Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1989

PERU
 
 
 
Peru has a freely elected democratic government, with an
executive branch headed by a president, a bicameral
legislature, a separate and independent judiciary, and an
attorney general's office (the Public Ministry). Peru's
history has been punctuated by periods of military rule, most
recently from 1968 to 1980. President Alan Garcia and his
center-left American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) won
the last general elections in 1985 by a large margin. The
next elections are scheduled for April 8, 1990.
Public security responsibilities are shared by the police and
the military. The Interior Ministry and its police services
have the primary counterterrorist role in the city of Lima and
in the 114 provinces which are not under a state of
emergency. The military leads the effort to combat subversion
in the 69 provinces which are currently under a state of
emergency. The states of emergency place all executive branch
authority in the local military command, suspend restrictions
on arbitrary detention and the requirement for search
warrants, and restrict rights of movement and assembly. More
than 50 percent of Peru's population of 22 million lived under
a state of emergency in 1989. Peru's history of military
coups has weakened civilian control over the military. There
is little oversight of military activities in the emergency
zones by civilian judges or prosecutors, and the
constitutional rights of persons detained by the military are
routinely ignored.
In Peru's mixed economy, private property is generally
respected. Unfavorable terms of international trade, lack of
foreign investment, capital flight, and internal structural
problems led in 1989 to stagnant exports, rising unemployment,
fiscal disaster, and one of the world's highest inflation
rates. Austerity measures produced a deep recession and a
50-percent cut in per capita annual income to an estimated
$800, without curbing inflation.
The chief factors driving human rights violations in Peru
remain the terrorist activities of the Sendero Luminoso
(Shining Path) Maoist guerrillas. The Sendero regularly
assassinates anyone perceived to be an opponent, or merely
uncooperative, including ordinary citizens, typically Indian
residents of the Andean highlands. As measured by the number
of reported deaths of government workers (144 civilian, 243
police, and 105 military), 1989 was the most violent year
since Sendero announced its "popular war" in 1980. Sendero
also increased its control over Peru's major coca-growing
region, the Upper Huallaga Valley, where it both represented
peasant coca growers in their dealings with narcotics
traffickers and cooperated with traffickers to thwart law
enforcement efforts. The Senate Commission on Violence
estimated that Sendero was responsible for a total 1,526
deaths in 1989. Several other smaller terrorist groups were
also active. Independent human rights groups charge that the
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) committed 161
political murders in 1989 and that the Rodrigo Franco Command
(CRF) murdered eleven.
Human rights abuses by government security forces also
increased in 1989, although independent investigations were
increasingly difficult to carry out because military
commanders restrict access to emergency zones. The Public
Ministry reports a backlog of over 3,000 pending cases of
disappearances, over 500 of them filed in 1989. There were
credible reports of summary executions, arbitrary detentions,
and frequent use of torture by police and the military. The
Senate Commission on Violence estimated that government
security forces were responsible for a total of 1,228 deaths
in 1989. Trials of military personnel accused of human rights
violations move slowly, if at all. In December two police
officers were sentenced to prison terms for their roles in the
1986 massacre of 124 prisoners at Lurigancho prison. The 6
army officers and 69 other police personnel on trial were all
acquitted.
A special congressional commission on paramilitary activities
was established after the April and May assassinations of two
members of the Chamber of Deputies. Commission members
concluded that extremist members of the ruling APRA party,
working with elements of the Ministry of Interior, are using
the Rodrigo Franco Command (CRF) vigilante terrorist group to
conduct operations against suspected antigovernment terrorists
and sympathizers.
It is estimated that at least 3,198 persons (civilian and
military) were killed in terrorist-related violence in 1989,
an increase of over 50-percent from the previous year.
 
