehan. Those who do not belong to these groups, and particular the Bantu and Bajuni work only as underpaid servants. In Jowhar and Balad, the Warsengeli (Abgal) and Da'ud control revenue collection, farm and livestock production and marketing, as well as all other economic activities. In Beletweyne, the Hawadle and other dominant clans control the economy. Minorities occupy subordinate roles. In Hargeisa there are nearly five telephone companies, six money transfer companies, several light industries, transportation and construction companies; all of which create hundreds of job opportunities. The minorities claim that these jobs are offered according to the ethnic identity of the individual. The Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir have no access to those jobs because of their ethnicity.
Remittances have also been, for the last decade, an important economic source for the Somalis. However, remittances have had little impact on the livelihoods of the minority groups in the north and even far less in the south. […]
The Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir in Hargeisa and elsewhere in Somaliland suffered both during after the armed conflict between Siyad Barres' army and the Somali National Movement of the Isak clan. These groups have similar physical characteristics as the Isak and it was difficult for Siyad Barre's army to differentiate between the Isak and other clans. When Siyad Barre was defeated, the Isak meted harsh punishments on the Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir because they were perceived to be Siyad Barre supporters.” (OCHA, 1. August 2002)
Situation der Midgan (auch Midgaan geschrieben)
Die Midgan werden in einigen Berichten auch als Gaboye beziehungsweise Madhiban (auch Madiban, Madheban, Madhibaan geschrieben) bezeichnet, während andere Berichte zwischen diesen Gruppen unterscheiden. Wir haben daher auch Informationen zur Lage der Madiban und der Gaboye recherchiert.
Auch die Madhiban werden vom US Department of State zu den Minderheitengruppen in Somalia gerechnet:
“Minority groups and low-caste clans included the Bantu (the largest minority group), the Benadiri, Rer Hamar, Brawanese, Swahili, Tumal, Yibir, Yaxar, Madhiban, Hawrarsame, Muse Dheryo, and Faqayaqub.” (USDOS, 6. März 2007, Sektion 5 - National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities)
Das UK Home Office gibt in seiner Operational Guidance Note (Richtlinien für die britischen Asylbehörden) vom 27. Oktober 2006 folgende Einschätzung zur Situation von Angehörigen der Midgan:
„Treatment. The Gaboye/Midgan (usually referred to as the Midgan but also known as the Madhiban), Tumal and Yibir (a group said to have Jewish origins) traditionally lived in the areas of the four main nomadic clan families of Darod, Isaaq, Dir and Hawiye in northern and central Somalia though in the last few decades many of them have migrated to the cities. These groups are now scattered throughout the country. They are mainly found in northern and central regions but the Midgan have been able to settle in Puntland. […] The Midgan, Tumal and Yibir and Galgala have always been placed at the lower end of Somali society and are subject to societal discrimination in urban centres from other clan groups and harassment where no patron clan protection exists, particularly in rural areas. […]
“Conclusion. Members of the Midgan, Tumal or Yibir groups are usually assimilated into major clan or sub-clan groups where they reside. While they may from time to time encounter discrimination and harassment from other clan groups due to their lowly social status, they may avail themselves of the protection of their patron clan or relocate to another region where their patron clan is represented. It is unlikely that such a claimant would encounter ill treatment amounting to persecution within the terms of the 1951 Convention. The grant of asylum in such cases is therefore not likely to be appropriate.” (UK Home Office, 27. Oktober 2006, Abs. 3.9.6.)
