Current organizational structure of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) (Sepah Pasdaran); whether the organization is involved in punishment for corruption in state-run companies [IRN33371.E]

The following information was obtained during an 8 December 1999 telephone interview with a journalist and assistant to the editor of the newspaper Kayhan. For further information on this newspaper please consult IRN23816.E of 16 May 1996. He stated that there would normally be two possibilities for the investigation of charges of corruption. In the first, the police would conduct the investigation and then, if charges were warranted, the case would be handed over to Ministry of Justice and the appropriate court. In the second, the secret police of the Ministry of Information would conduct the investigation, but again, if prosecution were warranted, the case would be transferred to the appropriate court.

The journalist stated that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is now more like the army than the secret police. He said that the secret police and the Ministry of Information used to be within the IRGC but that this is no longer true. He said that organizational roles are now much better defined and that "the secret police are completely different" from the IRGC. However, he stated that each security organization such as the police, the army, and the IRGC have their own intelligence activities in a fashion similar to other countries. In addition, there are links and exchanges of information between the various government organizations. As such, IRGC members might be involved with a corruption case, but that this would not be a normal procedure for this security organization.

He also stated that if a corruption investigation involved an IRGC member, or directly involved the IRGC, then this would likely be dealt with in a procedure internal to the IGRC, similar to a court-martial. Furthermore, if a corruption case involved a cleric, regardless of his job, then there are special courts before which clerics are tried.

The journalist added that if someone stated that they were recently arrested for corruption by the IRGC, this likely would not be "physically true" but that it could be a valid perception on the part of the individual. He explained that as a result of the previous pervasive involvement of the IRGC in security matters, both external and internal, ordinary citizens referred to the IRGC in a way that would include all security forces, regardless of whether it was actually the IRGC. He claimed that this often continues to be the case. As such, a person might state that they were arrested by the IRGC when it was in reality the secret police of the Ministry of Information.

However, a 6 July 1998 report from The Iran Brief refers to claims by the Iranian dissident Shiite Ayatollah Mehdi Rouhani that "the Pasdaran have more than 20,000 plain clothes officers whose job is to infiltrate opposition political movements."

There are reports that the Pasdaran controls a number of state companies (Financial Times 17 July 1997; ibid. 30 Jan. 1997) and the journalist for Kayhan stated that it is involved with research activities in industry, agriculture, and the arms industry (8 Dec. 1999). In an article about "the bonyad, the state foundations set up by the clergy after the revolution and directed by political nominees" refers to the IRGC as "itself an industrial and defence conglomerate second in size only to the Mostazafan" which the article describes as "notorious" for its corruption (Financial Times 17 July 1997). The article also states that the Pasdaran "has its own bank which, unlike other more conventional state banks, is exempted from keeping interest-free deposits with the central bank" (ibid.). A 30 January 1997 Financial Times article also states that state companies within the Bonyad "have a reputation for corruption and inefficiency" and that the industrial unit of the Pasdaran is a state company. A 13 November 1999 IRNA article states that the IRGC has been engaged in a wide range of projects that have "underlined the enhanced scientific and research capabilities of the islamic revolution guards corps" and that it "has gained outstanding technological achievements."

With regard to the IRGC's role in Iranian security, Akhbar reported on 1 June 1998 an interview with the commander of the IRGC, in which General Yahya-RahimSafavi states that it is the duty of the IRGC to "follow up threats to the national security and the Islamic revolution" and in reply to claims by some that this is not so, he states the following:

Under Article 150 of the Constitution the corps has been given the mission of safeguarding and defending the Islamic revolution and its achievements. The missions approved by the esteemed Leader and the Islamic Majlis about the five services of the corps are explicit.
The approvals of the Supreme National Security Council have been notified to the corps after the endorsement of the esteemed Leader as its missions such as the mission for ensuring and safeguarding security in the north west provinces - West Azarbaijan, Kurdistan and Kermanshah - and fight against the counterrevolution. There was the mission to ensure and safeguard security in south east of the country. We succeeded in establishing good security in that area within two and a half years after the notification of the Supreme National Security Council. Later the mission was given to the police.
The corps also has official responsibility to confront moves by the counterrevolution in cities and to confront probable crises resulting from the actions of the counterrevolution in all cities including Tehran.
Of course the army has the mission of defending the borders. But if, heaven forbid, an enemy crosses the border, the mission of the corps begins as an offensive force to drive the enemy out of the country.
Clearly the most principal mission of the corps is ensuring and safeguarding the security and confronting the counter-revolution and internal threats.

With regard to the organization of the IRGC, The Military Balance 1997-1998 states that it comprises approximately 120,000 members, of which about 100,000 are ground forces and 20,000 are naval forces (1997, 126). The ground forces are

grouped into perhaps 13 infantry, 2 armed divisions and 15-20 independent brigades, including infantry, armoured, paratroop, Special Forces, artillery (including surface-to-surface missiles), engineers, air defence and border defence units, serve independent or with Army; limited numbers of tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery (ibid.).

