Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1990
VIETNAM
Vietnam is an authoritarieui state ruled by the Vietnamese
Communist Party (VCP) through a 12-member Politburo and a
Communist Party Central Committee of 171 members selected by a
party congress held every 5 years. The 1980 Constitution
declares the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) to be a
proletarian dictatorship. Government policies, carried out
under the Council of Ministers, reflect guidelines—if not
specific directives—laid down by the VCP Politburo. During
1990, the VCP felt increasingly threatened by the changes in
the Soviet Union, the collapse of Communist parties in Eastern
Europe, domestic discontent, and antigovernment activities by
overseas Vietnamese entering the country. Continuing economic
isolation by the West in response to the unresolved conflict
in Cambodia, coupled with decreasing assistance from the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, also contributed to the VCP's
sense of unease. These pressures exacerbated historically
derived cultural and political differences between southern
Vietnamese and a predominantly northern political leadership.
The security apparatus consists of civil and military elements
under the control of the Government and the VCP. Police and
nonmilitary law enforcement officers are subject to the
directives of the VCP as well as to those of the Interior
Minister, who himself is a member of the Politburo. The
military security apparatus operates under a similar system of
dual party and governmental control. Police and other
security personnel continue to be responsible for numerous
human rights abuses, including severe physical mistreatment of
those running afoul of such authorities, whether undergoing
interrogation or while confined in the penal system.
Years of doctrinaire socialism and isolation have left Vietnam
one of the world's poorest countries. Recent efforts to
liberalize foreign trade and investment, eliminate subsidies,
decontrol prices, decentralize economic decisionmaking, and
implement other reforms have to date only marginally
alleviated depressed economic conditions. Vietnamese now may
open businesses and obtain long-term leases on private
property. Complicated bureaucratic procedures have affected
the economy unevenly: some aspects of the economy are highly
regulated while other areas remain largely untouched.
Responding to internal and perceived external pressures, the
Government intensified an ongoing campaign against dissent in
1990. At least several hundred—and perhaps as many as
several thousand—dissidents and suspected opponents were
detained between April and September, mostly in the south.
Targets of the crackdown included intellectuals, clergy,
journalists, and some foreigners. Police surveillance and
controls were increased, particularly against visitors from
abroad, and press controls were tightened.
Arbitrary detentions and widespread torture and mistreatment
of detainees continued, as did severe restrictions on freedom
of speech, press, assembly, association, and movement, worker
rights, and the right of citizens to change their government.
In addition, the Government continued its program of resettling
hundreds of thousands of people—some forcibly— into "New
Economic Zones" (NEZ's) for developmental objectives and as a
means of social control auid to repress "undesirable" elements
of the population, including families of political prisoners,
officials of the former South Vietnam government and military,
ethnic Chinese, and the unemployed.
Positive developments included new legislation that would
nominally restrict pretrial detention and enhance the role of
defense counsels, and increased freedom to travel internally
and abroad. Eight former military officers incarcerated since
1975 were released or amnestied; according to government
sources, about 120 of those originally incarcerated in 1975
remain in reeducation centers. The total number of persons in
arbitrary detention is estimated to be at least 2,000.
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing
Statistics on the number of deaths of political prisoners are
not available. Prisoners reportedly have died from exhaustion,
physical abuse, malnutrition, lack of medical care, and other
effects of conditions in prisons and reeducation camps, which
remained severe. In prior years there were credible reports
of hundreds of deaths in NEZ ' s as a result of harsh conditions.
