Document #1263501
ACCORD – Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (Author)
7 October 2016
This response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to ACCORD as well as information provided by experts within time constraints and in accordance with ACCORD’s methodological standards and the Common EU Guidelines for processing Country of Origin Information (COI).
This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status, asylum or other form of international protection.
Please read in full all documents referred to.
Non-English language information is summarised in English. Original language quotations are provided for reference.
Political opponents, journalists and human rights activists
In August 2016, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published a report detailing the treatment of political dissidents, human rights activists and critical journalists in the Chechen Republic:
“For close to a decade, Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Russia’s Chechen Republic, has steadily tried to eradicate all forms of dissent and gradually built a tyranny within Chechnya. Kadyrov has been in this post since 2007 by virtue of appointment from the Kremlin, but he now faces elections for the head (governor) of Chechnya scheduled for September 2016. In the months before those elections local authorities have been viciously and comprehensively cracking down on critics and anyone whose total loyalty to Kadyrov they deem questionable. These include ordinary people who express dissenting opinions, critical Russian and foreign journalists, and the very few human rights defenders who challenge cases of abuse by Chechen law enforcement and security agencies. The increasingly abusive crackdown seems designed to remind the Chechen public of Kadyrov’s total control and controlling the flow of any negative information from Chechnya that could undermine the Kremlin’s support for Kadyrov.
Residents of Chechnya who show dissatisfaction with or seem reluctant to applaud the Chechen leadership and its policies are the primary victims of this crackdown. The authorities, whether acting directly or through apparent proxies, punish them by unlawfully detaining them—including through abductions and enforced disappearances— subjecting them to cruel and degrading treatment, death threats, and threatening and physically abusing their family members. These abuses also send an unequivocal message of intimidation to others that undermines the exercise of many civil and political rights, most notably freedom of expression. Even the mildest expressions of dissent about the situation in Chechnya or comments contradicting official policies or paradigms, whether expressed openly or in closed groups on social media, or through off-hand comments to a journalist or in a public place, can trigger ruthless reprisals.
This report documents a new phase in the Chechnya crackdown and is based on 43 interviews with victims, people who are close to those who paid a price for their critical remarks, as well as with human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, and other experts.
In one case documented in this report, a man died after law enforcement officials forcibly disappeared and tortured him. In another, police officials unlawfully detained, threatened, and ill-treated a woman and her three children in retaliation for her husband’s public remarks criticizing the authorities. Police officials beat the mother and the eldest daughter, age 17, and threatened them with death, in an effort to force them to persuade the father to retract his critical comments. In another five cases documented in this report, law enforcement and security officials, or their apparent proxies, abducted people and subjected them to cruel and degrading treatment; four of those individuals were forcibly disappeared for periods of time ranging from one to twelve days.
The authorities subjected five of the people whose cases are documented in this report to public humiliations, in which they were forced to publicly apologize to the Chechen leadership for their supposedly false claims and renounce or apologize for their actions. In Chechen society public humiliation and loss of face can lead to exclusion from social life for the victim and his or her extended family.
Human Rights Watch is aware of other similar cases of abuse against local critics but did not include them in this report because victims or their family members specifically requested us not to publish their stories or because we could not obtain video materials and other evidence to confirm their accounts. There is also little doubt that some abuses against local residents in Chechnya may never come to the attention of human rights monitors or journalists because the climate of fear in the region is overwhelming and local residents have been largely intimidated into silence.
The Chechen leadership has also intensified its onslaught against the few human rights defenders who still work in the region and provide legal and other assistance to victims of abuses. In the wake of the 2009 murder of Chechnya’s leading human rights defender, Natalia Estemirova, only one human rights organization, the Joint Mobile Group of Human Rights Defenders in Chechnya (JMG) had been able to stay on the ground in Chechnya to provide legal assistance to victims or their family members in cases of torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions by law enforcement and security agencies under Kadyrov’s de facto control. However, towards the end of 2014 the Chechen leadership seemed determined to push JMG out of Chechnya. In the past two-and-a-half years law enforcement officials or their apparent proxies have on three occasions ransacked or burned the JMG’s offices in Chechnya, thugs who appear to be acting as Chechen authorities’ proxies have physically attacked JMG’s activists numerous times, and the pro-Kadyrov Chechen media has engaged in a massive smear campaign against the group. JMG withdrew its team from Chechnya in early 2016 for security reasons. Chechen authorities have also been making it increasingly difficult for journalists to work in Chechnya. They have fostered a climate of fear in which very few people dare talk to journalists, except to compliment the Chechen leadership. And journalists who persevere with Chechnya work also find themselves at greater risk. This report documents a recent case of a journalist receiving threats, including death threats, another of a journalist who was arbitrarily detained while investigating a story, and a third case of a violent attack against a group of visiting journalists.
