Whether there was an integration of the regular armed forces and the Pasdaran (Sepah, Revolutionary Guard) circa 1990; whether the functions of the Pasdaran would have included detention of political and common prisoners between 1989 and 1992 and whether Pasdaran personnel would be assigned to logistics duties such as supplies and services; Update to IRN22249.E of 24 November 1995, IRN22644.E of 26 January 1996 and IRN22706.E of 28 December 1995 on whether the Pasdaran would have had recourse to the draft after 1988 or relied solely on volunteers [IRN31191.E]

Detailed information regarding the Pasdaran is scarce among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate. According to the Website of the Intelligence Resource Program of the Federation of American Scientists:

The Iranian intelligence and security apparatus remains one of the most secretive in the world, and is very poorly characterized in the open literature. Available sources provide only extremely sparse and fragmentary information concerning internal organizational structure, and information on budgets, personnel levels or facility locations is almost entirely lacking in the open literature (8 Dec. 1997).

Integration of the regular armed forces and the Pasdaran

Although there was a movement to merge the regular armed forces and the Pasdaran (Sepah, Revolutionary Guard) in 1991, this was strenuously and apparently successfully resisted by the Pasdaran (Hunter 1992, 48-49). Several sources confirm, however, that there was a merger of the Komiteh and the police and gendarmerie in 1990 creating an entity known as the Nirouhay-e Entezami (Hassan-Yari 1998, 68; Katzman 1993, 43).

Policing and intelligence functions of the Pasdaran

With respect to the policing and intelligence functions of the Pasdaran and the Nirouhay-e Entezami, Kenneth Katzman stated that the Pasdaran is proactive in suppressing domestic unrest in Iran:

There is, moreover, no evidence that the Guard has ever had to await orders from the civilian leadership to disperse or arrest demonstrators, but rather the Guard appears to have assumed the authority to suppress demonstrations when they occur (1993, 84).

This information is corroborated in the entry on the Pasdaran posted within the Website of the Intelligence Resource Program of the Federation of American Scientists (n.d.).

In a telephone interview with the Research Directorate a professor at the Department of Political and Economic Science at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, and at the Department of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal, stated that the Pasdaran did perform policing roles after 1988 and in fact had their own jails (22 February 1999).

Pasdaran involvement in logistical duties

In an Information Session on Country Conditions in Iran held on 24 February 1998, a professor at the Department of Political and Economic Science at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, and at the Department of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal, stated that:

The Revolutionary Guards, they are not solely a military force, but they intervene in many domains among them the economy. For example, they have many companies.
One of them is a consulting firm heavily involved in the construction of Karkheh Dam in Khuzestan. I used to visit that dam many times and each time I would see many of those Revolutionary Guards working as engineers. ...
The Revolutionary Guards play also a social role as a very significant employer in the country. They provide jobs for so many people (Hassan-Yari 72).

The following information was provided during a 8 March 1999 telephone interview with a specialist on Iranian military and security issues in Iran who is a contributor to Jane's Intelligence Review, and who has published extensively on Iran. The specialist confirmed that the functions of the Pasdaran between 1988 and 1992 could certainly have included the detention of political and common prisoners as well as logistical duties such as supplies and services, including the preparation and delivery of food (8 March 1999). The specialist added that where the Basij were also involved it could be difficult to know whether the Basij were acting for or under the guidance of the Pasdaran or whether the Basij were acting on their own.

Pasdaran recourse to the draft

According to the professor at the Department of Political and Economic Science at the Royal Military College of Canada, the Pasdaran would have had recourse to the draft after 1988 through the lottery system (22 February 1999). This was corroborated by the specialist on Iranian military and security issues, who added that only those conscripts whose background indicated that they met the Pasdaran's standards of ideological commitment would have been selected, for example those coming from the families of martyrs (8 March 1999).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please find below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Response.

References


Houchang Hassan-Yari, Transcript. 24 February 1998. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Information Session on Country Conditions in Iran, Toronto.

Hunter, Shireen T. 1992. Iran After Khomeini. (The Washington Papers/156) New York: Praeger. (Published with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC).

Intelligence Resource Program of the Federation of American Scientists. 8 December 1997. "Joint Committee for Special Operations." [Internet] http://www.fas.org/irp/iran/intro.htm [Accessed 10 Mar. 1999]

_____. n.d. "Qods (Jerusalem) Force Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC - Pasdaran - e - Inqilab)." [Internet] http://www.fas.org/irp/iran/qods/index.htm [Accessed 8 Mar. 1999]

Katzman, Kenneth. 1993. The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Professor, Department of Political and Economic Science, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, and Department of Political Science at the Université du Québec à Montréal. 22 February 1999. Telephone interview.

Specialist on security issues in Iran and Iran military, England. 8 March 1999. Telephone interview.

Additional Sources Consulted


The Encyclopaedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems. 1989.

Iran After the Revolution. Crisis of an Islamic State. 1996. Edited by S. Rahnema & S. Behdad. London: I.B. Tauris.

Jane's Intelligence Review. 1995-1999.

Pointer. 1995-1999.

Zabih, Sepehr. 1988. The Iranian Military in Revolution and War. London: Routledge.

One oral source did not provide information on the topic requested.

Electronic sources: IRB databases, Internet, REFWORLD, WNC.