a-6669-1 (ACC-RUS-6669)
Nach einer Recherche in unserer Länderdokumentation und im Internet können wir Ihnen zu oben genannter Fragestellung Materialien zur Verfügung stellen, die unter anderem folgende Informationen enthalten:
Muslimische Glaubensrichtung der „Astrachaner“:
Ein Bericht des Center for Security Studies (CSS) und des Transnational Crime and Corruption Center (TraCCC) vom Jänner 2006 enthält folgende detaillierte Informationen zu einem islamischen Gelehrten namens Anguta Magomedowitsch Omarow, bekannt unter dem Namen Ajub Astrachanski. In der Region Astrachan sei Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts vor allem unter Einflüssen von islamischen Führern aus Dagestan eine Gemeinschaft radikaler Reformer entstanden, die fälschlicherweise als Wahhabiten bezeichnet würden. An der Spitze dieser Gemeinschaft habe Ajub Astrachanski gestanden, ein Schüler des geistlichen Anführers der dagestanischen Fundamentalisten Bagautdin Kebedow. Die Mitglieder seiner Gemeinschaft, die Ajubowzy, seien Einzelhändler in Astrachan gewesen. Da Ajub ungern Kontakt zu den Behörden gehabt habe, habe die Gesellschaft ein isoliertes Leben geführt. Mitte der 1990er habe die Gruppe mit Missionstätigkeiten begonnen und habe sich dadurch erheblich vergrößert. Zu den neuen Mitgliedern hätten auch Tataren, Kasachen und Russen gezählt. Die Gruppe habe nach einer „reinen“ Form des Islam gestrebt, und Ajub habe von seinen Anhängern erwartet, ihr äußeres Erscheinungsbild mit traditionellen islamischen Standards in Einklang zu bringen und religiöse Dogmen zu befolgen, die von Vielen als religiös radikal angesehen worden seien, jedoch im Grunde – so hält der Bericht fest – einen kulturellen Ausdruck von Religiosität ohne politische Botschaft dargestellt hätten. Die Angehörigen der Gruppe hätten die russischen Gesetze respektiert und gut Russisch gesprochen. Gegen Ende der 1990er Jahre habe sich die Gruppe aufgespalten, im Herbst 1999 hätten etwa 200 radikale Ajub-Anhänger Astrachan verlassen, um in Dagestan und Tschetschenien zu kämpfen. Diese Radikalen hätten die in Astrachan verbliebene, gemäßigtere Gruppe rund um Ajub geächtet, da sie sich gegen einen Dschihad in Tschetschenien ausgesprochen habe, und im Jahr 2000 sei Ajub bei einem Angriff verwundet worden. Gleichwohl hätten die Behörden auch Letztere als Wahhabiten betrachtet und sie politisch, religiös und rechtlich unter Druck gesetzt. Auch die offiziellen islamischen Führer in Astrachan hätten die Gruppe geächtet. Diese Schritte seien eine Folge von politisch motivierten Bemühungen der dagestanischen Behörden gewesen, ein 1999 erlassenes Gesetz zum Verbot des Wahhabismus in Dagestan auch in den Nachbarregionen beziehungsweise in Russland zu verbreiten, um den „radikalen Islam“ zu zerstören. Obwohl Ajub bei den Behörden gegen diese Behandlung protestiert habe, würde seine Gruppe in den Medien als extremistisch porträtiert:
“Astrakhan is a Eurasian border zone with a future. Observers frequently see Astrakhan as a unique city, a type of Volga Istanbul, in which East and West, Islam and Christianity, exist side by side. Maybe for these reasons, Astrakhan attracts various peripheral, oppositional, and marginal forms of religiosity. At the end of the twentieth century, the region became a home base for the movement of Islamic renewal. Many of the changes occurred under the influence of Dagestan, center of the most ardent rebirth of Islam in Russia. In fact, the Dagestani Islamic leaders are exporting their version of Islam to Astrakhan, creating a society of radical reformers, incorrectly and unscientifically called Wahhabis. At the head of this society stood a remarkable personality, Anguta Magomedovich Omarov, well known as Aiyub Astrakhanskii. In religious circles, he was famous as a subtle Islamic scholar and one of the best students of Bagautdin Kebedov, the spiritual leader of the Dagestani fundamentalists and one of the founders of the Soviet-era All-Union Islamic Party of Renewal, whose