The naval forces have bases at "Al Farsiyah, Halul (oil platform), Sirri, Abu Musa, Larak" and these forces are under joint command with Iran's navy (ibid.). There is also one brigade of marines (ibid.). The World Factbook states that the IRGC "includes Ground, Air Navy, Qods, and Basij-mobilization-forces" (1 Jan. 1999). However, a 13 September 1997 AFP article refers to claims by a former commander of the IRGC that the force numbers 800,000 troops inclusive of conscripts and in addition to the backing of two million Basij volunteers.

An 8 July 1999 report from Millat states that Iran set up in 1993 "female branches of the Sepahe-Pasdaran Iranian special services" and that they are known as "Jame-ye az-Zahra and Hoziye-Elmiya az-Zahra structures." According to the chairman of the organizing committee of the National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan "women who are trained there are fully versed in religious ideology. After becoming professional in the spheres of espionage, terrorism, acts of provocation, intelligence and so on, they are used for these purposes" (ibid.). Akhbar mentions the existence of a "Public Relations Office" within the IRGC, as well as a magazine by the name of Payeme Enqelab (Message of Revolution) which it describes as the organization's "organ" (1 June 1998).

Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi is the current commander of the IRGC (IRNA 13 Nov. 1999.; ibid. 5 Dec. 1999; Akhbar 1 June 1998). The Middle East and North Africa 1998 states that the Chief of Staff of the IRGC is Ali-Reza Afshar, while its commander is Major General Mohsen Rezai (1997, 507). AFP reported on 13 September 1997 that General Mohen Rezai had stepped down a week earlier as commander of the IRGC. Other officers that have been identified are: Brigadier-General Aziz Ja'fari as IRGC army commander (IRNA 31 Oct. 1999); Colonel Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr as "alternate commander" of the IRGC (Keyhan 2 Oct. 1999); Admiral Ali Razmjoo as "head of the tactical headquarters of the [Shahamat 78] maneuver" conducted in the fall of 1999 (Xinhua 26 Sept. 1999); General Mohammad Hasan Anjidni as commander of the first brigade of the IRGC (Tehran Times 3 Nov. 1999); and, Ali Akbar Ahmadian as commander of the IRGC's naval forces (Xinhua 21 Nov. 1998).

For further information on the IRGC please consult IRN31191.E of 10 March 1999 and IRN28847.E of 26 February 1998. No further information on the structure of the IRGC could be found in the sources consulted by the Research Directorate.

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. Please find below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

References


Agence France Presse (AFP). 13 September 1997. "Iran's Revolutionary Guards Commander to Enter Politics." (NEXIS)

Akhbar. 1 June 1998. "General Safavi Chooses Dialgogue." http://www.netiran.com/Htdocs/Clippings/Dpolitics/980601XXDP01.html [Accessed 9 Dec. 1999]

The Financial Times [London]. 17 July 1997. "State Foundations Dominate Economy." (NEXIS)

_____. 30 January 1997. Robin Allen. "Iranian Regime Sticks to Creative Budgeting... " (NEXIS)

The Iran Brief. 6 July 1998. "Pasdaran May Have Planted Tehran Bombs." (NEXIS)

IRNA [Tehran, in English]. 5 December 1999. "Iran: IRGC Commander on 'Parliamentary Coup d'Etat'." (FBIS-NES-1999-1205 5 Dec. 1999/WNC)

_____. 13 November 1999. "IRGC Commander: Iran Major Missile Power in Mideast." (FBIS-NES-1999-1113 13 Nov. 1999/WNC)

_____. 31 October 1999. "Iran: IRGC Begins Final Phase of Military Exercises." (FBIS-NES-1999-1031 31 Oct. 1999/WNC)

Journalist and Assistant to the Editor, Kayhan, London, U.K. 8 December 1999. Telephone interview.

Keyhan [Tehran, in Persian]. 2 October 1999. "Iran: IRGC Commander Urges Loyalty to Khomeyni Ideal." (FBIS-NES-99-1119 2 Oct. 1999/WNC)

The Middle East and North Africa 1998. 1997. 44th ed. London: Europa Publications.

The Military Balance 1997-1998. 1997. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Millat [Baku, in Azeri]. 8 July 1999. Sabina Vagifgyzy. "Azeri Nationalist Says Iran Using Religion to Achieve Aims in Azerbaijan." (NEXIS)

Tehran Times. 3 November 1999. "Judiciary Chief Calls for International Campaign Against Taleban, Drug Traffickers." http://www.tehrantimes.com/cgi-bin/news.cgi?R=1103&Y=1999&M=11 [Accessed 9 Dec. 1999]

The World Factbook. 1 January 1999. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ir.html#gov [Accessed 8 Dec. 1999]

Xinhua. 26 September 1999. "Xinhua: Iran Launches War-Games in the Gulf 26 Sep." (FBIS-CHI-1999-0926 26 Sept. 1999/WNC)

_____. 21 November 1998. "China: Xinhua: Iran Rejects 'Foreign Interference' in Iraq." (FBIS-CHI-98-325 21 Nov. 1998/WNC)

Additional Sources Consulted


IRB databases

Keesing's Record of World Events [Cambridge]. 1995 -1998.

LEXIS-NEXIS

REFWORLD

World News Connection (WNC)

Internet sites including:

NetIran Website. Encompassing IRNA 1993-98, Iran News 1993-99, Tehran Times 1995-98.

Tehran Times.

Associated documents