Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1990

BURMA
 
 
 
On September 18, 1988, a military dictatorship seized power in
Burma through deadly suppression of massive, countrywide
prodemocracy demonstrations. This popular uprising had done
away with Ne Win's Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) . This
party's policies isolated Burma from the international
community and engendered economic decline. The armed forces
imposed martial law and established a 19-member State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) as Burma's governing body.
Members of this council are all senior military officers loyal
to the ostensibly retired Ne Win and ranking members of the
old regime.
Fulfilling a promise made shortly after it took control, the
military staged elections in May. Despite harassment and
arrests of opposition leaders and tight campaign restrictions,
the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won over 80
percent of the parliamentary seats. However, contrary to its
promises to relinquish control, the military ignored the
election results and took steps to prolong its rule for an
indefinite period.
The Government continues to enforce martial law through a
heavy military presence in Rangoon, Mandalay, and other urban
areas. An 11 p.m. to 4 a.m. curfew; extensive surveillance of
government employees and private citizens; severe restrictions
on civil servants' contact with foreign missions; arrests,
harassment, and torture of political activists; and aggressive
propaganda denouncing alleged agitation and foreign
interference buttress the military's control. The Government
rationalizes its extensive security apparatus as necessary to
combat numerous ethnic insurgencies, although in recent years
insurgent groups have posed no threat to the country's
heartland. Financed mostly through narcotics production and
trafficking, these groups engage in small-scale fighting along
the country's borders to gain a measure of autonomy against
perceived domination by the ethnic Burman majority.
Twenty-six years of Ne Win's rule reduced what was once the
richest land in southeast Asia to a U.N. -designated "least
developed country." The new military leadership has tinkered
with the economy to permit some foreign investment and obtain
badly needed foreign exchange. It has failed, however, to
address the fundamental problems: highly centralized
decisionmaking, a grossly overvalued currency, and
uncontrolled monetary expansion.
Burma's deplorable human rights situation did not improve in
1990. Torture, disappearances, arbitrary arrests and
detentions, unfair trials, and compulsory labor persisted,
according to numerous credible reports. Freedom of speech,
press, and assembly were severely curtailed, as were worker
rights. The regime's program for arbitrarily relocating some
half million urban poor produced widespread hardship,
including malnutrition, disease, and some fatalities. Despite
holding—and losing—a free election, the military made it
abundantly clear that the people do not have the right to
change their government. Treatment of the population remained
capricious and apparently unrestrained by legal, institutional,
or moral considerations.
 
 
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
 
Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
 
a. Political and other Extrajudicial Killing
Government-instigated political killings were less common than
in the more turbulent years of 1988 and 1989. Sufficient
credible reports exist, however, to suggest a number of
civilian deaths at the hands of government officials or
soldiers throughout 1990. Most of the reported deaths
resulted from brutality in prison, including denial of medical
treatment. For example, an Asia Watch report cited the case
of one dissident who died while chained to his hospital bed.
In August a student caught returning home just after the 10
p.m. curfew hour was beaten to death at a Rangoon police
station. In October troops sent to crush a hunger strike in
Rangoon's Insein prison reportedly killed three inmates. In
November a man named Aung Aung Moe died after beatings by
local authorities, according to numerous reliable reports.
NLD official U Maung Ko died in custody in November. Although
regime officials claimed that he hung himself, several
witnesses reported that his body had bruises and one leg was
broken. Authorities again used excessive force in putting
down antigovernment demonstrations during 1990. On August 6,
Mandalay police beat four monks who were leaving the scene of
a just-completed demonstration. Two days later, during a
scuffle with demonstrating students and monks, Mandalay
security authorities fired shots that killed at least one
person and wounded others, according to numerous reliable
accounts.
 