In March 2016 a group of masked men attacked a minibus driving a group of Russian and foreign journalists from Ingushetia to Chechnya, dragged the journalists from the bus, beat them, and set the bus on fire. The attack was so shocking that it triggered an immediate, unprecedented reaction from President Vladimir Putin’s press secretary, who called it ’absolutely outrageous‘ and said that the law enforcement should ensure accountability for the crime. However, at this writing, the investigation, to the extent there is an active one, into the attack has not yielded any tangible results.” (HRW, 30 August 2016, pp. 2-4)
For more details on specific cases, please refer to chapters II, III and IV of the HRW report itself:
· HRW - Human Rights Watch: "Like Walking a Minefield"; Vicious Crackdown on Critics in Russia’s Chechen Republic, 30 August 2016 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1472803628_chechnya0816-1.pdf
International Crisis Group (ICG), a transnational non-profit, non-governmental organization that carries out field research on violent conflict and seeks to advance policies to prevent, mitigate or resolve conflict, writes in a June 2015 report:
„No opposition is accepted [in Chechnya]. Ramzan [Kadyrov] himself says, ‚I’m the boss. And no one else but me, understand? Ramzan – and this is it. No other names in this region, there is only one name – Kadyrov‘. Dissenters are considered enemies. Deputy Interior Minister Apti Alaudinov said candidly, ‘those who even yap against the authorities, I swear by Allah and the Quran, up to the maximum possible … I do not want to tell this in front of the camera, [but] I personally will try to create as much trouble as possible for this man‘. Intellectuals and artists are at risk if the authorities are dissatisfied with their statements or work. Scholars may face persecution for interpretation of facts. […] Verbal attacks by officials contribute to the dangerous environment. According to Adam Delimkhanov, ‘people who call themselves human rights defenders, who help these [militants], they actually complement their activity, and their goals are the same. The evil that they are doing is as great as the evil that is done by those who are in the forest‘ [i.e. rebels, annotation by ACCORD]. Ramzan called [the human rights organisation, annotation by ACCORD] Memorial ‚enemies of the people, enemies of the law, enemies of the state‘, and later said ‘a man named Kalyapin [head of the Russian human rights organisation Committee for the Prevention of Torture, annotation by ACCORD] brought Western security services’ money to terrorists to commit an attack on Grozny in December 2014‘.“ (ICG, 26 June 2015, pp. 35-37)
A May 2016 report of the Swiss Refugee Council (Schweizerische Flüchtlingshilfe, SFH) quotes a source with expertise on the human rights situation in Chechnya as indicating that one does not necessarily need to have links to alleged rebels in order to become a target of persecution. Making critical social media comments on Kadyrov’s policies or, say, the healthcare system or wide-spread corruption is already sufficient for a person to be punished, beaten, tortured or publicly humiliated:
„Gemäss den Aussagen vom 4. Mai 2016 durch eine Kontaktperson mit Expertenwissen zur Menschenrechtslage in Tschetschenien muss eine Person nicht unbedingt Verbindungen zu mutmasslichen Aufständischen haben, um verfolgt zu werden. Es genüge, über soziale Medien die Politik Kadyrows oder beispielsweise das Gesundheitssystem oder die weitverbreitete Korruption zu kritisieren, um bestraft, geschlagen, gefoltert und öffentlich gedemütigt zu werden.“ (SFH, 13 May 2016)
Voice of America (VOA), the official external broadcasting institution of the United States, reports in an article of January 2016:
“Kadyrov is known for publicly reprimanding fellow citizens who criticize the status quo in the republic. Last December, Chechen resident Aishat Inaeva complained in an Internet posting that officials were using violence to collect housing and utilities payments. Kadyrov forced her to appear on TV and recant.