 
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
 
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
 
      a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Political and other extrajudicial killings rose again in
1989. Sendero Luminoso continued to assassinate teachers,
engineers, development and human rights workers, Indian
peasants, and political candidates, as well as government,
police and ruling party officials. Official government
sources reported more than 1,450 civilian deaths from
terrorist violence. The independent National Coordinator for
Human Rights calculated a total of 823 civilian political
assassinations, 720 of them by Sendero, through the first 10
months of 1989. The Senate Select Committee on Violence and
Pacification calculates that Sendero's forces committed 1,526
killings in 1989. Sendero's killings thus remained primarily
aimed at the general public; by comparison, government
security forces suffered 157 deaths at Sendero's hands. Due
to the isolation of many rural areas where Sendero is most
active, the number of victims almost surely is underreported.
Sendero continued to use violence in the countryside,
particularly assassinations, to impose its control over
certain areas, punish peasants who withhold their support, and
eliminate opposition. In one such incident, Sendero killed at
least 45 peasants in three settlements in Huancavelica
department on June 9. The townspeople were rounded up,
community leaders and those who had refused Sendero's earlier
call for a work stoppage were selected for "trial," and then
shot, stabbed, or had their skulls smashed as family and
neighbors looked on. Another massacre, also probably by
Sendero, took place in the village of Canaire in Ayacucho
department, in which 35 were killed on February 27.
In the cities, Sendero used attacks more for propaganda and
intimidation purposes. In a major effort to disrupt the
nation's November 1989 municipal and April 1990 presidential
elections, it expanded its attacks on government and APRA
party officials to include opposition officeholders and
candidates for public office, regardless of party affiliation.
Sendero attacked and killed several foreigners in 1989,
including tourists, development workers, and journalists.
A second terrorist group, the MRTA, has expanded beyond its
original base of operations in Lima and environs to field its
own paramilitary cadres in some rural zones, most notably in
northern San Martin department. Though the MRTA chiefly seeks
the destruction of property through the selective bombing of
banks, factories, foreign businesses, and diplomatic
installations, these attacks killed at least 161 people in
1989. Among those killed was a police sergeant during a
September attack on the Lima residence of Economy and Finance
Minister Cesar Vasquez Bazan.
A third terrorist group, the CRF, also increased its
activities in 1989. Suspected of being controlled by elements
of the APRA party and the Ministry of Interior, the CRF
carried out a campaign of intimidation, bombings, and
assassinations. Among those targeted by CRF in 1989 were
journalists, human rights workers, labor union memDers,
lawyers, leftist politicians, and others the CRF accused of
working to advance the cause of Sendero or MRTA. According to
the Senate Committee on Violence, CRF was responsible for 11
murders in 1989, a figure which closely tracks with that of
independent human rights organizations.
There are no official statistics on the number of summary
executions in 1989. Because the number of confirmed
disappearances sharply rose for the second consecutive year,
it appears probable that the number of summary executions also
increased in 1989. In an August 1989 report. Amnesty
International (AI) charged that not only did the number of
extrajudicial killings and disappearances in emergency zones
grow "in a spectacular manner" during 1988 and the first half
of 1989, but that for the first time these practices were no
longer confined to the emergency zones, nor were the victims
only from indigenous peasant communities in the Andean
highlands.
Several notable cases of probable military killings occurred
in 1989. On May 17, some 100 troops of the Third
Ollantaytambo Infantry Battalion entered the town of Calabaza,
Satipo, Junin department. According to survivors' accounts
filed with the Attorney General's office, the townspeople were
assembled, and two hooded individuals (said to be former
Sendero members cooperating with the army) selected
approximately 20 persons. The prisoners were taken to a
ravine, tortured, and killed, although several escaped. The
next day the bodies of 11 townspeople, including those of 3
students aged 14, 16, and 17 years, were found on the shores
of the Calabaza river.
The last surviving witness of the May 14, 1988, army massacre
of at least 28 villagers in Cayara, Ayacucho department, was
killed in circumstances suggesting army invo vement. Martha
Crisostomo Garcia was shot to death after eight hooded
individuals in military dress burst into her house in Huamanga
at 3 a.m. on September 8, 1989. The ninth witness to
disappear or to be killed since the Cayara massacre,
Crisostomo had identified the body of one of those killed,
thus implicating General Jose Valdivia, then political-military
chief of the Ayacucho emergency zone. A Public Ministry
investigator concluded that there was clear military
responsibility for the Cayara massacre. The ruling party
member leading the congressional investigation into the
killings, however, concluded there had been "no excesses
committed on the part of the military," even though the
commission has yet to produce its official report. At year's
end, the investigation remained stalled.
Also in May, Delfin Ortiz Serna, a witness to the November
1988 killing of a journalist, who had filed a deposition
implicating the military, was shot to death. In neither the
Calabaza massacre nor the murder of Crisostomo, nor in any
other 1989 incident of alleged military or police violations
of a civilian's human rights, were the results of official
executive branch investigations ever made public, nor were
charges brought against security officials.
The public military trial of 77 army and police officials
accused of the June 1986 killing of 124 inmates at the
Lurigancho prison in the aftermath of a failed Sendero
uprising concluded in December with two convictions—and 75
acquittals due to "lack of evidence." Although police Colonel
Rolando Cabezas Alarcon and a police lieutenant were sentenced
to prison terms of 15 and 7 years respectively, none of the
military officers implicated were convicted. The military
justice code contains no specific language for dealing with
cases of killing, kidnaping, or torture—only "negligence" and
"abuse of authority."
The assassinations of Chamber of Deputies members Eriberto
Arroyo Mio (April 27) and Pablo Li Ormeno (May 6) prompted the
Chamber to establish a commission to investigate paramilitary
activities. The commission's preliminary report was submitted
in mid-August, "hypothesizing" that APRA party youths are the
actual perpetrators of the bombings, murders, and threats
being committed in the name of the CRF, with Minister of
Interior Agustin Mantilla as the driving force behind the
CRF. Commission members received a num.ber of death threats;
the daughter of commission member Manuel Piqueras was briefly
detained by armed men who threatened her father. After the
APRA congressional leadership declared the commission
dissolved, the non-APRA commission members issued a final
report in October, again implicating APRA and Minister
Mantilla. The APRA members had not issued any separate report
by year's end. Interior Minister Mantilla has resolutely
denied any involvement in the CRF or similar groups. Although
several suspects were detained and later released, by year's
end no criminal charges were pending in connection with any
actions undertaken by the CRF.
The CRF is also suspected in the January murder of Ayacucho
journalist Juvenal Arroyo, along with his wife and two
children. In April Tingo Maria radio personality Guillermo
Lopez Salazar was shot to death in his home by suspected CRF
terrorists. Sendero killed Peru's most prominent
environmental reporter Barbara D'Achille in May. American
journalist Todd C. Smith was kidnaped, tortured, and killed by
unknown assailants in Uchiza, San Martin Department in
November.
Miners Federation Secretary General Saul Cantoral was kidnaped
and murdered by unknown assailants on February 13. Also in
February, a demonstration of striking farmers in Pucallpa,
Ucayali department (not then an emergency zone) was broken up
by police who may not have known that last-minute approval hadEEEU
been given for the demonstration. Eight died and dozens were
wounded after the police fired first tear gas and then bullets
into the crowd. Some 300 persons were arrested; most were
quickly released. Campesino organizers claim 28 remain
unaccounted for and are presumed dead.
In late August and early September, several dozen bodies were
found floating down the Huallaga river near Santa Lucia in the
north central department of San Martin. Many of the bodies
had been decapitated and were also missing hands and feet.
Although no organization claimed responsibility for the
deaths, public speculation centered on the possibility that
the military had killed drug traffickers, Sendero members, or
other civilians. Others pointed to the possibility of a war
between rival drug gangs or to Sendero having killed
traffickers or civilians. The inability of police or private
human rights groups to ascertain responsibility for these
deaths, much less arrest those responsible, is indicative of
the level and variety of major violence prevalent in Peru
today.
 