first congress took place in Astrakhan in 1990. Aiyub comes from the Tsumandin Raion of Dagestan and is an ethnic Avar. In his home in Astrakhan there was a prayer room, equipped with special literature, where he met with people who came to visit and answered religious questions. Members of his society (aiyubovtsy) were involved in retail trade and lived in the Bol'shie Isady microraion, next to Astrakhan's central market. Aiyub did not like to have contact with the authorities and, as a result, the society lived an isolated life. In the middle of the 1990s, the group engaged in missionary work, which significantly increased its numbers. The new members were not just from the Caucasus, but also included Tatars, Kazakhs, and Russians. Aiyub and his followers sought a "pure" form of Islam, free of impurities that had built up in recent times. Aiyub expected his followers to bring their external appearance into line with traditional Islamic standards and to follow religious dogmas, which many took as a sign of religious radicalism and even extremism. However, this was simply a cultural expression of religiosity, which did not have a political or military subtext. On one hand, these people respected Russian law and spoke Russian well. On the other, they sought to strictly adhere to Muslim beliefs. They felt at home in Astrakhan and sought to occupy a social space there as true Muslims. By 1994, the jamaat's membership reached about 300 individuals. As the movement grew, contradictions developed among its members. Toward the end of the 1990s, the group split due to the appearance of many tendencies within it: radical, moderate, and peaceful. The decisive factor in the split of the group was the beginning of the second Chechen war and the military operations of the so-called Wahhabis of the Karamakhi enclave. In this Dagestani village, leaders renounced Russian rule and sought to live by Islamic law. In the fall of 1999, about 200 Aiyub supporters left Astrakhan to fight in Dagestan and Chechnya. The radicals' departure left behind, and strengthened, in Astrakhan a group of about 70 supporters of a peaceful brand of Islam. The Aiyub society formed from these members did not support the war in Chechnya. In closed meetings in Dagestan, the group denounced the second Chechen war and war in general. "There is no jihad in Chechnya!" and "We reject this war" were their slogans (Obshchaya gazeta, 19-25 October 2000). For these statements, the Caucasus radicals denounced them and sought to exclude them from working in the Astrakhan markets. In February 2000, Aiyub was wounded in an attack and his assistant was killed (Volga, 15 February 2000 and Komsomolets Kaspiya, 27 July 2004). Even though Aiyub and his followers were ostracized by the radicals, the authorities began to label them as Astrakhan Wahhabis and started to exert intense political, religious, and legal pressure on them. The official Islamic leaders in Astrakhan also began to ostracize them. These steps were the result of purely political motivations: the Dagestani authorities and their allies wanted to destroy "radical Islam," particularly after it looked like the federal forces were victorious in the second Chechen war and had destroyed the Karamakhi enclave inside Dagestan. To this end, the Dagestani authorities and their allies sought to spread the Dagestani law outlawing Wahhabism in Dagestan, adopted in September 1999, to the neighboring regions and to Russia as a whole. A delegation from the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Dagestan made this suggestion during a 6 December 1999 visit to Astrakhan. Other Dagestani officials began to accuse the Astrakhan Muslims of being Wahhabis as well. Aiyub responded by sending letters to the Astrakhan governor on 13 and 18 December 2000 asking that his rights be restored and that officials stop labeling them wahhabis. This was the first time that Aiyub had tried to make contact with the authorities since he had founded his group. Aiyub's protests had little success and the media continued to portray his group as a bunch of extremists. Stories circulated that they were preparing fighters in mountain camps and readying stockpiles of arms.” (CSS/TRaCCC, 16. Jänner 2006)