      b. Disappearance
The number of persons who disappeared during 1990 was probably
smaller than in 1988 and 1989, but accurate estimates are
again impossible. Family and friends assume that many who
have disappeared are under detention or have died in jail.
Some of those who disappeared were later reported as having
been arrested. Others dropped out of sight or quietly
attempted to leave the country in anticipation of arrest. A
trickle of young people continued to join student-insurgent
groups fighting the regime, while others were impressed as
army porters (see Section l.g.).
Authorities seldom responded to inquiries from embassies or
from families concerning the whereabouts and welfare of
disappeared or jailed individuals. The few replies routinely
consisted of only general statements that such persons were
arrested for violations of existing laws.
 
      c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Substantial evidence, including eyewitness reports, documents
that torture, beatings, and mistreatment of political
detainees remain commonplace in Burma. Maltreatment includes
sleep and food deprivation; beatings of prisoners causing
permanent injury; suffocation; cigarette burns; electrical
shocks to the genitals and elsewhere; and forcing prisoners to
sc[uat or assume unnatural positions for lengthy periods.
Techniques designed to intimidate and disorient prisoners
prior to interrogation are also routinely practiced. Guards
and prison physicians also have deprived political prisoners
of needed medical treatment. Imprisoned antiregime activists
have received beatings after requesting medical attention,
according to several well-sourced reports.
Despite repeated expressions of concern by foreign governments
and international human rights organizations, the regime made
no apparent effort to investigate charges of torture. The
Government routinely denied that it engaged in torture or
condoned the practice.
 
      d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile
The regime arbitrarily detained or arrested several thousand
people during 1990. While many were held only briefly and
released after interrogation, significant numbers were
detained for lengthy periods. In addition, many of those
released were subsequently rearrested. A conservative
estimate of politically motivated arrests would be 2,500 to
3,000, the majority occurring after the May 27 elections (see
Section 3). Detainees were commonly accused of violating
criminal statutes, though some were simply held without
trial. Most belonged to political parties or were involved in
peaceful antigovernment demonstrations or pamphleteering.
Numerous arrests of protesting students and monks occurred in
August in connection with demonstrations to mark the second
anniversary of the August 1988 crackdown. The military
sometimes arrested parents of students who could not be
located. In an October crackdown on the Buddhist clergy,
upwards of 100 monks were arrested, mostly in Mandalay.
Detention and interrogation of party officials occurred
throughout the election campaign, either as harassment or
reprisals for antigovernment statements or actions. In early
February, reliable sources reported the detention of 25-40
candidates from several parties. Military spokesmen
subsequently confirmed the interrogation of several party
officials but denied any arrests. In April the regime
arrested 13 leaders of the Democratic Party for a New Society,
who had written a letter alleging official harassment of their
campaign activities. Ten days before the election, the
Commander of the Irrawaddy Division announced the arrests of
more than 30 officials from different parties for infringing
various laws and campaign regulations. Arrests of party
officials intensified after the election, as part of a
campaign to stamp out all opposition. By year's end, an
estimated 500 NLD officials, including some 45 elected Members
of Parliament, were in custody.
In July the military, without public announcement, extended by
6 months the house arrest of National League for Democracy
General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi. The decision was taken
under the provisions of the "Law to Safeguard the State From
the Dangers of Subversive Elements," which also was the legal
basis for her initial 1-year period of house arrest. Further
6-month extensions are possible up to a period of 3 years.
Ms. Suu Kyi has never been formally charged.
Even before the establishment of martial law, there was no
provision in Burmese law for judicial determination of the
legality of detention. Under martial law individuals have no
pretrial rights. There is also no bail (see Section I.e.).
 
