a-4466 (ACC-RUS-4466)

Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten:
Detailfragen zur Sekte „Weiße Bruderschaft“ (‚Beloe bratstwo’; ‚White Brotherhood’ oder ‚Great White Brotherhood’)
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Materialien konnten nur sehr wenig aktuelle Informationen (veröffentlicht nach Januar 2004) über die Tätigkeiten der Sekte „Weiße Bruderschaft“ gefunden werden.
Sowohl die Rossiskaja Gaseta als auch die Moskovskie Novosti berichten im Frühjahr 2004, dass die Sekte „Weiße Bruderschaft“ inzwischen verschwunden sei bzw. sich kaum einer an diese Gruppierung erinnere:
„At one time religious sects, which drew young people like magnets, were a real scourge. Now almost nobody remembers such phenomena as the White Brotherhood and the like (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 28. Februar 2004).”
“The newly appearing societies of "nontraditional confessions"--which were full of enthusiasm and danger for RPTs--either disappeared (like "Aum Sinrikyo," and the "White Brotherhood") of they became "respectable" and benign (like the Krishnaites and Mormons) (Moskovskie novosti, 2. April 2004).”
Nauchnyi Ateizm berichtet am 12. Mai 2003 allerdings, dass die Sekte „Weiße Bruderschaft“ wieder zunehmend auftauche. So operiere die Gruppe, allerdings ohne offizielle Registrierung, in Orel:
“Two young women, singing beautifully on the main street of the city, attracted the attention of passers-by who actively threw money to them into a cash box with a cross. And few paid attention to the pictures that the collectors of the donations were holding in their hands. However, even for the majority of those stopping to listen to the singing, the heading "Yusmalos" on the covers of the magazines said little.
Ten years ago Orel, like many other cities of Russia and Ukraine, was literally covered with signs and posters of the "White Brotherhood." Portraits of Maria Tsvigun, who called herself by the resonant name Maria Devi Khristos, hung from almost every lamppost. It seemed that the "White Brotherhood" had disappeared long ago. But now the followers of this religion have appeared again. According to Zhenya, one of the followers of Maria Devi, there are not many in Orel who believe in Maria Devi; the religious group is operating without registration (although according to existing law, to receive the status of a religious organization it is necessary to prove at least a fifteen-year history). However the group is gradually growing and the number of followers of this religion is increasing.” (Nauchnyi Ateizm, 12. Mai 2003)
Nach Angaben von Portal-credo.ru sei die “Weiße Bruderschaft” in der Stadt Nischnij Nowgorod sogar offiziell registriert:
„Members of the Russian Union of Writers characterized the policy of Nizhny Novgorod authorities with respect to relations with religious associations as incompetent and unprincipled in their declaration that was published on the pages of the Nizhegorod newspaper "Orthodox Word," Blagovest-info reports.
The authors of the document called appeals for the spiritual regeneration of Russia issuing from the mouths of state figures of various levels insincere. In their opinion, this rhetoric and attendance of Orthodox churches are motivated only by attempts to imitate the president of the country. The writers stress that only bureaucrats' lack of religious convictions and elementary knowledge in the area of religious studies can explain the successful registration in Nizhny Novgorod province of "the totalitarian sects of Scientologists, Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, the 'Mother of God' center, White Brotherhood, and others." (Portal-credo.ru, 23. Februar 2004)“
Vor Beantwortung der für Sie relevanten Detailfragen möchten wir Sie auf die offizielle Homepage der Sekte verweisen, die über http://www.usmalos.com/english/index.shtml (englische Version) oder http://www.usmalos.com/ (russische Version) abgerufen werden kann.