Der Refugee Council of Australia beschreibt in seinem Bericht vom Februar 2006 folgende Gruppen in Somalia als besonders schutzbedürftig:
“Those in most need of protection are:
· female headed households
· women at risk, including trafficked girls;
· members of minority ethnic groups such as Bantu, Benadiri and Midgan;
· members of the Tumal and Yibro occupational groups of metal-workers,
leather-workers, hairdressers, herbalists and others and;
· religious minority groups such as the Ashraf and Shikhal Muslims.” (Refugee Council of Australia, Februar 2006, S. 36)
Amnesty International (AI) hielt in ihrem Jahresbericht für den Berichtszeitraum 2004, veröffentlicht am 25. Mai 2005, fest:
„Dass für Minderheitsgruppen im Übergangsparlament 31 Sitze reserviert waren, zeugte für gewisse Fortschritte im Hinblick auf die Anerkennung der Rechte von Minderheiten, die sich jedoch nach wie vor sozialer Diskriminierung und Übergriffen durch Angehörige der Clanmilizen ausgesetzt sahen. Betroffen davon waren insbesondere die unterprivilegierte ethnische Gruppe der Bantu (auch als Jarir bekannt) und die auf Dienstleistungen für die herrschenden Clans spezialisierten »Berufsgruppen« wie die Midgan.“ (AI, 25. Mai 2005, Abschnitt „Minderheitenrechte“)
Die Bertelsmann Stiftung schreibt in ihrem Länderbericht zu Somalia von 2006:
“With a vast majority of ethnic Somalis and nearly 100% Muslims, Somalia is, compared to other African states, a relatively homogeneous country in terms of ethnicity and religion, and ideally citizenship is not rejected – even to minority groups. Nonetheless, these minority groups (occupational groups, such as the Midgan, Yibir; Arabic minorities as well as the ethnic minority of the so-called Bantu) are clearly discriminated against in many aspects of social and economic life. Minority groups have also become a major target for several clan militias, and gunmen and freelance militias often harass them.” (Bertelsmann Stiftung, kein Datum angegeben, Kap. C.1.1. Stateness)
Amnesty International (AI) berichtet in einer Urgent Action vom 18. Mai 2005 von friedlichen Protesten in Somaliland gegen die Ermordung eines Gaboye durch die Polizei, infolgedessen bis zu 100 Mitglieder der Gaboye festgenommen worden seien:
“Following a peaceful protest up to a hundred demonstrators from the Gaboye minority group are held incommunicado without charge, either in Hargeisa central prison in the capital of Somaliland or in unauthorised and secret police Criminal Investigation Department (CID) detention centres where they are at risk of torture. They had been protesting at the shooting of Khadar Osman Dhabar by a police officer.
On 13 May, Khadar Osman Dhabar died in Hargeisa hospital of numerous bullet wounds after being shot on the night of 11 May in the street by a police officer. Details of the incident are still unclear but it seems that the shooting incident occurred when two police officers approached Khadar Osman Dhabar and his two friends in the Hawl Wadag area of Hargeisa. One of the police shot him, knowing the three were members of the discriminated Gaboye minority, against whom human rights abuses are frequently perpetrated with impunity.
Later on the 13 May, in an unprecedented and peaceful protest, a large crowd of Gaboye and sympathisers went to the central police station and president’s office. They were calling for justice following Khadar Osman Dhabar's death and for their human rights to be respected. They were confronted by armed police who used live ammunition against the non-violent demonstrators, mostly shooting in the air and without causing any fatalities. However, they did beat and arrest several hundred demonstrators, including children and women. Many have now been released.
Other Gaboye were later arrested in police raids on Dami village on the outskirts of Hargeisa, where most live in harsh conditions. Many have fled or are in hiding, wanted by the police for alleged involvement in the demonstration, criticising the government and calling for protection of the human rights of the Gaboye minority. Amnesty International considers the detained demonstrators and others arrested later to be prisoners of conscience who are imprisoned on account of their peaceful opinions and defence of the human rights of the Gaboye minority.” (AI, 18. Mai 2005)
Laut einem Bericht des Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) wies der Innenminister Somalilands die Vorwürfe von Amnesty International zurück:
“Somaliland Interior Minister Ismail Adan Osman refuted the allegations by Amnesty International.
"About 100 of the minority Gaboye group took part in a violent demonstration," he told IRIN on Sunday. "They burned tyres, barricaded roads, threw stones, damaged several business premises and a telephone company at the heart of the town. "The police were called in to restore public order. The police were forced to shoot in the air, and they made a number of arrests," he added.” (IRIN, 25. Mai 2005)
Amnesty International (AI) führt weiters zur Lage von Minderheitengruppen in Somaliland aus:
“Gaboye is the collective name in Somaliland for different occupational minority groups (Musa Dariyo, Tumal, Madiban and Yibir) who number some tens of thousands of people and suffer severe discrimination in this nomadic pastoralist-based society. They are also found in Somalia. They experience exclusion on account of their occupations as hairdressers, metal-workers and blacksmiths, leather-workers and shoemakers, herbalists and ritual specialists – services they traditionally perform for the “noble” Somali pastoralist clans. They are customarily not permitted to inter-marry with the pastoralist clans and thus have no clan protection in the form of vengeance or compensation for murder or other crimes. They equally have little or no protection in the state system of administration of justice, which is controlled by clan members, and in practice have little or no access to education or other economic and social rights. Although attitudes to minorities are improving, with two seats reserved for minorities in parliament, and several Somaliland human rights organizations working with minority associations to defend their rights, the minorities benefit little from the human rights guarantees in the Somaliland Constitution and laws. Cases of arbitrary detention, kidnapping, rape, torture and killing of Gaboye with impunity are still reported in Somaliland as well as Somalia.” (AI, 18. Mai 2005; siehe dazu auch AI, 17. März 2005, S. 21f.)