b. Disappearance
There were no reports of political abductions by government
security organizations or by antigovernment forces, but the
whereabouts of many persons associated with the former South
Vietnamese government remained unknown (see Section l.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Although both the 1980 Constitution (Article 69) and the 1989
Criminal Procedure Code (Article 5) prohibit physical abuse,
there continue to be credible, consistent reports from
refugees concerning police brutality against suspects
undergoing investigation, as well as the severity of
conditions for those confined in reeducation camps and
prisons. An Amnesty International (AI) report, "Vietnam
Renovation (doi moi), the Law and Hviman Rights in the 1980 's,"
dated February 1990, stated that torture or ill-treatment is
still a feature of police investigations and a means of
punishment in prisons and reeducation centers, despite legal
safeguards. According to Vietnamese press reports and
interviews with refugees, there is a pattern of severe
physical abuse of persons suspected of committing common
crimes, and police have sometimes tortured persons so severely
that they have confessed to common (nonpolitical) crimes that
they never committed. Some have died in custody. Persons
incarcerated in reeducation camps have reported brutal
beatings and being shackled in small dark cells for long
periods of time with grossly inadequate food. Authorities
reportedly have attempted to produce conformity among the
detainees through confinement, hard labor with inadequate
rations, self-criticism, and indoctrination. In addition,
refugees have reported that detainees receive poor or no
medical care and severe, often capricious punishment for minor
infractions of camp rules.
Interviews of refugees during 1990 suggest that the Government
is making some effort to end torture and other cruel or
inhuman practices, and there were some reports of police
officers being arrested and convicted for such offenses. Such
practices nonetheless remain widespread.
Refugees have recounted instances in which official
condenmation of human rights abuses has led police, fearful of
being punished for perpetrating abuses, to commit additional
abuses designed to cover their misdeeds. In one such
instance, a woman confessed to a common criminal offense after
being beaten by police. Later, when another person was found
to be guilty of the crime to which she had confessed, the
police fearing retribution, reportedly beat her again to
extract a phony confession to a nonexistent minor crime and
detained her for an additional short period, after which she
was released.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
Amendments and additions to the Criminal Procedure Code in
1989 and 1990 strengthened procedural legal safeguards against
arbitrary arrest and detention. The revised code prohibits
protracted detention without trial by spelling out the time
limits of detention which can be ordered by various
authorities under various circumstances. In unspecified
"urgent situations," certain local and civil military
authorities may order temporary detention for a 3-day period,
which can be extended for an additional 3 days. Each period
of detention must be approved by the People's Organ of Control
(POC) at the same level. The POC, which is independent of
both the Ministry of Interior and People's Courts, has
branches on every level of government down to precinct level.
According to the Constitution, its function is to monitor
government bodies to ensure their observance of the law. It
also provides prosecutors to people's courts. Once the POC
receives the results of an investigation, it has 30 days in
which to decide whether to prosecute, order further
investigation, or dismiss the case.
The law provides for longer periods of detention for people
suspected of "serious" crimes who the authorities, with the
approval of the POC, believe may not appear for trial, may try
to obstruct the investigation, or may commit additional
crimes. Limitations on such detention are clearly specified,
conforming generally to the time required to complete the
investigative and trial procedures. The law stipulates a
maximum of 4 months to prepare for trial. A 4-month extension
may be approved by a prosecutor at the provincial or higher
level. Additional extensions require approval of the Chief
Prosecutor heading the Supreme People's Control Commission in
Hanoi.
Public security officials are required to obtain warrants to
arrest a person for alleged serious crimes, including
political offenses. Warrants must contain a summary of the
offense and must be read to the accused. There is no
effective judicial review of the legality of detentions.
Provision for bail exists only for foreigners. Exile is not
used as a means of public control, although the Government has
resettled hundreds of thousands of people—some forcibly—to
NEZ ' s (see Section l.f.).
Despite these procedural safeguards, credible reports indicate
that officials continue to hold suspects for indefinite
periods of time without formal charges. Arbitrary arrest and
detention continue under old administrative provisions which
clearly conflict with the new legislation. People detained
for political crimes generally fall into one of two primary
categories: those associated with the former government of
South Vietnam or those who have been accused of antigovernment
activities.
From April to September the Government embarked on a securitycrackdown
against suspected opponents of the regime. In
August the Government issued Party Directive No. 135 which
called for the arrest of "organizations (sic) or individuals
who incite opposition to the Government and advocate political
pluralism." At least several hundred—and possibly as many as
several thousand—people were detained in the crackdown, which
was concentrated in the south. Special emphasis was placed on
controlling the activities of foreigners and their contacts
with Vietnamese. An undetermined number of foreigners were
arrested or deported for associating with Vietnamese deemed
politically untrustworthy or for using international
organizations to "spy" on Vietnam.