Wirkungsgebiet der Sekte auf dem Gebiet der RF
Die russische Pravda konstatiert im Juli 2003 zum Wirkungsgebiet der Sekte „Weiße Bruderschaft“:
„In Russia, the sect became very active in the Ural region, particularly in the city of Ekaterinburg. As any other successful sect, the White Brotherhood still enjoys very good financial opportunities. The sect has a website on the Internet now too. In Ekaterinburg, the sect conducts its activities at railway stations and other busy places. Sectarians take electric trains and sing songs about eternal love and peace to passengers there. They also offer video and printed material. Sect members buy plots of land on the outskirts of Ekaterinburg, build houses there, try to purchase prestigious mansions in the center of the city.
The Ekaterinburg eparchy of the Russian Orthodox Church says, the White Brotherhood attempted to be registered in the city as an official religious organization, but it failed to succeed. The sect’s members have changed too: they are presumably middle-aged and elderly people. The majority of them think of themselves as unhappy people. The sect's primitive ideal of love can attract only vulnerable people. It is not ruled out that hundreds of men and women will decide to commit suicide for the sake of the woman, who considers herself the mistress of people's lives (Pravda, 8. Juli 2003).”
Die bereits an anderer Stelle zitierten Medien Nauchnyi Ateizm und Portal-credo.ru berichten von Anhängern der Sekte „Weiße Bruderschaft“ in Orel und Nischnij Nowgorod (Nauchnyi Ateizm, 12. Mai 2003; Portal-credo.ru, 23. Februar 2004).
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Materialien konnten keine weiteren Informationen zum Wirkungsgebiet der Sekte gefunden werden.
Allfällige Gesetzesüberschreitungen seitens der Sekte
In dem letzten zur Russischen Föderation veröffentlichten Country Assessment des UK Home Office vom April 2003 findet sich die folgende Textpassage zur Sekte „Weiße Bruderschaft“:
“The White Brotherhood, founded by Yuriy Krivonogov and Marina Tsvigun in Kiev in 1990, is reported to have 10,000 followers, and believes that God became incarnate in the form of Mariya Devi Khristos, who took over Tsvigun's body in April 1990. Having mistakenly predicted the end of the world in November 1993, both Krivonogov and Tsvigun were arrested during a riot in Kiev's St Sophia Cathedral. They were charged with inciting mass unrest, infringing personal and civic rights under the guise of performing religious rituals, and the premeditated infliction of serious bodily injuries. Both were sentenced to a term of imprisonment, although Tsvigun was released under an amnesty in August 1997 (UK Home Office, April 2003, Par. 6.26).”
Nach Angaben eines in der Brigham Young University Law Review im Januar 2004 veröffentlichten Artikel über neue religiöse Bewegungen und das Problem des religiösen Extremismus in der Russischen Föderation heißt es:
„The White Brotherhood, a new religious movement whose members have been involved in and arrested for illegal activities,102 is an example of a new religious movement that isolates its members from outside influence and demands renunciation of social life and secular careers.103 The White Brotherhood requires an ascetic way of life for its members, including abstention from television, radio, and most written news sources, partly to achieve "maximum isolation" from the "Satanic energy" of the outside world.104 Similarly, members of Aum Shinrikyo typically create an economically selfsufficient society that allows them to maintain isolation and, allegedly, to create and train warriors to fight against the system as the end of the world draws near.103” (Brigham Young University Law Review, 1. Januar 2004)
In einem anlässlich einer im Dezember 2002 in Jekaterinburg statt gefundenen Konferenz zum Thema „Totalitäre Sekten: die Bedrohung durch den religiösen Extremismus“ wird die „Weiße Bruderschaft“ in einem Appendix, der eine Auflistung der bekanntesten „destruktiven totalitären Sekten“ liefert, angeführt (Russia Religion News, Appendix, 10. Dezember 2002).