      b. Disappearance
Since 1983 there have been an estimated 2,800 to 3,500 cases
of disappearances involving the security forces, the majority
of which occurred prior to 1985. Local human rights groups
report having received formal complaints of 297 new cases of
disappearances in the first 10 months of 1989, compared to the
170 cases reported by the United Nations Working Group on
Disappearances in 1988. Most cases involved Army detention of
persons suspected of terrorist links in the emergency zones,
but there have been notable cases in Lima as well. Though a
large percentage of those detained by security forces within
the security zones have reappeared, human rights groups
believe that most of the remainder were or will be summarily
executed. The bodies of disappearance victims are rarely
found. Based on the testimony of survivors, it appears that
most victims are taken to military bases for interrogation.
Some are turned over to the police after lengthy detentions
and are later freed for lack of incriminating evidence. Human
rights groups argue persuasively that the rest are summarily
executed by the armed forces. An unknown number of
"disappeared" persons are unaccounted for because they joined
the ranks of MRTA or Sendero, either voluntarily or
involuntar i ly.
 
      c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Although the Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman or
humiliating treatment, charges of brutality toward detainees
are common. Huir.an rights groups state that suspected
subversives held by the Government are routinely tortured at
military detention centers; lawyers and others familiar with
the police and judicial system concur. In 1987 the Public
Ministry noted that the majority of detainees held by military
authorities showed signs of mistreatment or torture. In 1989
there were reliable accounts from released detainees of
torture or mistreatment both by police and the military.
The 1987 terrorism law requires that persons detained for
terrorism be interrogated only in the presence of a defense
attorney and a Public Ministry prosecutor. In these cases, a
court indictment must be sought within 15 days of arrest or
the prisoner must be released. Reliable reports of violations
of these standards occur frequently in areas governed by the
military under a state of exception. There is some dispute as
to whether under Peruvian law the military is required to
adhere to these terrorism law requirements under a state of
exception, but Peru is obliged to meet such standards under
its international treaty obligations. In any event, the
military frequently ignore these standards. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1989 regained some access
to detainees in the military-controlled emergency zones and to
police detention centers where interrogations occur prior to
indictment.
Many victims of Sendero terrorism also show signs of having
been tortured before death. Torture of those victims often
follows a brief "popular trial," normally held in the presence
of rural villagers as a method of intimidation. Sendero uses
particularly brutal methods of execution, including slitting
throats, strangulation, stoning, and burning.
Prison conditions are extremely poor, and prisoners are likely
to experience unsanitary facilities, poor nutrition and health
care, and ill-treatment by prison staff. Many prison
cellblocks have reportedly fallen under Sendero or MRTA
control, with guards refusing to venture into them.
 