Targets of this campaign reportedly included intellectuals,
clergy, journalists, and student leaders. Among those
identified by AI as being arrested or placed under house
arrest for nonviolent political activity in 1990 were Nguyen
Ho and Ta Ba Tang, former leaders of the "Club of Resistance
Fighters" (an informal association of southern Vietnamese who
had often criticized the northern leadership); Catholic
priests Chan Tin and Nguyen Ngoc Lan; Dr. Nguyen Dan Que; and
Do Trung Hieu, Doan Thanh Liem, Do Ngoc Long, and Nguyen Van
Tan, associates of an American businessman detained for 2
months for investigation of alleged "spying" activities.
Eight more former South Vietnamese government officials were
released or given amnesty from mid-1989 to the end of 1990,
leaving at least 119 detained in reeducation centers without
charge or trial since 1975. The AI report stated that the
whereabouts of approximately 400 people associated with the
former South Vietnamese government remain unknown, suggesting
that the actual number of such detainees may be substantially
higher than the official figure of about 120.
In addition to the cases described above, the SRV continues to
hold a number of detainees who were arrested for antigovernment
activities subsequent to the 1975 Communist victory in the
south. The AI report indicated that "recent information"
(probably late 1989) received from former prisoners suggests
that reeducation camps still hold several thousand prisoners,
many of whom are being held for political offenses without
charge or trial. (The Government draws a distinction between
reeducation centers for those associated with the former
regime in the south, and reeducation camps for those detained
after consolidation of VCP power throughout the country.)
There are no reliable statistics available on the total number
of people in arbitrary detention, but taking into account
various estimates by human rights groups, refugees, and
government statements, at least 2,000 is a plausible
estimate. Some estimates range as high as several thousand
prisoners in each of several camps.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The Vietnamese court system consists of local people's courts,
military tribunals, and the Supreme Court, which can review
cases from either of the lower courts. The National Assembly
or Council of State may decide to establish special tribunals,
which may be superior to the Supreme Court, if either choose
to do so. In addition, local mass organizations are empowered
by the Constitution to deal with minor breaches of law or
disputes. Although, technically, judges in all regular courts
are elected, candidates for election as judges are selected by
the party organization. Article 131 of the Constitution
provides for the "independence" of judges and jurors.
However, at all levels, both are elected under a system that
is closely supervised and controlled by the VCP, thereby
vitiating their nominal independence. Reportedly the
selection process has placed emphasis on knowledge of
socialism and political reliability. Currently, Vietnam's
penal code consists of the Criminal Code and a Criminal
Procedures Code, which was eimended in 1990. Vietnam also has
a long-established body of feimily law, but it still lacks
civil law codes.
The 1989 Criminal Procedures Code includes the presumption of
innocence, while the 1990 amendments and supplements enhance,
at least nominally, the role of defense counsels. For
exeimple, the law now states that defense counsels have the
right to be involved in the process from the opening of the
proceedings, be given access to the file upon completion of
the investigation, prepare a defense, represent the accused in
court, and appeal decisions to the judge.
To date, there is little evidence that legislative
improvements have been implemented in practice. Vietnamese
Justice Ministry officials have been quoted in the press as
saying that the shortage of lawyers alone (among other
problems) precludes most defendants from receiving legal help
while they are being investigated and tried. Public defenders
are provided at state expense, but reports by both refugees
and AI indicate they tend to be poorly qualified. It cannot
be confirmed to what extent, if any, provisions in newer
legislation that provide for access to a defense attorney and
an appeals process are being implemented in practice.
Current legislation also provides for an appeals process, but
in practice it appears to mean little. In addition, AI has
reported that the duties and powers of the Supreme People's
Court and so-called specialized courts effectively vitiate the
right of appeal by stipulating in the law that either court
can "render preliminary and final judgment in particularly
serious and complicated cases."