Bekanntheit von Fällen der Verfolgungen oder ggf. Tötungen von Zivilisten, (ehemaligen) Mitgliedern oder deren Familienangehörige seitens der Sekte
Die russische Pravda berichtet im Juli 2003, dass die Ideen der Sekte „Weiße Bruderschaft“ zwar wieder propagiert würden, die Führer der Sekte jedoch nicht mehr zum Selbstmord aufrufen würden:
“At present, there are up to five million people in Russia, who have suffered from the activity of various sects. The threat of the massive hysteria is still actual in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, because hundreds of White Brotherhood followers still live there. The ideas of the sect are being propagandized again, although the leader does not urge people to commit suicides now (Pravda, 8. Juli 2003).“
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Materialien und der für diese Recherche angesetzten Recherchezeit konnten keine weiteren Informationen zu oben angeführter Fragestellung gefunden werden.
Schutzmöglichkeiten durch die Sicherheitsorgane der RF vor Verfolgung durch die „Weiße Bruderschaft“
Die Regionalzeitung von Krasnojarks “Segodnjaschnaja Gaseta” zitiert in einem Artikel vom November 2003 den Direktor des Zentrums für Entwicklungsstrategie und Nationale Sicherheit, Igor Olejnik, demzufolge die Regierung gegen gefährliche Sekten, wie beispielsweise die „Weiße Bruderschaft“, vorgehen solle anstatt „daneben zu stehen und zuzusehen“:
Krasnoyarsk's regional paper, Segodnyashnyaya Gazeta, reported that the "most dangerous" sects were the Church of Scientology, the Church of Unity, The Society of Krishna Awareness, Jehovah's Witnesses, White Brotherhood, and others. The paper quoted Igor Oleynik as saying that the government should take action rather than "stand by and watch." He alleged that sects are now working with terrorists and supporting suicide bombers in conducting terrorist attacks. Dvorkin went as far as to say that the terrorists who seized the Nord-Ost theater were from the ranks of sects. According to the paper, sects take money and energy from their members and give the "illusion" of love in return (FBIS Report, 6. November 2003).
Leider konnten auch zu dieser Fragestellung in der ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Materialien keine weiteren Informationen gefunden werden.
Wir möchten Sie an dieser Stelle auch auf die Sektion II des International Religious Freedom Report 2004, herausgegeben vom US Department of State (USDOS) im September 2004, hinweisen, der allgemeine Informationen über die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen für religiöse Gruppierungen in der RF sowie den Umgang der Behörden mit diesen liefert (USDOS, 15. September 2004, Sek. II).
Korruption der Sicherheitsorgane durch diese Sekte?
In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Materialien und der für diese Recherche angesetzten Recherchezeit konnten keine weiteren Informationen zu oben angeführter Fragestellung gefunden werden.
Organisiertes Verbrechen, Effektivität der Bekämpfung durch Sicherheitsorgane
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) berichtet im März 2005 unter Berufung auf strana.ru von einer Rede des Innenministers Raschid Nurgaliew zum Organisierten Verbrechen (OV):
“Speaking at a Federation Council hearing on 23 March, Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev said there are 116 organized-crime syndicates operating in Russia at present and they are active in 40 foreign countries, strana.ru reported. He said the core of these groups comprises some 4,000 members, controlling about 500 large companies. The most crime-riddled sectors of the economy are metallurgy; forestry; fisheries; automobile sales; and intellectual-property, tobacco-products, and alcohol production. Nurgaliev called for the restoration of property confiscation as a punishment for convicted criminals, citing a case in which police brought to trial a group of drug dealers with assets worth an estimated $100 million. However, the court was unable to fine them more than 1 million rubles ($26,600).” (RFE/RL, 24. März 2005)
Im Februar 2005 berichtet RFE/RL unter Berufung auf ITAR-TASS und Rossiiskaya Gazeta von einem ministeriellen Treffen, bei dem Nurgaliew und der geschäftsführende Leiter der ministeriellen Abteilung zur Bekämpfung des OV, Nikolai Owtschinnikow zu Korruption, Terrorismus und OV sprachen:
Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev told a gathering of ministry officials on 16 February that only one bribe taker in 10 is ever convicted in Russia, ITAR-TASS reported. He said that 7,000 bribery cases were filed in 2004, including high-profile cases involving members of the State Fisheries Committee, a deputy governor of Kaliningrad Oblast, and a deputy mayor of Pskov. However, he said that "there is no point in even trying to compare the results of our fight against corruption with the scale of this phenomenon in Russia." "The likelihood of receiving a prison sentence for corruption is minimal and the higher the rank of the official involved, the smaller that likelihood is," Nurgaliev said. Only 5 percent of those arrested in bribery cases are high-ranking officials. Nikolai Ovchinnikov, acting head of the ministry's Department for Combating Organized Crime and Terrorism, told the same gathering that the threat of terrorism is increasing, saying that the Islamist Hizb ut-Tahrir party is increasingly active in Russia, "Rossiiskaya gazeta" reported on 17 February. Ovchinnikov added that organized-crime structures are working to "get into the organs of executive power." "If we find members of the criminal community among law-enforcement personnel, we will treat them as enemies and traitors," he said.” (RFE/RL, 17. Februar 2005)
The Russia Journal berichtet im Februar 2005 wie folgt:
“The prime minister admitted that Russia lacked an effective system to fight corruption. He said the interior ministry’s efforts to combat corruption were not effective enough. In 2004 alone, around 7,000 cases of bribe-taking were uncovered, “which doesn’t reflect the real scale of corruption in the country,” Fradkov noted.
In this respect, he stressed the importance of “cleaning the law enforcement system itself of bribe-seekers and unscrupulous employees turning their service into a lucrative business.”
Nikolay Ovchinnikov, acting head of the department for the fight against organized crime, announced alarming figures on Tuesday. He said law enforcement agencies had uncovered 2,706 cases of corruption last year, 30 percent more than a year earlier.
Ovchinnikov said 5 percent of bribe-takers were top officials. Court bailiffs, heads of regional administrations, customs officials and other civil servants were detained on suspicion of corruption.
“We are far from content with crime disclosure rates, and we hope that society will help interior agencies, realizing the dangers of such activities,” he noted.
Last month, Russia’s prosecutor general Vladimir Ustinov also said corruption had reached dangerous levels in Russia” (The Russia Journal, 16. Februar 2005)
Das US Department of State (USDOS) berichtet in seinem im Februar 2005 erschienenen Menschenrechtsbericht 2004 zu OV u.a. wie folgt:
“A number of other journalists were killed, reported missing, or beaten for reasons that may have been associated with their journalistic activities. These journalists had published critical information about local officials and influential businesses or reported on crime and other sensitive issues. Although independent media NGOs reported a decrease in physical violence compared to 2003, they still characterized beatings of journalists by unknown assailants as "routine," noting that those who pursued investigative stories on corruption and organized crime found themselves at greatest risk.
Corruption is a widespread and longstanding problem in both the legislative and executive branches. Manifestations included bribery of officials, misuse of budgetary resources, theft of government property, extortion, and official collusion in criminal acts. In a 2002 survey by Transparency International, 75 percent of respondents considered the law enforcement agencies to be dishonest. An anti corruption campaign was launched in the summer of 2003 against high level officials in the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Emergency Situations. Seven Moscow Criminal Police colonels and General Vladimir Ganeyev from the Ministry of Emergency Situations were arrested and charged with bribery and extortion in an organized criminal group. This anti corruption operation in Moscow was followed by a wave of criminal investigations against corrupt law enforcement officials throughout the country. According to press reports, these anti corruption operations did not change the situation with regard to public corruption and were widely viewed as a public relations campaign for the approaching elections to the State Duma and Presidency. Corruption played a particularly important role in the political process in many of the regions.