      e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
Burma remained under martial law throughout 1990. Official
spokesmen on numerous occasions emphasized that the Government
ruled according to martial law and was not bound by any
constitutional restrictions. Citing improved security
conditions in 153 townships throughout the country—including
the major cities of Rangoon and Mandalay—the regime revoked
in those areas summary judicial powers granted to local
military commanders during the previous year. This revocation
did not, however, restore civilian legal authority, nor did it
appreciably change law enforcement procedures.
Military tribunals continue to exercise jurisdiction over all
cases involving defiance of orders issued by the SLORC or
local military commanders (civil suits, petty thefts, and
major crimes of no interest to the SLORC are left to civilian
courts). Tribunals can mete out death or life sentences, or
up to 3 year's imprisonment with labor, irrespective of
existing legal provisions. During trials, court officials
must report daily to the military and to the attorney
general—with the military having final authority. Military
courts continued to hand out heavy sentences to political
prisoners. For example, after being held incommunicado for
over a year, a well-known student leader was sentenced to life
imprisonment in May. In July a parliamentary candidate
arrested the day before the election was sentenced to 3 years'
imprisonment. A crackdown on political leaders in the fall
resulted in several political convictions. Two NLD leaders
were sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment in September for
"causing unrest." In November acting Chairman Kyi Maung and
the party's second-ranking official. Chit Rhine, were
sentenced respectively to 10 and 7 years' imprisonment for
"passing state secrets." At the same time, two more NLD
leaders were sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment for "creating
disturbances by writing false news" in connection with
Mandalay's August demonstrations. As part of an October
campaign against antiregime elements among the Buddhist
clergy, the regime increased local commanders' martial law
authority, delegating power to area commanders to investigate
and "effect speedy and effective disposal of cases" involving
politically active monks.
The tribunals are free to summon or reject witnesses and to
consider or ignore evidence. The accused is not presumed
innocent and has no guaranteed right to a defense attorney.
When allowed to participate, a defense attorney's role is
severely limited. Lawyers have been warned that an overly
aggressive defense could jeopardize both attorney and client.
Appeal is possible subject to certain conditions. Sentences
up to 3 years' imprisonment may be appealed to the regional
commander within 30 days. In cases involving the death
sentence, life imprisonment, or sentences of over 3 years,
appeals may be lodged within 30 days with the army
commander-in-chief. In practice, military authorities have
hampered the appeal process by noncooperation with and
intimidation of attorneys.
The number of political prisoners held by the regime remains
impossible to estimate accurately, although reliable sources
believe there are at least 2,000. According to one credible
account, during May there were more than 1,000 political
prisoners at Rangoon's Insein Prison alone. Prisons in
Mandalay and at least five other locations also reportedly
hold political prisoners. Moreover, arrests of dissidents
increased in the late summer and fall. Perhaps 1,500 to 2,000
were taken in during that time. Many were released after
interrogation, but some were rearrested.
 
      f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence
The State continued to intrude extensively into the lives of
private citizens during 1990. Forced entry and warrantless
searches of private homes were often conducted without
warning. The Government strictly monitored the travel,
whereabouts, and activities of many persons. A well-developed
and ubiquitous system of neighborhood informers reported on
dissidents and criticism of the Government. Security
personnel selectively monitored private correspondence and
telephone calls.
The regime continued its program of forced resettlement
throughout the country. It is difficult to estimate
accurately the number forcibly resettled, but a figure in
excess of 500,000 is reasonable. While the Government
described all those forced to move as "squatters," in many
instances people had purchased and held deeds to their
properties. There are several well-documented instances of
arrests of people who protested resettlement and of
intimidation and threats of force against reluctant
neighborhoods. While selection of communities for relocation
was arbitrary, several neighborhoods active in the 1988
disturbances were forced to move. Numerous unconfirmed
reports also allege official involvement in land speculation
in areas vacated as a result of the resettlement program.
The Government has resettled people, almost totally at their
own expense, to "new towns," sometimes 100 miles or more from
previous residences. These new settlements are in many cases
sited on abandoned rice paddy land, subject to severe flooding
in the rainy season. Facilities remain substandard or
nonexistent. Occupants quite often live without adequate
water, transportation, medical facilities, electricity,
sanitation, or shelter from the elements. Dengue fever,
malaria, and severe malnutrition took their toll, both in
Rangoon and at other locations.
 