Reeducation sentences are frequently imposed as an
administrative procedure without benefit of due process, and
are not subject to judicial review. Little information is
available concerning political trials in 1990 or the legal
status of those detained in the crackdown. One report claimed
that 11 people were convicted of spreading "propaganda against
the revolution through religious activities" in August and
sentenced to prison terms of up to 10 years. Vietnamese radio
reported in October that 38 people were convicted of treason
for membership in political organizations which sought tc~
"undermine and overthrow" the Government; they received prison
terms ranging from 3 to 15 years to life.
Detailed information contained in the AI report on over 50
people tried and convicted in 1987 and 1988 for political
offenses paints a general picture of a virtual lack of due
process in political trials. In 1987 two Evangelical pastors
who had been held in detention since 1983 were convicted,
after a 1-day trial, of assisting illegal departures and
receiving money from abroad. They received 8-year sentences.
Twenty-three Catholics, including Father Dominic Tran Dinh
Thu, were convicted of "propaganda against the Socialist
system, sabotage, disturbance of public security, and
terrorism" after a 4-day trial. Security forces claimed to
have found "many reactionary documents, illegal stored grain,
and a pistol." Father Tranh Dinh Thu denied the charges and
said the documents were prayer books and letters from abroad.
He and a monk were sentenced to life; the others received jail
terms of up to 20 years. In 1988, 5 writers and a postal
worker were convicted of "counterrevolutionary propaganda with
intent to overthrow the Government" for publishing
antigovernment material. At their trial, according to AI , the
prosecutor read out the charges, the accused were asked to
comment, and the judge then immediately read out sentences,
taking no account of the defendants' statements.
It is impossible to estimate with any certainty the number of
political prisoners. Based on credible reports, and including
those detained without trial as well as those tried and
sentenced for political offenses, there may be as many as
several thousand and perhaps more.
f . Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
In 1990 the Government continued to operate a nationwide
system of surveillance and control through household
registration and party-appointed block wardens who use
informants to keep track of individual activities. It works
imperfectly in southern Vietnam, partly because of a shortage
of trusted party workers. Beginning in April, the Government
increased surveillance of and controls on critics and
suspected opponents.
There were reports during 1990 of official and unofficial
security wardens conducting searches of homes, sometimes with
warrants issued by the authorities. There continued to be
reports that Ministry of Interior officials inspected and
sometimes confiscated mail and packages sent to Vietnam,
particularly items sent to politically suspect persons. Some
of the outgoing mail also was subject to inspection and
censorship. Some foreign publications—even some from the
Soviet Union—were prohibited; nevertheless, they were widely
available on the black market.
People are encouraged to belong to one or more mass
organizations. There are mass organizations for villages and
city districts, for school or work (trade union), for youth,
and women. These mass organizations disseminate party
propaganda and policy guidelines, support party-sanctioned
activities, and have an active watchdog role. Members'
attendance at meetings is advisable to prevent either being
singled out for criticism or to protect family members from
criticism. Membership in the VCP is essential for advancement
in the state sector.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press
The Constitution has provisions for freedom of speech and
press, but in practice such freedoms are severely limited. A
new press law, which took effect in late 1989, tightened state
control of the press and prohibited private press ownership.
The Government owns and operates broadcast media and does not
permit the airing of opposing views, although it has broadcast
reports of open debate during National Assembly meetings.
Party organs and the Ministry of Culture, Information, Sports,
and Tourism control all newspapers, books, and other
publications, as well as all cultural exhibitions. During
1990 the party continued to tolerate (and at times invite)
criticism concerning the performance of the party or
individual officials deemed to be corrupt or incompetent.
However, criticism of the legitimacy of the VCP or its
preeminent role is not tolerated. Short of clearly proscribed
writing (e.g., advocacy of a multiparty system), the limits of
criticism are sometimes not clear. Tough criticism of
economic performance may be permitted, as was illustrated in
1990 by some very critical investigative reporting on the
corruption and government impotence involved in the collapse
of a large number of Vietnamese credit unions. The Government
generally does not use prior censorship to control the media,
but national security legislation is sufficiently broad to act
as an incentive for the media to exercise effective
self-censorship. Reports indicate that some editors have been
removed from their jobs for straying too far from party policy.