      d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The Constitution, the penal code, and antiterrorist
legislation clearly delineate the arrest and detention
process. However, most if not all of these protections are
suspended in those areas under a state of emergency. In areas
not subject to a state of emergency, a warrant approved by a
Public Ministry prosecutor is required for arrest. Persons
arrested must be arraigned within 24 hours, except in cases of
drug trafficking, terrorism, or espionage, for which the limit
is 15 days. Detainees have the right to choose their own
attorney, or the Government must provide counsel at no
charge. Arrested persons are entitled to have an attorney
present when they make statements to the police. Under the
1987 terrorism law, police must also notify the detainees'
family and human rights groups of an arrest, although in
practice this is not consistently done. There is no bail or
provisional liberty for persons accused of terrorism.
Arrest procedures are different in the rural emergency zones.
The armed forces do not need an arrest warrant, and detainees
are often denied access to an attorney during interrogation
and to family members during their imprisonment. All
detainees, including those in the emergency zones, have the
right to seek judicial determination of the legality of their
detention, but this right is routinely disregarded by military
commanders in the emergency zones. Of the several thousand
prisoners held by the military inside the emergency zones,
human rights groups know of few who were turned over to
civilian authorities for prosecution. Arbitrary arrests and
detentions in the emergency zones in 1989 are estimated to be
in the hundreds.
In 1989 the military continued the practice of detaining
persons who enter the emergency zones to investigate human
rights cases or to instruct citizens on their constitutional
rights. Labor union organizers also often found themselves
detained under the broad terms of the terrorism law. In the 3
days before the mid-August start of a miners' strike, at least
34 organizers were detained and charged with terrorism.
Another 10 were arrested the following week. By September 2,
all had been released and charges had been dropped against all
44.
The Constitution prohibits, and there have been no known cases
of, involuntary exile in the past 9 years. With regard to
forced or compulsory labor, see Section 6.c.
 
      e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The judiciary is one of three separate branches of
government. Supreme Court judges, 23 in all, are nominated by
the President from slates supplied by an advisory committee,
and must be approved by the Senate. In the Peruvian legal
system, which is based on the Napoleonic Code, once criminal
charges are filed, a judge determines whether probable cause
exists. The judicial process prior to trial may last several
months, followed by a public trial. Defendants have the right
to be present at the trial, at which verdicts are rendered by
a judge or a panel of judges. Sentences may be appealed, and
judges may send cases back to lower courts for additional
investigation. Many judges on the Superior and Supreme Courts
are active in political parties, and there are occasional
claims that decisions have been politically motivated.
Courts face severe backlogs, a product of inefficiency,
influence peddling, and the sharp increase in terrorism
cases. There are too few public defenders for the large
caseloads. The Ministry of Justice reported in July 1988 that
there was a backlog of nearly 45,000 criminal cases. Human
rights groups have documented numerous cases of persons who
have been detained without bail, while awaiting trial, for
periods of up to 4 years. There are also widespread charges
of corruption and the suborning of judges, police, and
witnesses at all stages of the judicial process. Narcotics
traffickers reportedly have been able to buy their release
from jails. Outgoing Minister of Justice Cesar Delgado
Barreto acknowledged in September that fully two-thirds of all
prison inmates are awaiting trial for crimes of which they
have been accused, with only one-third having been judged,
found guilty, and sentenced.
Threats and intimidation of judges handling terrorism cases
represent a serious problem, accounting in part for the low
conviction rate of accused terrorists. Barely 5 percent of
those arrested for such actions are convicted, a notoriously
low rate that leads to police frustration with the judicial
process and to public tolerance of police abuses (this figure
does not include those held in military facilities inside the
emergency zones) . In 1987 Congress created special tribunals
to hear terrorism cases, and promised greater security
measures to protect judges and witnesses. There were
immediate problems with finding judges who were willing to
serve on these courts, with providing the guarantees of safety
required in the enabling legislation, and with the large
backlog of cases. Overwhelmed by these problems, the special
tribunals were abolished in April 1988. There continues to be
criticism of the lack of cooperation between the Interior
Ministry's technical police, who investigate and arrest, and
the Public Ministry prosecutors, who conduct their own
investigations as a part of the trial process.
Although the Constitution mandates that civilians be tried in
civilian courts. President Garcia proposed in July 1989 that
civilian terrorists be tried by military tribunals throughout
the country, both in and outside the emergency zones.
Although this proposal was not adopted, special civilian
courts were established late in the year to try terrorism
cases in Lima and the rural emergency zones. The Supreme
Court decides whether military or police offenders are tried
in civilian courts or in a separate military court system.
The military generally asserts its jurisdiction in these
cases, and the Court typically rules in its favor. In the
first attempt to have a civilian court try a military officer
since 1986 (that case was thwarted when the officer fled the
country), nine army personnel, including at least one officer,
are to be tried in Sullana, Piura department, for the April
1989 murder of Army Sgt. Jorge Yanez Ceci after a round of
drugs and drinking. The civilian courts are making slow
progress on several cases involving alleged police violations
of human rights. Ongoing cases include those against police
charged in the 1981 killing in detention of Cusco University
student Marco Antonio Ayerbe, the 1982 killing of prisoners in
an Ayacucho hospital, the 1982 death of Francisco Nufflo, and
the 1986 torture of detainees in a Cusco police station. Two
police officers (of 71 police on trial) were sentenced to
prison in December 1989 for their roles in the June 1986
Lurigancho prison massacre (Section l.a.).
Military trials may be closed to the public at the discretion
of the ruling magistrate, and little is known about specific
cases. Although the military claims that human rights
offenders are severely disciplined, no member of the armed
forces has ever been convicted in either military or civilian
courts for human rights violations. Cases reportedly still
pending in military courts include charges against: a
lieutenant for the 1985 murder of 69 persons in Accomarca; an
officer for 3 1985 Huanuco deaths; and officers accused of
summary executions in 1986 in Parco and Pomatambo. The
military prosecutor asked for sentences ranging between 6 and
25 years against the 77 accused security force members (6 army
officers, 20 police officers, and 51 police) accused of
involvement in the June 1986 massacre of prisoners at
Lurigancho prison. The prosecutor requested a 25-year
sentence for police Colonel Roland Cabezas and 6 years for
army General Jorge Rabanal. Cabezas received a 15-year prison
sentence. Police lieutenant Jaime Oswaldo Marquina was
sentenced to 6 years. All other defendants, including army
General Rabanal, were found not guilty due to "lack of
evidence.
"
 
