a-5990-2 (ACC-AFG-5991)

Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten:
 
Anm.: In den ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehenden Quellen konnten im Rahmen der zeitlich begrenzten Recherche keine Informationen konkret dazu gefunden werden, ob die Wahdat-Partei Anhänger/Sympathisanten von General Malik in Mazar-i Sharif verfolgt.
Hintergrundinformationen über General Malik
BBC bietet in einem Who is Who vom November 2001 folgende Kurzinformation zu General Malik Pahlawan: Er sei zweithöchster Befehlshaber der Junbisch-Miliz gewesen, bis er versucht habe, die Macht von Dostum (auch zu Dostum findet sich bei BBC ein Profil) zu übernehmen, indem er ein Bündnis mit den Taliban schloss. Er sei geflohen, als Dostum nach Afghanistan zurückkehrte:
“General Abdul Malik Pahlawan
Second-in-command of the Jombesh militia until he tried to usurp Dostum's power by striking a deal with the Taleban.
He fled when Dostum returned to Afghanistan.
He is widely believed to have been responsible for the brutal massacre of up to 3,000 Taleban prisoners after inviting them into Mazar-e-Sharif.” (BBC, 19. November 2001)
Laut einem Bericht von Human Rights Watch (HRW) sei General Abdul Malik Pahlawan allgemein als „Malik“ bekannt:
“On May 19, 1997, one of Dostum's deputies, Gen. Abdul Malik Pahlawan (generally known as "Malik"), who had a grievance against Dostum, struck an agreement with the Taliban and arrested a number of Dostum’s commanders and as many as 5,000 of his soldiers.” (HRW, Oktober 2001)
Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) beschreibt im Juni 1997 Maliks Machtübernahme im Mai 1997, sein Bündnis mit den Taliban und seinen neuerlichen Seitenwechsel (FAZ, 9. Juni 1997, der Artikel ist im Anhang beigelegt). Im September 1997 berichtet die FAZ von der Rückkehr Dostums und der Flucht Maliks (FAZ, 25. September 1997, der Artikel ist im Anhang beigelegt).
 
Ahmed Rashid berichtet in einem Buch über die Taliban von 2001 ebenfalls ausführlich zu diesem Vorfall. Das entsprechende Kapitel 4 ist dem Anhang beigelegt (Rashid, 2001, S.55-66, siehe insbes. S.57-63).
 