      g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts
The Burmese Army has fought various insurgencies for more than
four decades. These conflicts have resulted in numerous human
rights violations on all sides, including mistreatment and
killing of prisoners, neglect of sick and wounded, impressment
of civilians for porter duty, and indiscriminate attacks on
civilians. Although there were no verifiable, eyewitness
reports of deaths of impressed Burmese Army porters, it is
reasonable to believe that such deaths continued to occur.
The Burmese military continues to impress civilian labor to
serve without compensation in combat areas. Porters carry
ammunition, supplies, and wounded under the harshest
conditions. They are subject to hostile fire as well as
maltreatment at the hands of Burmese soldiers. They are
placed at the head of columns to detonate mines and booby
traps and to trigger ambushes. When porters are wounded, fall
ill, or become unable to continue their work, they are left
unattended to die. At the end of their service, survivors
often must find their own means to return home.
Section 2 Respect for Civil Liberties, Including;
      a. Freedom of Speech and Press
Freedom of speech remained severely restricted. Although the
degree of enforcement varied, the regime did not tolerate
opposing views or criticism. Private citizens remained
reluctant to express opinions for fear of government
informers. The Government established extensive and
restrictive guidelines for candidate speeches and party
statements during the election campaign. Banned were
criticism of the regime, the army, and remarks "causing
unrest." Regulations limited parties to one lO-minute
televised address and one 15-minute radio broadcast—both
approved in advance by censors. On February 28, the commander
of the Rangoon Division instructed authorities to scrutinize
summaries of planned remarks by candidates before giving
permission for political rallies.
The regime continued to ban publications which it alleged
criticized its programs and policies. Throughout the year,
authorities closed presses and arrested printers and
distributors of "agitative pamphlets." During the political
campaign, the Government directed parties to exercise
self-censorship of their written materials. Parties could
issue without prior approval only those publications they
believed did not contravene the law, but had to seek official
approval in case of doubt. Regime propaganda repeatedly
denounced various foreign news organizations for interference
in Burma's affairs. Censors banned issues of news magazines
with articles criticizing regime practices or reporting
activities of opposition figures or groups. The regime also
used arrests and other forms of intimidation to discourage
widespread listening to foreign news services.
The Government continues to run and operate the mass media,
including television, radio, and the sole newspaper. The
Working People's Daily. The regime appoints newspaper editors
and reviews editorials before publication. Especially for
domestic news, journalists must observe strict publishing and
broadcast guidelines. The Government receives the product of
several wire services, but carefully selects and edits
international news before publication or broadcast. All forms
of communication—domestic and imported books and periodicals,
stage plays, motion pictures, and musical recordings—are
officially controlled and censored. Criticism of the
Government, its officials, or sectors of the economy it
controls or partially controls is not permitted.
Late in the year, the military stepped up its monitoring of
local journalists attached to international news services. In
October security authorities detained and interrogated a
journalist for several hours because of alleged ties to the
opposition NLD.
University teachers must report in daily at their offices,
despite the fact that, excluding a few schools, the entire
university system has been closed since June 1988. All
teachers and professors are subject to the same restrictions
on freedom of speech, political activities, and publications
as other government employees. These include frequent
warnings against criticism of the Government; repeated
instructions not to discuss politics while at work; and
strictures against joining or supporting political parties,
engaging in political activity, and meeting foreign officials.
 
      b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The right of assembly exists only for those organizations
permitted by law and duly registered with the Government.
Moreover, the regime severely restricts the activities of
these organizations. Trade associations and professional
bodies, like other organizations, are permitted only if
sanctioned by the Government, which strictly monitors their
activities. Members are not free to discuss politics or
criticize the regime. The martial law edict prohibiting
outdoor assemblies by more than five persons was again
unevenly enforced.
The regime tightly controlled and monitored political rallies
during the election campaign. In its preelection report, the
International Human Rights Law Group concluded that the
Government had "grossly breached minimum campaigning freedoms
including the exercise of freedom of assembly." Campaign
regulations banned political processions, limited campaigning
to prescribed places, and required parties to seek permission
for rallies 7 days in advance, specifying the date and
identity of speakers. Authorities had wide latitude to
disapprove requests or to attach numerous, arbitrary
conditions. Parties subsequently complained that in many
localities officials deliberately designated areas for rallies
that were inconveniently distant or otherwise inappropriate,
such as cemeteries.
 