Human rights organizations say Kadyrov has established a regime of personal power in the republic. The work of human rights activists in Chechnya is extremely complicated. They are threatened with physical violence, threats which are sometimes acted on. In December 2014, the office of the Joint Mobile Group of Russian human rights defenders in the Chechen capital of Grozny was destroyed in an arson attack.” (VOA, 11 January 2016)
A January 2016 article published by The Jamestown Foundation (JF), a Washington, D.C.-based foreign policy think tank, describes Ramzan Kadyrov’s rhetoric and measures directed against persons criticizing the Chechen or Russian government:
“Ramzan Kadyrov and his Russian critics have squabbled for the last two weeks. Most of those who criticized Kadyrov are either members of the Russian political opposition or rights activists who are also opposed to President Vladimir Putin. Kadyrov regards all opposition to the Russian president as pro-American and anti-Russian. Speaking to journalists in Grozny, on January 12, Kadyrov called the Russian opposition a ‘fifth column,’ saying they are enemies of the country who should be ‘tried in court for their subversive activities’ (Interfax, 12January 2016).
Kadyrov made these controversial statements against the backdrop of massive criticism of his methods of governance. In particular, Kadyrov’s critics pointed to the practice of publicly shaming republican residents who criticize him on social media. In one case, Chechen TV showed a young Chechen man, Adam Dikaev, begging forgiveness in his underwear. The Chechen authorities had punished him for posting a video on Instagram criticizing Putin. Dikaev was shown on Chechen TV repeating that the Russian president was his ‘father, grandfather and everything’ and that he admired Putin (Kavkazsky Uzel, December 21, 2015).
At around the same time, Chechen TV featured another ‘repentant’ resident of the republic—a Chechen woman, Aishat Inaeva, who retracted her previous criticism of Kadyrov. Also during this period, rumors were spreading in the republic that the death of a Grozny State Technical University professor, Khizir Yezhiev, had involved violence (Ekhokavkaza.com, January 7). These events prompted the Russian opposition to launch a flash mob campaign—‘Kadyrov [Is] the Disgrace [Pozor] of Russia.’ In response, the Chechen authorities launched their own campaign—‘Kadyrov [Is] Russia’s Pride [Gordost].’ The Chechen authorities’ campaign culminated in a large rally in Grozny in support of Kadyrov (Novayagazeta.ru, January 19). The organizers of the rally labeled as enemies of Russia the deputy chairman of the opposition PARNAS party, Ilya Yashin; the leader of Grazhdanskoe Sodeistvie, Svetlana Gannushkina; the head of Moscow Helsinki Group, Lyudmila Alekseyeva; the editor-in-chief of Ekho Moskvy radio, Aleksei Venediktov; as well as opposition leaders Garry Kasparov, Aleksei Navalny and Mikhail Khodorkovsky; among others. In short, Chechen authorities put all the opposition activists who publicly spoke out against Putin on their list of enemies. Understandably, the opposition figures perceived this as a threat of physical reprisals against them (YouTube, January 18).” (JF, 29 January 2016)
An April 2016 press release of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), a non-governmental federation of human rights organizations, notes that several vocally critical residents of Chechnya have been abducted since the beginning of the year:
“Most recently, Grozny University professor, author, bard songwriter and performer Khusein Betelgeriev was abducted by two unidentified men in uniform on 31 March 2016. After twelve days with no information regarding his whereabouts, he returned home on 11 April 2016. His health condition is reportedly very poor and there are strong reasons to believe that he was ill-treated and tortured. Some of his posts on social networks, deemed critical, could have been the cause for his abduction.
For more than a decade, critics of the politics in Chechnya have frequently disappeared or have been found murdered. None of the cases have ever been effectively investigated, including the case of abduction and murder of human rights activist Natalia Estemirova in 2009.