Weitere Informationen zu diesen Vorfällen und der Rolle General Maliks lassen sich folgenden Quellen entnehmen: 
„Die Nordallianz war von vornherein belastet. Konflikte zwischen den Parteien waren alltäglich. Als der usbekische General Malik Pahlawan im Mai 1997 mit seinem Führer Raschid Dostum brach, diesen zur Flucht nötigte und dadurch den Taliban erstmals den Einmarsch in der nordafghanischen Stadt Mazar-e Scharif ermöglichte, war es der erbitterte Widerstand der Hazara, der die ‚Koranschüler’ zum Rückzug zwang. Als die Taliban im September desselben Jahres die Stadt erneut angriffen und die Truppen Maliks nur halbherzig die Abwehr unterstützten, entwaffneten Kämpfer der Wahdat Teile der usbekischen Milizen, zwangen Malik zur Flucht und verhalfen Dostum zur Rückkehr.
Im Zuge der Kämpfe um Mazar-e Scharif brutalisierte sich die Art der Kriegsführung auf beiden Seiten. Die Truppen Maliks und der Hezb-e Wahdat unter Führung von Mohaqeq sollen an die 2.000 kriegsgefangene Taliban-Soldaten ermordet und in Massengräbern verscharrt haben.“ (S.4)
“In May 1997 the Taliban launched another offensive on Mazar-i Sharif. This time, they received support from Dostum’s second-in-command, Gen. Malik Pahlawan, who apparently believed he had struck a deal to share power with the Taliban and ousted Dostum in a coup. [Fn.7: Malik was avenging the killing of his brother Rasool, who was gunned down in Mazar along with fifteen bodyguards on June 25, 1996. Malik blamed the assassination on Dostum.] When the Taliban reneged on the agreement and began disarming local forces, resistance broke out first in Hazara neighborhoods, and the Taliban found themselves trapped in a city that had turned murderous on them. Hundreds of Taliban were attacked in the streets and killed, and at least 2,000 taken prisoner, only to be summarily executed and their bodies dumped in wells or taken to remote desert sites and left lying in the open. Most analysts appear to agree that General Malik was responsible for many of the summary executions of the Taliban prisoners. However, a large number of Taliban forces were reportedly gunned down in the streets by the Hazara Hizb-i Wahdat. Malik fled to Iran, and Dostum returned. Driven back after a subsequent attack on Mazar in September 1997, retreating Taliban troops who may have included Balkh Pashtuns massacred Hazara civilians in Qizalabad, south of the city on the road to Herat.” (S.6)
“International news agencies reported, on 17 November, of the discovery of mass graves in northern Afghanistan. Those buried were reportedly Taleban militia possibly killed after they had been captured by forces of General Abdul Malik. The exact number of those killed cannot be easily established, but most reports put the number at around 2,000 and the number of graves at between 20 and 30. The dead are thought to have been among some 3,000 Taleban militia taken prisoner after the Taleban entered the city of Mazar-e Sharif in May 1997 but retreated shortly from the city in the face of an uprising by the local population as well as a counter attack by the combined forces of General Abdul Malik and another armed political grouping, Hezb-e Wahdat led by Karim Khalili.
General Malik had earlier ousted General Abdul Rashid Dostum from the city. He had made a pact for the Taleban to enter Mazar-e Sharif but reneged on the agreement after they entered. General Malik then became the sole chief commander of northern Afghanistan from May 1997 for several months. General Dostum who fled to Turkey after his ouster returned to Afghanistan in September this year and regained control over much of the northern areas, namely the provinces of Balkh, Jowzjan, and Samangan. For several weeks, both General Malik and General Dostum remained in the anti-Taleban alliance which controls about one third of the country. In mid-November, General Malik was reported to have fled the country. His exact whereabouts are not known but some reports suggest that he may have fled to Turkmenistan and from there to Iran. The remaining two thirds of the country is controlled by the Taleban.
According to the AIP, the news of the discovery of the mass graves was made public by General Dostum who offered to facilitate the airlift of the bodies to the Taleban-controlled areas for burial. The graves were reportedly found near the town of Shebarghan in Jowzjan province which is now controlled by General Dostum. He has said that the soldiers were killed when the area was controlled by his rival General Malik, but General Malik has denied this.”
Aktuelle Informationen zu General Malik
Im November 2005 berichtet swisspeace von Kämpfen zwischen den Warlords Malik und Dostum im September 2005. Laut swisspeace habe es in der Vergangenheit häufig Kämpfe zwischen Kräften der beiden Warlords gegeben:
“The relation between warlords in the provinces and the central government is still tense. Fierce fighting between two commanders in Farah left 17 people dead on the 22nd June. In Faryab followers of Abdul Malik and former Jumbesh leader Rashid Dostum clashed, leaving four wounded on 29th September. Forces loyal to Malik and Dostum have clashed frequently in the past.” (swisspeace, November 2005, S.4)
Die British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) berichtet im August 2006 von Kämpfen zwischen Dostum und Malik (auch USDOS berichtet von Kämpfen im August 2006, USDOS, 6. März 2006, Section 1.g):
“It was reported on 9th August that heavy fighting in the northern province of Faryab, over the previous week or so, between Rashid Dostam and Abdul Malik, had resulted in the deaths of at least four people and the displacement of hundreds from their homes. It is not clear what sparked the fighting, which was brought to an end through the intervention of central and local government officials, with backup from the army, police and ISAF. Further fighting was reported in the same district on 23rd August. This was halted by the army. Tensions between the two men go back to, at least, 1997 when Abdul Malik accused Dostam of killing his brother and then cooperated with the Taliban to oust Dostam from power before turning against the Taliban himself.” (BAAG, August 2006, S.4)
Anm.: UNHCR erwähnt im Dezember 2007 in den Elegibility Guidelines noch 144 ethnisch usbekischen Binnenvertriebenen, aus einer Gruppe von ursprünglich 300 Familien, die aufgrund von Kämpfen im Sommer 2006 zwischen Kommandanten der Junbisch und der Azadi vertrieben worden seien (UNHCR, Dezember 2007, S.59).
 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) berichtet im August 2006 ebenso wie Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) im September 2006 davon, dass das afghanische Innenministerium nach erneuten Kämpfen zwischen Kommandanten Dostums und Maliks versuche, deren Parteien verbieten zu lassen (RFE/RL, 21. August 2006; IWPR, 1. September 2006). Malik wird als Anführer der „Freedom Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Azadi-ye Afghanistan)“ genannt (RFE/RL, 21. August 2006; siehe auch IWPR, 1. September 2006).
Laut IWPR würde die ISAF Dostum und Malik als de-facto-Machthaber in der Provinz Faryab behandeln:
“The NATO peacekeepers in northern Afghanistan, part of the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, appear to treat Dostum and Abdul Malik as the de facto powerbrokers in Faryab.” (IWPR, 1. September 2006)
Laut dem im März 2008 veröffentlichten Menschenrechtsbericht 2007 des US Department of State (USDOS) sei nach Protesten ihrer Mitglieder keine der beiden Parteien aufgelöst worden:
“In August 2006 Interior Minister Zarar called for two parties run by rival warlords, National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan, known locally as "Junbish" and headed by General Abdul Rashid Dostum and the Freedom Party of Afghanistan, run by General Abdul Malik, to be disbanded after allegations surfaced connecting them to violence in the Northern provinces. Members of both parties protested and the parties were not dissolved.” (USDOS, 11. März 2008, Section 2.b)
Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines bestimmten Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar. Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien zur Gänze durchzusehen.
Quellen:
Hintergrund
Aktuelle Informationen zu General Malik