A system of informants also chills free speech. As part of
the security crackdown in April and May, the Government
reportedly shut down 14 local newspapers and magazines, and
strengthened Party control over the press. The crackdown also
effectively curtailed contacts between foreigners and
Vietnamese who, in the previous several years, had been
willing to express critical views in the presence of others.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of assembly is restricted in law and practice.
Persons wishing to gather in a group are required to apply for
a permit which is issued or denied by local authorities, often
arbitrarily. According to refugees, in some localities
citizens must obtain permission for gatherings of over three
persons. In March the Government forcibly suppressed
demonstrations in Ho Chi Minh City protesting the collapse of
many credit unions. Police reportedly beat demonstrators and
made numerous arrests.
Nongovernmental organizations are permitted but they may meet
only for approved and narrowly defined objectives. Opposition
political parties or organizations are not permitted.
Statements by government officials indicated that the
crackdown on dissent extended to peaceful assembly. In June
the Government warned against breaking regulations governing
the establishment and activities of grass roots organizations,
and stated that it would crush any such activity intended to
challenge the Party's leading role.
c. Freedom of Religion
Buddhism is the dominant religion. According to some estimates
nearly three-fourths of the population of 65 million is
Buddhist. The Government has claimed, however, that only 6
million Vietnamese are practicing Buddhists. Up to another 6
million reportedly are Catholic, and a much smaller number are
Protestant. Adherence to a religion is not permitted for party
members. But Vietnamese are permitted to attend religious
services, and visitors to Vietnam report that attendance at
religious services seemed to grow during 1989 and 1990. The
general tightening of security in 1990 appears not to have
affected this trend. Reports indicate that even some
government officials, who prior to 1989 feared losing their
jobs if it was known that tliey attended religious services,
show no such inhibitions now.
Freedom of worship is provided for in the Constitution, along
with the proviso that no one may use religion to violate state
laws and policies. The Government, concerned that religious
groups could engage in subversion and political opposition,
has consistently attempted to divide and control religious
groups, in part by establishing government-controlled
policymaking bodies such as the Catholic Patriotic Association.
The Government has attempted to prevent the growth of religious
groups by inhibiting the publication of religious materials
and the training of new clergy through rigid screening of all
applicants. Currently, the focus of government efforts to
control religious activity appears to be in preventing the
clergy from, expressing dissatisfaction with Vietnam's
political system. The Government exercised the right to
approve the content of sermons and speeches by senior monks,
but reports indicate that approval was generally granted as
long as it was not construed as criticism of the Government or
party. The New Testament is available in Vietnam, and several
American nongovernmental organizations were allowed to import
small numbers of Bibles during 1989 and 1990.
Since achieving nationwide power in 1975, the Government has
regularly detained and arrested religious figures of all
faiths on political grounds and restricted their activities.
Charges of "criticizing the Socialist system," "fomenting
unrest," and "possessing and disseminating counterrevolutionary
propaganda" are commonly levied against Buddhist monks and
nuns as well as Catholics and Protestants.
Seminaries and other places of religious instruction continue
to operate but are subject to strict controls on admissions as
well as hiring and training clergy. The Government permits
some travel abroad for religious reasons. Foreign religious
leaders in 1990 could travel to Vietnam, but the SRV tightened
control of travel for foreigners generally within the
country. The Government continued to prohibit proselytizing
and restricts the movement of some clerics.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
During 1990 the Government continued the trend of recent years
in allowing freer movement within the country for most
citizens. Vietnamese are required to obtain permission to
change their residence, but most observers concur that this
has been less difficult during 1989 and 1990. The Government
continued its campaign against illegal checkpoints, noting
that they exist to extort money from travelers and that they
inhibit movement and impair economic renovation. The
Government tightened travel restrictions on foreigners,
however, mostly by requiring that foreigners traveling in
Vietnam do so in supervised groups rather than individually.