In August, the State Duma passed a witness protection statute that applies to all organized crime cases in which a witness' life or physical safety is in danger; this measure was strongly favored by anti trafficking supporters.” (USDOS, 28. Februar 2005)
Im Dezember 2004 veröffentlichte RFE/RL ein Briefing zu Macht und Korruption, in welchem drei ExpertInnen von der Verbreitung von Korruption in Behörden und Polizei berichten, sowie von der Unfähigkeit bzw Unmöglichkeit, diese effektiv zu bekämpfen (siehe Artikel für Details: RFE/RL, 21. Dezember 2004).
Ebenfalls im Dezember 2004 berichtet RFE/RL von einer Rede Putins:
“Putin noted that the government took measures this year to strengthen the state security organs not only in the center, but also in the regions. He added that he expects more results in fighting corruption, drug trafficking, and organized crime. "These crimes corrode the economy, compromise the government, and undermine Russia's international prestige," Putin said.” (RFE/RL, 20. Dezember 2004)
Im August 2004 berichtet RFE/RL unter Berufung auf Nezavisimaya Gazeta von einer Umfrage zur Organisierten Kriminalität:
A survey conducted by Public Opinion Foundation of 1,500 people in 44 regions found that some 76 percent of respondents believe that people with links to organized crime are currently members of regional and local government bodies, "Nezavisimaya gazeta" reported on 9 August. Some 63 percent said that this happens fairly often, while 43 percent said that there are more representatives of organized crime in regional government bodies now than there were in the 1990s. Seventeen percent of respondents said that it is acceptable to vote for candidates with links to organized crime under certain circumstances, while only 68 percent believe that it is never acceptable to do so. Last month, voters in Vladivostok elected a mayor with a criminal record and alleged ties to organized crime” (RFE/RL, 10. August 2004)
Im Juli 2004 betonte Putin laut RFE/RL, dass das Hauptziel für die Umstrukturierung des Innenministeriums der Kampf gegen Korruption und der Schutz von Geschäftsleuten vor kriminellem Druck gewesen sei, und dass er das Federal Security Service (FSB) zum Kampf gegen das OV aufforderte (RFE/RL, 29. Juli 2004).
Im Februar 2004 berichtet RFE/RL unter Berufung auf die Nachrichtenagentur Rosbalt von steigenden Zahlen im Terrorismus, sowie von der Anti-Terror-Einheit des Innenministeriums:
“In 2003, 561 "acts of terrorism" were registered in the Russian Federation, a 56 percent increase on the 2002 figure of 407, according to Yurii Demidov, head of the Interior Ministry's Department "T" aimed at combating organized crime, Rosbalt news agency reported on 20 January. Both figures represented an increase on the 339 registered acts of terrorism in 2001. What constitutes a "terrorist act" is not publicly defined by the Russian Interior Ministry, and the number of unregistered attacks remains a matter of speculation.
Department "T" was created as part of the Interior Ministry's Organized Crime Division on 12 August by then Interior Minister and now Russian Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov. The newspaper "Vremya novostei" on 21 January reported that, among its other responsibilities, Department "T" deals with kidnappings, adding that there were 1,367 kidnappings in 2003, 580 of which were registered solved.” (RFE/RL, 3. Februar 2004)
Über einen Schlag gegen das OV und gegen korrupte Polizeibeamte, die falsche Beweise zur Erpressung verwendeten, im Juni 2003 berichten sowohl BBC als auch RFE/RL (BBC, 23. Juni 2003; RFE/RL, 11. Juli 2003). Im Artikel von RFE/RL wird auch auf die Meinung von Experten zur Bekämpfung des OV und auf vergangene „war on crime“ eingegangen.
Im Februar 2002 äußerte sich Putin einem Bericht von BBC zufolge zur Lage des OV in Russland und dazu, dass weite Teile der Wirtschaft des Landes immer noch vom OV kontrolliert werden. Laut dem Bericht würden jährlich hunderte Menschen durch Auftragsmorde getötet, und nur wenige der Täter würden bestraft werden können (BBC, 11. Februar 2002).