Recently, cases of abduction of vocal citizens in Chechnya have reached an alarming level. […]
The day following Khusein Betelgeriev’s abduction, on 1 April 2016, publicists Rizvan Ibragimov and Abubakar Didiev went in turn missing. On 5 April, they reappeared again and Rizvan Ibragimov informed in a social network post that he had spent the last few days in a police station. No further information concerning the reasons and lawfulness of his and Didiev’s detention was so far provided by the law enforcement bodies.
It’s important to remind that on 1 January 2016, Khizir Ejiev, lecturer at Grozny Technical University, was found dead in the woods an hour drive from Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, after being abducted twelve days earlier.” (FIDH, 18 April 2016)
In a March 2016 press release, HRW reported about an attack on Igor Kalyapin, head of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, and an earlier (above-mentioned) assault on six journalists and two members of Kalyapin’s group as they were travelling from Ingushetia to Chechnya:
“A mob of unidentified people attacked a leading Russian human rights defender on March 16, 2016, in Chechnya, Human Rights Watch said today. The attackers hit Igor Kalyapin, head of an independent Russian human rights group called the Committee for the Prevention of Torture, as he was leaving his hotel in Grozny, the capital. They also pelted him with eggs, and threw flour and bright antiseptic liquid on him, which stained his face and clothes. The attack came a week after a group of masked men brutally beat six journalists and two members of Kalyapin’s group traveling together from neighboring Ingushetia to Chechnya.” (HRW, 17 March 2016)
A June 2015 joint statement by HRW, Amnesty International (AI) and (the Dublin-based human rights organization) Front Line Defenders notes that people wearing masks stormed the office of the human rights group Joint Mobile Group (JMG) for Chechnya in Grozny:
“Unidentified people in masks forced their way into the office of the human rights nongovernmental organization Joint Mobile Group (JMG) for Chechnya, in Chechnya’s capital, Grozny, on June 3, 2015, destroying its contents and forcing its staff to evacuate. […] Witnesses said police officers joined the crowd but did not intervene.” (HRW/AI/Front Line Defenders, 3 June 2015)
In a December 2014 press release, Front Line Defenders noted the following events relating to the Joint Mobile Group (JMG):
“On 14 December 2014, at approximately 1pm, several armed men entered the apartment of the Joint Mobile Group (JMG) in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. The apartment is located next to their office, which was badly damaged in an arson attack the previous day. The armed men refused to identify themselves but later said that they were from Leninsky district police department in Grozny. They forcibly searched the premises and two members of JMG, Mr Sergey Babinets and Mr Dmitry Dmitriev, were held in the apartment.
The alleged police officers did not have a warrant to search the premises and provided no explanations, except to point out that Sergey Babinets is suspicious ‘because he has a beard.’ The policemen seized the human rights defenders' mobile phones and they had no means of contact and no access to legal representation for an hour and a half. Two computers and CCTV cameras were also seized. At approximately 2:30pm the human rights defenders were released.
The previous day, on 13 December 2014, three unidentified armed men tried to enter the JMG office in Grozny. This followed a demonstration that morning calling for the ban of JMG in Chechnya. It was allegedly organised with support from the authorities. Later that day, the armed men in plain clothes tried to enter the JMG office on two occasion and members of JMG were followed as they drove away.” (Front Line Defenders, 14 December 2014)
Members of the insurgency
A January 2015 report by the Danish Immigration Service (DIS) which is based on a fact-finding mission which was conducted to Moscow, Volgograd and Grozni in April and May 2014 quotes comments from a think tank analysts, human rights activists, an academic editor and a lawyer referring to the treatment of alleged insurgents by the Kadyrov regime:
„When asked if it is possible to provide an estimate of the number of cases against alleged supporters of the insurgents in Chechnya in 2013 an ICG [International Crisis Group] analyst stated that [in 2013] 30 accomplices and one recruiter were detained, 17 supporters surrounded [surrendered], according [to] official statistics. There are serious doubts about the justice of many criminal charges against accomplices as many were blamed for 2002-2005 events and it remains unclear why police had not shown interest in them for 10 years. The greatest numbers of accomplices were detained in Vedeno and Achkhoy-Martan districts and the city of Grozny, a wave of detentions followed the killing of prominent field commander Gakayev.