      f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The Constitution stipulates that the police need a judicial
warrant to enter a private dwelling, and this requirement is
generally respected in practice. The requirement is suspended
in the emergency zones, however, and security forces in those
areas routinely conduct searches of private homes without
warrants.
 
      g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts
Approximately 1,748 combatants, including some 1,400 presumed
terrorists, died in armed clashes in 1989. Previously the
Government claimed to have killed 4,500 terrorists from
1980-1988, including 630 in 1988. Though the military may
inflate these counts, confirmed killings of terrorists may
also be underreported because Sendero attempts to retrieve all
its casualties, including fatalities, after clashes with the
military. Local human rights groups charge that a significant
but unknown number of captured terrorists and innocent
civilians were executed by the military. Sendero' s disregard
for the rules of war and humanitarian law are infamous. As AI
reported in August, "the violent adversaries of the Government
routinely torture, mutilate and assassinate their captives."
Both Sendero and the military are known to have blocked
passage of relief supplies and humanitarian assistance. The
international relief organization Medicins Sans Frontieres
suspended its efforts in the emergency zones.
Abuse of the rights of prisoners (able-bodied, wounded, and
sick alike) was widespread by both security and terrorist
forces. The military's violations of international norms
ranged from the routine blindfolding of prisoners, to the
frequent refusal to admit to holding certain persons in
detention, to the less frequent summary execution of unarmed
prisoners. Responding to a Sendero ambush of a military
patrol, army helicopters on June 19 strafed a village near
Aguaytia in the Upper Huallaga valley, killing or injuring an
unknown number of civilians.
 
 
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
 
      a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and the
press. With 8 television stations, dozens of radio stations,
and 15 daily newspapers in Lima alone, Peruvians have access
to a very broad range of opinion and information. The media
are highly partisan. The Government owns one of the two
national television networks, a radio network, and three
newspapers; APRA operates two newspapers, and close advisors
of the President control a third. The independent media are
quick to criticize any branch of the Government. Most major
opposition parties boast their own newspapers, and opposition
figures also have frequent access to the government media.
There were occasional and credible complaints of government
pressure on the media and restrictions on journalists.
However, there was no discernible trend in these incidents,
nor did they constitute government policy.
Journalists were often barred from traveling in the rural
areas of the emergency zones, and those who attempted to do so
were occasionally detained by the military, although they were
generally released within hours. There were also frequent
complaints of police confiscation of video and photographic
material of events the Government did not want publicized.
Police arrested Janet Talavera, the interim director of the
pro-Sendero newspaper El Diario, in June. She was detained
under the provisions of the legislation prohibiting "apologies
for and encouragement of terrorism." Additional charges of
committing terrorist acts were later filed; she was awaiting
trial at year's end. Police raided the offices of El Diario
on November 2, arresting a dozen workers and closing the
paper. Nonetheless, it appeared irregularly for the remainder
of the year, edited and printed clandestinely. Luis Arce
Borja, the paper's permanent director, is also under
indictment for "apologies for and encouragement of terrorism"
and spent most of the year living in Europe. A local lawyer
attempted to invoke the same statute against Cesar
Hildebrandt , one of the country's most prominent journalists,
who was at the time the editor of the influential magazine Si.
Hildebrandt alleged that the move was orchestrated from the
Presidential Palace. Whatever the truth, the move ultimately
came to naught. The antiterrorism statute has been applauded
by some journalists as necessary; others fear that it can be
used to stifle press freedom.
Journalists were sometimes the victims of violence and
threats. Four noted journalists were killed in 1989 (see
Section 1 . a . ) ; the College of Peruvian Journalists reported
that as many as 22 persons involved in the news media were
killed. The owner of the Panamericana Radio and Television
network. Hector Delgado Parker, was kidnaped by MRTA on
October 4, and his bodyguards killed. MRTA announced Delgado
Parker would be "tried" for unspecified "crimes against the
people." There were also death threats against other
journalists. The local ANSA correspondent temporarily fledthe
country in May after a reported threat.
 