In einer älteren Studie von United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) zu Minderheiten in Somalia vom 1. August 2002 heißt es in Bezug auf Minderheitengruppen in Somalia, darunter den Gaboye (Midgan):
“One of the things that were deliberately downplayed was the existence of minority groups. Although the population of minority groups living in Somalia has not as yet been established, estimates indicate that they constitute one third of the total Somalia population; approximately 2,000,000 people. The minority groups include Bantu, Bravenese, Rerhamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumal, Yibir and Gaboye. These groups continue to live in conditions of great poverty and suffer numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion. […]
Social segregation of minority groups in Somalia dates back to periods before the armed conflict of 1991. Siyad Barre's regime gave minority issues some prominent and positioned some minorities, mainly from the Gaboye (Midgan), Tumal and Yibir in high military and government posts. However, the regime did not carry out any tangible programmes to empower minority groups. On the contrary, it seriously violated the basic human rights and right to development of these groups. […]
The Gaboye, Tumal, Yibir and Galgala are ethnically associated with the Samale, which forms a dominant clan in Somalia. However, cultural stigma and traditions have excluded them as outcastes from the Samale clan. They engage in the activities of blacksmithing and shoemaking, as well as being hunters/gatherers. They live mainly in central and northern Somalia.
Most of the minority groups have assimilated into other Somalia clans with whom they live. […]Some Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir assimilated into the Isak in Somaliland, while others yet have assimilated into the Darod in Puntland and central regions. There are also other Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir who assimilated with Hawadle, Murasade and Marehan clans in Galgadud region.
With the exception of the Bantu, Rerhamar, Bravanese, Bajuni and Eyle who have distinct "non-Somali" physical appearance, all other minorities have physical appearances similar to that of the dominant clans, as well as having ethnic and cultural similarities. What distinguish the assimilated minorities are their distinct economic livelihoods. […]
Economic dominance is one of the most serious socio-economic problems facing the minority communities. Since independence, the major clans at the expense of minority groups have dominated social and political affairs of Somalia. This trend has continued more than ten years after the collapse of the Somali state.
In Kismaiyo, all economic sources such as the seaport, airport and commercial activities are all controlled by the Habregedir and Marehan. Those who do not belong to these groups, and particular the Bantu and Bajuni work only as underpaid servants. In Jowhar and Balad, the Warsengeli (Abgal) and Da'ud control revenue collection, farm and livestock production and marketing, as well as all other economic activities. In Beletweyne, the Hawadle and other dominant clans control the economy. Minorities occupy subordinate roles. In Hargeisa there are nearly five telephone companies, six money transfer companies, several light industries, transportation and construction companies; all of which create hundreds of job opportunities. The minorities claim that these jobs are offered according to the ethnic identity of the individual. The Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir have no access to those jobs because of their ethnicity.
Remittances have also been, for the last decade, an important economic source for the Somalis. However, remittances have had little impact on the livelihoods of the minority groups in the north and even far less in the south. […]
The Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir in Hargeisa and elsewhere in Somaliland suffered both during after the armed conflict between Siyad Barres' army and the Somali National Movement of the Isak clan. These groups have similar physical characteristics as the Isak and it was difficult for Siyad Barre's army to differentiate between the Isak and other clans. When Siyad Barre was defeated, the Isak meted harsh punishments on the Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir because they were perceived to be Siyad Barre supporters.” (OCHA, 1. August 2002)
Weitere allgemeine Informationen zur Lage von Minderheitengruppen in Somalia entnehmen Sie bitte dem Abschnitt zu den Tumal.
Weitere Informationen zur Lage von Minderheitengruppen in Somalia entnehmen Sie bitte dem jüngsten Länderbericht des UK Home Office vom 28. Februar 2007, Abs. 20.26-20.28 (Midgan, Tumal, Yibir and Galgala), einer Anfragebeantwortung des Immigration and Refugee Board Canada (IRB) vom 9. August 2004 und einer Stellungnahme an die UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights vom 8. August 2006.
Weiters haben wir die „UNHCR Empfehlung zu Rückkehrmöglichkeiten somalischer Staatsangehöriger nach Somalia“ vom November 2005 und die „UNHCR position on the return of the rejected asylum seekers to Somalia“ vom Jänner 2004 beigelegt (siehe Qellenverzeichnis).
Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines bestimmten Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar. Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien zur Gänze durchzusehen.
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UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Working Group on Minorities: Statement on Item 3 (a) of the twelfth session: Reviewing the promotion and practical realization of the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 8. August 2006
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/228_1161598265_deman-mahamoud-somalia.doc (Zugriff am 6. April 2007)
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