In early 1988, the Government announced that it would
authorize private travel abroad for education, tourism,
medical treatment, and visits to close relatives. Such travel
is restricted to 3 months, except in the case of travel for
education or medical treatment. Violators of this limitation
faced being barred from further travel for 3 to 5 years.
The Government continued its program of relocating hundreds of
thousands of people—some forcibly—into sparsely populated
NEZ's. According to government statistics, over 900,000
laborers plus 2 million dependents were resettled in over
1,000 NEZ's in the period from 1981 through 1989. The
Government's objective of resettling some 97,000 more families
in 1990 was not achieved due to insufficient resources, weak
incentives, and poor planning. Refugee and other reports
claim that the Government uses NEZ's as a means of social
control, and singles out regime opponents, the unemployed, and
ethnic Chinese for participation. People who escape from
NEZ's are sxibject to restrictions on residency and employment.
The Government continued to permit emigration for family
reunification as well as the emigration of Amerasian
Vietnamese and their close family members. In January the
first departures of former reeducation camp detainees and
their families began pursuant to a U.S.-SRV agreement in July
1989 to permit such emigration. By year's end, approximately
11,000 former reeducation camp inmates and their families had
departed. Total departures of Vietneimese under the Orderly
Departure Program (ODP) more than doubled from 1988 to a 1990
figure of 43,000.
Vietnamese who emigrate are generally free to return to
Vietnam. In mid-1987, prompted in part by the need to earn
foreign exchange, Vietnam relaxed its restrictions on the
issuance of tourist visas for Vietnamese who had fled the
country clandestinely. Only those who allegedly committed
"serious crimes" are not allowed to visit. During 1990 the
SRV continued issuing tourist visas to significant numbers of
overseas Vietnamese whether they had emigrated legally or had
been granted permanent resettlement after illegal departures
from Vietnam. By and large, this policy has apparently
survived both the SRV's security crackdown during 1990 and its
expressed concern that some overseas Vietnamese are members of
groups dedicated to the overthrow of Vietnam's Communist
Government.
In December 1988, Vietnam signed a memorandum of understanding
with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
to increase acceptance of voluntary repatriates, provided
there was financial assistance. This agreement included a
commitment by Vietnam to waive prosecution and punitive
measures for persons who departed the country illegally and
who return under the UNHCR voluntary repatriation program.
Vietnam also agreed to permit the UNHCR to monitor the
returnees by follow-up visits.
In June 1989, Vietnam joined 56 countries in the adoption of
the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) at the International
Conference on Indochinese Refugees in Geneva. Under the CPA,
Vietnam agreed to encourage volunteers to return from
first-asylum camps in the region. By the end of 1990, nearly
6,000 asylum seekers, most of them from Hong Kong, had
returned voluntarily to Vietnam. The UNHCR' s monitoring
program has entailed visits to some 20 to 30 percent of the
returnees (its highest monitoring ratio in the world) and
visits to local authorities. The visits have shown no
instances of returnees being abused or harassed.
Investigation of three alleged instances of abuse revealed
that the allegations were fraudulent.
The rate of clandestine departures fell in 1990. During 1989
78,191 Vietnamese arrived in first-asylum camps in Southeast
Asia and Hong Kong. As of September 1990, the figure was
39,057. In 1990 the Government continued to arrest and try
people for organizing illegal departures under "crimes against
the State" statutes. Penalties range as high as 20 years in
prison. While seeking to discourage and inhibit clandestine
departures, the Government continued efforts to encourage
people who desired to depart Vietnam to apply for orderly
departure.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Citizens are not free to change their government. All
authority and political power is vested in the VCP. Political
opposition is not tolerated, nor are there any other political
parties. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the VCP is
the supreme decisionmaking body in the nation. The
Politburo's powerful Secretariat oversees day-to-day
implementation of its directives. Debate and criticism is
limited to certain aspects of individual, state, or party
performance determined by the party itself. No challenge to
the legitimacy of the one-party state is permitted, and it is
off-limits as a topic for debate. Citizens elect members of
the National Assembly, ostensibly the chief legislative body,
but it is subordinate to the party in practice. Although all
candidates are approved by the party, they are not required to
be party members themselves, and multiple candidates contest
some seats. By law, women and minority groups participate in
politics but in practice, particularly in the case of women,
are seriously underrepresented.