      b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
These rights are expressly provided for in the Constitution
and are normally respected in practice except in areas under a
state of emergency (where the right of assembly is
suspended) . Public meetings in plazas or streets require
advance permission, which can only be denied for reasons of
security or public health. Municipal authorities usually
approved permits for demonstrations in nonemergency zones.
Many unauthorized demonstrations also occurred, and, for the
most part, the Government dealt with them in a
nonconf rontational manner. However, as opposition groups
adopted more provocative and violent tactics, the Government
often denied permits or broke up marches. Police resorted
more often to clubs, tear gas, buckshot, and f iretruck-mounted
water cannons to disperse unruly or threatening crowds. At
least eight (and possibly many more) were killed in February
when police opened fire on a demonstration of striking farmers
in Pucallpa (see Section l.a.).
There are no particular restrictions placed on political
activity by trade associations or professional bodies. Such
organizations are permitted to, and routinely do, maintain
relations or affiliate with recognized international bodies in
their respective fields.
For a discussion of freedom of association as it applies to
labor unions, see Section 6. a.
 
      c. Freedom of Religion
Roman Catholicism predominates in Peru, and the Constitution
formally recognizes the Church. The Constitution also
establishes the separation of church and state and ensures
freedom of religion and conscience. These rights are
respected in practice. Members of minority religions
encounter no government interference in practicing their faith
or in exempting their children from religious instruction in
public schools. Organized religions are free to establish
places of worship, train clergy, engage in religious
publishing, and proselytize. Foreign-born clergy are not
barred from entry; rather, they constitute a significant
presence, even within the dominant Catholic Church.
Missionary organizations operate freely in the country.
Nonetheless, particular members of various religious
organizations report having received death threats from
Sendero, MRTA, or the CRF during 1989. Several religious
workers were killed. These incidents appear prompted by the
terrorist group's perception that a given individual's
activities "strayed" from pastoral to political. Some
religious officials fear, however, that Sendero is
increasingly antagonistic to organized religion in general.
They cite the December bombing of a Catholic church, increased
amounts of Sendero vitriol directed against the church, a
spate of killings of religious workers, and reports of death
threats in some areas of the country against those who
celebrate Christmas. MRTA bombed three Mormon churches, which
it publicly accuses of having links to U.S. corporate
interests.
 
      d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
The Constitution provides for the right of free movement, and
there are no political or legal constraints on foreign travel
or emigration. Approximately 150,000 Peruvians emigrated to
other nations in 1988, and similar numbers are believed to
have emigrated in 1989. Departure taxes and passport costs,
although substantially reduced at year's end, nonetheless
constitute a prohibitive expense for millions of Peruvians.
Freedom of movement is legally suspended within the emergency
zones and travelers may be detained by authorities at any
time. Other domestic and international travel is not known to
be restricted for political reasons. There have been no major
resettlement efforts by the security forces in several years.
Persons fleeing turmoil in other countries traditionally have
been encouraged to return eventually to their country of
origin or to emigrate to third countries, but have not been
forced to do so. Involuntary repatriation occurs only in
cases of persons accused of nonpolitical crimes.
 
 
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
 
Peru is a democracy governed by a freely elected president and
congress. The political process is open, subject to
monitoring by an autonomous National Elections Board, and
elections are vigorously contested by parties ranging from
conservative to Marxist. In the November 1989 municipal
elections, for example, 10 political movements fielded
candidates for mayor of Lima. Sendero Luminoso persistently
sought to deny citizens their political rights--particularly
in the more remote areas--by killing candidates and elected
officials and threatening voters. Sendero leaders have
repeatedly and publicly stated their intention to disrupt the
1990 presidential elections, just as they tried to disrupt the
November 1989 municipal elections. By September 30, over 590
mayors and city aldermen elected in the general municipal
elections of 1986 had been forced from their posts by
terrorist threats or violence. Over 75 mayors and other
municipal, district, and provincial officials were killed by
Sendero during 1989. After Sendero assassinated Fermin
Azparrent, the Mayor of Ayacucho City, on September 19,
Sendero warned that any mayoral or city alderman candidate in
Ayacucho who did not withdraw his candidacy within 24 hours
would also be killed. All but one candidate withdrew (and he
moved to Lima) . A second candidate reentered the race the
week of the election. Nationwide, 252 districts (12.5 percent
of the total) fielded no candidates for municipal office.
Suffrage is both universal and mandatory for persons 18 to 70
years of age, except for active duty police or military, who
are barred from voting or holding public office. Balloting is
direct and secret. Although the fine for failing to vote was
raised from $4 to approximately $50 (roughly equal to a
month's minimum wage) on the eve of the November elections,
the National Elections Board announced afterwards that the
fine would not be enforced. Elections are held every 5 years
for president and the two vice presidents, as well as for the
Senate and Chamber of Deputies. The president is barred from
running for consecutive terms of office. Elections for the
nation's newly established regional parliaments are to be held
every 3 years, at the time of the nation's municipal
elections. Under the Constitution the Government is headed by
a powerful executive. More than 95 percent of all new laws
are enacted through unilateral presidential decrees.
Nonetheless the legislature (currently also dominated by the
APRA party) freely and openly debates government policies and
does on occasion vote against government positions.
The political system, although legally open to all, is
dominated by Peruvian males of European or mixed European and
indigenous background.
 