Das Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), ein regierungsunabhängiges Forschungsinstitut mit Sitz in Brüssel, schreibt in einem Bericht vom Februar 2009 (Hg: Michael Emerson), dass der Staat auf Bundesebene wie auf lokaler Ebene allgemein eine rigide Haltung gegenüber „Islamischen Dissidenten“ einnehme. Doch wird erwähnt, dass der Staat sich in der Region Astrachan relativ zurückhaltend gegenüber radikalen lokalen Muslimen, die von Ajub Astrakhanskii angeführt würden, verhalten habe, um eine Eskalation der Situation zu vermeiden:
“At both the federal and local levels, the state takes a very rigid position in respect of ‘Islamic dissidents’. In the Northern Caucasus, they are outlawed and an unceasing warfare is carried on against them. […] Although the state policy in respect of Islamic radicalism remains mainly repressive, some of the public officials speak up from time to time for the need for a more balanced approach to the opponents and sometimes even admit errors (although very rarely) committed by the authorities. […] It is also known that in the Astrakhan region (Southern Federal District) the local administration took a relatively reserved attitude towards local radicals and their head, Ayub Astrakhansky, which was instrumental in avoiding an exacerbation of the situation. Still, such examples remain exceptions.” (CEPS, 23. Februar 2009, S. 181-183)
Gordon M. Hahn erwähnt 2007 in seinem Buch “Russia’s Islamic Threat” einen Scheich Ajub Astrachanski, dieser sei ein Wahhabit und in den 1990er Jahren in Dagestan aktiv gewesen. Er sei bei der muslimischen ethnischen Gruppe der Tsumadins beliebt und gegenüber den anderen ethnischen Gruppen Dagestans, unter anderem Russen und Juden, tolerant gewesen. Jedoch sei er gegenüber nicht-wahhabitischen Muslimen weniger wohlwollend eingestellt gewesen:
„DAGESTAN IN THE YELTSIN ERA […] Another Wahhabi with a presence in the republic in the 1990s, Sheik Ayub Astrakhanskii, popular among the small Tsumadins ethnic Muslim group, was tolerant of the other Dagestan peoples, including ethnic Russians and Jews. But although he was tolerant regarding ethnicity, he was said to be – typically for a Wahhabi – less welcoming of non-Wahhabi Muslims.” (Hahn, 2007, S. 100 und 106)
Juri Kobischtschanow schreibt 2002 in einem Buch über Muslime in Russland, dass Scheich Ajub Astrachanski, den der Autor als Wahhabit bezeichnet, Sufis, Schaafiten und Hanafiten als Nicht-Muslime betrachte, und dass seine Anhänger in den verschiedensten Ethnien in zehn Bezirken der Republik Dagestan zu finden seien:
"[…] Напротив, ваххабит шейх Аюб Астраханский считает суфиев и даже шафиитов и ханафитов немусульманами. Среди его последователей много цумадинцев, но встречаются и представители самых разных народов Дагестана (они действуют в десяти районах республики), даже принявшие ислам русские и евреи." (Kobischtschanow, 2002)
Achmet Jarlykapow erwähnt in einem undatierten Artikel für die Nachrichtenagentur RIA Nowosti im Zusammenhang mit muslimischen Bewegungen in den 1990er Jahren, dass Ajub Astrachanski eines von drei islamischen Jamaats in Dagestan angeführt habe:
“The republic had been one of the most stable in the North Caucasus until 2004, and was seemingly immune to the extremism, separatism and other diseases afflicting North Caucasus regions. However, the October 13 explosion has been brewing since the early 1990s. Back then, young Muslims who had been educated in respected Islamic schools in Saudi Arabia created a community with a rigid structure and discipline. From 1993, they rallied around the Islamic Center of Kabardino-Balkaria, which was transformed into the Kabardino-Balkarian Institute of Islamic Studies in 1999. Mussa Mukozhev, the leader of the Jamaat of Young Muslims, enjoyed undivided authority and maintained strict control over the movement. […] It was a unique situation for the North Caucasus, because no common Jamaat has been created in any other part of the region. Dagestan had three jamaats, led by Akhmad-kadi Akhtayev, Bagautdin Muhammad and Ayub Astrakhansky.” (Jarlykapow, ohne Datum)