During 1990 the VCP appeared to grow increasingly alarmed over
the disintegration of party rule in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. The leadership clearly worried about the
ramifications for its control of a populace long disillusioned
with the VCP's rule. As a result, the party is attempting to
implement a complex strategy that has four principal
components. The first is insistence that Vietnam remain a
single-party state; advocacy of any alternative to VCP rule is
strictly forbidden. Second, the party has continued its
strong commitment to economic "renovation." Third, the VCP is
undertaking (within the limits of a one-party state) some
"political renovation," or measures designed to make one-party
rule less onerous. Last is a crackdown on certain elements,
such as Vietnamese citizens who might challenge the legitimacy
of Vietnam's political system, foreigners, and overseas
Vietnamese.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights.
Vietnam does not permit private human rights organizations to
form or operate in Vietnam. Moreover, it prohibits private
citizens from contacting international human rights
organizations. However, since 1989, the Vietnamese Red Cross
has been permitted expanded cooperation with the American Red
Cross in assisting persons seeking missing relatives,
including those in reeducation centers.
While continuing to fall far short of international standards
in human rights practices, the Government carries on some
dialog with human rights organizations. Some visits by human
rights organizations are permitted, but the Government limits
their access to the penal system and its inmates. In
September the SRV agreed to permit the International Committee
of the Red Cross to visit prisons on a recurring basis, and
such visits reportedly took place since then.
AI ' s report on Vietnam recounted a May 1989 visit to Vietnam
during which its representatives were permitted to visit only
one reeducation camp and to meet a political prisoner held
there in detention without trial. The Government rejected
AI ' s requests to visit other prisons and reeducation camps
where AI believed other prisoners of concern to it are being
held.
Earlier visitors had reported that they were shown only model
camps. Former detainees have described extensive preparations
to beautify camps prior to visits, temporary removal of most
detainees during visits, and careful briefing of the remaining
detainees by VCP cadres on what to tell the delegation members.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status
Many citizens face discrimination in employment, education,
and social services or are subject to forced relocation in
NEZ ' s , based on family background or political views. Family
members of former South Vietnamese government and military
officials and people affiliated with ant i -Communist
associations or religious sects have been systematically
discriminated against.
People released from reeducation camps face considerable
discrimination in education, housing, and employment,
according to refugees. They do not regain their citizenship
rights until 1 year after leaving the camps, if then. While
their children generally are not allowed to enter the
university, they still face discrimination within the
university system.
Gradual assimilation and cooption appear to be the
Government's long-term strategy for most minorities. The
Government has created special schools in the Hanoi area for
the education and indoctrination of minorities to be the "eyes
and ears of the party" among their own people. Highland
minorities in central Vietnam are subject to repression if
suspected of ties with resistance groups. Officially
programmed resettlement of ethnic Vietnamese into the
highlands is designed in part to increase government control
over minority groups. Minorities in the south, such as the
Chinese and Indians, have been encouraged to leave the
country. Since the adoption of economic reforms, however, the
Government has valued the entrepreneurial skills of the
Chinese population and has allowed a limited renaissance of
private enterprise in Cholon, where most of Ho Chi Minh City's
Chinese population lives. It has also permitted the reopening
of private Chinese-language schools.
Priority in social services is given to families of party
members and families of soldiers who fought for North
Vietnam. Academic standards are reportedly lower for
children of party officials. Arbitrarily high standards are
set to keep the children of suspect background out of a
university. Study abroad is also restricted to politically
acceptable persons.