 
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights
 
Access by the ICRC to the emergency zones and to detainees
which had been denied in mid-1988 was restored in early 1989
and ICRC personnel visited over 100 security detainees in
September. AI last sent =i formal delegation to Peru in
November 1988 and was received by various members of the
Cabinet. Outside of the emergency zones, the Government did
not impede or restrict their access. In May 1989 AI forwarded
a draft report to the Government for comment but did not
receive a reply. AI published the report, "Peru: Human
Rights and State of Emergency," in late August, noting that
"grave violations of human rights" had increased throughout
the previous 18 months. In November AI released a second
report, "Caught Between Two Fires," charging that "torture,
mutilation, 'disappearance,' murder, and rape have become a
hallmark of the armed forces' 'campaign against terrorism.'"
The Ministry of Defense issued an immediate, heated denial but
did not further address the charges.
Local human rights organizations complain that they are
limited by the military in their efforts to investigate human
rights abuses in the emergency zones and that their requests
to the Government for information are usually ignored.
Although most groups state that they are usually not harassed
or threatened by the Government, incidents continued to
occur. In September three visiting human rights lawyers and
five local residents preparing a seminar on constitutional
rights were arrested on terrorism charges in San Marcos
province of Cajamarca department. They were held for 2 1/2
days before all charges were dropped and the eight were
released. Human rights groups also received threats from
terrorist groups, mostly from Sendero, but also from the CRF.
Due to violence and the specific threat of continued violence,
a num.ber of human rights and humanitarian assistance
organizations were forced to close their offices in certain
emergency zones during 1989.
A number of local private human rights organizations
constitute the independent National Coordinator for Human
Rights. These include the National Human Rights Commission,
the Institute for Legal Defense, the Association for Human
Rights, and the Catholic Church's Commission for Social
Action. Other smaller groups work in the departmental
capitals and other cities. These groups are generally
credible observers, investigating and reporting on human
rights abuses to the extent possible, regardless of the
perpetrator.
In 1989 the Government repeatedly complained that both local
and international human rights groups distort or exaggerate
Peru's human rights problems. The Government's general
unresponsiveness to specific inquiries, however, has done
little to improve its credibility. Peru is a member of the
United Nations Human Rights Commission.
 
 
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status
 
The Constitution grants women equality with men, and laws on
marriage, divorce, and property rights do not discriminate
against women. Nevertheless, tradition impedes the access of
women to leadership roles in major social and political
institutions.
Spouse abuse is a chronic problem. Anecdotal police reports
indicate that such abuse is increasing in frequency as the
nation's political and economic frustrations grow. In late
1988 a special police center, staffed by policewomen, was
established in Lima to provide legal, medical, and psychiatric
assistance to abused spouses and children. A number of
women's organizations and feminist groups are active in Peru.
Peru's large indigenous population and its small black
population were also subject to pervasive social
discrimination, although far less so than before the Velasco
resolution of 1968. The former group, mostly speakers of
Quechua, Aymara, and other native languages, traditionally has
lacked access to public services. Peru is a classic case of
differential development, with public investment traditionally
focused on the coast, drawing migrants to the cities,
especially Lima. Recognizing this fact, the Government has
increased the flow of resources and services to poor, largely
Indian, rural areas. Development efforts, however, have been
impeded by the difficulty and cost of providing services to
remote areas which are out of the mainstream of Hispanic
culture, and by the continued disruption of these efforts by
Sendero. As a result of current problems, as well as historic
and continued prejudice, the economic and social needs of
Peruvians of European ancestry continued to be met to a far
greater extent than those of Peruvians of black, mixed, or
pure Indian heritage.
Section 6 Worker Rights
      a. The Right of Association
The Constitution provides for the right of workers freely to
associate and form labor unions without previous
authorization. In practice, however, there are legal
restrictions on the right to organize (see below), and a
requirement to register with the Ministry of Labor in order
for the union to become legal and capable of performing its
functions. Suspension or dissolution of labor unions is
forbidden by the Constitution, but it can be done legally
through the civil court system at the request of the union
itself, or by cancellation of the union's registration by the
Ministry. Unions may form industrywide federations which can,
in turn, form confederations, all of which can be affiliated
with international labor organizations. Private and public
sector unions of workers performing the same type of work
cannot join together as a confederation at any level. Police
and military are proscribed from forming unions.
About 18 percent of the labor force is organized. Organized
labor, however, is found in industries responsible for about
70 percent of Peru's gross national product. The majority of
unorganized Peruvian workers are those in the countryside and
those involved in the vast underground "informal" sector that
work outside government regulations.
Although a significant percentage of Peruvian organized labor
belongs to independent unions and federations, those unions
with a political party affiliation are routinely manipulated
to serve political interests.
The Confederation of Peruvian Workers is a member of the
Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers and is
affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions. The Communist party-controlled General Confederation
of Peruvian workers is affiliated with the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions and its Latin American
organization, the Permanent Congress for Trade Union Unity of
Latin America.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike "according
to law." There is no strike law, however, even though
Congress has considered various implementing bills since the
Constitution was promulgated in 1979. By Supreme Executive
Decree (which defines some strike behavior in the absence of a
formal law), workers in the private sector must give 72-hour
notice to the employer and the Ministry of Labor before going
on strike. When direct negotiations between workers and
employers break down, the Government intervenes and
constitutes a tripartite (government, management, labor) board
to review the situation. If no agreement is reached, the
Government then weighs the overall economic implications of
the employer's and the workers' positions and makes a decision
(which can be appealed in the civil court system) . The
Government may then make a final offer which, if rejected,
will open the way for declaring the strike illegal. A
government determination that the strike is illegal can lead
to the dismissal of workers or union leaders and permits
employers to hire strikebreakers legally. Despite these
restrictions, innumerable strikes, often wildcat in nature,
did take place in 1989. There are no norms regulating strikes
in the public sector and all such strikes were therefore open
to legal challenge. In spite of the constitutional right to
strike, nearly all strikes in Peru are declared illegal.
However, the penalties on the workers who strike illegally are
seldom implemented.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee on
Freedom of Association, at its meetings in June and November
1989, considered at length several pending complaints against
the Government of Peru. Among these complaints were
allegations from several trade union organizations that the
Government has used force to repress trade union demonstrations
and strikes resulting in the injury and death of strikers and
demonstrators, including the alleged murder of 88 peasants who
were participating in a meeting; and, that it has violated
trade union autonomy by searching union offices, detaining
their leaders, and interfering in their organizations. The
complaints also alleged that the Industrial Relations Bill and
administrative actions of the Government violate the right to
strike. The Committee deplored the violence, requested the
Government to submit further information, and agreed with the
union allegations regarding the Industrial Relations Bill.
 