Allgemeine Informationen zu islamischen Gruppen in Dagestan enthält folgender Bericht der International Crisis Group vom Juni 2008 (siehe Kapitel 3: „Islamism in Dagestan and Chechen connections“):
Allgemeine Situation von muslimischen Gruppierungen
Folgende Quellen gehen auf die aktuelle Situation muslimischer Gruppen, unter anderem solcher, die als „Wahhabiten“ bezeichnet würden, ein:
Das Menschenrechtszentrum Memorial schreibt im April 2007, dass Anklagen wegen “Wahhabismus” in der Nordkaukasusregion und nun auch in der Wolgaregion verbreitet seien. Häufig würden zudem Anklagen wegen strafrechtlicher Vergehen gegen „islamische Extremisten“ fabriziert. In diesem Zusammenhang wird der Fall von Mansur Schangarejew in der Region Astrachan genannt, der in den Jahren 2005 und 2006 angeklagt worden sei. Im Dezember 2006 seien in Astrachan sechs junge Männer verhaftet worden, die einer Moschee angehört hätten, die von örtlichen Sicherheitskräften als „wahhabitisch“ angesehen worden sei:
“Justifications for persecuting Muslims in Russia do not run out with charges of their participation in banned organizations. Suspicion is sometimes aroused by simple observance of Islamic tradition in clothing and way of life. Charges of “Wahhabism,” so widespread across the North Caucasus, are starting to appear against Muslims in the Volga region. Religious and political discussions between Muslims have been viewed in several cases by the state as ‘subversive activity.’ Citizens who offer humanitarian assistance to convicted believers and their families also encounter repressions. There are known cases of seized Korans and popular Islamic literature being used as material evidence against suspects. More often than not, ‘Islamic extremists’ also have purely criminal charges fabricated against them. Previous reviews have provided the classic Russian example of fabricated ‘Wahhabism’ – the case of Mansur Shangareyev (Astrakhan region), convicted in 2005 and 2006 on two criminal charges for a total of four years imprisonment for ‘illegal possession’ of drugs and grenades that were planted on him during a search, and for ‘inciting hatred or hostility on religious grounds.’ The second charge was based in part on the fact that he ‘spoke of the superiority of Islam,’ expressed ‘non-conventional religious beliefs’ by refusing to accept last rights, and sowed radical Islamic ideas by inviting ‘Hindus (?!) and natives of the Caucasus with unkempt long beards’ to a mosque. December 2006 saw the arrest in Astrakhan of six young men – members of a mosque that, according to city residents, was called ‘Wahhabite’ by local security service officials. Earlier, that March, ammunition was planted on two of the young men during a search, but the criminal case was halted at the time. There exist statements in the case about the detained being beaten, and also evidence of threats by security service officials against their relatives should they appeal human rights groups for help.” (Memorial, 15. April 2007)
Das US Department of State (USDOS) schreibt in seinem Jahresbericht zur Religionsfreiheit vom September 2008, dass „Wahhabismus“ in Dagestan gesetzlich verboten sei, die Behörden sich jedoch nicht auf dieses Gesetz berufen hätten, um muslimischen Gruppen ihre Registrierung vorzuenthalten. Es gebe ein 2002 erlassenes (und 2006 novelliertes) Gesetz zu Extremismus, das eine Reihe von Aktivitäten und Redetätigkeiten kriminalisiere, und von dem insbesondere muslimische Gruppen betroffen seien. In vielen Fällen seien Muslime wegen Extremismus oder Terrorismus angeklagt worden, auch wenn es an einer klaren Verbindung zu solchen Aktivitäten gefehlt habe. Manche seien dabei angeblich gefoltert und misshandelt worden. Laut Menschenrechtsgruppen habe eine Entscheidung des Obersten Gerichtshofs vom Februar 2003, 15 muslimische Gruppen zu verbieten, es den Behörden erleichtert, Muslime wegen angeblicher Verbindungen zu diesen Gruppen festzunehmen. Islamische Organisationen würden von Regierungsbeamten, Medien und der Öffentlichkeit als „wahhabitisch“ bezeichnet, dieser Begriff sei nunmehr bedeutungsgleich mit „extremistisch“:
“The regions of Kabardino-Balkariya and Dagestan have laws banning extremist Islamic "Wahhabism," but there were no reports that authorities invoked these laws to deny registration to Muslim groups. […] The 2002 Law on Extremism, amended in July 2006, can affect religious groups, particularly Muslim groups, by criminalizing a broad spectrum of speech and activities. The 2006 amendments allow some charges of extremism where persons are alleged to have defended or expressed sympathy with other individuals already charged with extremism. […] The Government used counter-terrorism methods to commit serious violations of religious freedom against the Muslim population. There were numerous cases of Muslims being prosecuted for extremism or terrorism even when they had no clear connection to such activities. These included individuals detained for possessing religious literature such as the Qur'an or on the basis of evidence allegedly planted by the police. Some persons suspected by local police of Islamic extremism allegedly were subjected to torture and ill-treatment. According to human rights groups, a February 2003 Supreme Court decision to ban 15 Muslim groups for alleged ties to international terrorism made it easier for officials to arbitrarily detain Muslims for alleged connections to these groups.“ (USDOS, 19. September 2008, Sec. 2)
“Muslims continued to encounter societal discrimination and antagonism in some regions. After terrorists associated with Chechen, Ingush, and Islamic extremists seized a school in 2004 in Beslan, North Ossetia, interethnic and interreligious tensions resulting in discrimination persisted in the region without the authorities' intervention, according to NGOs. Government officials, journalists, and the public liberally labeled Islamic organizations ‘Wahhabi,’ a term that has become equivalent with ‘extremist.’ Numerous press reports documented anti-Islamic sentiment.” (USDOS, 19. September 2008, Sec. 3)
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Informationen zu Wahhabiten entnehmen Sie weiters auch unserer Anfragebeantwortung a‑5166 vom 7. November 2006 (siehe Kopie im Anhang)
Ein Bericht von Memorial aus dem Jahr 2005 geht folgendermaßen auf die Situation muslimischer Gruppen ein:
„Die Kampagne, Moslems Extremismus und Terrorismus vorzuwerfen, hat inzwischen in allen Regionen Russlands, in denen die moslemische Bevölkerung einen beträchtlichen Teil der Bevölkerung ausmacht, um sich gegriffen. Besonders gilt dies für Tatarstan und Baschkirien, aber auch Udmurtien und Tschuwaschien, im Wolgagebiet für die Gebiete Astrachan, Samara und Nishnij Nowgorod, im Südural für Orenburg und Tscheljabinsk, in Sibirien für das Gebiet Tjumen und das autonome Gebiet Chanty-Mansijsk. Besonders im Nordkaukasus werden Menschen häufig beschuldigt Wahabiten zu sein.“ (Memorial, 2005, S. 13)
Diese Informationen beruhen auf einer zeitlich begrenzten Recherche in öffentlich zugänglichen Dokumenten, die ACCORD derzeit zur Verfügung stehen. Diese Antwort stellt keine Meinung zum Inhalt eines bestimmten Ansuchens um Asyl oder anderen internationalen Schutz dar. Wir empfehlen, die verwendeten Materialien zur Gänze durchzusehen.
Quellen: (Zugriff auf alle Quellen am 23. März 2009)
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Jarlykapow, Achmet: Clash in Kabardino-Balkaria was unavoidable, ohne Datum (verfasst für RIA Novosti, veröffentlicht auf Website der Botschaft der Russischen Föderation, Iran)
http://www.iran.mid.ru/news/rian017_e.html