      c. Freedom of Religion
Freedom of religion is provided for in law and widely observed
in practice. The great majority of Burmese are Buddhist,
although sizable numbers of Christians, Muslims, and animists
exist among various minority ethnic groups. While allowing
these groups to practice freely, security services monitor the
activities of some religious communities. The Government
rec[uires all religious organizations to register and subjects
religious publications to the same control and censorship as
that imposed on secular ones.
In mid-October, authorities reacted strongly to organized
passive opposition by monks in Mandalay and elsewhere.
Upwards of 100 politically active clerics were arrested and
others threatened with similar treatment if they continued to
refuse to provide religious services to military personnel.
Concurrently, two official proclamations outlawed groups of
monks opposed to the Government and empowered local military
commanders to move against others who engage in political
activities. Troops subsequently searched numerous monastery
compounds in Mandalay and seized quantities of alleged
contraband goods and political literature. In Rangoon, two
teaching monasteries were closed—both on the grounds that
their students were out of control. To tighten its control
over the activities of Mandalay monks, the Government in
October enforced a photo registration card requirement for all
monks and threatened to defrock those who refused to comply.
Religious groups can and do establish links with
coreligionists in other countries. The Catholic Church, for
example, maintains ties to the Vatican. Foreign religious
representatives are usually allowed only tourist visas and are
not permitted to preach, proselytize, or remain to carry out
missionary activities. There is at least one long-time
resident foreign Catholic (Italian) priest in Burma, but
permanent missionary establishments are not permitted.
As part of its large-scale "urban development" program, the
Government took control of several Christian and Muslim
properties throughout Burma. A Catholic cemetery in Sagaing
(near Mandalay) was turned into a park, and there are several
reports of seizures of mosques and other Muslim properties in
Mon and Arakan states. Religious communities in Mandalay have
appealed, so far successfully, a government plan to bulldoze
Christian and Moslem cemeteries and move the remains outside
the city. In April authorities arrested and briefly held all
seven lay members of the Board of Management of the Catholic
Church of Burma who had gathered to protest the seizure of
part of a church compound in Rangoon.
 