In general, women do not appear to face discrimination in
employment. Problems faced by women in competing with men for
higher positions are generally a function of attitudes deeply
ingrained in traditional Vietnamese society. Such problems
persist in spite of government efforts to mold popular
attitudes to conform with the Constitution, legislation, and
regulations mandating equal treatment before the law in
virtually all respects. Article 63 of the 1980 Constitution
provides that women and men should receive equal pay for equal
work, and a large body of legislation and regulations is
devoted to the protection of women's rights in marriage as
well as in the workplace. Government statistics indicate that
approximately 50 percent of the primary school students are
girls and that women represent about 39 percent of university
students. The Government claims that women hold 46 percent of
the senior posts in government and about 22 percent of the
National Assembly membership. The top leadership, however, is
predominantly male, as can be seen, for example, in the
all-male Politburo.
There are no statistics available on the frequency of violence
against women within the home. In 1987 Premier Do Muoi issued
a decree banning spouse beating.
Section 6 Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association
Vietnamese workers are not free to form or join unions of
their own choosing. All workers automatically become members
of the union in their workplace, and dues are deducted from
their pay. These groups are organized by the Government and
belong to the government-controlled Federation of Vietnamese
Workers, which is affiliated with the Communist-controlled
World Federation of Trade Unions. Strikes are considered
unpatriotic and officially forbidden; none are known to have
taken place in 1990. Vietnam is not a member of the
International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Vietnamese workers do not have the right to organize unions of
their own choosing or to bargain collectively. No law
protects against antiunion discrimination by employers against
union members and organizers; in the context of mandatory
union membership the concept is meaningless. Although new
legislation governing labor unions promulgated in July stops
well short of providing the right to strike and other tools of
Western-style collective bargaining, it is nevertheless
designed to enhance labor's bargaining power vis-a-vis company
management and to give labor stronger representation in the
Government. The Chairman of the Vietnam Federation of Trade
Unions is empowered by the new law to attend conferences of
the Council of Ministers and raise issues on behalf of labor
that cannot be resolved at lower levels.
Despite plans for export processing zones, none are
operational as yet.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Compulsory labor is permitted by the Constitution, which
states in Article 58 that "people fit for work must work as
provided by law. " Refugees report that every Vietnamese is
required by law to contribute 15 days of work per year to the
state or to pay a fee. In addition, unemployed persons,
especially unemployed young people, are compelled to work in
exchange for small wages and food. A number of government
projects have used forced labor provided by reeducation camp
prisoners.
d. Minimum Age of Employment of Children
According to existing regulations inherited from the former
French colonial administration, the minimum age for workers in
Vietnam is 17. Refugees report that children under age 15 are
exempt from compulsory labor requirements. There is no
reliable information concerning the enforcement of these
regulations, nor are any statistics available on the number of
child workers in Vietnam.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
The Government inherited from the former French colonial
administration a system of regulations pertaining to working
conditions, including a minimum wage, a maximum workweek of 8
hours per day, 6 days per week, and safety standards.
However, except for some safety standards and workers covered
by a Ho Chi Minh City labor statute, these regulations have
not been updated since at least 1975, nor are existing
standards enforced universally.
Such safety standards as- exist are developed jointly by the
Ministry of Labor and worker organizations at individual
workplaces. Enforcement of the standards has been uneven at
best. The new labor union legislation promulgated in July
1990 stipulates that if the union sees a life-threatening
situation in the workplace, it can request that management
correct the problem immediately and that a cessation of work,
if necessary, be authorized. It further stipulates that the
union has the right to participate in investigations of
industrial accidents and to request that the Government or a
court fix the responsibility for an accident.
There is no minimum wage in effect. Wages are set locally by
management. They are generally low and inadequate to provide
the vast majority of workers and their families a decent
living. Moreover, workers frequently are paid late, sometimes
by as much as several months. According to reports from
refugees, nearly all workers experience delayed paydays in
their workplace. Observers agree that doctors, nurses, and
teachers are most often the victims of delayed paydays.
Possibly as a result, many are reportedly leaving these
professions, and there is currently an acute shortage of
teachers