When asked about the number of court cases in Chechnya involving support to the insurgency, a lawyer from Grozny was not aware of the number of such cases. However, the information provided by the Chechen Prosecutor’s Office of 30 court cases in 2013 regarding support to the insurgency would not reflect the real number of cases. The real figure is much higher as the police departments are required to make at least one arrest per month in such cases. The people who are arrested are quite quickly found guilty by the courts.
According to Svetlana Gannushkina, Memorial/CAC, recently the vast majority of criminal cases involving support to the illegal armed groups would be fabricated cases. Only a few recent court cases would involve support provided several years ago.
A few years ago you could find people who actually did provide support such as food, clothes and medicine to the insurgents. These people could account for some of the court cases involving providing support to the illegal armed groups and in that case one cannot describe the charges as fabricated. However, all of these genuine cases of support to the insurgents involve relatives to the insurgents who have provided the abovementioned support. According to Chechen tradition, family members of active members of the insurgency cannot refuse to provide support. Chechen tradition stipulates that even an unknown guest who could be an insurgent should not be refused some food or other items.
It was emphasized that Gannushkina had no information regarding recent examples of people who have provided support to active members of the insurgency.
A representative from CAT stated that it could not be said that 100% of all cases involving support to the insurgency are fabricated. There are actual cases of people who have provided some kind of support to the insurgents. The representative of CAT did not possess information about from which area of Chechnya these cases originate.
The overall number of cases that involve support for illegal armed groups in Chechnya as a whole is not accessible by the CAT. But as for the cases where CAT has been involved, no living person charged under articles 205 or 208 of the Russian Criminal Code has ever contacted CAT for assistance. Those who had contacted CAT all later disappeared without a trace. CAT has never found those who disappeared. Only relatives of such persons have applied for help to the Committee. It was added that there are also cases in which CAT clients were verbally accused of supporting terrorists by the state officials, but in fact no official charges were brought against them.
Mairbek Vatchagaev, editor of the Caucasus Survey, stated that nine out of ten arrests in Chechnya are connected with suspicion of support to the insurgents. The Chechen authorities are not shy of burning down houses to deter people from supporting the jihadists.
When asked about the conviction rate for helping illegal armed groups, Said-Magomed Samadievich Chapanov, a lawyer in Grozny, [the meeting with Chapanov was arranged by the Ministry of National Policy] stated that there a only very few cases involving the illegal armed groups today. […]
An ICG analyst in Moscow stated that there are almost no examples of disappearances in Chechnya today. Instead, fabricated criminal cases are instigated against alleged supporters of the insurgents. Following the same pattern, alleged supporters of the insurgents are held incommunicado for from 12 hours and up to three or four days. During that time they are exposed to pressure to reveal any information they may have about the insurgents, and they are forced to sign a confession that they have provided support to the insurgents. Beatings and torture are routinely used by the police to obtain the confession.“ (DIS, Jänner 2015, S. 34-35)
The same report goes on to elaborate on the treatment of family members of insurgents and other persons who are suspected of providing support to insurgents:
„A representative of CAT considered lawyers and human rights activists in Chechnya to be the best sources of information regarding information about persons who fear ill-treatment due to accusations of involvement in terrorist activities, such as having provided support to the insurgents.
Family members of people who either have provided support to the insurgents or who are facing a fabricated charge of providing that kind of support would risk being subjected to various types of pressure by the Chechen authorities, ranging from losing their job, threats of violence against themselves or their family, interrogation, detention and physical abuse, ranging from a slap in the face to severe beatings. They could also risk becoming the next victim of a fabricated criminal case. It was added that female family members of suspected insurgents or alleged supporters could risk being raped.
The pressure exerted by the Chechen authorities on family members of suspected insurgents and alleged supporters of the insurgents serves several purposes. One reason is to create a climate of fear in the broad population. Another reason for applying pressure on family members is to obtain new forced confessions that can be used in new fabricated criminal cases, and thirdly the pressure is used to make sure that no one withdraws the confession that has been obtained by force. Finally, people are deterred from filing complaints with the ECHR in Strasbourg or contacting civil society organizations. It was added that the Chechen authorities would normally subject the father of a suspected supporter of the insurgents to pressure, but other close and especially male relatives could be targeted as well.