      d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation
Burmese citizens have the legal right to live anywhere in the
country. Except for limitations in areas of insurgent
activity, Burmese citizens may travel freely within the
country, but must inform local authorities of their temporary
place of residence. Road checks are frequent, and have
resulted in detention for several days of people deemed
suspicious. People who fail to report either guests or
intentions to stay overnight to the authorities are subject to
a jail term, and arrests sometimes have been made. Throughout
most of the year, the Government imposed a 10 p.m. to 4 a.m.
curfew on the entire country. In October it relaxed the
curfew to 11 p.m. to 4 a.m. —the first change since December
1988. In most cases, the curfew was strictly enforced, and
violators were often punished.
Legal requirements, bureaucratic procedures, and corruption
cause long delays in obtaining passports. Emigrants must
reimburse the Government for "educational expenses" before
receiving exit permission and are severely limited in what
they may take with them. Those who leave the country
illegally cannot legally return. On the other hand, Burmese
citizens who leave the country legally are generally allowed
to return to visit relatives. However, the law does not
recognize dual citizenship, and acquiring citizenship in
another country results in the loss of Burmese citizenship.
While those who take citizenship in another country are
legally banned from returning, even to attend family funerals,
the regime showed some flexibility in 1990 by permitting a few
former Burmese to visit for brief periods. Emigrants wishing
to return permanently are required to reapply for Burmese
citizenship, and approval is not guaranteed. Noncitizen
residents, including ethnic Indians and Chinese born in Burma
who hold foreigners' registration cards, must obtain prior
permission to travel.
Foreign refugees or displaced persons may not resettle or seek
safe haven within Burma. The Government treats persons
claiming to be refugees as illegal immigrants and imprisons
them.
Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens
to Change Their Government
Burma is governed solely by the military, and the Burmese
people do not have the right or the ability peacefully to
change their government. In 1989 and 1990 active-duty
military officers replaced civilians in important positions
throughout the administration. The military occupied every
cabinet-level position, numerous director general and
subordinate posts, and key positions previously held by
technocrats in the economic ministries. The establishment in
February of a large military holding company, with
capitalization equal to about 9 percent of Burma's total gross
domestic product, significantly increased the military's role
in the economy.
On May 27, the Government held Burma's first national election
involving multiple parties in 30 years. Several accounts have
attested that the procedures employed by the regime for voting
and counting ballots were free and fair. Prior to the
election, however, the regime had, in a series of closed
proceedings, banned the candidacy of the country's leading
opposition figure. National League for Democracy General
Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi. Imprisonment, in most cases
without trial, of numerous other political leaders effectively
barred their candidacies as well. The subsequent election
campaign was severely restricted and featured repeated press
and official statements deprecating the democratic process and
attacking various political parties, most particularly the NLD.
In the election, the NLD received nearly 60 percent of valid
votes cast and over 80 percent of parliamentary seats. At a
postelection press conference, official military spokesmen
acknowledged the party's mandate and pledged that the newly
elected parliament would be free to write and adopt any
constitution. By year's end, however, the military government
had given no indication of a timetable for transfer of power.
Moreover, it arrested NLD leader Kyi Maung, deputy leader Chit
Khine, 45 elected Members of Parliament, and an estimated 500
NLD officials throughout the country. The authorities renewed
press attacks against the party, stopped all of its
publications, and raided NLD offices throughout Burma. The
regime now insists that transfer of power can occur only after
a protracted constitution-drafting process under its control
has been completed. The conditions it has imposed effectively
negate the election results and ensure indefinite military
rule.
Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
of Human Rights
The Government rejects outside scrutiny of its human rights
record. It is unwilling to discuss human rights problems with
foreign governments or nongovernmental organizations and
routinely denies visas to foreign officials concerned with
human rights. The military consistently denies charges of
abuses and criticizes other governments and independent
organizations for interfering in its affairs. No internal
human rights organizations exist. A group called Amnesty
International of Burma, established during the 1988
prodemocracy demonstrations, was subsequently denied
registration as a legal organization.
Amnesty International, Asia Watch, the Governments of the
United States, Japan, Australia, India, and the European
Community have repeatedly and publicly expressed concern over
various human rights abuses in Burma. The February 1990
meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Commission
appointed an "independent expert" to examine Burma's human
rights situation and report to next year's session. The
regime permitted this expert to visit Burma but took great
pains to limit her access to people outside the regime.
Section 5 Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
Language, or Social Status
Burma's numerous ethnic minorities, with their own distinctive
cultures and languages, are underrepresented in the Government
and largely excluded from the military leadership. Despite
some limited regime attention to the problem, economic
development among minorities continued to lag and many still
live at the subsistence level. This is due in part to
geographic factors that impede economic development in the
rugged, isolated border areas populated by minorities.
Persons of nonethnic Burmese ancestry, primarily Indians and
Chinese, are denied full citizenship and excluded from
government positions. Indians and Chinese minorities continue
to play an important role in the economy—a situation resented
by many Burmans . Social prejudice against the country's
Muslim community has in the past erupted into violence and
prompted official actions infringing on the practice of
Islam. The military periodically requires minority
populations to provide without compensation vehicles,
ec[uipment, and lodging for soldiers.
Women in Burma have traditionally had an active role in
society. They enjoy most of the same legal rights as men,
keep their own names after marriage, and often control family
finances. Though there is no legal or obvious de facto
discrimination against women, female participation is low in
the minuscule industrial sector and in the government
administration. There are no women's rights organizations.
There is no violence directed specifically against women.
Although several credible reports attested to beatings of
female prisoners, authorities appeared generally to treat
detained women better than men. While in 1988 there were
unconfirmed but persistent reports of rapes by soldiers or
police, Burmese culturally view rape with great abhorrence.
 