Einen Überblick über Entwicklungen in der Bekämpfung von Korruption finden Sie im Jahresbericht von Transparency International (Transparency International, 13. Jänner 2005, S.199-202).
Einen Überblick über die Bekämpfung des OV durch die russischen Behörden gibt der Länderbericht des britischen Innenministeriums UK Home Office vom April 2003 (UK Home Office, April 2003, Abs.6.52-6.55).
Hintergrundinformation zum Organisierten Verbrechen entnehmen Sie bitte den in der Referenzliste angeführten leider bereits etwas älteren zweiteiligen Artikel von Eurasianet (Eurasianet, 31. Jänner 2002 und Eurasianet, 1. Februar 2002).
Im Oktober 2003 berichtet RFE/RL im Rahmen der Ernennung dessen neuen Leiters über das sog. „T-Center“, der Anti-Terror-Abteilung des Innenministeriums (RFE/RL, 17. Oktober 2003).
Schließlich berichtet das Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) in zwei Anfragebeantwortungen vom Dezember 2002 von Korruption, staatlicher Reaktion darauf und vom Schutz kleiner Geschäftsleute vor Erpressungen (IRB, 3. Dezember 2002a und b).  

Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Die Antwort stellt keine abschließende Meinung zur Glaubwürdigkeit eines bestimmten Asylansuchens dar.
Detailfragen zur Sekte „Weiße Bruderschaft“ (‚Beloe bratstwo’; ‚White Brotherhood’ oder ‚Great White Brotherhood’)
  • Brigham Young University Law Review: New Religious Movements and the Problem of Extremism in Modern Russia, 1. Januar 2004 (veröffentlicht auf Nexis, 5. Oktober 2004)
  • FBIS Report: Highlights: Russian Religious Issues -- 6 Nov 03, 6. November 2003 (veröffentlicht auf WNC: WNC Document Number: 0hnzgd9044siu1)
  • Pravda: White Brotherhood Conquers Russia, 8. Juli 2003
    http://english.pravda.ru/main/18/90/364/10678_sect.html (Zugriff am 8. Juni 2005)
  • Moskovskie novosti: Condemnation Of The Witnesses, 2. April 2004 (veröffentlicht auf PDS Russia Religion News, Stetson University, 2. April 2004
    http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/0404a.html (Zugriff am 8. Juni 2005)
  • Nauchnyi Ateizm: "White Brotherhood" Returns To Orel, 12. Mai 2003 (veröffentlicht auf PDS Russia Religion News, Stetson University, 13. Mai 2003)
    http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/0305c.html (Zugriff am 8. Juni 2005)
  • Portal-credo.ru: Nizhny Novgorod Writers Condemn Religion Policy Of Local Authorities, 23. Februar 2004 (veröffentlicht auf PDS Russia Religion News, Stetson University, 25. Februar 2004)
    http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/0402a.html (Zugriff am 8. Juni 2005)
  • Rossiyskaya Gazeta: Russian Police General Cited on Skinhead Groups After Moscow Court Sentences, 28. Februar 2004 (veröffentlicht auf WNC: WNC Document Number: 0htyd3403evnc8) 
  • Russia Religion News (Stetson University): Appendix to concluding document of the international applied science conference "Totalitarian Sects: the Threat of Religious Extremism", 10. Dezember 2002
    http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews/destructivesects.html (Zugriff am 13. Juni 2005)
  • UK Home Office: Russian Federation, Country Assessment, April 2003 (veröffentlicht auf ecoi.net)
    http://www.ecoi.net/pub/ds522_02704rus.htm (Zugriff am 13. Juni 2005)
  • USDOS - US Department of State: International Religious Freedom Reoprt – Russia, 15. September 2004
    http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35480.htm (Zugriff am 13. Juni 2005)
Organisiertes Verbrechen, Effektivität der Bekämpfung durch Sicherheitsorgane