The actions taken in relation to a case involving support to the insurgency depends on the personal attitude of the individual representative of the authorities who are in charge of the case. In some cases the family of the accused might be involved and in some cases they might not. Threats by the police are quite common but the extent to which threats are carried out varies. There are, however, examples of threats of shops being burned to the ground or stealing of businesses that were actually realised [carried out] by the Chechen police.
The Chechen authorities use a deliberate strategy of prosecuting people perceived as being in opposition and people who in any way challenge the current regime in Chechnya. […]
In all court cases involving support to the insurgency a forced confession is the only evidence presented by the prosecutor. The courts accept this confession as the sole basis of its verdicts. If the courts did not accept these confessions, the authorities would be less inclined to use ill-treatment and torture. However, under the current circumstances torture is often used to force a confession and subsequently securing the conviction of a man. It was added that the conviction rate in these cases is close to hundred percent.
A representative of CAT explained about a case in which the brother of a retired OMON officer was taken from his home by the authorities and verbally accused of having provided support to the illegal armed groups. He was not officially convicted. A representative of CAT could not recall when this event took place. The brother was working with IT, and he did not appear to be an Islamic fundamentalist, so it would be safe to assume that this case was fabricated. This is illustrative of the lack of logic behind who is at risk of being subjected to arrests and convictions based on fabricated terrorism related charges. It could happen to practically anyone if the police for some unclear reason want to or have to show results.
Svetlana Gannushkina, Memorial/CAC, stated that people who have fallen victims of a fabricated criminal case involving support to illegal armed groups would be detained illegally and kept in an unofficial detention facility. During that time the person would receive severe beatings and possible torture. […]
In all of the cases where people have been charged with providing support to the illegal armed groups the courts have found the person guilty. If there is absolutely no incriminating evidence in the case, usually the sentence is between one to two years in prison. The prison sentence would be much more severe if there was some evidence in the case. It was added that if a person has survived the brutal torture, the police would threaten to rape his mother, sister, daughter or another woman of his family. Then he signs everything they ordered him. The authorities can do the rape themselves or ask somebody else to do it.
When asked to explain how it is possible for the Chechen authorities to claim on the one hand that the insurgents have been defeated and driven out of the republic and on the other hand keep on fabricating criminal cases involving support to the insurgents, Svetlana Gannushkina, Memorial/CAC, stated that it is a paradox and there is no logic to it. However, it is important to understand that the Chechen authorities do not need any logic in their behaviour. It was added that the bizarre logic could be explained by the saying that ‚to have anti-Semitism, we do not need Jews, we need anti-Semites‘. […]
When asked to comment tendencies regarding criminal cases in which people have provided support such as food, medicine or transportation to active members of the insurgency, a human rights activist stated that there are fewer cases than before but they still appear. Most cases are initiated because local police are required to show a certain number of cases of people convicted of having supported the insurgency. This leads the police to fabricate cases against people who have not actually supported the insurgency. […]
A lawyer from Grozny stated that the level of fear in Chechnya is very high. People are afraid to seek help from lawyers or from the police in cases where they have been accused of supporting the insurgency. From 2003 to 2009 the lawyer worked specifically on cases involving persons accused of having supported the insurgency. Most or all cases where people are accused of having supported the insurgency with food, shelter, transportation or medicine are likely to be fabricated or false. Especially relatives of active insurgents are likely to be falsely accused of supporting the insurgents. If a relative of an insurgent is arrested, he or she would definitely be exposed to ill-treatment and torture and a fabricated criminal case would be instigated.“ (DIS, Jänner 2015, S. 36-39)