 
Section 6 Worker Rights
 
a. Right of Association
After seizing power in 1988, the military banned the workers'
and peasants' organizations established by the previous
government. In 1990 several political parties established
workers' organizations or committees to consider labor issues,
but there continue to be no trade unions and no independent
labor movement in Burma. Leaders of unofficial labor
associations are subject to arrest. Workers do not have the
right to strike, and none did so in 1990.
In April 1989, the United States suspended Burma's eligibility
for trade concessions under the Generalized System of
Preferences program (GSP), pending steps to afford its labor
force internationally recognized worker rights. Early in
1990, a United States interagency subcommittee declined a
formal request to reconsider the suspension.
 
      b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively
Workers have no right to organize and bargain collectively.
Military authorities are the sole arbiter of workers' issues.
The regime abolished labor arbitration boards which, while
government controlled, at least theoretically provided means
for airing labor disputes. No special economic processing
zones exist in Burma.BURKk
 
      c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
Burma's legal code does not prohibit forced labor. The regime
routinely employed forced labor on its myriad building
projects. For example, according to numerous credible
reports, authorities employed corvee labor—including preteens
and the elderly—drawn from townships in southern Rangoon to
construct a new road. Officials accepted bribes to excuse
people from work and, according to one reliable report, on May
7 beat five persons caught sitting at the side of the road
instead of working. The press subsequently reported the
construction of this road by "voluntary" labor.
The Burmese army has for years conscripted civilian males to
serve as porters. According to numerous eyewitness reports in
1990, the army continued to impress youths off the streets in
various cities in minority areas. Women are now also being
impressed as cooks and laundresses for soldiers in frontline
areas, according to one report. Military authorities commonly
permitted conscripted individuals and their families to pay
money in lieu of serving as porter (see Section l.g.).
d. Minimum Age of Employment for Children
Children between 13 and 15 years of age may work 4 hours a
day. The penalty for employers who disregard this regulation,
2 years in prison, is not strictly enforced. In cities,
working children are highly visible. Many spend their nights
on the street, according to numerous reliable sources. They
are hired at lower rates than adults for the same kind of
work, and economic pressure forces them to work not only for
their own survival but also to support their families.
Burmese law requires children to attend school through the
fourth standard, usually reached between the ages of 12 and
14. According to a draft UNICEF report, however, 33 percent
of children aged 5 to 9 never enroll in school. Of those who
do, less than 30 percent complete the fourth grade. Forty-two
percent Burma's primary school children leave school for
economic reasons. In the higher grades, the dropout rate
among girls is double that of boys. With the exception of a
few special schools, the entire university system has been
closed since the unrest in June 1988.
 
      e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
There is a 5-day, 35-hour workweek for employees in the public
sector and a 6-day, 44-hour workweek for private and
state-owned business employees, with overtime paid for
additional work. However, government employees seldom work
more than 6 1/2 hours a day. Workers have 21 paid holidays a
year.
On April 1, 1989, the Government raised the minimum wage to
about $2.50 a day at the current official rate of exchange.
At the more realistic free market rate, this works out to
about 25 cents a day. Wages continue to lag far behind
inflation and are well below subsistence for many. In the
private sector, the minimum wage law applies only to
cheroot-rolling plants and rice mills. There are numerous
provisions to protect health and safety at workplaces,
pertaining to room size, ventilation, fire hazards, and the
availability of latrines and drinking water. In practice
these are seldom enforced, particularly in the private sector.