      b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
By law, employers cannot discriminate against union members or
organizers. In practice, however, union activists are
sometimes harassed by employers who threaten to fire them, or
who pay off the workers to leave the enterprise. (There were
reported incidents during the year of more serious harassment
of labor union activists, including arbitrary detention (see
Section l.d.), kidnaping, and killing (see Section l.a.). The
workers can appeal their case through the Ministry of Labor
or, in case a decision is not acceptable to both parties,
through the civil courts. Throughout this process, which can
be lengthy, the worker is kept on the company's payroll until
a final legal ruling is obtained.
The right to bargain collectively is provided for by the
Constitution, but there are restrictions on what can be
negotiated. In the public sector, for example, only working
conditions can be negotiated, and then only if the changes do
not involve expenses greater than the funds already budgeted.
In the private sector, collective bargaining can cover both
working conditions and pay. Labor laws and regulations are
applied uniformly throughout the country, including in an area
of the Amazon Basin, granted in a Peru/Colombia border
agreement, which is analogous to a free trade zone .
 
      c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The Constitution prohibits compulsory labor, and this is
usually respected in practice. There have been reports of
compulsory labor on plantations in remote areas of the country
where law enforcement is all but nonexistent. Sendero has
also been accused of forcibly recruiting peasants to either
join its ranks or render support services.
In its 1989 report, the ILO Committee of Experts urged the
Government to adopt pending legislation prohibiting practices
which violate ILO Convention 105 on forced labor.
 
      d. Minimum Age for Employment of Children
The law prohibits the employment of children under 14 years of
age. In the formal sector of the economy, the law allows for
the employment of older children in some jobs, for a limited
period of time, and for a curtailed workweek at full pay.
According to a 1987 Senate report, however, 1.1 million
children 6 to 14 years of age work. Unofficial sources
estimate that about half a million children work in the Lima
area alone. A June 1989 survey of 133 working children by the
Agrarian University in Lima showed that 78 percent of them
were between 10 and 12 years old. Some 40 percent sold
assorted merchandise as street vendors, and 53 percent went to
school only occasionally or not at all. One-third worked 7
days a week, and 57 percent of the total worked between 2 and
5 days a week.
 
      e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Labor code provisions concerning conditions of work are
routinely ignored for the majority of the working population.
The code provides for an 8-hour day and an official 48-hour
week for men, and 45 for women. There are government
standards for health and safety by industry, but these are
rarely enforced, either by the employer or the Government
(which has no inspectors). Accidents are common, and there is
usually no emphasis on prevention; once accidents occur,
employers normally make compensation.
All workers are entitled to 30 days' paid vacation. Those in
the private sector have to work a minimum of 260 days
(excluding 30 days' sick leave) or forfeit their vacation.
The minimum wage is increased regularly by the Government, but
it continues to lag inflation. Equal to about $40 per month
on the parallel market, the minimum wage is not sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
However, many Peruvians are paid more than the minimum wage
and many others supplement their income through multiple jobs
and/or subsistence farming.
 

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