„When asked about how it could be that the Chechen authorities continue to arrest and accuse people of supporting the insurgency when there are now very few active insurgents left in Chechnya and the republic has been safe from any major terrorist attacks in the past years, a lawyer from Grozny explained that it is a question of business. If there were complete peace in Chechnya all the Russians on contract in the Chechen law enforcement structures would be out of work. If the Chechen police did not make any arrests, it would mean that Chechnya would be free from insurgents and many Chechen police officers would no longer have a job.“ (DIS, Jänner 2015, S. 41)
A June 2015 article of Caucasian Knot, an independent online news site that covers politics and human rights issues in the Caucasus region, reports that Chechen authorities arrested two suspected former members of the armed underground and another eleven alleged supporters of illegal armed formations (IAFs):
„During the past day, in Chechnya, law enforcers have detained two suspected former members of the armed underground and other eleven persons suspected of aiding and abetting members of illegal armed formations (IAFs). […]
The police assume that several years ago, two of 13 detainees used to be members of IAFs operating in the territory of Chechnya and the other detainees were aiding and abetting IAF members during the past 12 years. ‘The suspects supplied militants with food, uniforms, and medicines, transported them in their cars and provided them with shelters for nights,‘ the ‘Caucasian Knot‘ correspondent was told by the policeman. He has noted that the detainees are prosecuted under the relevant articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.“ (Caucasian Knot, 24 June 2015)
A May 2015 article by Caucasian Knot reports about the arrest of a Chechen resident suspected of aiding members of IAFs:
„On April 27, employees of the Vedeno ROVD (District Interior Division) of Chechnya detained, in the village of Selmentauzen, a local resident suspected of aiding members of illegal armed formations (IAFs). According to operative data, in spring of 2006, the 38-year-old man supplied foodstuffs to IAF members acting in the Vedeno District. During the interrogation, the detainee confessed that he had helped militants for some time. He is under recognizance not to leave“ (Caucasian Knot, 4 May 2015)
References: (all links accessed 7 October 2016)
· Caucasian Knot: On April 27-May 3, at least two persons were lost in armed conflict in Northern Caucasus, 4 May 2015
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/31628/
· Caucasian Knot: 13 residents of Chechnya detained on suspicion of involvement in armed underground, 24 June 2015
http://eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/32141/
· DIS - Danish Immigration Service: Security and human rights in Chechnya and the situation of Chechens in the Russian Federation – residence registration, racism and false accusations; Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Moscow, Grozny and Volgograd, the Russian Federation; From 23 April to 13 May 2014 and Paris, France 3 June
2014, January 2015 (available at ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/90_1423480989_2015-01-dis-chechnya-fact-finding-mission-report.pdf
· FIDH - International Federation for Human Rights: Chechnya: Abducted artist returned alive but in bad physical shape, 18 April 2016
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/russia/chechnya-abducted-artist-returned-alive-but-in-bad-physical-shape
· Front Line Defenders: Arson attack on office of Joint Mobile Group and search of its apartment after threats against HRDs working in Chechnya, 14 December 2014
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/fr/case/arson-attack-office-joint-mobile-group
· HRW - Human Rights Watch/ AI – Amnesty International/ Front Line Defenders: Joint Statement by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Front Line Defenders, 3 June 2015
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/06/03/joint-statement-human-rights-watch-amnesty-international-and-front-line-defenders
· HRW - Human Rights Watch: Russia: Rights Defender Attacked in Chechnya, 17 March 2016
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/17/russia-rights-defender-attacked-chechnya
· HRW - Human Rights Watch: "Like Walking a Minefield"; Vicious Crackdown on Critics in Russia’s Chechen Republic, 30 August 2016 (available at ecoi.net)
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1472803628_chechnya0816-1.pdf
· ICG - International Crisis Group: Chechnya: The Inner Abroad, 26 June 2015 (available at ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1435827871_236-chechnya-the-inner-abroad.pdf
· JF - Jamestown Foundation: Russian Opposition and Chechens Living in Europe Condemn Ramzan Kadyrov; Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 20, 29 January 2016 (available at ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/318528/443724_en.html
· SFH – Swiss Refugee Council: Tschetschenien: Aktuelle Menschenrechtslage: Update, 13 May 2016 (available at ecoi.net)
https://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1788_1464436271_160513-rus-menschenrechte.pdf
· VOA - Voice of America: Russia's Opposition Ponders Problem of Chechnya's Kadyrov, 11 January 2016
http://www.voanews.com/a/russia-opposition-ponders-chechnyas-ramzan-kadyrov/3140533.html